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Abstract 
In recent years there has been much political and academic interest in new 
modes of local governance, which are increasingly based on deliberative 
mechanisms and aim at engaging larger sectors of the population (i.e. 
governance by networks, territorial pacts, strategic planning). Whereas the 
literature on urban governance has focused on the emergence of novel 
governance arrangements at city and regional levels and on the formation of 
a collective actor, deliberative democracy scholars have examined the 
democratic dimension (i.e. the deliberative forums) and assessed the 
applicability of their normative models to the real world; the literature on 
planning helps to understand the implementation gap that plagues many of 
these new arrangements. All these approaches often study the same 
empirical phenomena, however, with a few exceptions, debates within these 
literatures take no account of one another. This comparative case-study of 
strategic planning in four medium-sized Italian cities (Trento, Prato, Lecce, 
and Sassari), characterized by different socio-political and economic 
contexts, intends to contribute to bridging the gap between the above 
theoretical paradigms. Thus, the impact of strategic planning on the local 
polity is assessed on three levels: the formation of a collective actor, the 
democratic process, and implementation. Comparative analysis can help to 
evidence how such an impact is either hindered or enhanced by different 
forms and resources of leadership and how the latter interact with 
endogenous (i.e. pre-existing associational density) and exogenous factors 
(i.e. institutional constraints and opportunities at other jurisdictional levels). 
Different typologies of leadership will influence each dimension of the 
dependent variable (i.e. the formation of the collective actor, the democratic 
process, the implementation) to varying degrees. The type of leadership now 
required within the new multilevel governance system could be defined as 
facilitative leadership, which arises from the activity of working with, rather 
than exercising power over, others. This leadership is no longer identified 
solely with political institutions but often emerges from the coordinated work 
of a political sponsor and a public service CEO that acts as the champion of 
the governance process. Institutional constraints might affect outcomes, as 
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weak administrative capacity and resistance to change from within the 
bureaucracy will hinder implementation. A facilitative leadership can help to 
drive cultural change and organisational learning within local institutions, 
while offering identity incentives to the wider community. While pre-existing 
associational dynamics do not influence outcomes, since an inclusive 
leadership can encourage greater participation even where the social fabric 
would seem weaker, poor policy coordination among jurisdictional tiers will 
inevitably hamper the positive effects of strategic planning at the local level, 
which might be lost in a plethora of fragmented initiatives. 
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Introduction 
 
The geography of administrative and political responsibilities in 
Europe has rapidly changed over the past two decades. Decentralisation of 
decision-making authority to the local level and diffusion of power through 
greater openness of local institutions towards private and social interests are 
now a major feature of government agenda. Local administrations have had 
to learn how to exert their new authority and respond to plural and 
fragmented local needs, while often being confronted with a rationalisation 
of public resources. Several European countries, including Italy, have 
reinforced local executives and introduced the direct election of mayors. 
These reforms were often presented as an antidote to the malaise affecting 
western democracies, or Skopcol’s diminished democracy (2003), with 
voting turnouts decreasing sharply, particularly at the local level, in a context 
of widening disengagement from party politics and representative 
institutions. The adoption of direct mayoral elections had the effect of 
limiting the influence of political parties (Kersting 2005), while citizens are 
now increasingly perceived to be direct interlocutors of state institutions, 
rather than passive recipients of public policies (Fazzi and Scaglia 2001).  
The decline in more traditional forms of participation, based on 
elections and party membership, and the newfound local autonomy, albeit 
limited by insufficient financial resources, have encouraged the opening of 
new participatory venues, which are “more direct, ad hoc and narrow in 
scope” (Pilet et al 2005: 619), often on the initiative of the new directly-
elected mayors. Within this context, new forms of governance based on 
participatory mechanisms, such as Strategic Planning, have gained 
popularity among European cities. These new arrangements promise to 
address the socio-political and economic challenges facing cities: social 
conflicts, exacerbated by the market model of deregulation of the 1980s and 
early 1990s and by new migration flows; the crisis of legitimacy of 
representative democracy; the new paradigm of sustainable development as a 
response to the environmental crisis; the spatial rescaling of politics (Brenner 
2004), whereby local leaders are expected to play the role of coordinators of 
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large structural projects, often promoted at the national and supranational 
levels (EU); the crisis of traditional economic models and the comparative 
advantage of developing countries, which have forced some cities to 
transform their productive structures. Furthermore, fragmented local 
societies raise the issue of how to coordinate plural interests and transform 
cities into collective actors, which is at the very heart of novel experiments of 
territorial governance.  
Encouraged by the EU, which requires the establishment of 
partnerships in order to access its programmes and funds for cities, the 
rhetoric of collective decision-making is now well entrenched into the urban 
governance discourse. Local government increasingly sponsors new 
mechanisms of decision and policy-making, which employ, albeit with 
varying degrees of awareness, the language of deliberative democracy.  
Within this context Strategic Planning (SP)1 has come to be perceived 
as an important instrument to help the city and its surroundings to redefine 
their role and position within the global context, and to restore broken 
relations among local actors. The rationale is that non-hierarchical and 
consensual models of decision-making can better respond to the new 
challenges than traditional government processes (Camagni 2000).2 SP is 
based on voluntary cooperation among public, private and social actors, who 
seek the collective elaboration of a vision of territorial development. Diverse 
stakeholders meet in working groups and deliberative forums that should 
define projects consistent with an overall development strategy (Trigilia 
2005), which aims to enhance economic development and competitiveness, 
but also to improve liveability and strengthen social capacity. The inclusion 
of social groups becomes a key ingredient, as social capital promises positive 
outcomes also in terms of economic development.  
The emphasis on participation and partnerships responds to the 
political need to reconcile plural and fragmented interests and to the 
demands of citizens, who increasingly seek participation outside traditional 
institutional venues. As local government is often seen as a producer of goods 
and services (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992), the functionalistic understanding 
of participatory mechanisms as instruments to manage conflicts and build 
consensus on top-down policies would seem to prevail. The ideal of the city 
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as a collective actor might lead to imagine an inclusive process opened to new 
actors, who can challenge traditional relations of power, but a predetermined 
design often excludes, intentionally or inadvertently, precisely those 
marginal interests that could bring in new resources as well as new 
expectations (Gelli 2005; Blaug, 2002).  
Although similar programmes based on partnerships for local 
development are emerging strongly all over Europe, in Italy they have 
acquired even greater significance, for at least two important reasons. First, 
Italy’s economy is characterised by local production structures based on 
small and medium-sized enterprises (Crouch et al 2001). This has increased 
demand for local development strategies and encouraged new informal 
experiments of governance on the initiative of local administrations, in the 
North as in the South, in order to respond to the crisis of the Fordist model 
and to the lack of financial resources available (Trigilia 2005). Second, 
devolution of responsibilities to regional and municipal authorities has raised 
expectations of a more active role on the part of the local leadership in 
addressing economic and development issues, particularly in the context of 
de-legitimised national parties. In Italy the 1990s reforms introducing direct 
mayoral elections were not merely a response to declining electoral turnouts 
and the difficulty of achieving political accountability, but represented a 
reaction to a deep legitimacy crisis of party politics, precipitated by 
Tangentopoli (Bribesville) and the party corruption scandals (Borraz and 
John 2004; see also Dente 1997). I shall discuss later in Chapter 2 the limits 
of these reforms, nevertheless the direct election of mayors has undoubtedly 
engendered a different relationship between local administrations and 
citizens, as Italian local government builds its new legitimacy upon the 
participation of social interests in policy-making. 
Theoretically, this work intends to contribute to bridging the gap 
between three paradigms which, albeit often analysing the same empirical 
phenomena, rarely engage with one other’s debates: the literatures on urban 
governance, deliberative democracy, and planning. The literature on urban 
governance offers a theoretical framework to analyse the emergence of new 
governance arrangements and the formation of a collective actor within the 
new economic and political framework, and in a context of multilevel 
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governance. The literature on deliberative democracy examines the 
democratic process, the deliberative forums that increasingly represent a 
defining dimension of these mechanisms. Deliberative democracy theorists 
have defined the normative standards by which participatory mechanisms 
should be assessed, while deliberative policy studies have examined their 
applicability to the real world. The fairness and inclusiveness (or lack 
thereof) of the participatory venues will influence the degree of innovation 
and effectiveness of the strategies elaborated, as well as the level of 
cooperation among stakeholders. Finally the literature on planning can help 
to unveil the causes of the implementation gap that plagues many of these 
new initiatives. By employing and combining these theoretical frameworks 
this study can shed light on new participatory arrangements as SP outcomes 
(the dependent variable) are analysed based on three dimensions: the 
formation of the collective actor, the democratic process, and 
implementation. As this study acknowledges the weak results of most SPs in 
terms of project implementation, the focus is on the direct or unintended 
governance dynamics that these arrangements can unleash and how different 
types of local leadership use SP and can influence its outcomes. The case 
study analysis will thus examine the capacity to create a collective actor, the 
quality of the participatory process, its inclusiveness and fairness, and the 
operational phase. What type of leadership was behind the process, and how 
did it develop during the process? Was it able to reinforce inter-level 
coordination and foster new associational networking?  
As this research intends to examine the role of leadership vis-à-vis the 
local context, Italy represents an ideal case, since it displays deep structural 
and cultural differences among regions, particularly evident along the North-
South divide. The debate sparked by Putnam’s work on Italy, which explains 
variance of performance among regions by their degree of “civic-ness”, has 
inspired much work on local governance, as several scholars challenged 
Putnam’s conclusions and focussed their research on the role of leadership 
and institutions in changing local culture. Assessing the impact of SP on 
different socio-political contexts will help to highlight the role of leadership 
(independent variable) and how different forms and resources of leadership 
can determine outcomes. Pre-existing associational levels and the 
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relationship with higher tiers of government were identified as two main 
intervening variables that might facilitate or hinder the influence of local 
leadership. The focus is on local leadership vis-à-vis civil society, in order to 
assess whether pre-existing associational dynamics affect the formation of 
the collective actor and the inclusivity of the participatory processes, and to 
what extent; vis-à-vis other levels of government with regard to policy design 
and implementation, as urban governance should be understood in a context 
of multilevel governance (see Le Galès 1998; 2002).  
Italy would seem to have enthusiastically and perhaps uncritically 
embraced Strategic Planning (SP), with cities often following an imitation 
path (see Di Maggio and Powell 1983). Over a decade since the first plans 
were elaborated, this study will contribute to the literature on SP, by offering 
new empirical evidence on medium-sized cities, while the focus, apart from a 
few exceptions, has so far been on metropolitan and larger cities. Thus, four 
medium-sized cities, which have all adopted Strategic Planning (SP) but are 
characterised by different socio-political and economic environments, were 
selected so as to cover broad socio-economic differences between the North, 
Centre, and South of the country: Trento in the North-East, Prato in Tuscany, 
Lecce in the southern region of Puglia, and Sassari in the island of Sardinia. 
These four cases all display similarities in terms of size (between 100,000 
and 180,000 inhabitants) and broad institutional framework (i.e. directly-
elected mayor); they are all provincial capital cities and represent the main 
political and cultural centre in their area. However, they present maximum 
variance with regard to the dimensions under study, hence not just in terms 
of economic development, but also of local leadership/ political orientation 
(and different degree of strength and cohesiveness of the local party 
structure), social fabric, and relations with/ autonomy from other tiers of 
government.3  
This thesis develops over seven chapters. Chapter 1 sets out the three 
dimensions of the dependent variable (the impact of SP) by reviewing the 
literatures on urban governance, deliberative democracy and planning, and 
the developments in the study of new governance arrangements within these 
theoretical approaches. This chapter highlights the benefits of bridging the 
divide between different paradigms, in order to provide deeper 
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understanding of new modes of governance, their potential, limitations, and 
implications for local development and local democracy. The final section 
examines the literature on Strategic Planning (SP) to highlight persistent 
obstacles to implementation and contradictions inherent to the 
methodological approach of SP, imprisoned between apparently 
dichotomous concepts: decentralised decision-making and centralised 
synthesis, selectivity and inclusivity, strategy and planning. 
Chapter 2 offers a background analysis of the Italian political and 
institutional context, following reforms in the 1990s, to evidence their impact 
on governance dynamics at the local level and on the quality of local 
democracy. The second section of this chapter examines the main factors that 
have plagued Italian urban politics and describes developments in 
governance instruments, the new institutional discourse on participation and 
the financial incentives which encourage Italian local government to engage 
civil society in policy-making. The third section addresses the debate on the 
influence of leadership and institutions vis-à-vis the local culture and, based 
on the empirical research, argues that local leadership plays a pivotal role in 
fostering new social capital around specific actions, often irrespective of pre-
existing associational dynamics. This section sets out the independent 
variable (the role of local leadership) by reviewing the literature on 
leadership and introducing the concept of facilitative leadership, which 
proves to be more conducive to new governance arrangements than 
traditional hierarchical leadership. Finally the last section describes the 
methodology of the empirical research; it introduces the case studies, 
explains case selection methods, and identifies the dimensions under study.  
Chapter 3, 4, 5, and 6 will examine each case: Trento, Prato, Lecce, 
and Sassari respectively. Each chapter is envisaged as a heuristic analysis of 
the political and socio-economic context of each city, in order to identify the 
actors of local development. The focus will be on SP and on the leadership 
behind it, the rationale underpinning the choice of launching the process, the 
stakeholders involved, the methodologies employed to facilitate the 
deliberative process. Empirical findings derived from 175 semi-structured 
interviews with institutional, private and social stakeholders that took part in 
the process are triangulated with official documents and websites, and local 
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newspapers. The empirical research was designed to help understand how 
participants perceived their involvement in the process, what political space 
was gained or lost, whether the deliberative process encouraged cooperation 
among actors, if anything changed in terms of decision and policy-making, 
and whether interviewees believed such changes were sustainable. The 
objective is to evidence the impact of SP on the local polity and to highlight 
how leaders used the process.  
Finally Chapter 7 presents a comparative analysis of empirical findings 
from all four cases, based on the three dimensions of the dependent variable. 
The role of leadership is analysed and the concept of facilitative leadership is 
identified as the type of leadership most conducive to participatory 
arrangements. In order to prove solid, the new alliances between 
institutional, private and social actors need to be sustained by an inclusive 
leadership with consensus-building capacity (though one should always be 
aware of the risk of collusive behaviours). Facilitative leadership, rather than 
from formal political authority over others, arises from the activity of 
working with others (Denhardt and Denhardt 2003; Svara 2008) towards 
given objectives. It can therefore help to create “identity incentives”, 
intended as resources that will encourage identification with an overall vision 
of development (Trigilia 2005: 145). Different forms and resources of 
leadership fostered, or failed to foster, the formation of a collective actor, 
facilitated or hindered the degree of inclusiveness of the democratic process, 
and therefore influenced outcomes. Leadership typologies are presented to 
explain the incentives for leaders to guarantee an inclusive participatory 
process and to open up to new stakeholders, depending on the local socio-
political structure and the multilevel governance context. As local 
development has to be situated within the larger context of inter-state 
interaction, in the logic of multilevel governance, coordination over strategies 
and modus operandi between different tiers of government will be pivotal to 
guarantee concrete results and offset the risk of policy fragmentation. 
Chapter 7 also examines how different socio-cultural contexts respond 
to different forms of leadership. The case studies, and particularly the case of 
Prato, highlight the limits of participatory venues opened from above and the 
clash between invited spaces (top-down participation) and the invented 
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spaces (bottom-up initiatives) of critical democracy (Cornwall 2002; also see 
Blaug 2002). Some local associations remained critically outside 
participatory arenas and strongly contested a leadership which they 
perceived to be non-inclusive and non-legitimate; they thus challenged the 
top-down participatory arenas by elaborating their own subaltern 
counterpublics (Fraser 1992). The conclusive section offers some normative 
reflections on the quality of local democracy in Italy and on the future of SP, 
and it identifies areas for further research. 
The positive impact of participatory mechanisms on the local polity 
cannot be taken for granted and these new arrangements should not be 
perceived as a panacea and a cure for all the ills of local democracy, but they 
do trigger an important reflection on the new role of representative 
institutions. Participation is not simply a method but a political culture. 
Opening a new participatory arena cannot simply consist of specific 
methodologies, but it has to entail the will to drive a project of cultural 
transformation which will have to involve all stakeholders in an active way. 
Thus, a participatory process cannot be understood as an isolated moment 
within a system that continues to produce the same non-transparent 
dynamics (Freschi and Raffini 2010). The following chapters will try to 
elucidate what part participatory mechanisms can play within local 
government, how local political elites understand and use these 
arrangements, and whether the emphasis on Strategic Planning (SP), after 
the litmus test of practice, is worth sustaining.  
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PART I:  
THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
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     Chapter 1 
Strategic Planning 
And The Participatory Turn 
 
The newfound enthusiasm for participatory mechanisms appears to be 
driven both by dissatisfaction with traditional models of representation and 
the growing relevance of regions and cities as loci of innovative modes of 
governance. Themes of local participation are now deeply entrenched in the 
institutional discourse of urban governance (Melo and Baiocchi 2006). The 
literatures on urban governance and deliberative democracy often study the 
same empirical phenomena, however, with few notable exceptions (Melo and 
Baiocchi 2006; Abers and Keck 2006; Fagotto and Fung 2006), they do not 
take enough account of one another’s debates. The literature on urban 
governance has focused on the outcomes of different institutional 
arrangements at city and regional levels (Le Galès 1998; Pierre 2000; 2005), 
emphasising local attempts to create collective actors to face the challenges of 
globalisation (Pichierri 2001; Le Galès 2002). These scholars tend to focus on 
the conditions that facilitate or hinder the emergence of new governance 
mechanism, but they focus on the outcomes, while neglecting the process and 
the normative standards by which such governance mechanisms should be 
judged. By contrast the literature on deliberative democracy has theorised 
ideals of deliberation and empirically studied governance structures that 
approximate those normative standards (see among others Fischer 1993; 
Fishkin 1995; Gutmann and Thompson 1996; Ackerman and Fishkin 2002; 
Neblo 2005). Empirical studies of deliberative democracy often point to its 
governance potential, without considering its overall impact (Melo and 
Baiocchi 2006). Decisions need to be taken, but deliberative democracy tends 
to focus on the conversation that precedes decisions (Chambers 2003). 
This study will focus primarily on one governance mechanism, 
Strategic Planning (SP). There exists a rich literature on SP (Gibelli 1996; 
Pinson 2002; 2005; 2007; 2009; Pugliese and Spaziante 2003), particularly 
with reference to organisation and management studies (Bryson and Crosby 
1992; Mintzberg 1994; Bryson 2004), which can help to identify the potential 
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and the limits of the application of SP to local government. The review of 
these three literatures can help to frame three main dimensions of SP, which 
will form the dependent variable of this empirical work: the formation of the 
collective actor (the literature on urban governance), the participatory 
process (the literature on deliberative democracy), and the implementation 
of collaborative projects (the literature on organisation and management 
studies).  
 
The City as a Collective Actor 
The new local government 
In the last thirty years, new economic dynamics have shifted the locus 
of development strategies from central government and its national-level 
policies to the regional and local level. The motives behind the new 
devolutionary trends are mixed. The globalization debate argues that power 
is devolved to the subnational level as the efficacy of nation states comes 
under challenge by global economic processes operating at the supranational 
scale. Thus, the importance of cities as decision-making centres increases 
(Ohmae 1993).4 The new economic global order, by creating deeper 
interrelations between firms and territories, would appear to have 
emphasised the role of the place (Agnew 1987) in elaborating development 
strategies; but it would also seem to have strengthened subnational 
autonomy in business decision-making, as corporations need to embed 
themselves within the locality to cut costs, through subcontracting and 
strategic alliances (Ohmae 1993).5  
The institutional context and social dynamism of “local production 
systems” now determine the degree and nature of local development (Crouch 
et al 2001). On the one hand globalisation appears to distance the economy 
from the locality, due to deregulation processes and high mobility of firms. 
On the other hand there is renewed interest in the local context, beyond the 
endowment of natural resources and the geographical proximity to markets, 
what is referred to as the territory’s comparative advantage (Trigilia 2005). 
The focus is now on competitive advantage (Scott 1998), or the local 
collective competition goods that a place can produce. Such collective goods 
are the product of the capacity to cooperate and elaborate a development 
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strategy that can help the locality to respond to the challenges of 
globalisation and seize the opportunities the latter can offer. During the 
Fordist period the economy was essentially separate from the locality. 
Vertically integrated firms used new technologies to create economies of 
scale and the only non-economic factors that influenced development were, 
at the micro level, the firm’s organisational capacity – Chandler’s (1977) 
“visible hand” – and, at the macro level, state policies, which served to 
regulate demand and the marketplace and to promote programmes for 
under-developed areas (Trigilia 2005). The notion of stability has been 
gradually substituted by flexibility, and, as market dynamics have become 
less predictable, local autonomy is increasingly important.6  
These economic processes also affect centre-periphery relations, since 
the regulative role of regional and local government becomes more relevant. 
The literature on centre-periphery relations (see Tarrow 1977; Page and 
Goldsmith 1987; Page 1991) has shown the diversity of interactions between 
the state and its local government. However, in the current context, centre-
periphery relations have changed and “the question is no longer simply what 
autonomy is for local authorities within the state, but rather what capacity 
territories have to become collective actors of European governance” (Le 
Galès 2002:235).  
The EU represents an important factor behind the new role of cities, as 
“[a] European-wide urban coalition has gradually formed, finding 
intermediaries among commissioners, member state representatives of the 
European Commission, and members of the European Parliament promoting 
the URBAN Program for the renewal of urban neighbourhoods” (Le Galès 
2005:251).7 However, Europeanisation should not be understood as a 
process generating simple patterns of homogenisation or a convergence of 
local governance structures, within and across member states. Rather it 
entails a process of mutual adaptation, involving actors and institutions at 
different levels of government, nationally and supranationally (Hamedinger 
et al 2008).8 
As globalisation (and European integration) limits the redistributive 
capacity of the centre and as the subnational level is devolved more 
responsibilities, local government faces new challenges in promoting local 
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development. Competition with other areas, both within and across national 
borders, becomes fierce (Keating 2001). Thus, the capacity to coordinate 
local interests and elaborate a strategy that can encourage the production of 
local collective competition goods, while simultaneously defending such a 
strategy to the outside world in order to extract and attract resources, 
becomes a key to creating the locality’s competitive advantage (Le Galès 
1998; 2002).  
The European Union has played an important role in driving the 
rescaling of politics and has contributed to the political validation of a more 
central role for subnational government, through promoting the principle of 
subsidiarity. This principle is enshrined in the treaties of the European 
Community (Article 5 TEC, formerly Art. 3b TEC) since Maastricht.9 At the 
state level, this principle encapsulates two main aspects: it regulates the 
exercise of existing competencies and offers guidelines for their allocation, 
vertically among different tiers of government and horizontally among local 
authorities and between the state and civil society. Since the 1980s, cities and 
regions have been involved in the process of European integration and the 
EU has developed a number of programmes and networks within different 
policy areas involving and supporting cities (Hamedinger et al 2008; also see 
Atkinson 2001; Parkinson 2005).10 Cities are beneficiaries of several funding 
programmes, but are also offered new arenas to debate and negotiate with 
new partners. Networks are developed to foster co-operation between cities, 
which now increasingly embark on EU-level urban lobbying by establishing 
offices in Brussels (Hamedinger et al 2008). The notion of the “European 
turn of cities” developed by many scholars (Goldsmith and Klausen 1997; 
John 2001; Le Galès 2002) can be understood within this framework. 
For their part, national states have been highly receptive to the 
restructuring and rescaling of politics. If federal and regionalised states, such 
as Germany, Austria, Belgium, Spain, Italy, and France, have deepened their 
decentralisation processes through institutional reforms, even centralised 
states, such as The Netherlands, Finland and Greece, have accepted this 
evolution (Leonardi and Nanetti 2007).11 In exchange for higher visibility and 
political power vis-à-vis the EU, subnational government “becomes a major 
contributor to the institutionalisation of European local government” (Borraz 
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and John 2004:113). Local government is increasingly subject to EU 
regulation and standardization; large policy areas, such as environment, 
economic development, and social housing, are covered by EU regulative 
frameworks, effectively limiting the autonomy of local and regional actors. 
Local government has to learn how to master EU policy-making procedures 
in order to access funds (i.e. Structural Funds, under the EU cohesion 
policy,12 Objective 1 and 2 programmes, URBAN, etc.), and has to adapt to a 
growing number of norms and standards, such as partnerships with the 
private and the third sector (Brunsson and Jacobsson 2000).  
Notwithstanding these important developments, national responses to 
globalisation are often different and not all subnational governments 
respond to European policies by carrying out the same “globalisation agenda” 
(Harding 1997: 308). The narrative of the new role of subnational 
government to the detriment of central authority should not be overplayed. 
As explained below, the idea that the nation state is being supplanted by 
alternative structures of governance is misguided and perhaps the current 
experimentation at the local level is just a “search for a fix” falling short of 
any decisive shift (Harding 1997; also see Peck and Tickell 1994).13 In fact the 
current crisis, which has highlighted the democratic deficit at the EU level, 
might lead to the strengthening of nation states, amid disillusionment with 
the European project and local government’s inability to face the new 
economic and political challenges. 
 
New governance 
The new approach to local development often draws on the literature 
on economic sociology (Swedberg 1993) and on the social construction of the 
market (Bagnasco and Trigilia 1993) to show that the place has become an 
integral part of economic development. The emphasis is also on institution 
building, especially at the subnational level, as institutions are expected to 
build networks and partnerships that will foster development (Wannop 
1995). In light of the “new localism” produced by globalisation and European 
integration, local political leaders strive to attract resources and make their 
territory competitive in the global economy (Goetz and Clarke 1993). In order 
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to do so they need to coordinate different local interests, state and non-state 
actors.  
Since governmental power is diffused above and below, and policy-
making more frequently entails interactions between institutional and civil 
society actors, several scholars choose to employ the concept of governance 
as a framework to understand what government does and how it carries out 
its functions (Leonardi et al 2007). Governance may thus be defined as “a 
flexible pattern of public decision-making based on loose networks of 
individuals in key public, para-public, and private bodies at various 
territorial levels” (Borraz and John 2004:112). Le Galès (1998:496) offers a 
broader definition, whereby “Governance is the capacity to integrate and give 
form to local interests, organisations and local groups and, on the other 
hand, the capacity to represent them outside, to develop more or less unified 
strategies towards the market, the state, other cities and other levels of 
government.”  
Governance is still a contested term and a difficult concept to 
operationalise (Keating 2008), since it can be interpreted more broadly as 
new forms of social regulation where government is only one of the actors, 
or, more narrowly, as a specific form of policy-making based on negotiation 
rather than hierarchy. Some scholars argue that governance is not so 
different from government. Pierre and Peters (2000:18), for instance, believe 
that “[g]overnance, strictly defined, is as old as government. What is novel 
[…] is recent changes in government”. Thus, both the theoretical debate and 
empirical research tend to focus on new forms of governance that are 
emerging at regional and local level (Hamedinger et al 2008), whereby 
governance can “provide a framework for understanding changing processes 
of governing” (Pierre and Stoker 2000:33). These transformations are being 
addressed in different ways (Pierre and Stoker 2000; John 2001; Keating 
2008), but generally new governance refers to a new approach to decision 
and policy-making that brings together bottom-up and top-down pressures, 
through networks and partnerships with non-institutional actors, which 
supplement the formal dimensions of politics (Hamedinger et al 2008).  
It should be pointed out that there is a normative aspect to 
governance, which often underpins the neoliberal agenda. In this respect, 
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governance is perceived to be an inevitable empirical process driven by 
market forces, to which political actors can only react. Here, on the contrary, 
governance is understood as the context within which government acts, and 
which political agents shape, as well as being shaped by it (Ascoli and Ranci  
2002; Blakeley 2005). As argued by Taylor (2002:44), governance entails “a 
change in methods of control, not a general loss of control” on the part of 
state institutions. Governance cannot be reduced to collective action, the 
same way government cannot be solely explained by the institutional 
approach; both concepts and approaches can be combined to open the way to 
conceptual renewal (Le Galès 2002; also see Borraz and Le Galès 2001).  
If some such as Rosenau (1997) see a loss of power from the central 
state to networks of corporations, nongovernmental organisations, as well as 
lower and higher tiers of governments, others believe that, although the 
central state no longer holds the monopoly on policy formulation, it still 
plays a defining role (Borraz and John 2004; Peters and Pierre 2000). Rather 
than neglecting the role of the state, these processes entail the reorganisation 
of institutional levels and the way services are delivered, financed and 
coordinated; in fact “[s]ocial expenditures did not decline radically as 
heralded and the state did not disappear” (Kazepov 2005:27).  
The EU is clearly contributing to reinventing forms of governance, in 
order to reconcile economic competitiveness with social cohesion, but also to 
enhance the role of the European system of “multilevel governance” (Hooghe 
and Marks 2001), through promoting subnational government, which 
becomes an “active (and broadly pro-European) [actor] on the EU stage” 
(Hamedinger et al 2008:2674).14 Multilevel governance refers to the process 
of restructuring nation-states and reinforcement of other tiers of government 
(i.e. regional government and the EU), encouraged by new decision-making 
processes in several policy areas. It also refers to novel coordination modes 
among formally sovereign yet functionally inter-dependent entities (Piattoni 
2005; see also Jachtenfuchs 1995; Hooghe and Marks 2001).15 However, the 
term is now applied to the EU more generally (Bache and Flinders 2004; 
Grande 2000, cited in Hooghe and Marks 2003; Hooghe and Marks 2001).16 
Theorists such as Keating (2008:76) question the validity of the concept of 
multilevel governance, as territorial politics has always existed and, although 
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it has changed its form over time, “tracking these changes requires common 
concepts, not a conceptual break from one era to another”, as it is difficult to 
compare past and present without conceptual continuity. 
Beyond conceptual arguments, the literature shares a basic postulate: 
the diffusion of power creates a more flexible form of governing, as decision 
makers can “adjust the scale of governance to reflect heterogeneity” (Hooghe 
and Marks 2003:236). As decision-making increasingly lies with 
partnerships between state and non-state actors, across multiple 
jurisdictional levels, governance might raise issues of procedural legality, 
accountability and legitimacy.  
 
A New Role For Cities 
Following decentralisation trends, urban elites control more public 
policies, and cities represent the most visible locus of interdependence 
between social groups, and between economic interests and institutions. 
Thus, cities and their mayors – particularly where the latter are directly 
elected – would appear to be the most immediate mediators between 
cultural, social, and economic forces (Le Galès 2002). Urban policies in 
European cities have become more fluid and policy-making is opening up to 
a wide range of actors from different sectors of society and different 
institutional levels, leading to greater experimentation by local actors (Le 
Galès 2005).  
As urban elites respond to the pressures of capital, strategies might 
converge and, as cities compete for job creation, issues of housing, exclusion 
and social conflicts might fade away from the political agenda, while lower 
taxation becomes the indicator of good management (Le Galès 2002). 
European cities could transform themselves into entrepreneurial cities, 
following North American cities, as the discourse of competition and the 
market, the rhetoric of image and identity, become dominant, economic 
development is given political priority to attract investments and local 
government is increasingly based around public-private partnerships.  
However, as yet, modes of governance in Europe are not solely organised 
around competition, as they often rely more on local culture and social 
groups and associations than local business. The locality is mobilised to 
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create a sense of unity (ibid.). “Initiatives to promote urban and territorial 
identities – like strategic planning or city marketing, for example – should 
not be seen solely as simple propaganda or territorial ‘merchandising’ tools 
or as signs that market logics are replacing state logics in territorial policies. 
These policies may bring about a ‘recombination’ of modes of local 
regulation.” (Pinson 2002:4).  In this respect, politics remains an important 
factor in coordinating these processes (Kazepov 2005) and leadership can 
play a pivotal role as it facilitates the development of collective internal 
interests and gives direction on the representation of such interests outward. 
The blurring between the private and the public sector and the 
interdependence between different tiers of government will either “increase 
social and political fragmentation or strengthen the city as a site of 
governance” (Le Galès 2002:264).  
Contrary to US cities, European urban government still has strong 
capacities in terms of initiative and control. Notwithstanding differences 
among liberal (Anglo-Saxon countries, such as the UK), social-democratic 
(North European countries, such as Denmark) or corporatist/welfare 
regimes (continental Europe countries, such as Germany) and familistic 
regimes (typical of Southern European countries),17 cities can for now rely on 
a welfare state and its redistribution mechanisms. These can at least mitigate 
tendencies to segregation and poverty, and can guarantee a relatively stable 
institutional milieu that new forms of governance can build upon (ibid).  
If in the US the dependence of cities on firms represents a powerful 
incentive for public-private coalition-building, the private sector is less 
important in European cities, as elucidated by the four cases of this study, 
which are less reliant on business taxes and whose resources rather depend 
on local taxes and state subsidies (see Le Galès 2002). Thus, urban regime 
theory is not necessarily the best framework of analysis for Europe as it relies 
on the asymmetrical relationship between local authorities and private 
interests and tends to neglect the institutional context (Pierre 2005). The 
community power studies place emphasis on the local actors outside 
institutional structures that help determine urban policies, i.e. “informal 
arrangements by which public bodies and private interests function together 
in order to be able to make and carry out governing decisions” (Stone 
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1989:6).18 Urban governance research in Europe emphasises the importance 
of an integrated approach, whereby the structural context, the political 
culture, and the institutional framework represent fundamental variables for 
any analysis.19  
Cities’ own dynamism is thus a pivotal factor behind new governance 
and there is a great deal of experimentation underway in terms of 
collaborative strategy making, as in the case of multi-municipal partnerships 
(or the Italian Territorial Pacts) and new forms of Strategic Spatial Planning 
(Healey 2001).20 These new urban projects have become an important form 
of mobilisation of local societies in European cities (Bryson and Crosby 1992; 
Newman and Thornley 1996; Healey et al 1997), as they aim to strengthen 
horizontal interactions within the city, without neglecting concerns of 
efficiency and management of the territory (Le Galès 2002). Within this 
context, “strategic planning for places and territories becomes an exercise in 
collective risk-taking and mobilising forces to help invent the future”, 
through “identifying possible trajectories and patterns in emergent 
tendencies and imagining ways to enhance and counteract them in order to 
provide a different inheritance for our successors” (Healey 2001: 153).  
In order to analyse new governance arrangements, Le Galès (2002) 
differentiates between modes of governance adopted by European cities 
along four main dimensions: 1) the structure of local society and political 
institutions (the degree of strength of the local government, links to other 
levels of government, economic situation and market pressures, presence of 
organised interests, and influence of the associative sector); 2) the 
institutionalisation of collective action (type of institutional arrangement, 
what actors are involved in the process);21 3) the political orientation of the 
local government; 4) and finally the outcomes (the capacity to extract 
resources from the EU, the state, the region, the market, and whether in 
cooperation or in competition with other cities; the type of policies carried 
out – or not – and their coherence; the winners and the losers in terms of 
redistribution of wealth and power).22 Le Galès argues that relatively 
integrated modes of governance are found in medium-sized regional capital 
cities between 200.000 and 2 millions inhabitants. This framework proves 
more difficult to apply to large and metropolitan cities, which are too 
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complex and fragmented. This study will use this framework to guide the 
analysis of the four case studies, which are medium-sized cities between 
100,000 and 180,000 inhabitants. However, it is important to acknowledge 
that such a small size often implies the lack of local resources, both financial 
and in terms of expertise, and hence greater reliance on higher levels of 
government. 
This new horizontal approach to governing territories claims to be 
about opening up new political space to foster a (deliberative) dialogue with 
the community that will help pursue collective strategies of development, 
while also building social capital, which here becomes an integral part of the 
place’s competitive advantage. Pichierri (1997) identifies five elements that 
define a collective actor: collective decision-making; common interests, thus 
a strong local identity; integration mechanisms, through the 
institutionalisation of collective action; internal and external representation 
of the collective actor, perhaps through a visible directly-elected mayor 
capable of animating the local polity; a capacity for innovation. European 
cities, however, should not be viewed as a priori collective actors. Integration 
of interests becomes a response to new challenges, as collective constructions 
can serve to legitimise a certain political order. The search for cohesion and 
consensus might therefore exclude certain interests, who do not seem 
pertinent or cannot offer resources perceived to be of merit (Le Galès 2002; 
Pinson 2005).  
 
Beyond Negotiations: The Participatory Process 
Deliberative democracy in practice 
The discourse on citizen participation is emerging strongly in Europe, 
as an antidote to political disengagement and a tool to increase democratic 
legitimacy and administrative efficiency. In an institutional context of double 
devolution, local authorities are recognised as having a greater role in policy-
making and are expected to diffuse power below and directly involve citizens 
in local governance. Citizen participation is encouraged by the EU, which in 
the Treaty of Lisbon introduces citizens’ initiatives and recognises the 
importance of consultation and dialogue with associations and civil society. 
As examined above, the EU’s cohesion policy is founded on a system of 
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multilevel governance increasingly open to civil society involvement, through 
partnership-based processes (Hooghe and Marks 2001). 
Whether called “unitary democracy” (Mansbridge 1980), “strong 
democracy” (Barber 1984), “civic discovery” (Reich 1988), “discursive 
democracy” (Dryzek 2000) or “deliberative democracy” (Gutmann and 
Thompson 1996), engaging citizens in local decision-making is increasingly 
referred to by practitioners as the preferred cure for “the ills of democracy” 
(Weeks 2000), as it is expected to increase local government’s 
responsiveness and transparency. A number of deliberative policy studies 
have attempted to empirically test the applicability of deliberative democracy 
to the real world (see among other Ackerman 1991; Benhabib 1996; Kirlin 
1996; Cohen 1997; Dryzek 2000; Fischer 1993; Fishkin 1995; Gutmann and 
Thompson 1996; Thompson 1999; Weeks 2000; Valadez 2001; Warren, 
2002; Young 1996). In fact, the effort to relate the need for greater public 
participation to ideas of deliberation is quite striking and seems to justify 
Dryzek’s assertion that “[t]he final decade of the second millennium saw the 
theory of democracy take a strong deliberative turn. Increasingly, democratic 
legitimacy came to be seen in terms of the ability or opportunity to 
participate in effective deliberation on the part of those subject to collective 
decisions” (2000:1). 
Participation and deliberation are expected to foster civic-ness and 
social cooperation, following the Habermasian communicative reasoning. 
For Habermas, the very structure of language entails cooperation. The power 
of good debate will represent the main dynamic of deliberation, as through 
conversation and discussion people will rationally move towards reasonable 
(and consensual) agreement (Habermas 1996). In Elster’s (1991) view, the 
discursive and reflexive construction of the political discourse can derive 
from bargaining but also from arguing. A deliberative agreement will not be 
based on bargaining, by which people’s reasons remain unchanged and a 
compromise is sought, but rather on arguing, which aims at reaching a 
convergence of all interests on the same solutions, based on valid reasons 
that are capable of convincing all sides.  
In representative democracy, voting simply expresses one’s own self 
interest. By contrast within a deliberative process different opinions are 
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discussed and the fairest and most persuasive will win; participants will form 
or transform their opinions as a result of an often conflict ridden 
contestation. Since choices and preferences are not given, but are expected to 
develop and change as they are confronted with stronger arguments, 
deliberative democracy distances itself from rational choice theory and its 
applications to political systems, and instead enhances the cognitive 
dimension of politics, as agreement is based on personal development and 
mutual learning (Gelli 2005).  
However, several conditions need to be met for deliberation to be 
effective, and criteria such as the inclusiveness of the process, the mutual 
exchange of arguments and the existence of clear rules are pivotal (see 
Bohman and Rehg 1997). Representatives of different interests should thus 
be invited, and all stakeholders should be equally informed and empowered, 
so that they can effectively represent their group’s interests. Deliberative 
theorists envisage deliberative forums that, when inclusive, will have the 
potential to augment democratic legitimacy through accountability and 
participation; to foster cooperation, through encouraging a public-spirited 
perspective on policy issues; to promote mutual respect among participants; 
and to enhance the quality of decisions (and opinions) through an informed 
and substantive debate (Chambers 2003).  
In order to describe empirical experiences of deliberative democracy, 
Fung and Wright (2001; 2003) elaborated the Empowered Deliberative 
Democracy Model (EDD) based on three main principles: practical 
orientation, bottom-up participation and deliberative solution generation. 
Practical orientation means that governance structures are developed to 
address concrete concerns; bottom-up participation refers to direct 
participation of citizens and associations, which will increase accountability 
and offer a more diverse knowledge and experience to solve novel problems.23 
Finally in deliberative solution generation, participants listen to each other’s 
positions before making a group decision. Under the EDD, Fung and Wright 
(2001:25-29) highlight three institutional objectives: effectiveness, equity 
and sustained participation. The first and most important institutional 
objective is to advance public ends through effective problem solving and 
successful implementation; if the performance does not adequately meet 
34 
 
expectations, the participatory project will quickly loose attractiveness. On 
the contrary good performance will receive widespread popular and perhaps 
elite support – the so-called demonstration effect. A second important 
objective will be equitable outcomes, as the main goal of participatory 
democracy should be to deliver effective public action to the most 
disadvantaged people, who normally have the least tools to seek responsive 
policies from the state. Broad and sustained participation is the third main 
factor to determine the success of citizen voice initiatives and their 
sustainability. A political campaign supported by a vibrant civil society and 
clear and effective outcomes in the short term would thus seem paramount to 
encourage and sustain participation. However, notwithstanding the 
importance of the role of associations and their strength within the locality 
(Fung 2003, Maloney et al 2000), there is still much debate about the most 
conducive levels of associational density in order to empower weaker sectors. 
In fact, highly organised actors could simply further corporatist interests.24  
Overall, although deliberation can engender a learning process as it 
helps to develop individual and collective democratic understanding and 
fosters critical and reflexive skills to analyse and solve political and policy 
issues, it cannot be an end in itself. In fact, many theorists of deliberative 
democracy insist that democratic legitimacy is not simply about procedures, 
but also demands a substantive element (see Estlund 1997). In order to be 
effective, these initiatives need to offer the real prospect of exercising state 
power. By focusing on pragmatic, problem-centred concerns that citizens 
have a deep interest in, they can reduce expert-based barriers, while enabling 
citizens to develop their technical competence and master the information 
necessary to make sensible and informed decisions (Fung and Wright, 2001; 
2003).25 In order to achieve these results, local government will need to enjoy 
clear authority over the policies discussed in deliberative forums and have 
access to enough resources, both financial and administrative, in order to 
implement participatory decisions. The case studies provide good examples 
of how excessive financial and policy ambition, or insufficient clarity on 
which tier of government holds decision-making authority for specific policy 
areas, can jeopardise both the process and the credibility of local 
government. 
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Deliberation and Empowerment 
Several critics of deliberative democracy observe that the central 
weakness of communicative reasoning is that it fails to take account of 
Foucauldian relations of power. Successful experiences of participation in 
urban regeneration are often seen as transcending conflict and power 
relations (Harris and de Renzio 1997, Woolcock 1998, cited in Cento Bull and 
Jones 2004). However, scholars emphasise that conflict between interest 
groups is inevitable and participants clearly display different “power 
resources” (Lowndes and Wilson 2001:639). In fact, one of the main 
concerns of deliberative democracy critics is that it can reproduce the 
hierarchies of society at large, class hierarchies as well as hierarchies of 
experts’ political competence against non-experts (Bourdieu 1991). For 
Bourdieu (see also Young 1996), the language itself becomes a medium of 
power, and language competence is clearly not equally distributed to all, 
which could constitute another factor of exclusion of the poor and less 
educated. Stronger and better organised interest groups or segments of the 
population that are traditionally well-resourced, such as the middle-classes, 
will have a tendency to capitalise on the new political space, as they enjoy 
greater human and financial resources. In fact, extending governance might 
weaken democracy insofar as the interests of those who have the time and 
the inclination to participate will be prioritised (Perrons and Skyers 2003). 
Thus, in recent years, just when it is reaching its zenith in the 
institutional discourse, participation has come under harsh criticism from 
many observers (see among others Cooke and Kothari 2001; Mohan and 
Stokke 2000; Taylor 2000; Foley and Edwards 1997). Some view 
participatory mechanisms as tools in games of power that reproduce 
inequality and even have the potential “capacity for tyranny” (Cooke and 
Kothari 2001). Certainly the gap between the normative models and the 
empirical realities is hard to ignore.  
Institutionalists argue that better institutional design can offset the 
bias towards more privileged participants; for instance pro-poor institutional 
arrangements could be built into participatory structures (Heller and 
Chaudhury 2003). The didactic component seems to be a salient ingredient 
of equitable deliberative participation: when the institutional design includes 
36 
 
a number of meetings devoted to learning procedures and rules, participants 
tend to acquire sufficient technical knowledge within a relatively short time 
(Baiocchi 2001). However, no amount of facilitation will succeed in budging 
certain differences between participants, who will bring with them their own 
ideas, knowledge, background, and connections (Cornwall and Coelho 2007). 
If the objective is to empower the marginalised sectors of society, the 
newfound enthusiasm for participatory mechanisms cannot become a 
substitute for transformative redistributive strategies (Perrons and Skyers 
2003). Social movement theorists (Tarrow 1994; Della Porta and Diani 2004; 
Della Porta 2006) have argued that only social mobilisation can push for 
redistribution of power and resources.  
In this respect, Cornwall (2002) distinguishes between invited and 
invented spaces of participation, whereby the former are more institutional 
participatory arenas opened from above, hence infused with power relations, 
whereas the latter are bottom-up initiatives, such as grassroots civic 
organising - or what Fraser (1992) terms “subaltern counterpublics.”26 Blaug 
(2002: 107), in an article that reviews recent experiences of participatory 
governance, differentiates between “incumbent” and “critical” democracy: 
Incumbent democracy is primarily motivated to preserve and improve existing 
institutions by maximizing and managing orderly participation. Critical 
democracy seeks, instead, to resist such management and empower excluded 
voices in such a way as to directly challenge existing institutions. Incumbent 
democrats assume that effectiveness is only achieved through institutions, and 
that participation requires institutionalisation in order to be compatible with 
the central representative structures of the democratic state. Critical democracy 
upholds a rather different assumption: that effectiveness can arise out of a 
collective adherence to common concerns. Here, the institutionalisation of 
participation is seen as an attempt to tame radical energy. 
 
Thus Blaug believes that when incumbent democracy (i.e. elected officials) 
opens up new political space for public participation, as it sets the rules and 
the agenda, it ends up controlling the process and the participants. He 
concludes that such “democratic engineering” results in what Habermas 
(1987) calls “colonisation”, or cooptation of the participants, as incumbent 
democracy takes precedence over critical democracy. The clash between 
incumbent and critical democracy defines many participatory experiences - 
as the case study will elucidate clearly - when the new space is not perceived 
to and inclusive and substantive decision-making arena. 
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However, the new invited space can also open possibilities, or 
windows of opportunity (Kingdon 1984), “enabling citizens to transgress 
positions as passive recipients and assert their rights” (Cornwall and Coelho 
2007).27 The merit of the much celebrated experience of Participatory 
Budgeting (PB) in Porto Alegre (Abers 1998; Avritzer 2000; Allegretti 2003; 
Baiocchi 2001; Gret and Sintomer 2005; Heller 2001), which successfully 
interprets the Freirian idea of “conscientization” and empowerment, lies in 
its outstanding outcomes in terms of wealth and power redistribution. The 
resource issue is thus central. Even when local participation allows some 
voices to be heard, unless participants have a degree of say on the way 
resources are effectively allocated – which, as noted above, implies some 
level of financial and decision-making autonomy at the local level, as well as 
institutional capacity – empowerment will remain a token word and 
participatory mechanisms of governance will do little to redress social 
disadvantage (Perrons and Skyers 2003). 
 
The Quality Of Local Democracy 
As subnational government is devolved new competencies and 
responsibilities, there is now wide support for what has been defined “local 
democracy”, which is increasingly seen as a possible way of reinforcing 
democratic institutions and increasing efficiency of local governance systems. 
From local government’s perspective, the concepts of local democracy and 
local autonomy are often interchangeable, as it has long been putting 
pressure on central government for devolution of power and resources (Gelli 
2005). Pratchett (2004:358) conceptualises the concept of local autonomy as 
“freedom from higher powers” and “freedom to effect particular outcomes; 
the reflection of local identity”.  
The European Charter of Local Self-Government incorporates several 
of the “pluralist” arguments that support the idea that local democracy 
institutions should foster the diffusion of power below to society and 
promote diversity against standardising national policies, while building local 
self-government capacity (Gelli 2005). The Charter in fact reiterates that 
public policy-making should, whenever possible, be devolved to public 
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authorities that are closest to citizens (art.43), following the principle of 
subsidiarity.  
In EU rhetoric, the concept of subsidiarity serves to reinforce local 
democracy as a strategy to partly offset the democratic deficit and develop 
participatory mechanisms that are more coherent with the principle of 
territorial, economic, and social cohesion. The relationship between 
representative and direct democracy has different implications at the local 
level, as local elections are not strictly limited to one’s vote. The local 
electorate will not simply vote for the mayor, but also for a programme of 
policies which will directly affect citizens, and the different phases of the 
electoral campaign will at least partly respond to the themes of the local 
political agenda and the public debate, since local voters are perceived to be 
more aware and competent when it comes to voting on local issues (Gelli 
2005).28  
As governance entails the commitment of elected officials to work with 
formal and informal networks and partnerships (Rhodes 1996, 2000), 
scholars and practitioners disagree about whether the growth of these 
partnerships represents “a threat or an opportunity” for democracy 
(McLaverty 2009: 4). Although on the one hand it has been argued that 
traditional government systems are plagued by excessive bureaucracy and 
lead to waste of resources, on the other hand “governance by networks” 
(Marin and Mayntz 1991) raises issues of representativeness and legitimacy, 
as it does not guarantee accountability. In fact, as responsibility is diffuse, 
sanctioning becomes more difficult. This has the potential to create a 
democratic deficit, to the point that Cooke and Kothari (2001) describe the 
new governance system as an expression of “private governance”.29 Other 
scholars recognise that at the local level mechanisms that strengthen local 
political leadership (i.e. the direct election of mayors) could help to reconcile 
vertical accountability to citizens with governance mechanisms (Haus and 
Heinelt 2004). The directly-elected mayor will also be in a privileged position 
to guarantee the translation of informal decisions into tangible 
administrative acts. 
The issue of democracy as depending on representation is a complex 
one. The conflictual relationship between representative and participatory 
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democracy mainly derives from the fact that while liberal democracy is 
legitimated by universal adult suffrage and regular elections, one might ask 
where the new participatory mechanisms would gain their legitimacy from.30 
Scholars like Beetham (1993; 2005) believe that inclusive and accountable 
institutions can provide an important space for interactions between citizens 
and their elected representatives, and nurture critical democracy. Thus, 
participatory mechanisms can enhance the representative system (Beetham 
2005). Advocates of participation often refer to the degree of inclusivity to 
guarantee the legitimacy of the process (Bobbio 2005), whereby all the 
participants should have equal opportunities to express their opinion. 
However, several scholars argue that the problem with deliberative 
mechanisms is that participants are not representative of wider 
constituencies (O’Neill 2002; Cammelli 2005; Regonini 2005). O’Neill 
(2002:494) thus envisages a “weaker role for such institutions within the 
democratic process, say to the formulation of options and possible 
recommendations, allowing for other forms of accountability to be retained 
in the decision-making process”. This approach, which is generally endorsed 
by local political elites in the four cases of this research, would deeply 
undermine the role of the participatory arrangements in local governance. 
Beyond the discourse on empowerment, which can only be sustained through 
substantive saying on decision-making, the deliberative public policy 
approach (Majone 1989; Hajer and Wagenaar 2003; Torgerson 2003) points 
to the potential of policy democratisation as an alternative to the technocratic 
understanding of policy-making, as a way for the public to express their 
concerns, exchange arguments with other participants, learn and develop 
ideas, and influence policy-making in a more argumentative way than by just 
voting every four or five years. The degree of decision-making afforded to 
participatory mechanisms is thus one of the most important variables when 
examining these initiatives, and one might argue that “if there is no clear, 
systematic way by which decisions reached can feed into ultimate policy 
decisions, […] it is difficult to regard participation as effective” (McLaverty 
2009:9).31 
The participatory approach thus becomes a vital ingredient to the 
formation of a collective actor; but, as local government is increasingly seen 
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as a producer of goods and services, participation is often understood by local 
political elites as a way of manufacturing consent, as resistance against 
certain projects can be overcome more easily. Purely consultative exercises 
often translate into tokenistic efforts and have no tangible influence, and yet, 
according to deliberative democracy’s detractors, the existence of 
participatory mechanisms with decision-making powers would infringe on 
the democratic rights of those who do not participate, since participants are 
not representative of wider constituencies. The dilemma of the relationship 
between deliberative and representative democracy would seem impossible 
to resolve. However, against the representativeness deficit criticism, one 
might argue that the rationale behind participatory mechanisms should be to 
invite representatives of all affected interests (stakeholders) so as to reach 
fairer decisions that take account of all points of view on a given issue 
(Bobbio 2004).  
Local government is in a privileged position to enhance the human 
resources that the local active citizenship can mobilise and to involve social 
actors in producing local collective competition goods. The issue is how to 
institutionalise forms of democratic mobilisation. There follows a tendency to 
think of deliberative arenas in terms of efficiency and management of 
conflicts, fostering a politics of consensus. Osborne and Gaebler (1992), who 
first introduced the notion of local government as a catalyser, in that it 
creates an environment conducive to citizen participation, are perhaps the 
most notable interpreters of the thesis of local democracy to increase 
efficiency vs. the idea of fostering citizenship.  
The neo-Marxist view sees the state function in regulating class and 
social relations, thus participation from above would reflect the effort to 
create social regulation, as government replaces expensive ways of 
controlling risk and treating inequalities with less expensive means (which 
however do not effectively address the problem) through disciplining once 
autonomous associations, buying them off with subsidies (Jessop 2002; Peck 
and Tickell 2002). The combination of actors and resources involved in the 
participatory process is often the product of a predetermined design that 
inhibits the emergence of marginal actors and new resources, rather than 
being a genuine collective process of innovation and transformation. As 
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associations interact with government, either through the bureaucracy or 
political parties, they conform to and internalise rules, as they respond to 
bureaucratic requirements and/ or the political funding system. This leads to 
increasing professionalisation of these associations, while their legitimacy 
and representation capacity might be weakened (Nicholls 2006). Thus a key 
challenge for leadership “is how to encourage new forms of democratic 
mobilisation without ritualising them and constraining efforts to deepen 
local democracy” (Bussu and Bartels 2013). 
Along the policy outcomes of these mechanisms, it is therefore 
important to evaluate the actual process, to assess the degree of inclusivity, 
which interests are involved and how, which interests are excluded or choose 
to exclude themselves and why. In this respect, the reference to the 
normative models conceptualised by the literature on deliberative democracy 
can offer an important framework of analysis of these phenomena. 
 
Strategic Planning And The Implementation Gap 
Strategic Planning (SP) is not a new concept, particularly in view of 
the fact that there exist three generations of plans that have interpreted the 
idea of planning in very different ways. The first iteration dates back to the 
1960s and 1970s, when some cities in the US, and later in the UK and France, 
introduced the systemic approach of long term planning for the public sector. 
This approach viewed the city or the region as a system consisting of closely 
linked sub-systems, to which quantitative models would be applied that were 
expected to provide reliable predictions upon which public decisions could be 
elaborated. The UK’s Structure plans or the French SDAU (Schéma 
Directeur d’Aménagement et d’Urbanisme) are examples of this first 
generation of plans, as their function was to establish objectives and 
directives for the development of the territory and its infrastructure (Curti 
and Gibelli 1999). The second generation emerged in a context of 
deregulation during the 1980s, particularly in the US, and later in the UK, 
Holland, and France, and was characterised by the attempt to apply the 
market logic to the public sector (Gibelli 1996).  
Vinci (2011) notes that during the past 20 years the literature has 
analysed the development and increasing popularity of a strategic approach 
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which is the result of a twofold trend: the tendency of urban planning to 
internalise the principle of Strategic Planning in light of the changed 
economic context and of institutional governance (Healey et al 1997; 
Albrechts et al 2003); and the re-interpretation of the 1980s corporate SP, by 
emphasising the collective and relational aspects that can mitigate the 
competitiveness dimension (Gibelli 1996; Bagnasco and Le Galès 2000; 
Perulli 2004). This third generation of plans represents a reaction to the 
systemic approach of the first wave, which was focused on a top-down vision 
that had to be inflexibly implemented. The new Strategic Plans are also 
radically different from the second generation. There the focus was mainly on 
performance and implementation, while there was limited interest on issues 
of coherence between the planned objectives and what was actually achieved; 
the concept of vision was more or less neglected and cooperation and 
alliances among actors were short-term and perceived in a utilitarian way.  
This third generation of SP (also known as collaborative strategic 
planning, see Healey et al 1997) has developed since the mid-1990s and all 
the Italian experiences are included in this latest wave. The new plans thus 
represent a third approach, sitting somewhere between the normative, 
holistic and highly hierarchical approach of the first generation and the 
excessively flexible, performance-based, utilitarian, and opportunistic 
approach of the second generation. SP now aims at creating synergies among 
actors around a consensual vision of the future that rests on the resources 
(not just financial) of those involved (Spaziante 2003). The global socio-
economic context, as examined above, has also changed and it is increasingly 
based on territorial cooperation and competition, whereby cities, as 
discussed above, become by necessity loci of economic and political 
innovation (Keating 2000; Le Galès 2002; Kazepov 2005). 
SP has been defined by Camagni (2003:83) as “a collective vision of 
the future of a given territory, through processes based on participation, 
discussion and listening; as a pact among administrators, local actors, 
citizens and different partners to create such a vision through elaborating a 
strategy and a subsequent series of projects, variously interconnected, 
justified, evaluated and shared; finally as the coordination of these actors’ 
responsibilities in implementing the projects.”32 In this respect SP has 
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become a tool to plan the physical as well as the economic development of 
the place and build its identity, in the logic of inter-tier project cooperation 
and integration. It generally starts on the initiative of local government, 
which has a pivotal role to play in creating identity incentives that can foster 
collective action. The identification of the distinctive features of a place 
represents a process of collective learning that can raise the stakeholders’ 
awareness of their ecosystem (Vinci 2010). 
Magnaghi (1990; 2000) and the scuola territorialista (that 
emphasises the role of the locality) have offered a great contribution within 
this framework of analysis, by which the rebirth of a place is determined by a 
strong self-recognition process on the part of the community and through 
building a virtuous relationship between the community and its 
environment. By reinforcing pre-existing social networks and supporting new 
ones, a good SP purportedly encourages collective behaviours that can help 
generate a more integrated, hence more competitive, local system, while 
providing incentives for new entrepreneurship (Gastaldi 2003). However, as 
within multilateral decision-making stronger interests tend to prevail, there 
exists the risk that these strategies become yet another instrument to put 
forward the same top-down policies and ensure legitimacy for those interests 
that might have otherwise encountered the community’s hostility (ibid.). 
SP develops through several stages during which the actors involved 
meet in deliberative forums and thematic workshops: an initial stage, when 
all the interested institutional, private and social actors elaborate a collective 
strategy for local development; a second phase of analysis, during which a 
diagnostic document is produced to highlight the potential and the limits of 
the locality, and the issues that the participants identify as priorities; a 
planning phase, when projects are defined, consistently with the overall 
development model; the approval of the final plan (officially presented to the 
community and subscribed by all participants); the implementation phase; 
and finally monitoring and evaluation of project implementation (Segatori 
2007).  
Mintzberg (1994) identifies three main interrelated rationales behind 
SP: thinking about the future, whereby the emphasis is on the constructions 
of visions; integrating decision-making, to create a network or a coalition of 
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actors for urban and regional policies, as a governance tool to increase 
effectiveness; and improving coordination mechanisms, whereby the SP 
encourages convergence between sectoral policies. Cities may choose to 
adopt SP to maximise the impact of a great event and engender long term 
benefits, as in the case of the 1992 Olympic Games in Barcelona (Maragall 
2004; Güell 2006); but a Strategic Plan is often a reaction to a crisis, as in 
Turin, where the city had to emancipate itself from its image as a Fiat-
centric, industrial city and reinvent itself in a post-Fordist perspective 
(Pinson 2002; 2005; 2007; Dente e Melloni 2005).  
As an increasing number of medium-sized cities in Italy are adopting 
SP, the rationale behind this decision is often diverse: the need to revitalise 
and modernise the concept of local development, by generating new 
opportunities through mobilising different actors, as in Trento; the challenge 
of responding to the crisis of a place’s local development model and the need 
to reconvert it, as in the case of Prato; finally the necessity to coordinate the 
investment of funds, from the private sector, from national or regional 
government, or from the EU, as in Lecce and Sassari. The focus is more on 
process than outcomes, and some authors (Pinson 2002:9) argue that “the 
nature of the strategies produced hardly matters”, while the process of 
elaborating them can foster the inter-acquaintance of different interests, 
contributing to the consolidation of the collective city-actor (ibid.). 
For these collaborative processes to work, stakeholders will need to 
recognize their mutual interdependence, listen to each other’s views, and 
develop open, constructive, and trusting relationships. This requires letting 
go of initial perceptions and assumptions, changing habitual modes of 
communications, and accommodating each other’s interests in finding a 
consensual agreement (Innes and Booher 2003; McGuire 2006; Weber and 
Khademian 2008). Interdependence of stakeholders is however hard to 
engender, as more powerful actors are often able to control the process or 
have the option of other, non-collaborative channels (Ansell and Gash 2007; 
Innes and Booher 2003). Those actors that could really impact the local 
reality often refuse to take on substantive responsibilities and their 
involvement becomes just a formal exercise. In fact, perhaps one reason why 
these processes often remain just “good intentions” is that pacts are signed 
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without clarifying what responsibilities each participant is taking on, in 
concrete terms (Gastaldi 2003).  
Although each city should develop a different plan that responds to 
the local context, there are several recurrent themes, such as the 
environment, security, infrastructure, internationalisation of economic 
relations, new models of local welfare, and new ways of managing services 
and mobility in the face of privatisation tendencies (Gastaldi 2003). The 
general model of the plan will be influenced by the institutions behind it; 
frequently the local administration will take the initiative and manage the 
implementation process, although in some cases ad hoc agencies are created 
to act as coordinators (i.e. Torino Internazionale in Turin or Firenze 2010 in 
Florence). Formal and informal networks among municipalities encourage 
policy transfer (Wolman and Page 2002), and new inter-municipal networks 
and partnerships among cities are certainly helping to disseminate 
information about SP. As argued by Bryson (2004) SP is more successful 
wherever the administrative and political leadership is capable to define the 
plan based on the place’s political and social peculiarities, against the allure 
of blueprints and transferable models. The paradox of SP, according to 
Bryson, is that it is particularly necessary where it is unlikely to work, since it 
requires a rich social fabric, whose relational and cognitive potential SP can 
further enhance. 
SP will also have a different political function, depending on when it is 
launched in the political cycle (Gastaldi 2003): at the end of the first term or 
during the second term, the plan will represent an assessment of the mayor’s 
mandate and it can become a sort of final balance on what has been achieved 
and what can still be achieved. Conversely plans that mark a change in 
government and originate from a new political phase will help to open new 
government prospects, like in Sassari or Trento (see Gastaldi 2003). An 
innovative leadership that can coordinate and sustain cohesive networks 
appears to be the key ingredient to ensure that the process does not quickly 
implode under the pressure of opportunistic interests on all sides.  
Although SP is extra legem, the absence of binding power can 
encourage the informality of the relationship among the participants and 
allow them to exchange views, without formal constraints. Yet the decisions 
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that originate from these processes are still important, as their value derives 
from the consensus of the stakeholders. In this respect these instruments can 
be considered as an example of soft law (Bobbio 2004). Informal decisions 
still have to be translated into formal actions and, as noted above, directly-
elected mayors can often represent this interface. Mayors (and public service 
CEOs) understand the procedural as well as the administrative aspects and 
can act as guarantors of collective decisions against interferences from 
political representatives during the operational phase, by reassuring those 
councillors or party representatives that might feel bypassed during the 
process (ibid). 
 One of the main challenges is that SP clashes against an institutional 
framework whereby the competencies and resources of regional governments 
have been reinforced, yet local political representation at the regional level 
has not been adjusted. Furthermore, as regional policies are still sector-
based, the demand for integrated planning entailed by SP might struggle to 
meet an equivalent structure at the regional level. This could result in local 
integrated planning having to converge on regional sector-based planning 
(Santandrea 1997). As the case studies will elucidate, these collaborative 
processes cannot be taken in isolation, but need to be located “in their 
continual interactions with wider processes” and at different tiers of 
government (Healey et al 2003: 85).  
 
Strategic Planning in Italy 
SP was first implemented in Italy by Turin in 1998, as the city was 
trying to reconvert its industrial development model within a post-Fordist 
environment (Dente and Melloni 2005). The process was launched in view of 
the forthcoming 2006 Winter Olympic games, which represented an 
opportunity to diversify the local development path and move beyond the one 
company town model (i.e. Manchester and Glasgow) characterising cities 
that developed around one main industry (FIAT’s automotive industry in 
Turin’s case). The association Torino Internazionale was established to 
coordinate the operational phase. This continues to exist and today includes 
125 members and some of the most important players in the local polity: the 
local authority, the University, the Chamber of Commerce, and all the main 
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trade and industry associations (http://www.torino-
internazionale.org/IT/HomePage). Here the political elites, by highlighting 
the territory’s competitive advantages, were able to promote “a shared view 
of the territory as social capital: the bonds created and the consensus built 
enable the strengthening of cooperative ties” (Pinson 2002:13). However, 
Torino Internazionale is an “elitist mobilisation”; it introduced pluralism 
into the representation of these elites, whereby politics has fostered a process 
of pluralisation by supporting mechanisms that encourage “the inter-
acquaintance and inter-recognition between these different interests” (ibid.). 
However, as other weaker interests are excluded, the cost of building a 
coalition, a collective actor, might be democratic “opacity” and “a growing 
compartmentalisation of urban society” (ibid.). 
Soon Turin’s example was followed by Florence, La Spezia, Pesaro, 
Trento, Venice, and Verona, which in 2004 founded the Network of Strategic 
Cities (Rete delle città strategiche) to exchange experiences and models of 
good practice. On its website (www.recs.it), the Network states among its 
objectives: to disseminate information about the approach of SP as a local 
and European mode of governance; to promote benchmarking activities; to 
reinforce the role of cities at the national and international levels; to research 
support tools for the implementation of SP; to create an International 
Observatory of Cities; to expand the number of competent institutional 
actors. In 2012 the network included 37 cities and numerous smaller towns 
(34 communes in Sardinia alone implemented SP). Perhaps an element of 
emulation can be detected in the latest wave of Strategic Plans, which started 
in 2005, as less experienced cities reinterpret and adapt to their own context 
successful SPs, such as Turin’s. It was partly the effect of a copycat syndrome, 
as in a mimetic process of isomorphism (Di Maggio and Powell 1983), 
whereby when an innovation is poorly understood and goals are ambiguous, 
organisations cope with the uncertain environment by modelling themselves 
on other organisations.  
Modeling, as we use the term, is a response to uncertainty. The modelled 
organisation may be unaware of the modelling or may have no desire to be 
copied; it merely serves as a convenient source of practices that the borrowing 
organisation may use. (Di Maggio and Powell 1983: 151) 
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This new niche might soon become saturated; within the next few years we 
will see how many of these cities will move on to their second or third plan, 
and in which cities SP will become an integral instrument of governance or 
just a redundant process.  
SP has traditionally been initiated by local government on a voluntary 
basis and it has not been formalised as a governance instrument. However, 
since 2005 it has undergone “proceduralisation,” as attested to by a few 
handbooks published by Formez (Gioioso 2006)33 and the Government’s 
Department of Public Function (Dipartimento della Funzione pubblica della 
Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri) (Tanese et al 2006). Since 2005 CIPE 
(Comitato interministeriale per la programmazione economica/ Inter-
ministerial Committee for Economic Planning) has been actively promoting 
SP in Mezzogiorno, through an important initiative of the Ministry of 
Infrastructure in 2005, in conjunction with the beginning of the new 
European programme period of structural funds (2007-13). The European 
Commission in fact insisted on the idea that the projects submitted should be 
part of a strategic vision elaborated through partnerships and participatory 
processes. Regional governments welcomed the initiative and offered 
regional funds to co-finance local SP processes (Camagni 2010), as the 
chapters on Lecce and Sassari will elucidate. This top-down approach to SP 
raises a dilemma. On the one hand, disbursing regional financial incentives 
to start the process and linking project implementation to EU structural 
funds clearly alters the voluntary nature of SP and might encourage 
opportunistic behaviours of stakeholders interested in capturing funds for 
their own projects. On the other hand, by using SP to decide on how to invest 
structural funds, which represent the biggest chunk of central transfers to the 
South, an administration might signal that SP is an important decision-
making arena, and this might foster greater and more committed 
participation. A national strategy of financial transfers to sustain SP could 
however engender the same perverse effects as in the case of other 
development policies already experimented in the South, such as fragmented 
initiatives and waste of public resources. A rather more fruitful approach 
might entail the provision of technical expertise and know-how, as well as 
greater coordination between national and municipal policies, following the 
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French Contrats de Ville (Perulli 2007; 2010).34 The comparative chapter will 
analyse these different dynamics and also highlight the potential and the 
limits of two voluntary experiences, in Trento and Prato, vs. two compulsory 
or highly incentivised ones, in Lecce and Sassari. 
 
The Pathological Implementation Gap 
The literature offers a dire record of the outcomes of governance 
arrangements, particularly in Italy (Dente 1997; 1999; 2007; Cerosimo and 
Wolleb 2006; Balducci and Fedeli 2011; Pasqui 2011), since these 
mechanisms struggle to produce tangible results. The reasons often lie in 
several limits in terms of central and local action. At the central/ regional 
level, unclear norms and regulations often generate confusion and frustration 
at the local level, while limited inter-institutional and coordination capacity 
often condemn these initiatives to a plethora of fragmented projects (Piselli 
2005; Cerosimo and Wolleb 2006). In terms of local action, politicians’ short 
attention span often sacrifice genuinely collective goods for their own 
political interests, as the gap between electoral politics and substantive 
politics (Le Galès 1998) inevitably hinders these initiatives. There is often 
great emphasis on local resources, but, particularly in the case of smaller 
cities, limited local competence, financial and human resources can constrain 
the elaboration of effective and truly innovative strategies, while a lack of 
awareness over actual local competencies can frustrate over ambitious 
expectations, as final decisions are the responsibility of another jurisdictional 
level. There is perhaps some degree of naivety among administrations. The 
SP often represented a claim of greater independence and 
“responsibilisation” of local government vis-à-vis the Province and/or the 
Region, but this seeming lack of awareness about actual competencies, while 
at the same time failing to ensure integrated decision-making across 
institutional tiers, contributed to the “pathological implementation gap” 
(Deidda 2010:113).  
At all levels the logic of political consensus forces actors to sacrifice 
selectivity (and strategy) for political bargaining and to opt for suboptimal 
solutions that enjoy greater support (Cerosimo and Wolleb 2006). Thus, 
there exists a conflict between selectivity and inclusivity which can limit the 
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ability to focus on few strategic aspects, as if failing to cover all policy areas 
within the SP means that they disappear entirely from the policy agenda. 
Given the pluralistic political and social context, it is perhaps unsurprising 
that plans often turn out to be all-encompassing. The risk, though, is that “If 
Planning is Everything, Maybe it’s Nothing” (Wildawsky 1973). The tradeoffs 
are between selectivity and consensus, and the political pressure for the latter 
is clearly stronger. Selectivity could then become too high a political risk to 
take (Albrecht 2006).  
The implementation gap is also a consequence of contradictions 
inherent to collaborative initiatives, as observed by scholars of organisation 
theory, who have long studied these instruments applied to private and 
public contexts (Mintzberg 1994; Bryson 2004). SP claims to be democratic, 
based on decentralised initiative and centralised synthesis. But centralised 
synthesis can undermine decentralised initiative, so there is an extreme 
centralising bias that conflicts with the idea of participation, as intended by 
the literature on deliberative democracy. As participation is precluded the 
determination of final results, it discourages the commitment that SP claims 
and needs to foster.  
Are the new strategic plans any different in reinterpreting the 
relationship between knowledge and action, as proposed by Friedmann 
(1993)?35 Are the new planning practices helpful in fostering the capacity to 
be selective? Mintzberg (1994) highlights the conflict between the very idea 
of innovative strategy and the inflexibility of plans and planning, which tend 
to preserve categories rather than rearranging them and become generic and 
holistic, rather than creative and strategic. The four case studies add to the 
literature on SP (Albrecht 2006) and are a further testament to the fact that 
cities have not been able to move beyond traditional planning models, and SP 
tends to become a tool to systematise long-standing project ideas. The 
administrators’ inability to understand the plan as a continuous process, 
which requires the ongoing collaboration with the other actors involved, 
clearly constrained strategic capacity and further jeopardised 
implementation. The plan is perceived to be the mere list of projects; this 
tricks politicians into thinking that this first decision-making phase will by 
itself safeguard the operational stage. However, decision-making happens at 
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the time of implementation, as the influence of stronger interests and 
institutional and administrative constraints, as examined in the next chapter, 
become apparent. 
Wildavsky and Majone (1979) describe the implementation process as 
a process of “evolution” that constantly undergoes reformulation and 
redefinition. As administrators often try to control all the elements of the 
elaboration phase, they inevitably lose sight of three main elements that 
could later help to sustain the operational phase: 1) the stakeholders’ initial 
definition of the problem; 2) the arena where the process develops; and 3) 
the initial actions of the promoters of the policy. The initial design can thus 
act as a disposition defining the nature of the problem, the arena and the 
initial actions. However as SP is an evolutionary process, these dispositions 
can take many directions (Balducci and Fedeli 2011). Along this line, Albrecht 
and Van de Broeck (2004) propose a “four track approach”: 1) the 
elaboration of a long-term vision, but 2) allowing for immediate actions and 
3) involving the relevant stakeholders, but 4) also trying to reach out to 
public opinion. Both frameworks suggest then that the focus should be on 
implementation as a continuous process, rather than as an enucleated 
dimension that follows diagnosis and planning as if in a logical sequence 
(Balducci and Fedeli 2011).  
As administration struggle to move beyond traditional planning, new 
waves of plans and governance mechanisms deliver similarly poor outputs, 
often creating a planning and participation fatigue, as several new plans at 
different level of government are introduced. As expectations are frustrated, 
the new arrangements can generate disillusionment and disaffection, and 
new social capital is often dispersed. Concrete outputs are pivotal to 
guarantee the legitimacy of the process, so as to guarantee Fung and Wright’s 
demonstration effect, which will encourage further participation. 
 Any analyses of SP and other governance instruments should focus 
primarily on the formation of the collective actor and the democratic process, 
as sharing the project is more important than its content. In continuously 
changing contexts, deductive cogitation of strategies will inevitably clash 
against inescapable institutional and administrative constraints; by contrast 
a collective process can facilitate the incremental emergence of innovative 
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strategies (Pinson, 2002:11). Here politics can play a pivotal function, by 
mediating between two dimensions, avoiding on the one hand wish lists that 
cannot be translated into concrete projects, and on the other hand the risk of 
constraining the room of manoeuvre, as the process is hijacked by 
opportunistic interests or depends excessively on procedural and technical 
considerations (Pinson 2005). 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has reviewed three main literatures - urban governance, 
deliberative democracy, and the literature on planning, with particular 
reference to SP - in order to frame the three dimension of the dependent 
variable under study, the impact of SP: the formation of the collective actor, 
the democratic process, and the implementation phase. Urban governance 
scholars have focused on the rescaling of politics and the new role of the city 
within the state, but also within the broader context of European governance. 
They have studied new modes of governance, based around arrangements 
that increasingly move beyond negotiations between political and economic 
elites and tend to invite associations and the wider community to take part in 
policy-making. The rationale underpinning the new governance 
arrangements is to enhance that social capital which is now perceived to be a 
key to augmenting the place’s qualities and transform it into a collective 
actor, in order to increasing its competitive advantage.  
Conversely deliberative policy studies, as they examine the 
applicability of deliberative democracy and its normative standards to the 
real world, have focused on issues of inclusivity, groups’ resources and all the 
variables that might affect the fairness of the debate and prevent the 
empowerment of the weakest groups. The focus here is on the democratic 
process. An inclusive process is more likely to produce policies that are 
innovative (as new actors are invited to the table and bring with them new 
sets of skills and expectations) and enjoy greater legitimacy; if these are 
effectively implemented, the demonstration effect (Fung and Wright 2001) 
will help sustain participation in the future. A non-inclusive process will 
generally translate into a tokenistic exercise and will just serve to consolidate 
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the privileged position of certain groups, while legitimating the same top-
down policies, with no real gain in terms of social capital and/ or innovative 
strategies. Thus, it is pivotal to understand the relationship between special 
interests, which will enjoy greater influence, and particular interests, which 
are more diffused but enjoy fewer resources (Crosta 2003). This study will 
show how often counterpublics or invented spaces, often developing 
antagonistically as a reaction against the new invited spaces that might be 
perceived as non inclusive, can be more effective, albeit disordered, at giving 
voice to participants and gaining political and media attention, at least in the 
short term. Bottom-up mobilisation, which generally emerges in response to 
a pressing issue, is naturally easier to foster and to sustain than participation 
in arenas opened from above. 
One of the major challenges raised by SP, and other governance 
processes, is the tension between participatory and representative democracy 
and how to integrate one into the other. The response to the “crisis of 
representation”, as examined in the next chapter, was to strengthen executive 
decision-making, often through introducing direct mayoral elections as in 
Italy, while local government and local governance have come to be 
understood as means to increase efficiency, rather than democracy.  
Finally the literature on planning reminds us about the obstacles to 
implementation, as administrative and political constraints hinder the 
concrete outputs of collaborative planning, sometimes jeopardising gains in 
terms of social capital produced through the initial process. An inclusive 
leadership can play a key role in mediating between opportunistic behaviour 
and collective goods, between excessively ambitious projects and smaller/ 
non strategic measures, but the inherent contradictions of SP, torn between 
inclusivity of actors and selectivity of strategies, remain unresolved and 
demand some degree of conceptual rethinking. The case studies will offer 
different typologies of leadership, to help to elucidate how different forms 
and resources of leadership can explain different outcomes in terms of the 
formation of the collective actor, the democratic process, and 
implementation (or lack thereof).  
It is certainly difficult to evaluate the degree of success of these 
initiatives, as they cannot be simply measured by the number of projects 
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implemented. This study is, thus, more interested in understanding the 
dynamics unleashed by new governance mechanisms, in the form of greater 
cooperation between actors and the local administration, but also within the 
public sectors, and how such dynamics are hindered or enhanced by local 
leadership vis-à-vis pre-existing associational dynamics and institutional and 
political opportunities and constraints at other tiers of government.  
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Chapter 2 
 
Rescaling Politics 
The Italian Context  
 
The institutional reforms introduced in Italy in the early 1990s have 
encouraged the emergence of new modes of governance for local 
development, which are now supported by a growing body of national and 
regional laws. A brief overview of the Italian local context and of the impact 
of these political reforms on local democracy will help to explain the 
enthusiasm towards participatory governance of the last decade. The 1993 
Act, which introduced the direct election of mayors, interpreted the deep 
sense of distrust towards the gigantic party machines of the First Republic, 
which had collapsed under the investigation into party corruption called 
Mani Pulite (Clean Hands). The reforms represented an attempt to 
dramatically alter the balance of power between national political parties and 
their candidates, and between central and local government. The new mayors 
gained authority and visibility, but they had to confront the challenge of 
coordinating plural interests of increasingly fragmented societies, which 
political parties struggled to interpret and represent. Mechanisms of 
participatory governance, such as Strategic Planning (SP), were thus 
perceived by administrators as a way of creating collective identity incentives 
and pre-empting conflicts. 
The mayoral reform strengthened the relationship between the new 
“head of the local state” (Newell 2007:171) and the local polity; however, the 
impact on local democracy has not been entirely positive. As the local council 
has been deprived of many of its previous powers, political mechanisms of 
checks and balances have been weakened and local administration mostly 
happens through executive acts. This increases the need of legitimation of the 
mayor’s mandate in between elections, and governance arrangements can 
become useful instruments in this respect. In fact the new entrepreneurial 
mayor, through coordinated work with public service CEOs, is generally the 
sponsor of these initiatives, as he enjoys a privileged position for translating 
SP’s informal decisions into political acts. On the contrary, the body that has 
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traditionally interpreted representative democracy, the council, is 
increasingly bypassed.  
This chapter will examine the mayoral reform and explore the 
dynamics highlighted above, in light of the literature on leadership. An 
analysis of the impact of the reform can help to explain the emergence and 
increasing popularity of SP in Italy, with a focus on the way varying forms 
and resources of leadership, vis-à-vis the council and the local civil society, 
can determine its outcomes. Great attention is devoted to the issue of 
weakened mechanisms of political checks and balances, which the reforms 
have engendered by altering the balance of power between the cabinet (and 
the directly-elected mayor in particular) and the council. Empirical findings 
from the four case studies show how these dynamics deeply affect the quality 
of local democracy (and its efficiency, as demonstrated by the increasing 
number of municipalities waking up to unexpected holes in the budget).  
The second section of this chapter will analyse the emergence of 
participatory arrangements in Italy following the political reforms, and it will 
offer an overview of the regulatory framework supporting these new modes 
of governance. Notwithstanding the emphasis of the local governance 
discourse on these new mechanisms, so far the results have been mixed. The 
goals of governance arrangements are admittedly ambitious: to increase 
efficiency, to engender greater transparency and accountability, to develop 
the sense of the city as a collective actor and strengthen inter-tier 
cooperation. Such aspirations often clash against weak administrative 
capacity and limited political awareness.  
Several scholars emphasise the role of leadership in driving 
collaborative initiatives, against the argument that a strong social fabric is a 
pre-requisite for participation to work rather than its outcome. This section 
will address this ongoing debate and argue that the understanding of social 
capital as linked to action, à la Coleman (1988), is more constructive. As 
demonstrated by the empirical research, leadership plays a key role in 
strengthening or weakening social capital, irrespective of pre-existing 
associational dynamics, by choosing to, or refraining from, legitimise the 
“action” (in this case the instrument of SP) around which a collective actor 
can develop, based on political interests and contexts. 
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 The last section will introduce the four case studies and present the 
research design and methodology, evidencing the merits of a comparative 
approach. The preceding sections will have helped to frame the independent 
variable, leadership, as it is strengthened or weakened by the way it 
interrelates with two intervening variables, the local associational context 
and other levels of government. 
 
Institutional Reforms in Italy 
The Rise Of The Mayors 
The status quo ante of Italian local administrations, prior to the 1990s 
reforms introducing direct mayoral elections, was characterised by 
precarious coalitions and governmental inertia. The centrality of the 
municipal council vis-à-vis the executive, combined with a proportional 
voting system, often meant that the local administration would become 
another arena for party machinations and distributive agreements among 
political factions. National parties had full control over post-electoral 
majorities and coalitions, hence over the election of the mayor and the 
executive (giunta), encouraging political irresponsibility and limited 
accountability, as local officials had to respond to their party coalition rather 
than the electorate (Di Virgilio 2005). In a context of partitocracy, or the 
omnipresence of political parties in social and economic institutions, 
paradoxically, and particularly at the local level, parties never had the 
capacity to exert strong political control (Pinson 2007). This was due to a 
very fragmented party system which would open the way to coalition-making 
games to practice the so-called lottizzazione, or sharing out assessori (local 
ministers) positions. This would result in further weakening of mayors and, 
as different political tendencies would influence local administration, in “the 
blurring of political strategies, when there were any” (ibid:120).  
At the national level, the 142/1990 Act was emblematic of Parliament 
and central government’s paralysis, as political actors were incapable of 
promoting any substantial reforms. Although this bill introduced important 
changes in terms of local autonomy, by reducing the council’s powers and 
proposing a clearer distinction between political and administrative 
functions, it fell short of changing electoral rules or the substantial form of 
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local government, because the delicate party balance of power would not 
have allowed it (ibid.).36 The Italian partitocracy, weakened by growing 
support for the separatist party Northern League (Lega Nord), eventually 
collapsed under Tangentopoli and the Mani Pulite (Clean hands) 
investigation on party corruption. Several local administrations were 
dissolved, as many local administrators were prosecuted, while a parliament 
of indicted politicians could hardly oppose the growing pressure exerted by a 
popular referendum movement backing the direct election of mayors. Law 
81, introducing direct mayoral elections, was finally passed in March 1993, to 
avoid a referendum that would have otherwise taken place the following 
month (ibid.).  
The 1993 Act set a limit of two consecutive mandates37 and introduced 
several other innovations, such as the majority system for the election of the 
council and the power for mayors to appoint and revoke the assessori.38 The 
giunta and the council are now clearly separate, as the assessori do not need 
to be chosen from within the council.39 In order to increase the stability of 
local government, the new balance of power favours the executive, as the 
mayor now represents the local administration before the citizens, and the 
council has been deprived of many of its powers (see Catanzaro et al 2002). 
Council meetings are no longer chaired by the mayor, as this role requires 
impartiality and can impact on the mayor’s position as the head of the 
community, given the partisan bases through which he/ she has acquired and 
holds office (Newell 2007). Instead, the council members elect their 
president. The council retains an important power, the no confidence vote in 
the mayor, but, in order to offset the risk of political retaliation, such a vote 
determines the dissolution of the entire administration and results in new 
elections (ibid.). 
Soon after Tangentopoli, directly-elected mayors were expected to 
offer a counterweight to a de-legitimised parliament and de-structured 
national parties (Di Virgilio 2005), as the new reform opened “an innovative 
cycle in the recruitment process of the municipal leaders” (Bettin and 
Magnier 1995:91). The 1993 Act and the 1994 bill on the majoritarian rule for 
national elections40 interpreted the deep sense of distrust towards the 
gigantic party machines of the First Republic and represented an attempt to 
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dramatically alter the balance of power between national political parties and 
their candidates, and between central and local government. The rationale 
behind the reforms was thus to change policies through changing politics, by 
freeing mayors and their local executives from party pressures, while 
fostering a more efficient bureaucracy, independent from political influence 
(Trigilia 2002).41  
In the first round of elections after the reform, mayors without 
political experience displayed great success, in contrast with previous trends 
towards a long career within strict party structures. Mayors now sought to be 
the expression of all that was innovative in the new electoral system. Even 
when they were in fact old politicians, since they had managed to free 
themselves from the tight limitations of the previous institutional system, 
they were able to portray themselves as novel (Trigilia 2002). In fact, the 
most successful mayors were perhaps those who were able to combine 
political abilities with personal charisma and resources, as administrative 
competence and communication skills became pivotal qualities.42 Within the 
previous political system, on the contrary, control over party organisations 
and vertical ties to influential politicians, who could offer access to higher 
institutional levels, represented the most valuable resources for a mayor 
(ibid.).  
Several mayors and assessori, especially in the case of technical 
experts with limited previous political experience, have undervalued the 
importance of relations with local interests, whereas, prior to the reform, 
local leaders would influence policies by relying on clientelistic networks 
operating through party channels (see Chubb 1982). On the one hand, the 
reforms have increased the salience of mayors in mobilising resources for 
their territory. On the other hand they have triggered a shift towards that 
“administrative activism” by which Tarrow (1977) describes the French 
mayor, as he is involved in “an informal structure that follows the formal 
nexus between the mayor and [higher level] state officials and opens up to 
him a number of pathways within the administrative system for the 
satisfaction of his community needs” (Tarrow 1977:136). After the reform 
these managerial and consensus-building skills were required by new Italian 
mayors (Newell 2007).43 
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Galvanised by the high level of accountability built into the new 
electoral system, which gave them visibility and popularity, the new mayors 
soon formed a “mayors’ party”, across traditional ideological and territorial 
divides,44 which proved instrumental in building public pressure for 
devolution of power and resources that Rome was reluctant to grant (Pasotti 
2007). Administrative federalism (Vandelli 2004) came in 1997 with Laws 
59 and 127, sponsored by the Minister of Civil Service and Regional Affairs, 
Franco Bassanini. Services were transferred closer to citizens, based on the 
principle of subsidiarity, breaking the pattern of central appointments 
(Pasotti 2007). Mayors no longer had to swear loyalty to the prefetti, the 
local representatives of central government; city managers were introduced 
for municipalities above 15,000 inhabitants, while municipal secretaries were 
now appointed by mayors, who could also hire managers on a contract basis 
(ibid.). As in other western European countries, these laws followed new 
ideals of public management (Baccetti 2008), whereby the common narrative 
held that institutional changes could give local leaders a more clear-cut role 
in setting strategies and a vision of local development (Rao 1993; Stoker 
1999; Larsen 2002; Berg and Rao 2005). 
During the late 1990s several other reforms reinforced devolutionary 
trends and enhanced regional autonomy: the 1999 Act, by altering art. 121 
and 126 of the Italian Constitution, institutionalised the direct election of 
regional presidents, consistently with the 1995 reform of the regional 
electoral system that aimed at augmenting stability, through introducing 
voting thresholds and a majority premium.45 The 1999 Act was intended to be 
transitory, eventually replaced by the Regions’ own statutes to regulate their 
form of government and electoral law.46 These reforms made it necessary to 
alter the Constitution, which now appeared inconsistent with the new 
institutional order. Thus in 2001, following a referendum, changes were 
introduced to the second part of Title V of the Italian Constitution, which 
regulates the division of powers and responsibilities among all tiers of 
government. The Constitution now recognises the same degree of authority 
to each level, yet different competencies based on the principle of vertical 
subsidiarity. Art. 118 of Title V redefines the concept of local autonomy, as 
administrative functions are automatically devolved to municipalities, unless 
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clearly stated otherwise. This article also introduces the principle of 
horizontal subsidiarity, whereby national and local government are 
encouraged to promote autonomous citizen initiatives and popular 
participation, with regard to policies of greatest interest to the population.  
Furthermore, under Title V independent interregional and 
international relations of Italian local authorities are encouraged, in order to 
offset the democratic deficit created by new supranational centres of decision 
and policy-making; art. 119 was also amended to introduce greater financial 
autonomy for local authorities. On top of conferring greater autonomy to 
ordinary statute regions,47 Title V, under art. 116, constitutionally recognises 
the possibility of differentiated competencies among regions, depending on 
their capacity (and their financial resources).48  
There are several limits to these reforms in terms of their 
implementation, the most striking being that, to date, a Senate of the Regions 
has not been established. This would guarantee a representation of Regions 
within Parliament, where legislative decisions that affect the organisation of 
local government are taken. A code to regulate autonomies, as per art. 118, 
has not been elaborated yet, although a bill on fiscal federalism, strongly 
supported by Lega Nord, was passed by Parliament in 2009.49 Generally 
there still exists much confusion with regard to the relation between central 
government and local authorities in terms of competencies, as demonstrated 
by state initiatives such as the bill on urban planning (Piano Casa 2008), 
which raised a constitutional conflict, as the State expected to legislate on a 
policy area that is the responsibility of regional administrations.  
 
The Impact of the Mayoral Reform On Local Democracy 
Overall the mayoral reform is perceived by several scholars as 
successful (see among others Dente 1997; Baldini 2002; Caciagli 2005; 
Newell 2007). Although it failed in its most noble intent of reversing the 
negative trend of declining voting turnouts and increasing the legitimacy of 
local administrations, the reform has augmented local government’s stability 
and transformed the mayor into the “head of the local state” with substantial 
powers (Newell 2007:171). Baldini (2002) shows that between 1972 and 1989 
less than 1 percent of 904 giunte (local cabinets) in 95 provincial capitals 
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would last for a whole five-year term, while most would dissolve within one 
year. By contrast, between 1993 and 2001, only in ten cases the municipal 
giunta failed to survive due to political conflicts (Newell 2007). In terms of 
technical resources and know-how, the new reforms, by allowing mayors to 
select members of the executive often based on their technical skills and 
professional experience, have at least increased local capacity to mobilise 
more competent bureaucracies (Dente 1997).  
With regard to financial resources, by introducing new revenue-raising 
capacities for local authorities, the balance of power has improved for 
municipalities, but they still depend on regional and central transfers (Dente 
1997).50 The new tax levying powers are clearly constrained by people’s 
unwillingness to bear further taxation, while the stability pact, which local 
authorities have to abide by, inhibits local spending capacity. Overall there is 
still a deep discrepancy between the new responsibilities devolved to local 
authorities and their financial resources.51 Thus, new mayors often 
experience a dilemma, which is built into the reform itself, and is well 
encapsulated by Trigilia’s “decisional illusion” (l’illusione decisionista) 
(2005): although they enjoy greater visibility and personalisation, they have 
limited or no access to the required resources to match their new 
responsibilities, manage complex partnerships, and meet citizens’ high 
expectations (Borraz and John 2004). The reform has generated the illusion 
that to separate the bureaucracy from politics would be enough to engender 
greater efficiency and that a visible local leader would ensure prompt 
decision-making (Trigilia 2005).  
Initially, the sharp political crisis following Mani Pulite, which literally 
swept away the mass parties that governed the country during the First 
Republic, dramatically enhanced the effects of the reforms and translated 
into even greater autonomy for local political actors.52 Parties gradually 
started to restructure themselves and regained an important space within the 
new local political arena, exerting greater influence on the composition of 
local executives (Trigilia 2002; Di Virgilio 2005; Calise 2006; Pasotti 2007), 
only to face a new legitimacy crisis more recently, following corruption 
scandals and their inability to manage the economic crisis. At the latest local 
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elections in 2012 and national elections in 2013, civic lists and grassroots 
movements capitalised on party weakness.  
Personal resources become a necessary, yet not sufficient, condition 
for mayors to capitalise on the political space, while the local party structure 
will also play a pivotal role. The parties behind a mayor might be more or less 
cohesive and display different degrees of strength and capacity in 
pressurising the local leader; hence different combinations of more or less 
charismatic mayors and more or less cohesive party systems might help 
explain the variance among municipalities in terms of leadership strength 
(Catanzaro et al. 2002; Trigilia 2005).53 
The reforms have certainly altered the balance of power within local 
democracy. In practice, there has been a presidentialisation of local 
government, as power tends to concentrate in the hands of mayors and their 
giunta. Within a system that gives predominance to the executive, 
councillors inevitably suffer from a legitimacy crisis. As electoral mechanisms 
guarantee more solid support for the administration, the opposition tends to 
be relegated to a toothless role and the only effective instrument that the 
opposition can use to exert some degree of control, albeit minimal, over the 
cabinet is the budget (Catanzaro et al 2002). The continuing re-organisation 
process of political parties, which still experience great difficulties in 
developing a stable two-bloc system, translates into deep fragmentation of 
Italian councils (Baccetti 1999; Baldini and Legnante 2000; Minaldi and 
Riolo 2005). Empirical findings from the four case studies confirm that 
today’s main political parties are evanescent structures little-rooted in the 
territory and offering few opportunities for democratic debate, as they appear 
incapable of channelling public participation.54 Within a political culture 
increasingly dominated by personalisation, parties no longer offer spaces of 
deliberation for council members to study and discuss policies and measures, 
while councillors’ party allegiance is increasingly loose. Belotti and Maraffi 
(1994) suggest that parties only intervene on policy issues that directly 
concern them as organisations, such as recruiting candidates and selecting 
their elites. Other scholars, however, argue that parties continue to control 
the distribution of roles within municipal companies and agencies (Baccetti 
1999 and 2008) and influence urban policies. Based on the four case studies, 
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party influence would seem to be external (through party secretariats) and 
the presence of parties within the council is only felt at the moment of voting.  
Councillors lack political expertise, which is a consequence of 
reinforcing the role of the “party in the institutions” model to the detriment 
of the “party in the society” (Minaldi and Riolo 2005:152). Insufficient 
political know-how appears to have exacerbated the effects of a reduction of 
competencies. There are few council initiatives and administration is carried 
out through executive acts (atti di giunta) or administrative decisions 
(determine dirigenziali), which councillors seem unable to oversee 
effectively.55 Nearly 20 years since the reforms took effect in Italy, councillors 
still seem to sit uneasily with their new functions of steering and scrutiny, 
which they do not seem to understand fully, and which they are not always 
able to exert, because of limited political expertise and administrative 
competence.56 The governmental stability ensured by the reform thus comes 
at a considerable price, as the council loses its incisiveness.57 
The cabinet thinks it is omnipotent, because of the competencies the law gives 
it. So the cabinet is happy to do without the council. We, as councillors, had the 
feeling that for the mayor the council was no more than some useless ornament, 
something to tolerate because you can’t do otherwise. And more or less all 
mayors have this attitude. They never say, “Here’s the council group, we should 
go and ask them what they think of this particular act”. Not at all! Instead the 
reasoning goes like this, “We prepare the act and then we show it to them and 
let’s hope they’re OK with it. If not, we’ll make them.”  [PR46 - Former 
President of the Council] 
 
The vote of no-confidence often becomes a weapon of “mutually assured 
destruction” (Copus 2006:145) which can safeguard the system against 
frivolous and politically motivated no confidence motions in the mayor, but 
leaves little room for contributions from the council.  
Many in the majority, even when they don’t agree with the executive’s choices, 
lament they’re not consulted or involved enough. So several councillors support 
the executive that decides on its own – the councillor is only here to raise his 
hand. [...] Here’s the famous blackmailing effect of the reform. If the mayor asks 
his majority to vote for a particular measure, some councillors will agree, others 
won’t. But those who don’t agree will still have to say yes. [...] [SS13 - 
Councillor, opposition] 
 
The devolution of competencies to the local level and the phenomenon 
of full time executive leaders are pushing towards the professionalisation of 
politics (Berg and Rao 2005). This increases the gap between a 
professionalised executive and a council of laymen politicians and further 
decreases the council’s clout. Clearly, professionalisation and political 
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accountability are interrelated. If professional politicians are granted greater 
autonomy, they will have to be held accountable during terms and not just at 
election times.  
When the administrative level (CEOs and “technical” assessori) is 
strengthened the role of elected representatives in implementing policies will 
be diminished and this will affect their responsiveness to the electorate (Berg 
and Rao 2005). The rationale behind the Bassanini’s reforms was to separate 
politics from the bureaucracy, but greater autonomy of public service 
directors further reduces the scrutiny and planning capacity of the council.58 
Thus, what has effectively, if not procedurally, become a local presidential 
system is missing a strong framework of checks and balances.  
Directors were given great powers [by the reform]. They are not assessori; in 
the public service they are protected by trade unions rights, thus their 
autonomy is strong. Many public service CEOs perceive themselves as the ones 
in charge, since they see politicians as something short-stay. [LE39 - Councillor, 
majority] 
 
Councillors seem to lack the capacity to exert control functions over the 
executive, two out of three auditors are appointed by the council (hence by 
the majority) and the Court of Auditors (Corte dei Conti) only acts ex-post.  
This is why our communes’ balance sheets are a disaster, because there is no 
system of checks and balances. The auditors, strangely, are appointed by the 
majority. So even the auditors […] respond to the executive. [LE29 – Councillor, 
opposition] 
 
As administration rests in the hands of public service directors and the 
mayor (and his cabinet), there is a strong case for the reinforcement of 
effective checks and balances mechanisms. The amateurism of the council 
does not appear to sit comfortably with a goal oriented and scrutiny role, 
which requires greater political sophistication and administrative 
competence. Councillors’ powers of scrutiny should be enhanced, while their 
lack of competence should be compensated for through compulsory courses 
on administration and policy-making. Laymen politicians, who still represent 
a great resource for local democracy, cannot be expected to be experts on all 
administrative issues, but their role could perhaps be enhanced by 
strengthening commissions and their influence.  
The problem of weak political checks and balances is not one to 
underestimate. It ensues from a reform that concentrates power in the hands 
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of the mayor and public service CEOs to the detriment of the representative 
body par excellence - the council – and should be of paramount importance 
to local government scholars and policy-makers, since it affects the quality of 
local democracy as well as the efficiency of local administration. Such a 
democratic deficit cannot be overcome through simply relying on governance 
mechanisms, which often serve to reinforce the mayor’s legitimacy in 
between elections. SP, rather than being perceived as an instrument to 
legitimise the executive (bypassing the local council) and to further the 
mayor’s own political project could contribute to enhancing the role of 
councillors as scrutinisers. The new functions of the council of steering and 
scrutiny should be exercised precisely over the long term development 
projects and strategic measures that SP seeks to elaborate. Ad hoc 
commissions of councillors, representative of both majority and opposition, 
could thus work together with civil society experts and citizens within the 
new participatory arenas. This would also help to safeguard the collective 
nature of SP against political divides.  
The next section will examine how political reforms have encouraged 
the emergence of new governance mechanisms and will review the legal 
framework that supports these arrangements. 
 
Local governance and Participation in Italy 
Urban Planning 
Italian local governance is constrained by several historical factors. A 
rigid legal framework and administrative fragmentation make the local 
system vulnerable to clientelism and corruption, because “the issuing of 
construction licenses and the enforcement of building codes and zoning 
regulations are the exclusive domain of local administrations” (Chubb 
1982:128). Discretion in assigning public tenders has contributed to fuelling 
corruption (Della Porta 2006:242). The local bureaucracy has historically 
hindered local policy implementation, because of low levels of specialisation 
and administrative capacity. In the past political affiliation guaranteed 
certain privileges to bureaucrats, and in fact in the 1980s a large percentage 
of local government officers was a party member (Della Porta 2006:238).  
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Since the 1980s, following the process of deindustrialization, cities 
have looked at the real estate market as the engine of new economic activity, 
favouring the influence of property developers on urban planning (Khakee & 
Barbanente, 2003; Governa and Saccomani, 2004; Healey, 2007).59 Local 
administrations were thus vulnerable to business interests (Pacione, 1987; 
Balducci, 2003; Cognetti & Cottino, 2003; Healey, 2007), and in this context 
political parties would control access to resources and mediate among 
various interests (Crosta 1990:276). Both political institutions and the 
bureaucracy showed low levels of planning capacity and policy elaboration 
was often delegated to experts, often from academia (Dente 1990). 
As a reaction to weak planning regulations, a community of 
“reformists” (planners, academic, and practitioners) emerged to reinforce 
regulatory planning, to constrain the activities of private actors (Pinson 
2007). However, as each territorial level had its own regulatory plan, 
regulatory documents and plans started piling up, to the point that the 
management of the planning system became unmanageable. The elaboration 
of plans became an excessively long process and local authorities, confronted 
with pressing housing issues, were often forced to grant derogations and in 
the absence of a clear regulatory framework, urban development became an 
anarchical affair  (ibid.).  
The 1990s reforms discussed in the previous section attempted to 
change the rules of the institutional game, but the only tangible effects were 
on political dynamics, as the mayor gained powers and visibility vis-à-vis the 
council and political parties. On policies, notwithstanding the strengthening 
of the new instruments that local authorities enjoy, the difference with the 
past is less apparent (Baccetti 1999). However, the European urban 
programmes, with their emphasis on the regeneration of poor 
neighbourhoods, have had an important impact, as they provide new 
methodological tools in terms of direct interventions and governance 
processes (Pinson 2007). 
Concepts of negotiation, integration, and participation have become 
popular ideas in urban policy and regeneration (Balducci and Fareri 1998; 
Gualini 2001). Since 1992 the Ministry of Public Works (incorporated into 
the Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport since 2001) issued several 
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national urban renewal programmes, such as the 1998 Programmi di 
riqualificazione urbana e sviluppo sostenibile del territorio (Urban Renewal 
and Sustainable Development of Territories Programmes) and in 2003 the 
Contratti di Quartiere II (Neighborhood Contracts II) (Governa and 
Saccomani 2004). The rationale underpinning these new policies is to 
promote social cohesion, urban regeneration, and economic development 
through an integrated approach of public, private, and civic stakeholders. 
Policy guidance and financial support from the European Union were pivotal 
in fostering these new initiatives (Gualini 2001; Barbanente and Tedesco 
2002), as the objectives and the terminology of European URBAN 
programmes have been incorporated into Italian urban policy, in rhetoric if 
not in practice. 
 
Development Policies 
As discussed in Chapter I, the new devolutionary trends need to be 
understood in the context of a significantly changed global economic order. 
In the post-Fordist economy, the relationship between the economy and the 
territory is redefined: firms no longer function autonomously from the local 
environment and the role of the place in elaborating development strategies 
is emphasised. New models of production are more oriented towards 
flexibility and quality, especially within more developed countries, which 
have to respond to costs-based competition from developing economies 
(Trigilia 2005). The focus is now on local competitive advantage, or the local 
collective competition goods a place can produce. In this respect, local 
government has a pivotal role to play in coordinating different interests and 
offer identity incentives. 
The EU is responding to this new context by fostering policies that aim 
to enhance the quality of the economic and social environment, through 
programmes that improve infrastructure and services and foster cooperation 
between private, public and social actors, and among different institutional 
levels. Such policies are not solely dependant on public institutions, neither 
do they represent an attempt to deregulate in favour of private interests. By 
contrast, these forms of social and economic regulations are based on 
agreements between public and private actors and are now encouraged at the 
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EU level through two main mechanisms, a regulated system and a voluntary 
one (Trigilia 2005). The policies for regional development promoted through 
structural funds or urban regeneration programmes under URBAN represent 
an important example of regulated strategies that, by introducing the concept 
of partnership, are now influencing national development policies.60 
Conversely, the successful experience of some local partnerships for 
development, which formed on a voluntary basis, have encouraged the EU to 
promote “European territorial pacts” (ibid.).  
The case of Italy is particularly interesting, as perhaps the most 
obvious characteristic of the Italian economy is the sharp disparity between 
weak areas (generally in the South of the country) and strong areas.61 It is 
worth emphasising that Italy has always been characterised by a culture of 
reforms, which had already driven a process, albeit limited, of political and 
administrative decentralisation to the regional level during the 1970s.62 
Although reforms have often failed to alter the patterns of Italian politics, the 
principle of regional reform has always enjoyed great support by public 
opinion, in light of growing dissatisfaction with central government 
performance and national political parties (Bull and Newell 2005; see also 
Putnam 1993; Tarrow 1977).  
National development policies promoted during the 1970s and the 
1980s clearly neglected the issue of local development, as they were generally 
based on targeted incentives for certain sectors and more specifically for 
certain firms. Until the early 1990s, policies of territorial rebalancing still 
prescribed substantial public investment, though they were unable to 
promote “autonomous” local development (Trigilia 1992). If in the Centre-
North the absence of national policies of local development triggered a wide 
variety of voluntary experiments, which contributed to the emergence of 
successful industrial districts, in the South two main development models 
took place as a response: the first one from the bottom-up, based on informal 
economy and local traditions; the second one top-down, based around large 
firms – either local or exogenous – which would drive local businesses’ 
competitiveness (Burroni 2005).  
During the 1990s, with the end of the politics of “extraordinary” 
measures for Mezzogiorno and a new political role for local government 
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following the reforms, a different approach emerged, or what has been 
defined as Negotiated Planning (Programmazione negoziata), which 
includes instruments such as Territorial Pacts (Patti territoriali) or Area 
Contracts (Contratti d’area).63 Although forms of partnership between 
private and public actors, such as Programme Agreements (Accordi di 
programma), have existed in Italy since the 1970s (Salis et al 2006), initially 
they often entailed the public sector pouring resources into the private sector.  
Since the 1990s these arrangements have rapidly evolved; several laws 
have attempted to formalise partnerships and regulate inclusive decision-
making processes, as legislators gradually realised that complex issues could 
only be managed by involving all stakeholders.64 In terms of social policies, 
for instance, law 328/2000 on Piani di Zona (area plans) aims to reform 
social service management. The new law establishes a framework of vertical 
subsidiarity to balance the responsibilities of various political-administrative 
levels (national, regional, and municipal) and integrates social services with 
health, education, training, and employment policies. This new model 
identifies the third sector associations as actors entitled to co-participate in 
the design and the production of social services, but it also asserts the need to 
involve citizens/ stakeholders in the decision-making process, not just as 
direct beneficiaries, but also as local community members (Bifulco and 
Centemeri 2008). 
Territorial pacts have played an important role in local development, 
particularly in the South, and, although they started out as voluntary 
initiatives, they were soon proceduralised by CNEL (Consiglio nazionale per 
l’economia e il lavoro/ National Council for labour and the economy). Since 
1995, they have been regulated by CIPE under a 1996 law that defines 
negotiated planning as “the agreed regulation between public actors or 
between the relevant public actors and their private counterparts, to 
implement different policies with regard to the same development projects.” 
(Pichierri 2001:244).65  
Strategic planning (SP) emerges within this context between the late 
1990s and the early 2000s (see Chapter 1). The rationale behind all these 
governance arrangements is to encourage cooperation among local private 
and public actors through financial incentives, in order to implement 
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integrated projects for local development. Thus, instead of offering financial 
incentives to the private sector, the rationale underpinning these initiatives is 
to remove the obstacles that affect local production through enhancing 
material economies (i.e. infrastructures and services) and immaterial 
economies, such as social capacity (Trigilia 2005; see also Le Galès 1998, 
2001; Pichierri 2001; Santandrea 1997). As these experiences cannot be 
simply measured by the number of projects implemented or new 
employment opportunities created (Magnatti et al 2005), Trigilia (2005) 
suggests a more constructive approach: examining their impact in terms of 
the degree of integration among private initiatives; the improvement of 
public infrastructure and services that can enhance the local environment for 
business and citizens; the reinforcement of the public administration’s 
leadership and of local relational capacities and cooperation between 
institutional and private actors.  
These governance instruments, however, have come under harsh 
criticisms from many sides, because the decision-making process tends to be 
very slow and because they can encourage collusive practices among certain 
actors, who can form coalitions to access public financial resources, while 
eluding the requirement of integrating individual initiatives within a solid 
development project for the locality (Trigilia 2005). Ideas of collaborative 
governance often clash against a conservative civil service, which displays a 
clear discrepancy between formal procedures and actual practice. 
Fragmentation and compartmentalisation often result in poor cooperation 
between sectors, and attempts at reform have often failed, as unclear 
drafting, contradictions and overlapping facilitate the institutionalisation of 
deviant behaviour (Cassese 1999). This clearly impacts on the 
implementation of projects. However, the case studies show that public 
services are at least partly absorbing the new rationale of participation and 
collaborative governance. Although cross-sector integration and cooperation 
are not always easy to engender, some departments - and generally Social 
Policies and Education are at the forefront in this respect (TR2, SS14) - have 
opened stable channels with local associations and the third sector. Trento, 
Lecce, and Sassari have all set up offices whose function is to ensure 
72 
 
coordination among sectors and monitor calls for bids at regional, national, 
and European levels.  
Though legislators would generally believe that a clear separation 
between the bureaucracy and politics will ensure greater efficiency and less 
corruption, where the local political and private actors involved in these 
partnerships also play an active role in the management trust and are 
involved in project implementation, governance mechanisms show greater 
effectiveness (Piselli 2005; Trigilia 2005), perhaps because of higher 
accountability levels. All the case studies show that high levels of trust and 
cooperation between the mayor and the public service CEO in charge of SP 
increase the legitimacy, the inclusivity and the effectiveness of the process.  
 
The Importance of Leadership 
It is often believed that participatory mechanisms will benefit the most 
those places that need them the least. In fact, much of the literature on 
participatory democracy identifies pre-existing high levels of associationism 
as one pre-condition for collaborative mechanisms to work and be 
sustainable (Putnam 1993; Fung and Wright 2001; 2003; Heller 2001). The 
debate on whether local culture determines effective institutions and good 
governance, or whether leadership can drive innovations (thus contributing 
to changing the local culture and fostering social capital) has underpinned 
several studies explaining variance in Italian local government and 
governance over the past few decades.  
Putnam’s 20-year comparative study of Italian regions (1993) assesses 
differences in terms of economic productivity and development between the 
North and the South of Italy and explains the northern regions’ good 
government performance by their higher degree of “civic-ness” compared to 
the South, for which the presence of associations represented the main 
indicator. His work sparked a heated debate, as several authors have 
questioned whether all associations and forms of social capital favour 
democracy (Foley and Edwards 1997; Levi 1996) or why volunteer 
associations appear to be the main locus of social capital, while the role of 
employment, family or education is not considered (Cohen 1999; Newton 
1999). The main objection against Putnam’s work is that its focus is too 
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citizenry-oriented, while other important actors, such as government (Levi 
1996) or political agency, and centre-periphery relations (Tarrow 1977; 1996) 
are entirely neglected.66  
An understanding of social capital in terms of its dynamic evolution, 
following Coleman’s interpretation (1988), can represent a more effective 
tool to analyse the different outcomes of collaborative processes, which can 
encourage trust and cooperation (Piselli 2005). According to Coleman’s 
conceptualisation social capital depends on action.  Rather than pre-dating 
action, it emerges from it, often developing as its by-product as relations 
between people change in order to facilitate a specific action. On the contrary 
Putnam (1993) and Fukuyama (1995) force the concept and turn it into a 
feature of the whole social system, which facilitates democracy and economic 
development, whereby social capital is tautologically cause and effect of a 
phenomenon (Piselli 2005). Several study provide evidence that 
communities characterised by particularistic ties show high levels of social 
capital which has produced tangible benefits congruent with the actors’ 
objectives and the context where they acted (Arrighi and Piselli 1987; Piselli 
2005), engendering processes of horizontal cooperation  (Mutti 1994; 
Piattoni 1999).  
Putnam (1993) relies on a culturalist, path-dependent explanatory 
framework to account for variance among Italian regions in terms of levels of 
associationism and social capacity. By contrast scholars have often found that 
the outcomes of governance arrangements, such as territorial pacts, are not 
significantly influenced by the degree of local development or the level of pre-
existing social capital (Arrighi and Piselli 1987; Magnatti et al 2005; Piselli 
2005; Cerosimo and Wolleb 2006). In some instances, where civil society 
was particularly weak and fragmented the presence of a strong institutional 
leadership was able to encourage cooperation among local actors, promoting 
new social capital and enhancing local development.  
A leadership eager to build support might foster alliances with 
excluded or weaker social actors against political opponents (see Chapter 4 
on the case of the new centre-right majority in Prato and its relationship with 
neighbourhood organisations of leftwing voters excluded by the previous 
centre-left administration in). An innovative and autonomous leadership 
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(Evans’ embedded autonomy, 1996) with a clear development project might 
be interested in building social capacity and furthering redistributive 
strategies, to augment the locality’s competitive advantage and its own 
support base. Conversely, a weak leadership might be more vulnerable to 
party pressures or clientelistic ties with strong interests.67  
Within new participatory and collaborative arrangements, leadership 
has to have the capacity to coordinate and organise different interests, and to 
foster mutual trust within coherent and committed partnerships. It has to be 
capable of motivating and aggregating interests, as well as guaranteeing 
continuity between the initial phase and the operational phase (Piselli 2005), 
by ensuring all actors are clear about their responsibilities.  Thus, politics 
matter but it is no longer about the interventionist institutional actor which 
imposes top-down policies in a rigid fashion, rather leadership emerges 
through flexible practices which facilitate public discussion over policies and 
produce democratisation (Pinson 2002, 2005; Piselli 2005). 
 
Towards Facilitative Leadership 
Leadership is generally thought of as “a formal leader who either 
influences or transforms members of a group or organization – the followers 
– in order to achieve specified goals” (Huxham and Vangen, 2000: 1160). 
Some scholars offer a realpolitik portrait of leaders as individuals with 
charisma and authority who have to resort to “humbuggery and 
manipulation”, in order to gain and maintain power, by fostering the 
devotion of the masses and legitimacy and preeminence within their 
entourage, which will generally include potential opponents (Bailey 1988; 
2001). Others will stress the value-shaping role of leadership. Selznick (1957) 
distinguishes leadership from office-holding or high prestige decision-
making, and introduces the concept of the institutional leader who works to 
meet social needs and “is primarily an expert in the promotion and 
protection of values" (ibid:28).68 Creative leadership can infuse meaning and 
purpose into organisations, which will embody new and enduring values 
through socially integrating myths. “For creative leadership, it is not the 
communication of a myth that counts; rather, creativity depends on having 
the will and the insight to see the necessity of the myth, to discover a 
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successful formulation, and above all to create the organizational conditions 
that will sustain the ideals expressed” (ibid:151). Dente (1999) believes that 
politicians play a pivotal role in the policies that entails innovation in terms 
of values and goals.  
The myth and values, however, often represent simplifications and 
purified images conveyed to the people, while the leader and his entourage 
will keep the real world in mind. Thus, duplicity inevitably characterises the 
behaviour of effective leaders (Bayley 1988). Far from being virtuous, if they 
want to remain in office, leaders will circumvent the normative code 
regulating competition for power, through strategic rules and pragmatic 
evasions, as they “make and unmake competing definitions of truth” (Bayley 
2001:208).69 Overall, beyond the sometimes petty political interests that 
inevitably go with leadership, the general assumption is that, while systems 
and structures can substitute for leadership when change is not required, 
before a crisis or when fundamental change is necessary, there is no 
substitute for leadership (Bryson and Crosby 1992; Bayley 2001).  
Governance mechanisms such as Strategic Planning purportedly aim 
to engender change and require a leadership with a vision. However, while 
traditionally in the literature on leadership followers are believed to be 
incapable of resolving problems and fully rely on leaders (Susskind and 
Crushank 2006), here they become key actors. This approach to local 
government may bring about a ‘recombination’ of modes of local regulation, 
which leaves more room for self-organizational dynamics (Pinson 2005). 
Nevertheless, particularly in contexts “where incentives to participate are 
weak, power and resources are asymmetrically distributed, and prior 
antagonisms are high, leadership becomes all the more important” (Ansell 
and Gash, 2007: 555). In fact, within participatory processes particular 
individuals who act as catalysts often emerge (Abers 2003).  
As these arenas are infused “with value differences, conflicts, and 
mutual interdependence”, leadership now requires “something other than 
traditional leaders with formal political authority which they exercise over 
others” (Bussu and Bartels 2013). Political institutions, far from being 
nullified, are expected to play a different role in stimulating “multilateral 
exchanges, which will produce norms of behaviour and reciprocity” (Pinson 
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2002:14). Leadership thus becomes facilitative, which ensues not from 
formal political authority over others, but from working with others to 
achieve results through an inclusive process (Susskind and Crushank, 2006; 
Svara, 2008).70  
There exists a rich literature on the facilitative leadership of “collaborative 
public managers” (Kickert and Koppenjan, 1997), “consensus builders” 
(Susskind, 1999), “deliberative practitioners” (Forester, 1999), “boundary 
spanners” (Williams, 2002), “everyday fixers” (Hendriks and Tops, 2005), 
and “exemplary practitioners” (Van Hulst et al., 2011).71 Facilitative 
leadership here is understood as “skilful, situated performance” (Bussu and 
Bartels 2013). For instance, “facilitative leaders can only become ‘champions’ 
of a project if they have a ‘sponsor’ who gives political backing to their often 
unconventional practices” (ibid.). Furthermore, when talking about 
facilitative leadership the focus is not simply on facilitative leaders as one or 
two key individuals that govern the process, but “on leadership as accruing 
from the activities of many” (ibid.), as different stakeholders can take the 
lead on specific issues.72 Effective leadership is often a “collective enterprise” 
involving several people with different roles at different times (Bryson 2004). 
As they understand the context and the people involved, they can sponsor, 
champion, and facilitate the process, use dialogue and discussion, make and 
implement decisions, settle disputes and residual conflicts (ibid.).  
The challenges facilitative leadership faces are manifestations of intricate and 
intractable problems bound up with socio-economic inequalities, multi-level 
governance arrangements, political power struggles, and deep-seated 
differences. This requires the ability to work through pre-held assumptions, 
strong emotions, and the engrained perceptions held by stakeholders […] These 
challenges, and the need for the democratic capacity to jointly resolve them, are 
unlikely to stop when a project or partnership ends. Instead, facilitative 
leadership should enable an ongoing process of deepening local democracy.” 
(Bussu and Bartels 2013).  
 
The conflict between short-term political interests and long-term 
collective goods is one great challenge for those involved in participatory 
mechanisms. There is great pressure, often of a political nature, to endorse 
specific, apparently easier and faster solutions, which are often sub-optimal 
and not particularly useful (Kingdon 1984; Bryson and Crosby 1992). 
Political leaders might find their ability to implement decisions constrained 
by the bureaucracy, with its institutionalised rules and working practices and 
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entrenched personnel obstructive towards change (Bryson 2004). In this 
respect, a charismatic leadership, with a coherent and collective project in 
which the local bureaucracy has also been involved, could successfully 
engender change within the local institutional culture (Selznick 1957; Tendler 
1997). As examined in Chapter 1, participatory mechanisms are often 
understood by political elites in functionalistic terms, “[t]herefore, it is 
paramount to understand whether and how facilitative leadership can offset 
the risk of developing into technocratic leadership serving a functionalistic 
rationale and, instead, fulfil the promise of genuine democratic innovation 
and a collaborative mindset” (Bussu and Bartels 2013). 
The four case studies show how leadership often entailed the 
coordinated work of political elites (generally the mayor and/ or one 
assessore) and a public service CEO. Whereas the former would act as the 
sponsor of the SP, offering legitimacy and resources, the second would be its 
champion, organising and managing the process, and keeping SP high on 
people’s, and politicians’, agenda (Bryson 2004; Hendriks and Tops 2005). 
This political and administrative leadership will have access to regulative and 
redistributive resources and to higher institutional levels that control funds, 
and in this respect it is in a privileged position to act as coordinator of 
different economic and social interests. If some scholars (Dente 1999) see the 
key role of politicians as drivers of innovative policies, all four case studies 
emphasise the contribution of public services CEOs as policy innovators, as 
the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats is based on the sharing 
of both policy objectives and instruments to realise them.  
 
Methodology 
The Dependent Variable 
The main objective of this study is to understand the impact of SP on 
three dimensions, as examined in Chapter 1: the formation of the collective 
actor, the democratic process, and the implementation phase. SP can in fact 
be a vehicle for the formation of a collective actor, by encouraging collective 
decision-making and fostering common interests through the 
institutionalisation of collective action and integration mechanisms, in order 
to produce innovative development strategies that will require internal and 
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external representation, perhaps through a visible directly-elected mayor 
capable of animating the local polity (see Pichierri 1997 on the collective 
actor in Chapter 1). Identity incentives will have to be elaborated that can 
aggregate interests around a common vision safeguarding the process against 
opportunistic behaviour.  
In terms of the democratic process, all participants (institutional 
actors and strong economic interests, as well as citizen associations or non-
organised interests) can potentially contribute by taking part and interacting 
with the other stakeholders (Segatori 2007). In fact, SP can help to reinforce 
and diffuse a deliberative approach, as an alternative to non-transparent elite 
decision-making behind closed doors, or to the corporatist practices that 
often impede any substantive development (Donolo 2003). Clearly the main 
issue here will be how truly inclusive and non-opportunistic the process will 
prove. There will be inevitable asymmetric relationships among participants, 
since certain actors will always play a more important role than others (i.e. 
the president of a trade association vs. the president of a cultural 
association); but the mode of participation (i.e. which interests are invited 
and which are excluded or exclude themselves and why, how actors interact 
and what effective influence they have and are perceived to have by other 
participants) can make a difference to the process. In terms of the empirical 
analysis the focus is on the level of inclusiveness, the number and the nature 
of the stakeholders involved, the methodologies employed to facilitate the 
debate, and the corollary participatory initiatives that developed around the 
SP. Factors such as the stakeholders’ perceived influence on the final plan 
and the degree of their involvement in the implementation and monitoring 
phases represent important indicators of the level of inclusiveness of the 
process, in order to determine how/ if this affected outcomes.  
With regard to the final dimension, implementation, this study 
acknowledges a general difficulty of local government (particularly in the 
case of medium-sized cities that enjoy fewer human and financial resources) 
to translate the process into tangible results or outputs. The objective is to 
further elucidate the reasons behind the weakness of the operational phase 
while also focusing on longer term outcomes, whether direct or unintended. 
In fact measuring the degree of success of SP solely based on the number of 
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projects implemented and the relation between the expectations set out in 
the final plan and the actual results would be reductive. Other elements will 
be considered as indicators of value added in terms of governance dynamics: 
the effectiveness of strategies, the degree of institutional learning and 
influence on working practices, increased intersectoral and interlevel 
cooperation, and associational networking (see table 7.1).  
The empirical research will therefore try to assess whether SP was able 
to start the process of formation of a collective actor and of communities of 
practice around a certain vision of the future, through new channels between 
institutions and less structured/ weaker associations; whether greater inter-
sectoral and inter-institutional cooperation was encouraged across tiers of 
government both at a political and at an administrative level; to what degree 
the new working practices required by SP were incorporated by public 
services;73 whether the working groups and deliberative forums of 
participatory process fostered new cooperation between stakeholders. 
In each case, the final plan is examined to identify the rationale, the 
ambitions, the expectations, as well as the degree of awareness of the 
development potential of the locality and its polity. The development model 
elaborated through SP is generally based around two main dimensions: 
liveability and competition (Segatori 2007). The first dimension is associated 
with sustainable development, hence the concern for future generation vs. 
the global risk society (Beck 1992), but it is also linked to concepts of social 
cohesion and empowerment vs. fragmentation and isolation of individual 
family nuclei, and the sense of social and institutional neglect perceived by 
weaker segments of the population (see Donolo 2003; Segatori 2007). The 
competition dimension, on the other hand, allows the city to respond to 
economic and structural decline, by promoting a novel image of the territory 
and encouraging innovative, hence competitive, production structures 
(Segatori 2007). Here the main issue is the dialectic relationship between the 
liveability and the competition dimension, or the relationship between the 
social and the economic sphere. In fact, although the rationale underpinning 
SP should be a balanced approach to development, which coherently 
integrates economic profitability and attention to social issues and 
community building, some (economic) projects are generally given priority 
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over other (social) projects, because stronger interests are behind them, or 
because of the economic advantages they promise (ibid.). Projects that 
encourage social capacity, cohesion and sustainability are often relegated to a 
minor role, although they still have a highly symbolic value in the 
communicative process. The case studies will show how infrastructural 
projects still get the lion’s share: in all four plans all flagship projects are 
infrastructural and represent the link between the SP and the Town Plan, 
which responds to a more traditional understanding of planning. 
 
The Independent Variable 
Leadership is the independent variable of this study and it will 
influence the outcomes of the process. Within governance mechanism such 
as SP a facilitative leadership will be pivotal in providing identity incentives 
and ensuring internal integration and external integration (Pichierri 1997; Le 
Galès 2002). The first aspect refers to the leadership’s capacity to integrate 
different interests, in order to pursue development strategies. The new local 
strategies need to be represented and defended to the outside world – and 
this is the second aspect, or external integration – to the EU, the State, and 
other regional and sub-regional governments, so as to develop the political 
capacity to situate the locality within the larger context of inter-state 
interaction and extract resources from higher tiers of government (ibid.).74  
Short-term political interests and the local political structure might 
encourage or hinder the emergence of a facilitative leadership capable of 
integrating interests and guaranteeing continuity between the initial phase 
and the operational phase. Local political elites might have an interest in 
opening an inclusive process, in order to alter the balance of power with 
opponents to increase their visibility and widen their support base, or with 
higher tiers of government in order to have access to more resources and 
augment their competencies over policies. Local leaders might be stronger or 
weaker, enjoy more or less personal support, and have a greater or lower 
incentive to increase their legitimacy also through participatory instruments. 
Indicators for the strength of local leadership will be the personal support 
enjoyed by the mayor (percentage of votes), the strength of the coalition in 
power (number of mandates) and variance in the degree of fragmentation or 
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cohesiveness of the local political structure, which will either constrain or 
reinforce the autonomy of local political leaders.  
The previous section has examined the debate on the local culture vs. 
leadership. Pre-existing high associational levels are expected to enhance 
participatory mechanisms, as a strong social fabric will sustain participation 
and offer a counterpoint to political and business elites, ensuring greater 
government accountability. By contrast, strong associations could use the 
new deliberative arenas to further corporatist interests, and governance 
could thus encourage collusive behaviours between community leaders and 
political elites, while excluding weaker or non-organised interests (Tarrow 
1994). The role of leadership will thus enhance or hinder the role of local 
associations. The pre-existing associational dynamics variable is here 
assumed as an intervening variable. Local associations can be more or less 
collaborative (the cases of Lecce and Prato are elucidatory in this respect), 
although this will often depend on the degree of inclusiveness displayed by 
the local leadership and/or how substantive the process is perceived to be by 
stakeholders.75  
In terms of implementation and cross-sectoral cooperation, 
institutional constraints and dynamics of multilevel governance (or lack 
thereof) might affect the role and impact of local leaders. On the one hand, 
these new governance arrangements are often encouraged by the 
institutional rhetoric, at regional, national, and supranational level. On the 
other hand, political rivalries between regional and local government might 
affect policy outcomes, as certain projects, or certain partnerships, might be 
ostracised. More often the main constraints with regard to higher 
jurisdictional levels will be of an institutional nature, as the lack of 
coordination and a different approach to planning might determine 
fragmentation of local initiatives. Multi-level governance is thus the second 
intervening variable considered. 
One important dimension in the relationship between the local 
leadership vis-à-vis other levels of government is represented by the 
proceduralisation of SP for Southern cities, as explained in Chapter 1. This 
also allows for comparative analysis between the two Centre-North cases, 
where SP was an entirely voluntary experience, and the two Southern cases, 
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where there were regional-level financial incentives to open the process. On 
the one hand, these incentives can further restrict local autonomy, as local 
authorities will be reliant on regional/ European funds to implement their 
projects. Furthermore their capacity/ incentive to extract resources from the 
private sector or to integrate SP into their ordinary administration will be 
inhibited, as SP will be perceived by politicians and the public administration 
as an “extraordinary measure”. Projects will be elaborated based on the 
criteria and requirements to access funds, which might foster blueprints 
rather than original plans that respond to truly local challenges. On the other 
hand, the availability of funds might encourage participation (although it 
could also foster opportunistic behaviours) and help to reinforce 
interdependence between stakeholders, as actors recognise the SP meetings 
as a substantive decision-making arena.  
Figure 2.1 summarises the variables and their inter-relations. 
 
Figure 2.1 VARIABLES  
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The Case Studies 
A comparative study of four subnational entities within the same 
country allows for greater control of country-level institutional variables 
(Bukowski et al 2003). The literature generally pays more attention to either 
large cities or regions (Bukowski et al 2003; Keating et al 2003; Piattoni and 
Smyrl 2003), examining their new role vis-à-vis nation states and 
supranational centres of power. Medium-sized cities, however, were 
preferred because of their greater representativeness of the Italian and 
European urban context. These cities also face fierce economic competition 
at the national and global levels, as they struggle to increase their territorial 
competitive advantage. However, they enjoy considerably fewer resources 
and less bargaining power than larger cities vis-à-vis higher tiers of 
government, while they also need to manage ever complex challenges from 
below and from above (from the restructuring of politics to the need of 
reinventing their development path in the face of global competition; from 
demographic changes to migration flows, and the issue of increasingly 
fragmented societies). These four cities (Trento, Prato, Lecce, and Sassari) 
display deep differences in terms of economic development, socio-political 
and cultural context. They are emblematic cases of different areas of the 
country: Trento in the North-East, the white belt long dominated by the 
Christian Democrats and catholic associations; Prato in the Centre, the 
epicentre of the so-called red-belt, traditionally the stronghold of the 
Communist Party; Lecce in the Mezzogiorno; and Sassari in the special 
status Region of Sardinia, which presents socio-cultural peculiarities 
compared to mainland Italy.  
Cases were selected based on the diverse case method, whereby the 
objective is to achieve maximum variance along the dimensions under study 
(Seawright and Gerring 2008).76 Such a selection allows for spatial 
comparison (Gerring 2007), whereby the phenomenon is observed in similar 
cases but different along the variables under study. The spatial variation on 
the independent variable will form the crux of causal inference, but is not 
observable through time. As Gerring and McDermott state (2007: 694-695) 
spatial comparison can help to measure the outcome of interventions that 
occurred at some point in time.  
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We call this a "Spatial comparison" since the causal comparison is spatial rather 
than temporal. To be sure, there is an assumption that spatial differences 
between the two cases are the product of antecedent changes in one (or both) of 
the cases.  
 
These four cities represent comparable contexts as they display 
similarities in terms of size (between Trento’s 100,000 inhabitants and 
Prato’s 180,000) and broad institutional framework; they are all provincial 
capital cities and represent the main political and cultural centre in their 
province. However, they display different socio-cultural contexts, different 
degrees of leadership strength and cohesiveness of the local political 
structure, but also different political orientation, which represents another 
dimension of the leadership variable. Traditionally left-wing administrations 
tend to be more open to civil society and more inclined toward participatory 
initiatives, with left-wing parties generally ranking participation more highly 
in their electoral programs (Heller 2001; Fung and Wright 2001). However, 
participatory mechanisms have gained popularity across the political 
spectrum and, as these cases demonstrate, at the local level other dynamics 
play a role. In Prato, a traditional stronghold of the Left, an inexperienced 
centre-right coalition backed bottom-up participatory initiatives, as it sought 
to build its support base, while the Left, which had been in power since the 
post-war period, felt no need to open a dialogue with local neighbourhood 
associations. Comparing four cases that present different types of leadership 
and local political structure, within contexts characterised by different 
degrees of associational density and autonomy from the centre, will help to 
determine how leadership influences the three dimensions of the dependent 
variable and what type of leadership is most conducive to collaborative 
mechanisms. 
 Given the small numbers involved, random sampling would not have 
been appropriate; moreover, as the study intends to capture maximum 
variance with regard to the independent and intervening variables, cases 
needed to be purposively selected so as to exemplify such differences. They 
were thus identified by defining qualitative typologies (Elman 2005; see also 
George and Bennet 2005): pre-existing associational levels 
(low/medium/high; voluntary vs. civic associations etc.); the political 
orientation at municipal, provincial and regional level when SP was adopted; 
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the level of support enjoyed by the mayor77 and by his coalition; and the 
degree of autonomy vis-à-vis other tiers of government (see Table 2.1 here 
below).78 
In the three studies (Putnam 1993; Sabatini 2005; Cartocci 2007) that 
have attempted to measure “social capital” in Italy, Puglia has fared 
consistently poorly, being third last, out of twenty regions, in Putnam’s study, 
last in Sabatini’s and among the bottom five regions in Cartocci’s. 
Conversely, Trentino-Alto Adige is first in Putnam and Sabatini’s charts and 
fourth in Cartocci’s, followed by Tuscany, while Sardinia is consistently in the 
middle, scoring slightly better in Cartocci’s study than in the other two.79 
According to all these studies, there is a strong polarization in Italy between 
the Centre-North and the Mezzogiorno. Northern regions such as Trentino 
and central regions administrated by centre-left administrations, such as 
Tuscany, vaunt strong social capital of the bridging type (social networks 
between heterogeneous groups). Conversely social capital of the bonding type 
(social networks between homogenous groups) is prevalent in the South of 
the country, particularly in Sicily and Calabria (Sabatini 2010; also see 
Granovetter 1973; Gittel and Vidal 1998). Interestingly, the presence of 
bonding/ family networks is positively correlated with political participation 
- although not civic conscience – perhaps because political militancy is 
perceived as a way of building clientelistic relations for personal gain 
(Sabatini 2005).  
 
Figure 2.2 Leadership vs. Associational density 
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All four cities have adopted SP and are members of the Network of 
Strategic Cities.80 This Network, described in Chapter 1, counts among its 
members several Italian municipalities, but only provincial capitals were 
considered for selection, because of the major role they play in coordinating 
strategic plans, which are often area-based and involve smaller 
municipalities in the surroundings. At the time of selection there were 34 
provincial capitals among the Network’s members.  
 
 
Table 2.1 CASE STUDIES SELECTION 
CASES Associational 
Density 
             Leadership 
 
Political Orientation      Strength  
Degree of 
local 
autonomy 
 
Trento High 
(cooperatives/ 
voluntary 
organisations) 
Municipal: 
Centre-left 
Provincial: 
Centre-left 
Regional: N/A 
Three 
consecutive 
mandates of 
current 
executive 
(deputy mayor 
in previous 
administration 
now mayor) – 
very high 
consensus 
Autonomous 
Province 
Prato High 
(voluntary/ civic 
organisations) 
Municipal: 
Centre-Right 
(2004-2009 Centre 
Left) 
Provincial: 
Centre Left 
Regional: Centre-
Left  
Weak 
leadership. 
Highly 
fragmented 
and conflictual 
party structure 
Ordinary 
Status Region 
Lecce Low  Municipal: 
Centre-Right 
Provincial: 
Centre-Right 
(2004-2009 
Centre-Left) 
Regional: Centre-
Left 
Three 
consecutive 
mandates of 
current 
executive 
(deputy mayor 
in previous 
administration 
now mayor) – 
high consensus 
Ordinary 
Status Region 
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Sassari Medium 
(voluntary 
organisations) 
Municipal: 
Centre-Left 
Provincial: 
Centre Left 
Regional: Centre-
Right (2004-2009 
Centre-Left) 
First mandate, 
following 
centre-right 
administration; 
fragmented 
party structure 
Special Status 
Region  
 
Trento is part of the autonomous province of Trentino, in the special 
status region of Trentino-Alto Adige, in the North-East of the country; thus, 
in terms of relations with other tiers of government, it enjoys the highest 
degree of freedom. Its social fabric is strong and characterised by the 
presence of several associations and well-resourced cooperatives, which have 
developed sophisticated political skills. The centre-left coalition has been in 
power at municipal and provincial level since the beginning of the Second 
Republic, and it enjoys a high majority at both jurisdictional levels.  
Prato, in the ordinary status region of Tuscany, has long been at the 
centre of a textile district (see Bellandi and Trigilia 1991; Becattini 2000 
Bacci and Bellandi 2007), which has been deeply affected by the current 
recession. The clothing industry is increasingly in the hands of the growing 
Chinese community, who have developed their own district, albeit for the 
most part working in the informal economy (Toccafondi 2010). The social 
fabric is still vibrant, with several active associations, although the 
deterioration of the district, proverbially based on trust and social cohesion 
(Becattini 2000), has fragmented the local community. As new political 
parties are unable, unlike the old Communist party, to channel participation, 
neighbourhood movements, often based around single issues, are filling the 
new participatory vacuum. Though the city had been a stronghold of the Left 
for 63 years, the last local election in 2009 saw the victory of the centre-right 
coalition.  
Lecce, within the ordinary status region of Puglia, in the South, is 
characterised by a fragmented social fabric, weakened by clientelistic 
relations. It has been governed by a centre-right coalition since the beginning 
of the Second Republic (four consecutive right-wing administrations). At the 
provincial level a new centre-right coalition followed a centre-left one. 
Conversely, at the regional level a centre-left coalition has been in power 
since 2005 and it is now on its second term; the regional president is a 
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representative of the far left. The regional government is strongly promoting 
citizen participation in local governance,81 and Lecce first introduced 
participatory programmes back in 2001.  
Finally Sassari is part of a special status region, Sardinia, and is the 
second city of the island in size and importance. Several citizen 
organisations, and particularly volunteer associations, contribute to a 
dynamic civil society, though this has always been marginalised by political 
elites and lacks experience in engaging with state institutions. The centre-left 
coalition has been in power since 2005, following a centre-right 
administration, and immediately introduced SP to open a much needed 
dialogue with local associations. At the regional level, a centre-left 
administration, which had enthusiastically embraced integrated planning, 
was in power between 2004 and 2009; elections in February 2009 saw the 
victory of the centre-right coalition. 
As these cases are meant to encompass the full range of variations, 
their representativeness, within the limits of a small-N study, should be 
enhanced (Seawright and Gerring 2008). Four cases can hardly ensure a 
“representative” sample, yet, since they interpret the vast socio-political, 
economic, and cultural diversities that characterise Italian cities in different 
parts of the country, they suit the agenda of this research work and the types 
of analytical conclusions that the study wishes to draw. In this respect such a 
case selection can facilitate typological theorizing, or “the development of 
contingent generalizations about combinations or configurations of variables 
that constitute theoretical types” (George and Bennet 2005:233).  
Methodologically, this study will thus consist of two main parts: a 
within-case heuristic analysis of each city, in order to assess the impact of SP 
on the local polity and governance relations, and a comparative case-study to 
identify the factors (with a focus on the three independent variables 
identified above) that can either constrain or enhance outcomes (Stoecker 
1991; Yin 2003; George and Bennet 2005).82 The comparative method can 
help to uncover causal mechanisms of local political and social change; in 
fact comparative studies are “critical to take the study of urban governance to 
a theoretical level” (Pierre 2005:458). The challenge will thus be that of 
reaching the right combination between reducing complexity to highlight the 
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phenomenon under study and offer generalisable insights, while allowing for 
the contextual richness of each case.  
 
Methods 
Analysis of official documents and websites, newspaper articles and 
other relevant material (see Krippendorff 1980; Neumann 1989; Nissan and 
Schmidt 1995; Bauer and Gaskell 2000) helped to assess in each case the 
rationale behind the adoption of SP, what rhetoric was employed, what 
methodologies facilitated the deliberative process, what vision of local 
development was elaborated, and the local response. Document analysis also 
helped to understand whether the SP built upon other governance 
instruments and whether or not the plan was linked to and coherent with the 
Town Plan and other sectoral plans, and with what implications.  
These findings were triangulated with 175 semi-structured in-depth 
interviews (Merton and Kendall 1946; Marshall and Rossmann 1995; Bauer 
2000) with stakeholders selected so as to ensure a balanced mixture of all the 
interests involved (see questionnaires in Appendix 1).83 Interviews were 
designed to elicit information on how participants perceived their 
involvement in the process, what political space they felt they had gained or 
lost, whether the deliberative process encouraged greater cooperation among 
actors, if anything changed in terms of decision and policy-making, and 
whether they believed such changes were sustainable. The mayor and the 
main institutional and administrative figures and institutional agencies 
coordinating the SP process (including at other levels of government) were 
also interviewed (see list of interviewees in Appendix 2).  
 
Conclusion: Planning the Future 
The 1990s institutional reforms in Italy were driven by dissatisfaction 
with central government’s performance and the legitimacy crisis of national 
political parties following the Mani Pulite investigation. The reforms 
certainly strengthened the role of the mayor, who now represents the “head 
of the local community” and enjoys greater powers, to the detriment of the 
council. Such concentration of power in the hands of the cabinet vis-à-vis the 
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council has profound repercussions on political mechanisms of checks and 
balances, hence on the quality of local democracy. However, decision-making 
cannot be understood as a “one man’s job”, since local interests are vocal and 
social conflicts need to be resolved. The mayor is now in a privileged position 
to coordinate different interests, since he has access to regulative and 
redistributive resources that can at least facilitate agreement among local 
actors.  
The reforms should be examined in the context of a post-Fordist 
global economic order that demands a rescaling of politics, as the 
relationship between the economy and the territory has been redefined and 
the local collective competition goods a place can produce will determine the 
degree and the nature of development. These dynamics have fostered a new 
understanding of local development, which increasingly rests on the central 
role of territorial institutions and on governance mechanisms that encourage, 
at least in rhetoric, a cooperative and deliberative approach. Therefore the 
inclusion of a varied range of interests becomes one of the defining 
dimensions of new modes of governance. Leaders are expected to coordinate 
and engage different stakeholders, in order to elaborate a collective vision of 
development that can enhance the local social capital, which is now 
understood as an integral aspect of a territory’s competitive advantage. Thus, 
instruments that foster collective decision-making and build consensus 
around local issues, such as SP, continue to gain popularity, albeit with 
mixed results.  
Local development is increasingly conceived in terms of structural 
projects that require integration and coordination of policies at several 
jurisdictional levels, in the logic of multilevel governance. SP can represent 
an opportunity for local government to reinforce cross-sectoral relations and 
foster more coordinated and collaborative interactions with higher 
institutional levels, in order to respond to the challenge of multilevel policies 
promoted by the EU. It can also help the territory to create new common 
identities and reinvent its image to increase the locality’s competitive 
advantage in the regional and global system. It promises to foster innovation, 
in terms of methodology and content, through a collective development 
project that integrates economic and social policies.  
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These new governance mechanisms are spreading rapidly, encouraged 
by formal legislation and informal inter-municipal networks and “good 
practice” lessons disseminated by national and supranational institutions. 
However, to date results are poor, as implementation of these strategic plans, 
particularly in the Italian context, faces several administrative and political 
challenges. Certainly short-term political interests and search for visibility at 
all levels will often conflict with longer-term collective goods. 
A comparative case-study that assesses how these mechanisms 
interact with different socio-economic and political environments can help to 
clarify whether, and under which circumstances, they have any tangible 
effects on governance and power relations, how leadership uses and 
influences these arrangements and what type of leadership is most 
conducive. The experience of the four cities selected is somehow emblematic 
of these new governance developments, their limitations and potential. 
Notwithstanding deep differences in terms of socio-political and economic 
context, these four local administrations were eager to invest, for different 
reasons, in innovative methodologies, in order to build a collective 
development project. Stronger interests might tend to capitalise more on the 
new political space, especially at the beginning of the process; however, as 
weaker groups gain access to new political arenas, the traditional power 
balance might at least be challenged. The role of a facilitative leadership 
might prove pivotal in ensuring a more inclusive and substantive process.  
The next chapters will present the case study analysis, starting with 
the experience of Trento, one of the pioneers of SP in Italy, where a strong 
leadership enjoying high levels of support and a collaborative civil society 
failed to translate the plan into a transformative process, turning it instead 
into a government tool to govern and systematise administrative activities. 
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THE CASE STUDIES 
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Chapter 3 
      “Trento città delle opportunità”84 
 
Trento was one of the first Italian cities to adopt Strategic Planning 
(SP), officially launching the process in December 2000 when a protocol of 
agreement was signed between the City Council and representatives of local 
interests. Between the end of the 1990s and the early 2000s, the city 
launched a season of plans on social policies, tourism and culture. The SP 
represented a framework to incorporate, integrate and give greater coherence 
to all these sectoral plans. Unlike several other Italian and European cities 
that chose to adopt SP to respond to particular challenges such as the 
reconversion of their development model within a post-Fordist global system 
or a deep economic and/ or social crisis, Trento, the capital of the 
autonomous Province of Trentino, is a “fortunate” city. It vaunts very low 
unemployment rates, with a development model strongly dependent upon 
public investments. Trento counts over one fourth of the whole provincial 
population (106,000 out of Trentino’s 500,000 inhabitants) and it ranks 
highly in Italian statistics for quality of life and public services, while its 
status as an autonomous Province has so far represented a strong financial 
guarantee (Brunazzo and Fabbrini 2005).85 
The rationale behind the plan was thus the need to re-interpret the old 
welfare system in light of declining public finances to ensure sustainable 
development in the long term. The idea was that deliberation with all local 
stakeholders would help to identify critical issues that could generate 
problems in the future (Detassis and Penasa 2005), to reframe the role of 
Trento within an international context and increase its bargaining power vis-
à-vis a powerful provincial government. The empirical research unveiled how 
the SP was also an attempt of the local administration to alter the balance of 
power vis-à-vis the strong provincial government, and gain greater legitimacy 
with private stakeholders that normally see in the Province their privileged 
institutional interlocutor. Over a decade since the launch of the first SP and 
as a second SP has been approved, the city is reflecting and questioning itself 
over the methods of new governance mechanisms, on the validity and 
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feasibility of long-term planning and how to resolve the conflicts between 
participation and decision-making. 
Findings presented in this chapter are based on official documents, 
newspaper articles, and 37 in-depth interviews with local officials, at the 
municipal and provincial level, and stakeholders who took part in the SP 
process and in a corollary of sectoral plans.86 The next section will highlight 
the socio-economic and political context before delving into the analysis of 
SP and its impact on local politics and polity. 
 
The Socio-Economic Context 
Trento has been an autonomous Province since 1972, when the new 
special status for the Region of Trentino-Alto Adige87 transferred most 
competencies over health, education, welfare, transport, and infrastructure 
from the regional to the provincial level, whereby the two provinces of Trento 
and Bolzano are now entirely responsible for economic and social 
development and all matters which are not of strict national relevance 
(Losito 1997). The special status configures a highly favourable centre-
periphery relationship, with a clear divide between national and local 
competencies.88 
During the First Republic, the whole province was characterised by 
high electoral turnouts (Brunazzo and Fabbrini 2005), always above the 
national average. This was symptomatic of the strong local subculture that 
characterised the North-East, or the so called “white belt” (zona bianca), 
influenced by the Church and catholic associations, which became the main 
point of reference during the post-war social identity building process 
(Brunazzo et al 2008). The end of mass parties, following Tangentopoli and 
the end of the First Republic, has marked the decline of politics as an 
integrated system, since it is now increasingly based on territory and 
personalisation. In the transitional phase of the 1990s, new political 
formations emerged from the crisis of the old mass parties, which either 
disappeared or had to rebrand themselves.  
Since the 1990s in Trentino there has been strong political continuity 
between the municipal and provincial tiers, as twin centre-left coalitions at 
both municipal and provincial level would suggest great synergy in terms of 
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policy-making. At both tiers of government, leaders tend to enjoy strong 
electoral support, with over 60 percent of the votes. The strong 
administrative role of the Province and the forceful personality of its 
governor, however, have tended to hinder all attempts at multilevel 
governance that the new season of planning launched by Trento at the 
beginning of 2000 had tried to encourage.  
Trento has a high degree of associationism and cooperation 
characterises all relevant sectors of the economy. Social cooperatives have an 
important role as service providers, being the principal actors of the so-called 
welfare mix model. The emphasis here is on the multi-stakeholder approach, 
which entails the representation of all interest groups concerned and the 
active participation of all sides (service users, volunteers, professionals) in 
service shaping and provision. This approach has led to high democratisation 
of decision-making processes within social cooperatives, but it has also 
encouraged entrepreneurship. There are over 500 cooperatives in Trentino, 
counting about 200,000 members and 12,000 employees, and making 
roughly €2 billion turnover (Bobbio et al 2008; Bobbio and Pomatto 2008). 
The Cooperatives Federation is an important institution, whose presidency is 
by many perceived to be the second most important “political” position, after 
the Province’s governor (Bobbio et al 2008).89 Strong associations might 
have triggered a “delegation effect” on the part of individual citizens, whose 
participation in projects of local development and planning is comparatively 
scarce. However, a study by Fazzi and Scaglia (2001) found that Trento’s 
citizenry displays a very high level of participation in the local social life, as 
32.8 per cent of interviewees were members of associations (volunteer, 
cultural, civic) and/ or cooperatives. Although local authorities, both at 
provincial and municipal level, have invested greatly in participatory 
experiences, with positive outcomes in terms of innovation, such openings 
have sometimes favoured particularistic interests. Some interviewees [TR17; 
TR30] noted how associations can become an instrument of local 
corporatism; as they tend to be very close to political institutions, they are 
sometimes used to promote partisan policies and even raise electoral support 
for a particular party.  
Overall cooperatives have a very positive impact. There are farmers and shops 
in the valleys that would not exist otherwise. Small farmers can grow produce 
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that would otherwise be extinct [thanks to cooperatives]. The other side of the 
coin is that it is difficult to understand where the provincial government ends 
and where the Cooperative Federation starts. The laws that others have to abide 
by – you send application forms and if a stamp or the right documentation is 
missing, everything stops… There [within the federation] packs of money go 
through... like that. [TR17 - Farmers’ Association] 
 
Overall the interactions between representative democracy structures and 
associations have contributed to the high degree of responsiveness and 
accountability from municipal and provincial institutions. 
Technological innovation has received great attention in Trentino, 
which has heavily invested in the knowledge economy. Several research 
centres, including FIAT, Microsoft and OCSE, are today based in Trento, 
which also vaunts one of the best universities in Italy and several renown 
research centres, such as the Fondazione Bruno Kessler (Fbk) and the Centro 
Interdipartimentale Mente/Cervello (Inter-departmental centre Mind/ 
Brain), dedicated to neurosciences. The technological district on renewable 
energy has also opened office branches here, when it launched its project on 
green building certification (Campestrini 2008).  
However, the economic structure of this province is very different 
from the rest of Northern Italy, which is characterised by strong 
entrepreneurship and the presence of industrial districts; by contrast 
Trentino mainly relies on the public sector. All local and provincial 
government offices are naturally based in Trento, where the public sector 
absorbs 40 percent of the workforce, or about 24,700 people (SP 
document90). This has translated into relative wealth and stable levels of high 
employment even in the current recession. The public sector is thus the 
dominant actor in guaranteeing the delivery of all services and enhancing the 
competitiveness of the local economy.  
 
Strategic Planning: A Governmental Tool 
The Process  
Trento’s first SP, launched in 2000, represents an integral part of a 
participatory approach to development, which aims at reinforcing synergies 
among different policy areas. Mayoral elections after the reform represented 
the chance to start a new approach to local governance. Mayor Pacher, first 
elected in 1999, seized the opportunity of the SP to face problems that 
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normally go beyond the administrative borders of a city and that cannot be 
confronted through traditional instruments, requiring instead multilevel 
governance (i.e. delocalisation of enterprises and the re-organisation of 
labour, demographic changes due to migration and population aging). 
In 1999 the newly elected centre-left administration promoted a 
survey among stakeholders to elaborate a vision of the city within the next 10 
years. The municipality’s Local Development Department organised a forum 
involving the main local actors to identify the city’s strengths and 
weaknesses, threats and opportunities, through a SWOT analysis (Detassis 
and Penasa 2005). In 2000 a protocol of agreement was signed with the 
main trade unions and associations, including the Chamber of Commerce, 
the University, a local research institute (Istituto Trentino di Cultura) and 
the provincial government, in order to agree on the method and the process 
to be employed for the elaboration of SP. The territorial pact of Mount 
Bondone had already been launched in 1999 to enhance the development of 
the area as a tourist resort, and it represented a fundamental step towards 
the logic of participation and a moment of learning for the actors involved, 
which later facilitated the SP process.  
You need to make sure that all the actors involved are on the same wavelength 
and start together, and everyone has to put something in and commit, so that 
you don’t have smaller actors that are sidelined. They all have to start together 
and have to know where they’re going. This I’ve learnt from the territorial pact 
for Mount Bondone, which I was involved in. At the time there was this idea of 
thinking strategically, beyond the five years of an administration and look 
beyond the limited municipal resources, through involving the private sector, 
the hotel managers, the cultural resources... [TR3 - Former assessore for Local 
Development] 
 
The SP developed at a time of great fervour. The Social Plan helped to 
carry out a radical re-organisation of the Social Policies sector, through wide 
involvement of each borough. An important change to the Town Plan was 
being discussed at the same time and a renowned Spanish architect, 
Busquets, was hired to work on a project that would reinterpret the city’s 
image in relation to the surrounding territory, by moving the railway station. 
A conscious effort was made to strengthen the relationship between the 
ongoing SP and the new urban projects, which became a complementary part 
of the SP (Gastaldi 2003). Thus, within a few years, a new season of 
participatory planning was launched as a series of plans were produced, 
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including a Plan on Tourism and one on Culture.91 The SP, though following 
its own participatory course, acted as a “container” to incorporate all these 
sector-based plans and ensure coherence of policy-making within an inter-
sectoral strategic agenda.  
This new participatory approach to planning was reinforced through a 
change to the municipal statute by introducing art. 96, which inserts SP, 
specifically defined as a participatory process, among the planning 
instruments that the administration has to employ by law. This decision 
represents an innovative approach that highlights the importance of 
participatory governance. Trento’s local government decided to adopt SP as a 
compulsory instrument, not because of top-down regulations but because of 
its perceived validity as a method of planning to promote local development 
through wide cooperation between the private and the public sector. The 
authors of the SP document emphasise that the plan represents a unique 
opportunity to give coherence to private and public projects and other 
planning instruments and to stimulate and collect ideas and concrete 
proposals from local stakeholders in order to integrate them within a 
common project of development.92 
The process was articulated into three main phases: diagnosis, 
planning, and implementation. The local administration had a strong 
leadership role, as the initiator and facilitator of the process. Politically the 
mayor and the then assessore for Local Development, already familiar with 
governance mechanisms such as the territorial pact for Mount Bondone, fully 
endorsed the SP process. The local University was immediately involved 
through the creation of a mixed working group in February 2001, consisting 
of academic experts and two public service directors.93 The working group 
produced a preliminary document in April 2001.  
The whole process was organised by the university, in particular the department 
of Economics. There were three scholarship-holders from the university, 
including myself, who facilitated and organised the meetings, and collected the 
ideas that emerged from the meetings onto documents. So there was this 
scientific coordination from the university, while the administration, as the 
champion of the process, organised the meetings. [TR11 –Local Government 
Officer] 
 
A first round of nine public meetings in summer of 2001 led to the 
elaboration of a diagnostic document. The mixed group carried out an 
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articulate analysis concerning all dimensions of local development to be 
circulated among participants in the deliberative forums ahead of the 
meetings. In summer 2001 three thematic roundtables on territory, culture, 
and services involved 250 representatives of citizen associations, institutions 
and the private sector. A second cycle of roundtables took place between July 
and October 2002, when 321 people, representing 163 associations, 
participated in five thematic groups concerning infrastructure, quality of 
service delivery, education and training, culture and tourism, and finally 
environment and liveability. So-called cognitive maps, short files that would 
summarise the outcomes of previous meetings, were prepared and 
distributed to participants through the administrative office of the Local 
Development Department, which offered technical support throughout the 
process (Detassis and Penasa 2005).94 The final plan was approved by the 
Council in 2003. 
Trento’s SP was thus a top-down effort coordinated by the local 
government and the university; it stands out among other plans for its 
emphasis on the internal coherence of the plan and on its synergy with other 
planning instruments. 20 interviewees out of 36 agreed that the SP 
represented an opportunity for the city to collectively reflect on itself and its 
future, but also to reaffirm a more prominent role at the regional, national 
and international levels. In a way the SP also interpreted the new 
administration’s intention to readjust the balance of power in favour of the 
local government vis-à-vis a very strong Province. The administration opened 
up to structured actors as its privileged interlocutors in an attempt to 
increase its legitimacy vis-à-vis the Province, perhaps hoping that the 
involvement of local powerful stakeholders might incentivise the provincial 
government to endorse the process. Highly organised, however, and 
hierarchical organisations, such as trade associations, tend to identify the 
provincial government as their main institutional point of reference; thus 
they participated in the municipal SP with scarce enthusiasm.  
I don’t think it [the SP] was perceived to be the decision-making moment. I had 
previous experience of participatory planning and my impression is that diverse 
stakeholders interact and respond in a coherent fashion when they understand 
that that is the venue where decisions are taken. If they believe that’s just a 
moment of discussion, then yes, they might take part in the conversation, but 
their commitment in the following phase is not necessarily congruent with what 
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had been previously discussed and perhaps agreed. [TR26 – Former President 
of the Architects’ Association] 
 
By contrast smaller associations perceived the process as a window of 
opportunity to gain some visibility. Some of these stakeholders (TR7; TR18; 
TR30) agreed that the SP facilitated networking with other local actors and 
strengthened their relationship with the administration.  
There was space for everyone, that’s for sure. There was the space and the time 
to discuss an issue and develop it, reflect on it and then perhaps put forward 
observations the following time. It was a pleasant way of working. And then you 
realised that the idea that you had put forward in the first meeting could be 
developed in more concrete ways during the following meetings. Your own 
thoughts and ideas were later developed by other people. [TR18 - President of 
voluntary association for disabled people] 
 
However, others (TR17; TR22; TR36) were very critical of the inclusiveness 
(or lack thereof) of the process. Although facilitators tried to ensure everyone 
had the opportunity to speak out and put forward proposals, high numbers of 
participants and the lack of familiarity with deliberative methods meant the 
meetings often turned into assemblies, where a diverse platform of 
participants proved difficult to coordinate. 
It’s like English courses for adults. There is the highly educated person with 
some knowledge, the young one that learns fast and the one that really… [does 
not get it]. When you have such a diverse audience, it is difficult. [TR16 – 
Farmers’ Association] 
 
Smaller associations and non-organised citizens naturally struggled 
the most. One interviewee, with reference in particular to the meetings for 
the Plan on Tourism, complained that there was limited substantive 
participation. “The university worked on the plan with the public sector, so 
there was little room for us to influence the strategic lines.” (TR36) 
Associations often struggled to take part in all the plans that were being 
organised at the time, as they lacked human resources (TR16; TR17; TR18; 
TR19; TR22; TR33; TR34). “I guess these things could help and be good for 
us, but we don’t have the time.” (TR16) 
 
The Plan 
The document of the plan is divided into two main parts. The first part 
describes the ambition of Trento to be “a city of opportunities” (città delle 
opportunità) and organises the future scenarios through four lines of action: 
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city of urban quality; city of rights and services; city of research and 
innovative development; and finally city of the Alps, city of the Council95, of 
Europe and of the world. These four actions are divided into 73 projects, 
mostly sponsored – and later implemented - by the public sector. The second 
part of the document is a more in-depth analysis of the actions and measures, 
explaining the rationale behind each of them, the degree of innovation, the 
sponsors, and whether they are linked to EU or local directives, so as to 
convey the level of feasibility (Mazzara 2009).   
The document highlights the intention to create a collective actor, by 
sharing responsibility among the stakeholders in the implementation phase, 
promoting communication strategies, so as to guarantee an inclusive process, 
and updating the document regularly in accord with changing situations and 
in response to new issues. Overall the SP document shows the 
administration’s awareness of the difficulty and the importance of SP, as also 
attested to by its institutionalisation in the local statute. One of the strength 
of Trento’s SP in terms of cognitive effects is the adoption of quantitative 
evaluation as an instrument to assess the feasibility of each project and the 
coherence of the plan in its entirety (Pasqui et al 2010). However, the 
implementation phase suffered from several shortcomings given the 
ambitious expectations set out in the SP document. 
 
Implementation is for government 
Based on the number of projects implemented, Trento’s SP should be 
considered as a success case;96 however, most of the measures listed in the 
final SP were implemented by the administration, with limited input from 
other actors. This apparent success could also raise some suspicions over the 
causal relationship between the plan and its projects. It might suggest that 
these projects would have also been implemented without an SP, which had 
however the merit to intercept and organise inertial dynamics. A permanent 
office was created to overlook and coordinate the implementation phase, but 
this was an internal organisation and did not involve representatives of 
private or social actors. In fact the SP became a government tool of the 
municipal government (Pasqui et al 2010), while other institutional actors, 
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such as the Province, stayed at the margins, somehow hindering the overall 
impact of the process.  
In several decision-making processes, the trend towards the 
simplification of “working groups” led to a reduction in the number of 
associations involved, favouring the strongest, in terms of financial and 
mobilisation capacity. Communication and publicity were perhaps the 
weakest aspect of an otherwise highly structured process. No newsletter was 
in place to maintain communication with the stakeholders following the 
planning phase; the limited information available was communicated 
through the City Council’s bulletin. A dedicated website was designed and set 
up but it was not supported by more incisive and interactive communication 
tools (i.e. online forums and polls),97 while the media offered limited 
coverage of the process which was perceived to be too complex for their 
average readership. Coordination mechanisms to ensure the involvement of 
all the participants in the implementation phase were weak. There follows 
that, although the implementation of the plan proceeded swiftly, the 
stakeholders did not appear to be aware of this. 
If I’m honest, in these past few years there were no formal moments to monitor 
[the implementation of] the plan. We did not have clear strategic objectives. I 
feel the plan never translated into a strategic project, it remained as a plan, as 
guidelines. Perhaps this was the City Council’s intention [...] [TR7 - Director of 
the Science Museum] 
 
Although representatives of several private, social and cultural 
interests took part in the process, the involvement of simple citizens was 
intentionally limited and the organisers argued that the themes discussed 
required structured interlocutors. Even citizens otherwise very active and 
politicised such as neighbourhood associations’ leaders were completely 
oblivious of the SP (TR14). Key actors, such as environmental associations 
(TR22), failed to participate in the process (or were they not invited?), while 
some participants were clearly relegated to a secondary role, as there was a 
tangible divide between partners with real decision-making powers and 
partners that were just expected to legitimate decisions. Some participants 
commented that on certain issues they just felt obliged to agree (TR17; 
TR36). Thus the risk is to miss the difference, which should not be limited to 
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semantic terms, between structured consultation mechanisms and authentic 
public participation in decision-making.  
In terms of reinforcing local networks the plan had a limited impact, 
while the value added of the SP process, and of other plans, is more evident 
in terms of organisational learning within public services, since a new 
integrated approach to planning, though amidst some resistance, is being 
adopted. 
 
The most important effect produced [by the planning season] has been within 
the public administration. Because it has fostered some repositioning in terms 
of strategic vision of the City Council’s organisation and it has encouraged some 
changes in the way we work and we deliver services. [TR5 - City Council’s 
General Director] 
 
Perhaps the main merit of Trento’s SP is to have ensured greater coherence 
within local administration, through elaborating a collective vision that 
would guide future planning. In this respect the administrators conceived the 
plan not simply in terms of the projects it listed, but as a process 
incorporating measures from all the other sector-based plans produced 
simultaneously.  
The influence of the changes to the Town Plan (March 2002) was 
particularly important and Busquets’ project became the SP’s flagship 
project. This entailed the rebuilding of the old railway station (moving it 
underground) in order to give way to a boulevard on the surface that would 
have reconnected the city to the river. However, due to costs, but mostly 
because the Province had different plans (i.e. a high speed rail project) that 
would conflict with this project, the idea was eventually abandoned. This had 
a very negative effect on the credibility of the local executive; and the 
community perceived the SP process as partly unsuccessful because the very 
project that had captured the city’s imagination never materialised. 
The redevelopment of the disused industrial area ex-Michelin and the 
north of the city (Trento Nord) represents an exception within the plan for 
the strong role of the private sector. Both projects were part of the new Town 
Plan, but they were also inserted in the SP as measures that would contribute 
to revitalising the periphery and recovering the relationship between the 
town centre and the north of the city. The project ideas, like several others in 
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the plan, had already been in existence for a long time and the SP 
represented an opportunity to “popularise” them.  
The project of the ex-Michelin industrial area was elaborated by 
starchitect Renzo Piano and implemented through a public-private 
partnership. On the initiative of the administration in 1998, a redevelopment 
agency called Iniziative Urbane (Urban Initiatives) was created by 
representatives of the local banking and business sector.98 This same agency 
also presides over the redevelopment of the northern part of the city, where 
the need for an environment reclamation, due to the polluting nature of the 
chemical industries that used to be based in the area, has slowed down the 
project, since such an intervention is under the jurisdiction of the provincial 
government.99 The most interesting element about these two projects, which 
interpret the logic of SP as a governance system, is the fact that the public 
sector does not finance the implementation but exerts a regulatory and 
monitoring role to guarantee the public interest. It should be emphasised 
that Iniziative Urbane was formed on the initiative of the public 
administration. 
Overall, given the fervour around such intense planning activity, there 
were some inevitable polemics (TR8; TR15; TR23). 
Town planning, I’m afraid, is interwoven with many interests and this weakens 
it. I don’t want to get into the details, but there were two or three areas about 
which there was a big controversy on newspapers, because it looked like… a few 
presents were given to political groups and CEOs. It should be emphasised that 
this change to the Town Plan was effectively made by consultants. Busquets put 
forward these ideas but then the final document was written and signed off by 
the Town Planning Office. [TR8 – Coordinator of the Urban Centre] 
 
The Challenge of Collective Action 
In 2005 Trento launched the elaboration of its second plan, which 
marked some elements of discontinuity and innovation compared with the 
previous plan. The new document Towards a strategic agenda – Trento 
2020 (Verso un’agenda strategica – Trento 2020) sets out to evaluate the 
first plan a few years since implementation began, in order to understand the 
impact of this instrument on local governance. There was thus a redefinition 
of the approach to planning, moving beyond a self-referential plan rigidly 
focussed on its own content, and towards a strategic agenda, which 
prioritises the process instead of the plan as a list of projects. The document 
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reaffirms the commitment to participation, but when interviewed the author 
of the plan stressed that, since meaningful participation is extraordinarily 
challenging to coordinate, two conditions are paramount in order to 
guarantee tangible decision-making: 
The first one is that people really follow you. Agreements are reached and 
things are realised if the administration has more power than the other [actors], 
therefore if we can impose these projects upon them, basically. Or, and this is 
the other condition, the partners, though having decisive power, have a clear 
convenience [to take part in the process]. [TR2 – SP Office CEO] 
 
Thus, as highlighted by the literature (see Chapter 1), the 
interdependence of stakeholders appears to be a necessary requirement to 
guarantee a substantive process. Interdependence of stakeholders is however 
hard to engender, as more powerful actors are often able to control the 
process or have the option of other, non-collaborative channels (Ansell and 
Gash 2007; Innes and Booher 2003). The conclusion of Trento’s 
administration was that a collaborative process will work if the local 
government is the dominant actor in the process, vis-à-vis other stakeholders 
and other tiers of government, in terms of bargaining power and 
competencies. Focusing on those policy areas that fall under its full 
jurisdiction and on few strategic lines that it is certain it can govern and 
monitor can certainly facilitate concrete outcomes. However, from this 
perspective the concept of collective actor becomes redundant, as 
stakeholders would just respond to a top-down agenda rather than actively 
contributing to a governance structure. Perhaps, there was a failure of the 
local leadership to offer identity incentives that could have stimulated more 
committed involvement of stakeholders. The administration was not able to 
present SP as a substantial decision-making arena because the Province, the 
most important actor in local development, was not involved. The SP was 
partly used by the local administration to antagonise the Province and gain 
some power and legitimacy, but this approach acted as boomerang and 
jeopardised the formation of the collective actor. The limited inclusivity of 
the participatory process also inhibited the emergence of new actors and new 
resources that might have in fact increased the legitimacy of the local 
administration vis-à-vis the Province. 
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The Politics of Strategic Planning 
Whereas the mayor and some assessori fully endorsed the 
participatory experience and acted as its sponsors, the champions of the 
whole process were public service directors, who played a pivotal role in 
coordinating and supervising.  
I don’t think this SP was launched for need of visibility. Mayor Pacher really 
believed in it and wanted to look further and engage [the city at large]. And he 
found in XXX [the head of his cabinet, later CEO of the SP office] someone that 
could share his need for a broader perspective, and so the whole process was 
launched. But the political groups didn’t really participate. There was no 
hostility, but it turned out to be an administrative process. [TR9 - President of 
the Council] 
 
The council and part of the executive were often left at the margins, although 
the reason was to be found as much in the lack of formal mechanisms of 
involvement as in their scepticism towards the new approach to planning. 
[The reforms] have encouraged some dynamism [in local administration] 
thanks to a “lighter” relationship between the mayor and the political parties. 
The mayor is legitimised by the popular vote and this has pros and cons. The 
role of councillors has clearly moved away from the political limelight and this 
can be a bit frustrating [for the council]. Today I wouldn’t do it [the SP process] 
in the same way and I’d care more about involving the council. [TR13 - Former 
Mayor and current Provincial Vice-President] 
 
At the time the issue was partly addressed through ad hoc meetings to inform 
councillors about the various phases of the process and through the 
ratification of the final document by the council. Some majority councillors 
(TR24; TR29; TR35) were very involved and they understood this could be a 
learning opportunity for them as well, the chance to engage with the city at 
large, with private and social actors. The opposition just ignored the whole 
process, although there were never real conflicts.  
Perhaps they just did not perceive it as something fundamental over which to 
fight, they saw it as something a bit too far away in the future. Fights are 
generally over the projects that follow SP, because on these smaller actions 
councillors can gain some visibility […]. But the SP was rather perceived to be 
the mayor’s dream book. [TR9 - President of the Council] 
 
And the final document was judged as pretty unsubstantial. 
They’re just guidelines that make no difference. There’s nothing innovative 
about it. Remarque would have said, “Nothing new on the Western Front”. As I 
said, nothing more than an academic study... [TR25 – Councillor, opposition] 
 
Since the whole idea of an SP process was to elaborate participatory, 
hence bipartisan, policies that could be embraced by both political sides to 
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guarantee administrative continuity beyond political colour, there was a clear 
failure in this respect. The council resolution for the approval of the final 
plan in 2003 passed with 27 votes in favour, 4 votes against and 7 
abstainers,100 which means that the opposition was united in voting against 
it. Although the whole centre-left coalition supported the mayor, majority 
councillors also shared a few doubts, if not on the nature of the process 
certainly over the results and the feasibility of some of the projects. 
We voted for it, after making a few observations and contributions, but we 
perceived it as a big risk. Rather than a risk, perhaps it was just the fear of not 
being able to implement it. Perhaps it’s our culture, the way the city is, being a 
frontier post, and because it’s often too dependant on top-down decisions that 
come from the Province. [TR24 - Councillor, majority] 
 
One of the most important challenges of SP is that it requires 
continuity both in terms of strategies and coordination mechanisms that can 
sustain the involvement of actors in the long term. Since Trento launched its 
SP ten years ago, its experience can test the strength of the process vis-à-vis 
the pressure of every-day administration. Trento’s political context, given the 
high level of continuity of leadership, should be most conducive. Although 
the current mayor, and former deputy mayor and assessore for Town 
Planning, is willing to revive the participatory approach, the high turnover 
within the council, a different executive, or even changes of staff within 
public services, deeply hindered the collective cognizance that was gained 
during the process.  
Within the new council [the last local elections took place in May 2009] we have 
never even talked about SP yet. While within the 1999-2005 term many 
councillors were more or less involved, especially for the approval of the final 
plan etc., the councillors that started their first mandate in the following 
legislature [mayor Pacher’s second term], in 2005-2009, would have known 
very little about SP. [TR9 - President of the Council] 
 
Politically there was a long latency period (2005-2009) which 
translated into limited communication about the advancement of the 
implementation phase; once the plan was elaborated and approved, it 
gradually faded away from the local political limelight. The new mayor 
reaffirmed a strong commitment to the strategic agenda and a participatory 
approach. He stressed how participation has proved difficult and tiring; 
perhaps the real challenge was to reconcile the need for substantive and 
meaningful participation of civil society with political protagonism.  
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To reconcile everyone’s views [is hard], because they all want their space and 
want to be protagonists; everyone wants to have a say. If politics comes into 
play, then there are always issues of political visibility. [TR28 – Mayor] 
 
Certainly political interests tend to conflict with substantive politics, as 
politicians’ need for easy-to-communicate policies and short-term results 
clashes against the complex long-term vision and the long and at times 
inconclusive participatory debates that SP entails. 
 
The Limits of Inter-Institutional Cooperation 
Twin government coalitions at both levels would suggest great synergy 
in terms of policy-making, but the relationship between the two levels is not 
an equal one. An assessore, and former councillor, commented, “Not a leaf 
moves which the Province doesn’t choose” (TR29).101  Although Trento’s SP 
interprets the city’s effort to emancipate itself from “Mamma Provincia”, the 
limited involvement of the latter in the process, as examined above, has 
affected participation levels on the part of the private sector.  
I believe that the economic dynamics concerning the city should be negotiated 
elsewhere. At the provincial level. Today the newspapers write that the 
president of the Province wants to establish a permanent space of dialogue with 
all associations and orders [...]. Because... who’s got the legal competency? The 
Province. Who’s got the money? The Province. 10 years ago with the SP we had 
opened a permanent working group to consult with the professional orders and 
the associations. We had a very detailed agenda of some very complex issues. 
But sometimes they [the stakeholders] turned up, sometimes one was missing, 
sometimes two were missing… These are people that work and they asked 
themselves, “yes but in concrete terms what are we achieving here?” [TR2 – SP 
Office CEO] 
 
Busquets’ flagship project on the rebuilding of the old railway station 
was never implemented. The local administration commissioned an 
evaluation study of the project and this new vision of the city had captured 
people’s imagination, but the Province had its own project of the high speed 
rail in the pipeline, which made Busquets’ plan redundant. 
The Province has the mentality of the monopolist, “I take the decisions and we 
can discuss on the rest.” If we want multilevel governance, we can go and coyly 
knock on their door and ask, “Please.” But if decision-making on a particular 
project/ policy pertains to the provincial level, the SP will mean very little. The 
relationship between the two levels is completely unbalanced and asymmetric. 
On a political level, the relationship is fairly dynamic anyway, but on a 
bureaucratic and administrative level much less so. And the administrative level 
is the inflexible executor of what it believes is its own prerogative, by divine 
right. [...] The municipality is not completely dominated by the Province, 
because it has some bargaining power – ¼ of the population of the whole 
109 
 
Trentino lives here. The city level is strong, but there’s always a propensity 
towards compromise. [TR2 – SP Office CEO] 
 
The limit of the SP was that decision-making often pertained to the 
provincial level which had limited involvement in the whole process. In this 
respect there was a far too optimistic approach on the part of the municipal 
administration, and perhaps some degree of naivety in judging its capacity of 
influence. Inevitably there was a widespread perception, at times unjustified, 
that the local administration was incapable of decision-making. 
We lacked enthusiasm and decision-making capacity. Both the previous mayor 
and the new one in particular, who was assessore for urban planning in the 
previous administration, have a terrible fault: they’re great mediators but they 
can’t lead. [TR26 - Architect] 
 
The synergies between the municipal SP and the Provincial 
Development Plan (Piano Provinciale di Sviluppo - PPS) are somehow 
guaranteed through this dirigiste approach on the part of the Province. 
Trento and the other 222 municipalities receive the PPS already done and 
dusted and they have a month since it is published to send in their observations. 
Then it is formally approved by the provincial giunta. [TR2 – SP Office CEO] 
 
 
However the relationship between the two levels also has several points of 
strength, as there is, for instance, coordinated political work towards area-
based planning. A new project also includes the cities of Verona, Mantua, 
Brescia, and Vicenza, with the aim to create an integrated territorial system 
in terms of logistics and economic development, but also culture and 
research. The political continuity between the two levels (both the current 
president and vice-president of the Province are former mayors of Trento) 
ensures some degree of coordination, but the SP did not enhance or 
contribute to this relationship. 
Among the most important collaborations is the transport plan, with this 
project of a high frequency railway, which was possible because the new 
provincial assessore for transports was the mayor of Trento until last year 
[2009] and the president of the Province also used to be Trento’s mayor and so 
they have a certain sensibility and foresight. [...] But we could not say that this 
collaboration was fostered by the SP; it would not be true. [TR2 – SP Office 
CEO] 
 
In 2004 the Province launched its own strategic plan, called TXT 
Trentini for Trentino, as a governance instrument which, rather than giving a 
definitive reading of the future or guaranteeing optimal solutions to certain 
issues and dynamics, tries to manage change through a greater reflexive 
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capacity in term of strategic vision. This was the rationale underpinning the 
effort of the Province to involve other institutions, as well as private 
stakeholders, to elaborate a new social pact to strengthen the territory’s 
social cohesion. However, interviewees [TR11; TR22] believed that this was 
the Province’s response to Trento’s SP. Private stakeholders were perhaps 
more diligent in attending these provincial meetings. The working groups 
were an opportunity for new actors (i.e. the association of young 
entrepreneurs) to gain visibility and open new channels with provincial 
institutions; but the process suffered from the lack of legitimation from the 
top, and this affected outcomes. 
 
For instance at the provincial level... the assessore was really committed – he 
was actually the sponsor of the process – but there was not legitimation from 
the top; the president of the Province took part in the meetings but did not 
really act as its sponsor and failed to give this signal of attention, of priority. 
[TR11 – Office of the general director] 
 
 
Participation Is A Local Affair 
Trento’s administration preferred engaging structured stakeholders 
rather than involving the wider community; there were few official 
communication channels (i.e. the official website) and the media offered 
limited coverage. An efficient administration with a popular mayor who won 
the elections with over 60 percent of the votes hardly needed to increase 
legitimacy with the city at large, while several and active associations already 
enjoyed direct channels with administration.  
The Social Plan, focusing on social policies, was by many perceived to 
be more meaningful in terms of citizen involvement. It was based on the 
outcomes of two complementary participatory processes that took place in 
2000. The first one involved individual citizens through assemblies where 
800 participants formed 40 working groups; the second one consisted of 
three focus groups with third-sector organisations, several associations and 
institutional representatives, including representatives of the provincial 
government and the health service trusts (Fazzi and Scaglia 2001). 
I have to say that the Social Plan in particular has had the biggest impact, [...] 
not just an internal impact within public services in terms of its organisation, 
but also an external one, since it has helped to move service delivery closer to 
citizens [through a decentralisation process] [TR5 - City Council General 
Director] 
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The Social Plan produced a dramatic change in the administrative 
organisation of social services, which have been divided into five 
decentralised centres (poli sociali territoriali) to respond to demands specific 
to the area where each office is located. A general office coordinates them all, 
while a separate central office manages city-level social issues. Although 
there was initial resistance from within the public sector and there are still 
limits in terms of coordination between the decentralised and the central 
services (TR1; TR20; TR21; TR27; TR30), change is being incorporated in 
routine working practices. The decentralised services are working together 
with ward councils to increase interaction with local associations and 
strengthen the local social fabric, with varying degrees of success. One 
elucidatory account on how decentralised services work concerns some new 
blocks of flats, Il Magnete, built in an area with no services, public spaces or 
green areas.  
There were no associations, services or infrastructures. So we decided to 
organise this hot chocolate event, in the middle of winter. On private property, 
but we didn’t care... We had the backing of the ward council, in case something 
happened... And so we met with the families living there, who wanted to meet 
each other and get to know each other. And so we started a series of events and 
workshops. We organised a monthly workshop on Saturday afternoon for the 
kids and that was an opportunity for parents to meet. [...] Initially we’d have 
these workshops in the front yards in between blocks, then a pizzeria nearby 
allowed us to meet in their gazebo and eventually in a room inside the pizzeria. 
Then the owner sold the place and there were other problems. [...] But in the 
meantime the local ward council and an assessore [for Social Policies] worked 
really hard with us and at some point the mayor got involved. And eventually 
we decided to hire this hall. Once we secured this space we could launch a series 
of workshops, meetings for teenagers. […] And we involved Arianna, a 
cooperative that works with communities. [TR27 - Social Worker] 
 
Participation at the very local level was easier to sustain since more tangible 
results could be ensured (Fung and Wright’s demonstration effect), 
guaranteed by the autonomy that the local government enjoys vis-à-vis the 
Province over social policies, which are entirely delegated to the municipal 
level.  
In order to encourage participation in urban policies, the SP also 
included among its projects an urban centre, called CasaCittà, which was 
established in conjunction with the new changes to the Town Plan, as the 
administration intended, at least in rhetoric, to open a public debate on the 
transformation of the city. The urban centre was inaugurated in 2005 and is 
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managed through a collaboration between the municipality, the University 
and the local Architects’ Association. It was originally envisaged as space to 
discuss urban transformations with the local community, to offer 
information and foster horizontal exchanges of knowledge through seminars, 
meetings, and lectures. However, the architects and the other interviewees 
involved in this project were sceptical about the way CasaCittà developed 
(TR8; TR15; TR23; TR26).  
This urban centre was perceived to be something a bit scary within the 
administration, which saw it as a source of problems, because participation is 
difficult to control. So it was implemented and immediately weakened, since it 
no longer has a budget or a venue. It’s an immaterial office. (TR8 – Coordinator 
of the Urban Centre) 
 
One interesting participatory experience at the very local level was the 
participatory budgeting initiative in the S.Giuseppe S. Chiara borough; this 
was the only participatory initiative open only to individual citizens. It took 
place between April and June 2007 and involved a total of 180 residents. It 
was structured through different phases: a first phase of information and 
collection of proposals, a second phase where priorities were identified, 
among those technically feasible, a third phase where the administrators 
assessed the proposals. The local council agreed to implement at least one 
citizens’ priority for each of the four areas considered: pavements, parks and 
green areas, street lighting, social and family policies. While the 
administration could discard some of the priorities voted by the citizen 
assembly, it had to clearly justify its choice and could not alter the priorities’ 
ranking (Bobbio and Pomatto 2008; see also www.comune.trento.it). The 
process was not repeated, although it was initially agreed that it would run as 
a two years pilot. It was perceived to be a failure by the council, allegedly 
because of low participation levels. However, ward councillors believed city 
councillors felt bypassed and threatened in their role as sole representatives 
of the people and this would explain the lack of collaboration on their part. 
When a participatory process is opened from above and the people struggle 
to understand its rationale and do not perceive the urgency of the problems 
to be discussed, time is key to explaining the benefits of participation in the 
face of the time and resources that people are expected to invest in the 
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process; and time, argued the president of the ward council, is what they 
were not afforded.  
The failure of the PB is due to the hostility of the city council, since there is 
competition with the ward level for visibility. Besides it is difficult to involve 
people when the process is opened from above and the people do not feel the 
immediate need to participate. In this case you need more time to prepare 
people. [...]  And as in everything in order for things to work you need to repeat 
them a few times, because then people realise that it can work, that what they 
are saying has influence and then there will be greater participation the next 
time around. [TR30 - Ward President] 
 
The logic of participation often clashes against political impatience 
with the participatory process which can be lengthy or produce unpalatable 
or unfeasible decisions. Thus, a conflict is apparent between the need for 
greater involvement and participation and the fear that this will further delay 
decision-making, in a context, such is the Italian one, where this has always 
been an irritating weakness of local and national democracy. 
This is the question I ask myself, if the cost of participation is slowness, and it is 
like that to a point… but excessive slowness? I work on several Town Plans for 
small communes, we have plenty of meetings but in the end you have to decide. 
A planning process is useless if it lasts too long. If the SP continues to plan 
without ever deciding... The plan is a process but a process of decisions. And 
every now and then you have to decide, otherwise the plan is an end in itself. A 
sort of terrible blob that keeps planning while the city builds itself through 
different ways and decisions are taken in a different way. (TR26 - Architect) 
 
The participatory process in Trento Nord, organised by a group of 
young architects on behalf of the administration, is yet another testimony to 
the fact that opening up a participatory process without the certainty that 
results can be delivered and the municipality has effective control and 
competency over the specific policy areas can backfire politically. The 
residents were invited to decide on how to redevelop a publicly owned area. 
There was a participatory process from which clear decisions emerged, such 
as the building of a square and green areas, but everything stopped during 
the implementation phase.  
I personally took part in one meeting a couple of years ago and the 
neighbourhood was really angry. They said, “We went through this participatory 
process and we elaborated some decisions all together, we voiced our needs in a 
very responsible and realistic way. Why has everything stopped now?” So this is 
the risk of these moments of participation. The Italian public decision-making 
process, but not just the Italian one, is very complicated. If we open a 
participatory space we have to be serious about it. Participation shouldn’t just 
be for consensus-building on decisions already made. [TR23 – Academic 
Expert]  
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Conversely politicians were highly responsive towards the demands of 
critical participation when the initiative came, swift and in great numbers, 
from the bottom up. Often unaware of top-down participatory events, such as 
the SP, neighbourhood associations were able to attract much media and 
hence political attention [TR12; TR14]. The neighbourhood association of 
San Martino, for instance, formed around 2008 to “put some order in the 
neighbourhood” (TR14 – Leader of the association), as the area was the scene 
of petty crime and drug addiction. Within a few months it turned into a very 
structured organisation with its own statute. The association was able to 
catalyse attention among residents who supported their cause and the wider 
public (Il Trentino 27 January 2009). 
We had our hilarious moment of glory. Soon after our first meeting we were 
even on TV [...] It looked like we could do anything, a secession, put up 
barricades and declare the free state of S. Martino. At that point in time it 
seemed possible because the people were with us. You’d go to the supermarket 
and people would stop you and say, “Yes, we saw you [on TV]”. It’s something 
intoxicating. […] People feel they don’t have an immediate interlocutor in 
politics and then they feel they have to act themselves… Yes, you realise you 
have a certain power. I was surprised that all of sudden they [the politicians] 
were so eager to listen to us and gave us the mobile number of a reference 
person [an assessore]. The mayor could have said, “Leave it, we’ll be dealing 
with the neighbourhood problems”. But clearly we had some weight and they 
were afraid of us. [T14 – Leader Association San Martino] 
 
The leaders of the association were offered direct access to the mayor and 
one dedicated assessore; they were able to ensure the whole area was 
constantly patrolled and that virtually every resident had police officers’ 
mobile numbers. More recently the action of the San Martino association has 
been more oriented towards fostering greater integration within a very 
diverse neighbourhood, where there is a high concentration of immigrants. 
They joined a local cooperative, Baricentro, which puts together several 
associations working in the neighbourhood and helps organise local events. 
This neighbourhood association is now independently focusing on urban 
planning in the area, also through involving some local architects.102 
 
Conclusion 
Trento is a wealthy city always ranking highly in Italian statistics on 
quality of life and characterised by high political continuity (also across 
institutional tiers), strong leadership at the local and provincial level, and a 
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highly cooperative social context, with a dense network of voluntary and civic 
associations. In Trento the SP was a voluntary process based on the initiative 
of the mayor, who sponsored the process, supported by public service 
managers, who enthusiastically championed it, ensuring good levels of 
internal learning of new working practices.103 Trento changed its statute to 
make SP compulsory and the plan became an important government tool to 
coordinate a series of sector-based plans, all elaborated almost 
simultaneously through more or less inclusive participatory mechanisms.  
Based on interviewees’ accounts, Trento’s trade and industry 
associations thought the SP was an important space for the city to reflect on 
its future, but they perceived it more as a process that would give coherence 
to local planning. Thus, they did not feel it was something they had to engage 
with in a more proactive way and showed limited interest in being involved in 
the implementation phase. By contrast, the third sector and cultural and civic 
associations tried to capitalise on the process and participated actively. There 
was no real intention to engage with simple citizens, since administrators 
argued a dialogue with structured actors would prove more constructive. 
Citizen participation proved more substantive at the neighbourhood level 
through the Social Plan, perhaps because the objectives were more tangible 
and easier to understand than a vision of the city’s future. Furthermore, as 
authority over social policies has been fully delegated to the municipal level, 
the administration enjoys greater freedom in defining and delivering policy 
change.  
It is interesting to note how, while simple citizens and smaller 
organisations struggled to have their voice heard within the top-down 
participatory venues, the critical democracy of the neighbourhood 
associations of San Martino was more effective at attracting media and 
political attention. The next case, Prato, will offer an elucidatory account of 
the clash between incumbent and critical democracy (Blaug 2002).104 
Reflecting on Trento’s experience, the author of the plan (TR2) 
identifies three main failings, which also affected SP in the other three cases. 
First the process suffered from excessive “Enlightenment” (TR2) or naivety, 
as there had been the conviction that it would be enough to put collective 
decisions in writing or to institutionalise the process - through the 
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amendment of the statute and various public-private agreements – to ensure 
that such decisions would implement themselves as if through an organic 
process. Yet planning succeeds or fails at the point of implementation, which 
represents a decision-making moment in itself. Implementation is not some 
software that realises itself once the decisional hardware is in place. In this 
respect the new SP - Towards a strategic agenda, Trento 2020 - aims at 
reflecting on the meaning of planning, by understanding all the clashes, the 
uncertainties, the irrationalities of a decision-making process, as it tries to 
manage these dynamics. Thus, the focus is now on implementation, 
understood as a continuous process, rather than as a dimension that can be 
enucleated, as if there were an apparently logical sequence of diagnosis, 
planning, implementing, and monitoring. “This is only true in fairytales, I 
believe” (TR2). A second problem identified is the temptation of a holistic, 
all-embracing approach: one thing is trying to integrate policies, one very 
different thing is attempting at planning everything. On the contrary there 
should be greater selectivity, in order to control those truly important four or 
five policies. One last criticality was politics. In Trento the mayor supported 
the process, as he was eager to answer a twofold demand for innovation of 
planning instruments and a vision of local development. However, politics is 
not always aligned step by step with what it decides.  
[I have witnessed] many situations, and I could quote reiterated evidence, 
where politics, whether the local council or the giunta, actually asked to 
elaborate some acts which they later formally adopted and which then went 
unheeded. [TR2 – SP Office CEO] 
 
The mayor was generally supported by one or two assessori directly 
involved in the process, while the rest of the executive and the council kept at 
a distance, between scepticism and outright ostracism. Politics, with its need 
for visibility, seems to struggle to understand the advantages of a 
participatory and long-term approach to planning. Greater support came 
from within the public administration, especially where there were some 
highly committed and innovative individuals. Notwithstanding some initial 
resistance, the public administration is slowly adopting a more open and 
integrated approach to planning and service delivery, particularly within 
those departments, such as Social Policies, which are at the forefront of 
service delivery and have a more direct relationship with citizens. The 
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presence of internal leaders committed to the process, such as the CEO of the 
SP office, was pivotal to ensure coordination, to motivate staff, and to 
support them through change.  
One of the main constraints was certainly the lack of coordination and 
a different modus operandi between tiers of government, which can 
determine fragmentation of local initiatives and hinder the credibility of the 
local government. The Province did not participate in the elaboration of the 
SP, but had the political and financial authority to undermine it.  
Thus, with regard to the three dimensions of the dependent variable 
(formation of the collective actor, democratic process, and implementation), 
the local leadership delivered mixed results. It failed to create those identity 
incentives which could have fostered a collective actor. In a context where the 
Province is the main institutional interlocutor, as it holds decision-making 
and financial power, local private stakeholders, albeit interested in collective 
reflection on the future of the city, did not perceive SP as a substantive 
decision-making arena. These were precisely the stakeholders whose support 
the local leadership believed it needed to increase its legitimacy and balance 
of power vis-à-vis the Province. Consequently the participatory process did 
not prove as inclusive of smaller interests as it could have been, given the rich 
social fabric. A more open approach could have enriched the forums and 
workshops with new ideas and resources that might have given greater 
substantiveness and originality to the overall vision and perhaps contributed 
to forming a collective actor, although with different interests from those 
envisaged by the administration. The latter did not feel it needed to increase 
its legitimacy with the city at large, since everything works in Trento and 
local institutions engage with civil society through other channels. It chose to 
focus on those actors that it believed could support its own emancipation 
effort from the Province, as in a trial of strength. However, the Province’s 
involvement in, and support for, the process, were key factors to ensure 
private actors’ commitment and the overall success of SP. As local elites also 
struggled to communicate the rationale underpinning SP convincingly to 
local politicians (i.e. councillors and political parties), the political focus 
faded away, leaving the SP in the hands of efficient public services, which 
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were ensured the implementation of smaller measures already integrated 
within ordinary administration. 
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Chapter 4 
PratoAgenda: Between Weak Leadership 
 And Strong Neighbourhood Associations 
 
Prato, in the ordinary status Region of Tuscany, has only been a 
provincial capital since 1992, as it was previously part of the province of 
Florence. It has long been at the centre of a textile district, which has been 
often considered as a paradigmatic case of all Italian industrial districts (see 
Bellandi and Trigilia 1991; Becattini 2000; Bacci and Bellandi 2007). The 
district has been deeply weakened by the current crisis and it has developed 
into an ever complex reality where legal and informal enterprises coexist, 
and, next to the historical textile system traditionally characterising the local 
economy, the clothing industry is now increasingly controlled by the growing 
Chinese community (Toccafondi 2010).  
The need to address the deep social and economic crisis was behind 
the decision to start the SP process in 2004, on the initiative of the newly 
elected mayor, who had previous planning experience at the regional level. 
Although it remained a formal process, the SP significantly contributed to 
highlighting the need for an update of the old Town Plan, just as a new 
regional law on Urban Structural Planning (USP) had been enacted. Under 
the new bill town planning, which should now be conceived as a participatory 
process, goes beyond the mere urban aspect to encompass the environment, 
the economy, and the social repercussions of planning interventions.  
The regional tier played a major role in encouraging Prato’s USP in 
2007, which also employed the new regional law on participation to 
coordinate the participatory process. Thus, contrary to Trento, here the 
regional level strongly encouraged a participatory approach to planning. As 
these two plans – SP and USP - are inherently interlinked, this chapter will 
examine both processes (although the focus is primarily on SP).  
The region of Tuscany has long been a stronghold of the Left and is 
often held as an example of good governance. However, in recent years 
Prato’s left-wing coalition has been crippled by deep internal divisions. The 
highly charged socio-political context and internal political feuds 
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undoubtedly affected the legitimacy of the administration and in particular of 
the mayor, who was isolated within his own majority and eventually did not 
run for a second term in the 2009 elections. This contributed to the historical 
defeat of left-wing parties and inevitably killed momentum and support for 
the wave of participatory plans. The new right-wing administration - the first 
in 63 years - does not seem interested in continuing the work carried out by 
the previous government and, at a time of unprecedented economic crisis, 
planning appears as a luxury while priority is given to ordinary 
administration. However, bottom-up initiatives have capitalised on the 
window of opportunity represented by the change of government and have 
renewed local interest in participatory mechanisms. 
In Prato the ruling party’s political infighting catalysed political 
interest, while the mayor was increasingly isolated. This negatively affected 
the legitimacy of SP, as the local community was already sceptical following 
previous governance initiatives that did not produce the expected results. 
The formation of the collective actor was thus jeopardised, as the process was 
perceived as formalistic and little-inclusive.  
Findings presented here are based on official documents, newspaper 
articles and 46 semi-structured interviews with actors involved in both the 
SP and USP process.105 The first section describes the local socio-economic 
structure and political system, while the second and third sections focus on 
the SP and the USP respectively, the rationale behind these governance 
mechanisms, the expectations and the actual results and repercussions in 
terms of local policies and local democracy.  
 
The Socio-Economic Context 
Prato grew up around private textile factories and its urban 
development was characterised by a laissez-faire attitude on the part of local 
government in order to encourage local industries. The concept of mixité 
(Secchi 1996; Mariotti 1988) has often been employed to describe this town. 
It refers to a strong interconnection between residential areas and (polluting) 
industrial production, causing excessive overload of the plumbing system 
and the road network (Bressan et al 2007). The city, whose population 
doubled between 1951 and 1971 from 77,631 to 143,232 (PratoAgenda 
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2004)106 reaching 188,579 inhabitants in recent years 
(statistica.comune.prato.it), has experienced regular immigration flows since 
the post-war period from southern Italy and, particularly in the past few 
decades, from abroad. Immigrants today represent over 13 percent of Prato’s 
population and the Chinese community is the most numerous (Bressan and 
Radini 2010). Prato has the highest number of foreign nationals in Tuscany, 
as a proportion of its population (PratoAgenda 2004).  
The Chinese community, mostly coming from the Zhejiang province 
(and in particular from the city and district of Wenzhou) (Ceccagno 2010), 
has created its own shadow clothing district, which exploits the labour of the 
numerous undeclared immigrants. The Chinese who are legally registered are 
12,000, but the illegal ones are at least 25,000 (Corriere della Sera 06-11-
2010). As the post-Fordist de-industrialisation process advanced, several 
local entrepreneurs began to rent out to the new Chinese immigrants the old 
factories that had to be closed down. They all settled around the so-called 
Macrolotto 0 and via Pistoiese, an area bordering the town centre, which has 
recently turned into a “Chinatown” (Johanson et al 2010). Successive 
administrations were unable or unwilling to control such developments, as 
they represented an easy and lucrative way out for local manufacturers forced 
to close down their business. Thus, rather than opting for a reconversion of 
these buildings led by public institutions, local government closed an eye, 
contributing to the development of the Chinese informal economy. In the 
face of the difficulties experienced by the local industry,107 the Chinese 
district is flourishing notwithstanding the crisis. Its competitiveness is mostly 
based on low-cost labour and this is causing resentment among the Pratesi 
and fuelling social conflicts. 
The historical trust in the future and in progress that had always characterised 
the Pratesi has started to deteriorate. Their optimism has cracked. And their 
fears have been channelled in a very ideological way against immigrants, the 
Chinese, as if they were the cause of their inability to replicate the splendours of 
the past. They [the Chinese] have become a scapegoat for our inability to 
positively interact with the present. [PR15 - Trade Union] 
 
Conflicts have so far been contained by sections of a rich social fabric 
eager to avoid unbridgeable distances between the two communities (Spini 
2007) but Chinese immigration is perceived to be a threat by the town’s 
several medium-sized enterprises. However, the Chinese community 
122 
 
predominantly focuses on clothing rather than textile. The challenge is then 
to continue to support the manufacturing tradition while understanding the 
transformation of the district. The textile and clothing industries tend to offer 
developing countries a comparative advantage since they require low-skilled 
labour. Prato’s textile district has long struggled to maintain its 
competitiveness, but in the post-war period when the district started to thrive 
thanks to the cardato (a fabric made through recycling) the Pratesi became 
the “Chinese of Europe” and put out of business many of their competitors in 
other European industrial cities, such as Manchester. 
The idea of linking the two production lines, the Chinese clothing 
industry and the Pratese textile district, which in theory could be 
complementary, is supported by many sides (Toccafondi 2010; PR5; PR19). 
It is however difficult to put in practice, because of the difference in terms of 
quality and price (PR35). Perhaps promoting them as complementary 
districts could represent an effective strategy to encourage the legalisation of 
black market labour, but to date only one Chinese enterprise is regularly 
registered with the local industry association (Unione Industriali Prato): 
Giupel, owned by Xu Qui Lin, well known in Prato as Giulini.108 The Chinese 
community in Prato tends to be secluded and lacks accountable 
representatives or spokespersons, but to date local institutions have made 
few serious efforts to engage with it. Dialogue between the two communities 
has been patchy at best, and the hope is that second generation Chinese 
might eventually be able to bridge the gap. However, Junjy Bai, president of 
the association Associna, when interviewed by Il Corriere (Corriere della Sera 
06-11-2010) argued that there was an increasing distance between the two 
communities. The most vulnerable victims of this situation, he added, are 
second generation Chinese, who, having been raised in Prato with similar 
values to the young Pratesi, often feel rejected and discriminated against. 
The inability of successive administrations to act in a decisive manner 
and address economic and immigration issues partly explains the victory of 
the centre-right coalition in June 2009, after 63 years of left-wing 
governments. Prato was traditionally a stronghold of the Left and part of the 
so-called red belt (zona rossa), dominated by the Communist party (PCI) 
during the First Republic. The city has developed a corporatist model based 
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on effective negotiations and collective bargaining between the industry 
associations, representing the several entrepreneurs of the area, and the 
trade unions, which enjoyed enough leverage to secure the highest worker 
salaries in Italy. The tripartite alliance of the PCI, the trade unions and the 
industry associations proved instrumental in ensuring a thriving district, 
which made Prato one of the richest cities in the region, while successive 
administrations tried to favour the interests of entrepreneurs, even when this 
translated into a disordered urban development. Renowned Italian architect 
Bernardo Secchi drew the last Town Plan (1993/96), but that was never 
implemented and was instead altered through several zoning variances 
signed off by the local Town Planning Department.  
220 zoning variances were made on Prato’s current Town Plan, which means 
that it is totally arbitrary. The public services won’t tell you, but when you work 
through variances, it means that it’s all arbitrary. If there are 220 variances, 
even if they are published, who’s going to check? There is no public monitoring. 
Hence it is arbitrary. [PR9 - Architect] 
 
During the last administration the left-wing coalition was weakened 
by internal conflicts. The new Democratic Party (PD), established in 2007 
after the merging of Margherita (mainly former Christian Democrats) and 
Democracy of the Left (one of the numerous rebrandings of the old 
Communist Party), never resolved the differences between these two 
factions. Already in 2004, prior to the birth of the PD, internal divisions 
meant that Democracy of the Left was unable to agree on a mayoral 
candidate. The name of Marco Romagnoli was eventually “suggested” by the 
then regional president, Marini, also from Prato and former mayor of the 
city. Romagnoli, an expert in planning, had long been living in Florence, 
where he worked as a regional government CEO.109 Although highly 
respected for his long-term experience, he found himself isolated within his 
majority and was perceived to be “a foreigner” by the local community.110 He 
followed a controversial administration, which had implemented several 
contested planning decisions favouring big business and eroding the 
environment (PR9). Thus, from the start he was in a very difficult position 
for reconciling existing divisions and simultaneously building momentum 
and cohesion around the season of participatory plans he intended to launch. 
Being a technocrat more than a politician he struggled to communicate his 
vision of the city and the whole administration was often accused by the local 
124 
 
media of being far removed from the “real” people, an attitude that 
contributed to jeopardising the participatory process. 
As an administration, and a political elite, it was a bit closed, they did not pay 
enough attention to what was happening in town. There was a stand-offish 
attitude, because they believed that in Prato the Left would always win. The 
electoral result in the end proved them wrong. [PR10 - Editor of local 
newspaper] 
 
While trade unions, industry associations and several structured social 
actors nevertheless showed support for the administration, dialogue with 
neighbourhood associations proved extremely challenging. Prato vaunts 
numerous active associations that contribute to enriching the social fabric, 
although the deterioration of the industrial district has partly fragmented the 
local community. As new political parties are unable to channel participation, 
neighbourhood movements, often based around single issues, are filling the 
participatory vacuum.  
During the first few years of the Romagnoli administration, several of 
these associations were involved in a participatory process to decide on the 
redevelopment of a square, Piazza Mercatale. A project was collectively 
elaborated, but the administration – which lacked the resources to finance it 
- decided to leave it aside and proceeded with a different project put forward 
by ASM (Ambiente Servizi Mobilità – Environment Services Mobility), a 
company under municipal control. This project entailed the building of an 
underground car park and cutting down the trees in the square, but all the 
neighbourhood associations involved in the participatory process rose 
against the decision. There were attempts by the administration at placating 
them by proposing some alterations. “Mercatale, ahead but with caution. 
Among many perplexities, the project has been altered to make the 
associations happy”, headlined Il Tirreno (24-02-2007). Although the 
administration’s project would have had no negative aesthetic or economic 
impact, since new trees would have been planted and the underground car 
park would have helped to relieve traffic congestion, the associations never 
accepted the fact that they had been bypassed and their trust towards the 
administration was fatally compromised. They thus became weary of all new 
participatory mechanisms. The Mercatale project was finally put aside, when 
even the regional government, which had to intervene at the request of the 
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associations, suggested so. “Suddenly the Mercatale question has been frozen 
[…] But don’t dare talking about a u-turn: in the rooms of Town Hall they say 
it’s ‘an afterthought in order to review in a coherent manner the complexity 
of the urban transformation’” (La Nazione 06-06-2007). 
By the end of the administration prior to Romagnoli’s, following the constant 
erosion of the environment and the transformation of productive areas through 
bad planning, the political class felt the need to regain some support and they 
had the idea of redeveloping squares around the city through a participatory 
process. They had no money, people mobilised and participated, but then 
nothing happened. Then people rightly said, “I’m not going to participate again. 
Why did you call me? To take the mik?” With this administration it was really 
an operation of political speculation. It was rhetorical demagogy. [PR9 - 
Architect] 
 
 
The Strategic Plan: Expectations and Outcomes 
The Rationale  
SP was launched in 2004 (Il Tirreno 28-10-2004); the mayor initially 
championed the process, assisted by the director of the Local Development 
Department, the assessore for Local Development and a local research 
institute, IRIS. The rationale underpinning the plan was to respond to the 
challenge of the urban transition of an industrial district in the doldrums, 
through a process that included all local institutional, private and social 
interests (Pasqui et al 2010). The social crisis triggered by immigration flows 
also needed addressing, but traditional negotiations needed to be 
reinvigorated by also inviting new social actors to the table. The 
administration conceived the process as a Convention of all major actors to 
find solutions and decide together whether Prato could afford to remain a 
manufacturing town or whether it should choose a different development 
path, based on tourism and services. Notwithstanding the contraction of 
manufacturing and the textile industry111, while the growth in services has 
been constant, the city still remains an industrial hub where the textile 
industry continues to represent nearly 40 percent of the economy 
(PratoAgenda 2004) 
By 2004, several other Italian and European cities had started their SP 
process and the Network of Strategic Cities had already been established, 
thus encouraging policy transfer (Wolman and Page 2002). The imitation 
factor certainly played a role, as the nearby city of Florence had also launched 
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its SP. Although, as mentioned above, the mayor was an expert in planning, it 
soon appeared that the process lacked focus and coherence. Several 
documents were produced on Prato’s economy and its social context, but very 
few substantial proposals emerged from the working groups, which some felt 
turned into endless “talk for talking’s sake” (PR5), while meetings were held 
during working hours preventing many among smaller organisations from 
attending regularly. 
PratoAgenda [Prato’s SP] took place at the Pecci Museum [the museum of 
contemporary art]. This is a place where the Pratesi don’t even go when there is 
an exhibition. Clearly they were not going to go there to hear someone talking to 
them about how good it is to invest in knowledge and that the new economy 
won’t be textiles but imagination. [PR9 - Architect] 
 
One of the characterising aspects of SP is the fact that it offers the 
space for diverse stakeholders to elaborate projects together. Similarly to the 
case of Trento, also in Prato most project ideas were long-standing proposals 
which pre-dated the plan. The meetings mainly served to “popularise” them. 
Already before the process started, the industry association had 27 projects 
that it intended to put forward at the meetings (La Nazione 21-11-2004). 
What became the flagship project (the redevelopment of an area called Ex-
Banci, which will be described below) had been in the backburner for several 
years. The SP became an opportunity to intercept all these projects and put 
them together within a coherent vision of the city. While this is not a negative 
thing in itself, expectations were different and some of the less structured 
actors felt bypassed. 
The main limitation of Prato’s plan was that the elaboration phase was not 
opened up enough. There were projects on the table that were already at an 
advanced stage. In the end the risk was that it would become a consultation 
exercise. At these meetings there were five presentations of existing projects 
and we just had to listen. [PR13 – Environmental Association] 
 
In general, although a website was set up to facilitate communication 
and interaction, the wider public was not aware of the process and the local 
media quickly lost interest and limited their contribution to publishing 
notifications on new events, as instructed by the local government’s press 
office. The fact that the mayor was politically weak and felt under constant 
scrutiny, not only by the opposition but also by part of his own majority, 
meant that political support for the process faded quickly.  
Little support, little commitment. There were many important problems facing 
the city, but [politicians] chose to address the emergencies rather than working 
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through strategic planning. This was disappointing, because in the end this plan 
didn’t even exist in terms of local awareness. [PR4 – Local think tank] 
 
The Process 
Prato’s SP was called Agenda Strategica and according to the official 
document (PratoAgenda 2004) it was the necessary framework to innovate 
urban policies, create synergies and enhance cooperation among actors 
through using the existing networks that already characterised the district. 
The Plan reasserted Prato’s identity as a manufacturing city and stated the 
objective of reinforcing the production chain and supporting innovation 
within the district. A strong commitment to strong participation and an 
intense marketing and communication campaign as an integral part of the 
plan were optimistically emphasised in the preliminary documents. 
Three phases were identified: context analysis, the elaboration of the 
plan, and the implementation of the strategies agreed, whereby the local 
government and in particular the Local Development Department would lead 
the process, assisted by external experts. The working groups were organised 
around four main themes: urban planning, sustainability and innovation 
(focussing on economics, logistics, energy, the environment, and innovation 
and research), culture (cultural services, education, and tourism) and finally 
welfare, identity, and citizenship. The preliminary meeting took place on 20 
September 2004 and experts from Formez were also invited. About 500 
people were involved in 26 meetings between November 2004 and June 
2005, although only a few attended regularly. A series of 40 workshops and 
institutional meetings were also organised and, according to official 
documents, over 800 people took part (PratoAgenda 2004).  
The final document includes several studies on the local context and 
the SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats) analysis, 
which identifies the challenges of globalisation for the local system and the 
need to invest in the knowledge economy. Protection of the environment and 
industrial innovation emerged as the main priorities, but the emphasis was 
also on enhancing an alternative image of the city, complementary to its 
manufacturing vocation: for instance, the renowned museum of 
contemporary art, built on land donated to the local government by the 
owner of a woollen mill, Luigi Pecci, was identified as pivotal in helping to 
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relaunch Prato as a centre of contemporary art in Tuscany (Marinetto 
2008).112  
The document, which was discussed and voted by the council in 
September 2005, fails to elaborate concrete projects and its main strength 
lies in the rich complementary documentation on the local economy and 
social context. La Nazione on 23-09-2005 reports an interview with one local 
councillor (independent), “I did classical studies and I have a degree, but I 
didn’t understand much of that document. The Red Brigades’ leaflets were 
easier to understand.” The reaction of the local media was fairly negative. La 
Nazione wrote on 23-09-2005, “Over one year of work through meetings and 
reflections translated into an 80 pages report, which is unreadable and 
presents no relevant innovation. The experts reassure us that this is how you 
write this kind of documents. But the distance between the report and the 
real problems that the Pratesi have to face every day is frankly abyssal.” Only 
very general ideas were put forward. The emphasis was on the manufacturing 
vocation but on a metropolitan scale (Prato-Florence-Pistoia), whereby Prato 
would play a strategic role within central Tuscany, particularly in terms of 
logistics, while benefiting from the powerful image that Florence enjoys 
worldwide. The strengthening of the intermodal and logistics centre thus 
emerged as pivotal (PratoAgenda 2004).  
The urban aspect, here as in Trento, was prioritised and the 
redevelopment of a disused industrial area – Ex-Banci – stood out as the 
central project. This was however a project long in the pipeline and also 
became the central idea around which the new USP (Urban Structural Plan) 
developed a few years later. The SP became therefore an instrument to 
communicate this project to the city and legitimise it. The project envisages 
the transformation of the area, partly owned by Consiag (an enterprise under 
municipal control). The idea was to build an exhibition centre, which would 
have initially been linked to Florence’s own exhibition centre, while the main 
building, Fortezza da Basso, was closed for renovation. The project included 
a master plan for an area of 30 hectares (the part owned by Consiag), signed 
by renowned starchitect Massimiliano Fuksas, who was the winner of a 
competition called by Consiag.  
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The project was allocated €10 million of regional funds as part of a 
regional programme called PIUSS (Integrated Urban Plans of Sustainable 
Development), funded through Objective 2 structural funds (Il Tirreno 21-11-
2004). The rationale behind the PIUSS programme was to redevelop disused 
buildings and factories to promote a development model based on 
“knowledge” through urban, cultural, and environmental projects. The 
overall cost of the redevelopment of the Ex-Banci area or Parco Expò, whose 
feasibility and benefits in a period of recession have been questioned by 
many sides, would amount to hundreds of millions of Euros. However, the 
former mayor and the architects working on the project [PR9] were confident 
about its positive repercussions, and the Cassa di Depositi e Prestiti - a joint-
stock company under public control – was interested in financing it.  
The Cassa Depositi e Prestiti was ready to finance this project for €100 million. 
It was a very difficult, complicated project, which clearly needed the support of 
the community. The trade and industry associations were enthusiastic. It could 
have really given some hope, a new vision of [development for] Prato. Our 
position was that when there is a crisis you have to rise to the challenge, if we’re 
in a corner we have to start attacking. [PR35 - Former Mayor] 
 
The new centre-right administration, elected in 2009, refused to go 
ahead with the project and argued that it was as majestic as it was useless. As 
they were unable to renegotiate the terms of the regional funds Prato 
eventually lost the money already awarded. Although the objective of these 
participatory mechanisms is to produce shared policies for local 
development, beyond political divides so as to ensure continuity, clearly it is 
politically difficult for a new majority to support specific projects that voters 
ascribe to the previous administration. In February 2011 the right-wing 
administration proposed the redevelopment of the Ex-Banci area with a new 
project, possibly more majestic (and useless?) than the one they had 
dismissed: an exhibition centre that would become a museum of all the 
different cultural and ethnic traditions that characterise Prato today. As 
reported by a local newspaper, the mayor proposed, “I’d like to ask all local 
administrations in the world to send us one kilo of earth to be placed around 
the Ex-Banci area, so as to have a small-scale world here in Prato.” [La 
Nazione 15-02-11].  
One of the main limits of the SP was its inability to involve the 
immigrant community in the elaboration of the plan, when, as examined 
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above, this community represents an important and growing part of the 
productive sectors. This is particularly striking since much of the preliminary 
documentation of the SP as well as the SWOT analysis highlight the threats 
and the opportunities that the Chinese district in particular could represent 
for Prato’s economy. Furthermore, some of the redevelopment projects 
included in the plan concern the very areas where the Chinese community 
has settled, such as the Macrolotto 0. As political elites are well aware of the 
difficulties in, and the urgency of, engaging the Chinese community, which 
was not going to spontaneously take part in the process, perhaps greater 
effort should have been invested in outreaching exercises through informal 
forums held in Prato’s Chinatown, face-to-face interviews etc., so as to 
encourage some level of involvement. 
 
Building A Collective actor: Lights And Shadows 
The idea of a collective response to the crisis was welcome, albeit with 
some scepticism because of lack of trust towards local institutions (following 
the disappointing outcomes of previous administrations). As the mayor, 
under pressure from his own party, withdrew his support, at least on a 
financial level if not in rhetoric, the process went ahead thanks to the 
commitment of the Local Development CEO and the local think tank IRIS 
that intercepted EU funds,113 by linking the SP to an existing project 
(District).114 In Prato, a mayor expert in planning could have played a major 
role in coordinating the process, while a social context used to negotiations 
and cooperation should have been fertile soil for a participatory approach. 
Instead pre-existing conflicts with the local civil society, weak political 
commitment and deep divisions within the party in government translated 
into poor coordination and the absence of a unitary vision. It was soon clear 
to participants and the local media that the meetings would hardly produce 
any substantive policies.  
We reached a point when we lost an overall vision. Everyone specialised in their 
own subject, but there was no coordination to help us reflect together in view of 
synergic implementation. [PR5 – Local think tank] 
 
Within such a context, a collective actor would struggle to come by. 
There were, however, important networking efforts in terms of policy design, 
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as a research system was put in place that involved think tanks such as IRIS 
and Tecnotessile, which helped to elaborate policies. The SP process 
facilitated the integration between local planning and European programmes 
by putting emphasis on new technologies in the textile industry and the 
transition towards the knowledge economy (Pasqui et 2010). In this respect 
there are two interesting projects included in the final SP. Texmedin115 is an 
EU funded project which aims at creating “transnational clusters to increase 
the competitiveness of the partners' territories in the textile and clothing 
sector by fostering the focus on quality, design and innovation” 
(http://www.texmedin.eu/). In Prato the project was coordinated by a local 
think tank that carries out research on new technologies for the textile and 
clothing industry, Tecnotessile. The second project concerns Prato’s Museum 
of Textiles (Il Museo del tessuto). This museum saw its role enhanced 
through the SP as a research centre and as an agent of development of the 
“fashion system” of the territory.  
For us this plan entailed a reflection on our role and made us work with a 
department [Local Development] which we had had no relationship with prior 
to the process. This is a process that we are continuing even with this new 
administration – perhaps with less intensity and not in the same planned 
manner, but this channel remains open. [PR18 - Museum of Textiles] 
 
One of the most interesting networking experiences facilitated by the 
SP developed as a bottom-up process involving a few stakeholders that 
shared the common objective of encouraging local and sustainable 
agriculture. The associations initially gathered together after meeting at the 
SP working groups. They initially formed a forum of the various associations 
interested in the project, coordinated by an architect working at the 
University of Florence but originally from Prato (PR1). The forum included 
environmental organisations such as Legambiente and Slow-Food, and a 
group promoting sustainable farming (GAS), but also institutional actors 
such as the local sections of the national associations of farmers (CIA and 
Coldiretti), and the South ward council covering a large green area on the 
outskirts of the city.  
Despite its fast urban and industrial development, Prato still has over 
3000 hectares of green land, which still hosts some small-scale farming 
requiring new environmental policies to guarantee its preservation. The 
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associations intended to promote the idea of a Farming Park (Parco 
Agricolo) to protect the environment and invest in high quality small-scale 
farming of zero miles local and traditional produce. The idea was already part 
of a 2003 provincial plan, but it was a bottom-up effort that brought it back 
on the political agenda and developed it into a feasible project. In 2007 the 
forum officially registered as an association of associations to acquire greater 
legitimacy and coherence when interfacing with institutions 
(http://www.parcodellapiana.it) “Today the association has its own statute. 
[...] And the SP allowed us to meet, which is not a small thing.” [PR20] 
The most important aspect is that all these associations sat for the first time 
around a table, at least in my experience, to work on a common objective. There 
are conflicts but we are also united on this project that we call Parco Agricolo. 
[PR21 – Environmental Association] 
 
The project of the Parco Agricolo is directly linked to a regional 
project, Il Parco della Piana, covering green land in the metropolitan area of 
Florence-Prato-Pistoia to redevelop a vast plain, which also includes the area 
of the Parco Agricolo (Il Tirreno 14-11-2008; PR3). The regional government 
and the provincial governments of Prato and Florence are the main 
institutional actors involved in this metropolitan project. This represents an 
important experience of multilevel governance which goes beyond 
institutional actors, since several associations are involved in what appears to 
be an inclusive participatory process.116 The agencies coordinating the 
participatory process on behalf of the regional government and the provincial 
administrations are Sociolab and Avventura Urbana. They explained how 
the process was organised, 
We organised a series of interviews and public assemblies. We also had a mobile 
information point to collect citizens’ ideas around the area, so as to reach out to 
those people that tend not to participate. We organised an event of great media 
impact to launch the process, the Festival of Creativity. About 3600 people 
came to visit us and they had the opportunity to visualise the project of the 
park, identify the different commercial and farming activities. They could all 
leave comments and write recommendations. [PR3] 
 
However, conflicts are rife even on this apparently successful project. In the 
park there is an airport that the regional government intends to expand. This 
caused many to believe that the redevelopment of the green land was simply 
window-dressing to sweeten the bitter pill of the airport 
(http://wwfprato.altervista.org/index.php/aree-protette/103-parco-della-
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piana-o-effimera-espansione-di-un-aeroporto-che-comunque-non-potra-
mai-essere-un-grande-aeroporto.html; La Nazione 15-04-2011).  
 
In Search Of A Leadership 
Similarly to what happened in Trento, political parties and the local 
council tended to remain at the margins of Prato’s SP process. They 
perceived SP as a “pie in the sky” exercise and a publicity stunt to increase 
the mayor’s popularity (PR16; PR26; PR31; PR38; PR39; PR42; PR43; 
PR46). Councillors in particular often lack political expertise and parties no 
longer offer the institutional space to engage in constructive political debates, 
further worsening already low levels of political and administrative 
competence.  
Political parties perceived it [SP] as something abstruse and far away, thinking 
that politics was elsewhere, a system of relations, alliances, responses on very 
specific, corporative issues. So they viewed it as intellectual stuff, nothing to do 
with the real world. [PR35 - Former Mayor] 
 
Several among the councillors interviewed believed that as yet there were no 
instruments in place that could guarantee the representativeness of these 
new political arenas, which, from a politician’s point of view, can at best 
aspire to act as consultative bodies.  
 
I’d never dare to say no to popular initiatives but I might vote against them in 
the council. Because I have a responsibility towards those who voted for me and 
I don’t know whether they might agree or not. A neighbourhood association is 
only part of a city, no matter how important. How many people might take part 
in a participatory process? 100? Still less than the votes I got. [...] I think these 
things should be kept as consultative instruments, also to develop a civic 
conscience among citizens, which at the moment is nonexistent. [PR42 – 
Councillor, majority] 
 
There was some degree of organisational learning, as public services 
had to get used to the idea of participatory planning. In Prato the Local 
Development Department and the Town Planning Office had long been 
grouped in one department. The Romagnoli administration decided to 
separate them by establishing a new office which would focus on economic 
and strategic development and which would be in charge of coordinating the 
SP process. Setting up this new office was instrumental in supporting the SP 
process and ensuring that coordination mechanisms among all participants 
were in place throughout. The presence of this office also ensured that, even 
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when the mayor withdrew financial support, the process could continue. 
However, some interviewees, particularly from within public services, argued 
that the rationale behind the new office was entirely political, as a way of 
distributing roles within the majority and appease contrasts between 
opposing factions. 
There was no integration between these two departments. There’s always been 
this idea of competition between economic development and town planning, 
particularly at the political level [between the two assessori]. In fact with the 
last administration [Romagnoli] what used to be one department was divided 
into two. And they ended up sponsoring two very different projects for the 
exhibition centre [Ex-Banci]. It was pretty much a fight with cold steel. We got 
close to seeing blood running. [PR14 – Town Planning Office] 
 
In fact while the assessore for Local Development came from the old 
Democracy of the Left, the assessore for Town Planning was an old 
Margherita member, and they each had a very different understanding of the 
future development of the city. The project of the Ex-Banci area represented 
the link between the SP (sponsored by the Local Development Department) 
and the USP (coordinated by the Town Planning Office), which was launched 
in 2008. The administration made the questionable choice to appoint two 
different teams of architects to work on the project. On the one side Urban, a 
public consortium which was also involved in the SP process, and on the 
other side urban planners from Florence that also coordinated the 
participatory process of the USP, as explained in the next section. Each team 
elaborated its own project of the Ex-Banci redevelopment, which reflected a 
very different understanding of the exhibition centre and its role within the 
city. As the architects from Urban had been directly involved in the 
elaboration of the SP, this only served to exacerbate contrasts between the 
two teams and the two public services they referred to, further diminishing 
the synergy between the two plans (and the two departments).117  
Although the SP was adopted, at least in rhetoric, as an instrument of 
governance to inform all future policies, it did not carry enough legitimacy to 
actually impact on working practices within public services and improve 
inter-sectoral communication and cooperation.  
The public sector has always had its autonomy and was not interested [in the 
SP]. They never accepted the idea of having to refer to the SP for their activities 
[PR6 - Assessore for Local Development]. 
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Some sectors, such as the Town Planning Office, displayed limited awareness 
about what a participatory process entailed and strongly resented 
interference from citizens and experts in what they viewed as highly technical 
issues. Several local government officers and CEOs have been in their role for 
decades and this might contribute to their limited propensity to any external 
innovation, whether from politics or civil society. 
Each office went its own way. XXX [CEO of the Town Planning Office] felt that 
his “territory” had been invaded, the assessore a bit less since he had been 
nominated only recently. [PR23 – Academic Expert] 
 
In such a conflictual context, an inclusive and facilitative leadership 
able to foster identity incentives could have hardly emerged. The 
participatory process in this environment only served to escalate conflicts. 
 
Multilevel Governance, Or Not 
The regional government of Tuscany has long been at the forefront in 
promoting governance mechanisms in the face of a cultural context 
traditionally characterised by strong parochialism. Among the several 
attempts at multilevel governance of the past few years, the idea of creating a 
metropolitan area including Florence, Prato, and Pistoia received great 
attention and a protocol of agreement was signed in May 2010 to encourage 
coordination and common policies that promote tourism through a joint 
fund of at least €200,000 per year. This was welcomed by local media. La 
Nazione on 27 May 2010 wrote of “a Copernican revolution”, a strategy “to 
relaunch the town of textile among the great capitals of tourism.” 
Furthermore, a few initial agreements were signed to promote collaboration 
between the two intermodal structures of Livorno e Prato, as there is a clear 
perception of the need to create “governance systems” beyond the commune.  
These admirable efforts often clash against the parochialism of the 
communes. In Prato the relationship between City Hall and a young Province 
in search of political identity fuelled conflict. The Province struggled to get 
involved in the SP but later organised its own working groups with 
associations and institutions, such as the District Working Group (Tavolo del 
Distretto). This was the provincial attempt to respond to the crisis and 
“relaunch the Prato question asking for greater support for those who have 
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lost their job but also for concrete initiatives for local enterprises” (president 
of the Province interviewed by Il Tirreno 25 May 2010). 
 Local government in Tuscany treasures its own autonomy and Prato 
resented the Region’s interference in its USP, as explained in the next 
section. Unlike Sardinia and Trentino which are special status Regions and 
enjoy greater powers vis-à-vis Central State but also over local authorities 
within their borders, in Tuscany local government is politically very strong 
and the Region has limited coordination capacity. As the Tuscan association 
of communes [ANCI] commented, “We are in a very difficult economic 
season and the ambition of the new [regional] president is that he will be the 
mayor of Tuscany. But here we are splattered. Atomised.” This also explains 
why the Province and the Region had very marginal roles within the SP. 
 
From SP to the Urban Structural Plan:  
Critical  Democracy  vs.  Incumbent Democracy  
 
In the past decade Prato has witnessed the birth of a high number of 
neighbourhood associations. The association of Piazza Mercatale, which was 
formed in protest against a project concerning the town’s largest square (see 
above), was particularly militant against the administration. Its leader 
became the point of reference for several other associations in their battle 
against participatory mechanisms that they perceived to be tokenistic 
exercises. Following the disillusion with the participatory process for the 
redevelopment of Piazza Mercatale, these neighbourhood associations set 
out to boycott the new participatory processes opened for the USP, while 
starting an alternative participatory platform, or a “subaltern counterpublic” 
(Fraser 1992) to elaborate their own proposals. 
Tuscany, with law 1/2005, has transformed town planning by 
substituting the traditional land use regulations (Piano regolatore generale) 
with two new sets of regulations: the USP, which sets the overall strategic 
lines for long term planning, and the urban regulations, which regulate land 
settlements through five years plans. Before urban regulations can be 
approved, the USP, which represents the general framework, has to be 
elaborated. The USP goes much beyond the old land use plan, since it defines 
the characteristics of the territory, the resources of the local community as 
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well as land use and environmental protection regulations. It identifies which 
transformations will be permitted, by dividing the territory into unities and 
sub-systems. It also has to consider landscape, living standards, mobility, the 
economy, labour, public services. Under this new law, administrators and 
citizens should work together to elaborate the plan through a participatory 
process.  
The regional government has invested greatly in citizen participation 
and is one of the first regions in Italy to have passed a law that 
institutionalises it, whereby local administrations and/ or residents, 
including immigrants, can request that participatory decision-making 
processes are opened on any regional and local issues 
(www.regione.toscana.it). Law 69/2007 was elaborated through a bottom-up 
process, which was intended to give procedural form to the normative 
principles conceptualized by the literature on deliberative democracy 
(Floridia 2007). The regional government offers to fund participatory 
mechanisms on the agreement that the process is completed within 6 months 
and the final decision is binding.  
As noted above, planning in Prato has been a messy affair in the past 
few decades, as administrators have favoured private interests. Thus, in 
2008, the regional government strongly recommended that the new laws on 
USP and participation were experimented in the city. A few urban planners 
from the University of Florence were asked to coordinate the USP process. 
This was articulated in two phases: a first phase of ‘active listening’ to the 
local community and of interactive construction of the plan, which took place 
between April and December 2008; a second ‘deliberative’ phase to discuss 
the founding principles of the new Town Plan, which was concluded with a 
deliberative Town Meeting on 28 March 2009. The first phase of the process 
was aimed at collecting the numerous points of view of very diverse 
stakeholders, particularly those sectors of the population that are 
traditionally marginalized and poorly organized; several meetings and 
interviews helped to identify proposals and needs. The second phase was 
about conflict resolution through deliberation, so as to ensure shared 
solutions. One of the academics coordinating the process, an architect, also 
began to work on the technical plan in Prato’s Town Planning Office and this 
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served to strengthen the link between the participatory process and the 
technical elaboration of the USP, to ensure participatory decisions were 
incorporated into the final plan. 
However, the mayor did not enjoy enough legitimacy to sponsor the 
participatory process, particularly after the disappointing results of the SP. 
The academics from Florence lamented poor collaboration on the part of the 
local professionals that had previously been involved in the SP process. 
According to one interviewee (PR23), local architects and public officials 
refused to share results of the preliminary studies carried out for the SP, 
which could have been relevant to the USP. The Florentine experts felt 
ostracised; by the same token the SP team was convinced that the Florentines 
misunderstood the rationale of the process and that they were just interested 
in reporting economic statistics and attempting an unnecessary and “slavish 
analysis of the whole land registry back to the 19th century” (PR34). As there 
was limited communication between the two groups and the mayor was 
unable to act as a mediator, there was insufficient flow of information 
between the SP and the USP teams and the synergy between the two plans 
was thus jeopardised.  
On their part the experts in charge of the participatory instruments 
failed to convey to the community the value of a participatory plan and to 
explain clearly how they intended to structure the process. As they were not 
from Prato, they were perceived by the community as outsiders and many 
local experts and public officials resented their interference in their own 
territory. Furthermore, the experts, initially unaware of the ongoing conflict 
between the administration and some neighbourhood associations, found 
themselves caught in between dynamics that they could not control. 
We realised that there was deep resistance on the part of local associations to 
interact with us, not because we were bad and ugly, but because there was 
structured obstructionism against the administration. There was total lack of 
trust and an absolute de-legitimisation of the mayor, which resulted in an actual 
boycott. When we organized our meetings, there were people protesting 
outside. [PR23 – Academic Expert] 
 
Political and bureaucratic resistance as well as the coordinators’ 
excessive faith in the effectiveness of the theories behind participatory 
instruments negatively affected the process, fuelling confusion between 
communication, consultation and participation. The opposition in the 
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council was unsurprisingly vehement against the participatory meetings. The 
deputy secretary coordinator of Forza Italia (now PDL) talking to La Nazione 
about the USP said “Even the [political] majority recognises the limits of 
certain meetings, which are in fact melodramas financed with public 
money...” (09-07-2008).  
The participatory law 69/2007 provides for the establishment of a 
guarantor of communication, who oversees the process, ensures fair and far-
reaching communication on all the events and outcomes, and promotes 
participation. As stressed by one of the experts (PR23), this is a key position 
to guarantee an inclusive and successful process. However, the Town 
Planning Office was dismissive and felt this appointment would be a simple 
formality. Following a first disastrous appointment, a second one was made 
by literally forcing an employee to cover for that role, in addition to her 
regular workload. As she did not really grasp the importance of her tasks, 
emails were often not sent to stakeholders, events were not advertised 
properly and, as the local media, following the disappointing outcomes of the 
SP process, were not always supportive of this experience, meetings often 
went unattended. 
By the time the Town Meeting took place there was a hardening of 
positions, with the mayor refusing any contact with the neighbourhood 
movements, whose crusade against the USP and the Town Meeting (TM) 
received much attention from the two main local newspapers (Il Tirreno, La 
Nazione February-March 2009). In the end both the experts from Florence 
and the neighbourhood associations believed that the TM should be 
suspended, since the process had lost legitimacy within the community; they 
pleaded with the Regional guarantor118 to halt the process. The regional 
guarantor refused and the TM went ahead. At this point the experts decided 
that, since they had been the target of so much discontent, they would 
involve a neutral third party that would organise the TM, a private agency 
specialised in participatory events, IDEAIS.  
150 men and women took part in the TM (62.8 percent between 34 
and 71 years of age, 33 percent between 16 and 33); they were randomly 
selected so as to be representative of Prato’s population. The level of 
scepticism surrounding the event at this point was very high. When asked, 
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“How much do you think you can influence the future of Prato?” a large 
group (31 percent) answered, “very little” (La Nazione 30-03-2009). IDEAIS 
decided to organise a one day event (rather than a two day event as originally 
planned) to save on financial resources; this, however, might have well 
reduced the impact and the level of awareness that the participants were able 
to acquire. The TM had been envisaged as the conclusive part of the 
participatory process, the final stage where to illustrate and discuss projects 
following the participatory meetings where these ideas and proposal had 
been collected and elaborated. However, the two phases were in fact 
disjointed and the TM only allowed for the discussion of very general issues.  
During the TM the neighbourhood movements protested outside, in a 
clash between top-down participatory (or incumbent) democracy and critical 
democracy (Blaug 2002). The associations argued that not enough 
information was provided to the participants, which were not always well 
equipped to take part in the debate. While some members accepted the 
invitation of the assessore for Town Planning to act as observers at the TM, 
the rest organised a “garrison of counter information” just outside the sport 
centre where the TM took place, distributing informative leaflets to engage 
the people passing by. They prepared some questionnaires to test TM 
participants on their way out and claimed that very few were aware of the 
issues at stake and what the USP entailed.119  
To date the USP has not been approved, as the change of 
administration in 2009 has certainly affected the implementation phase. The 
new centre-right government, although it is expected to conclude the process, 
might not take account of the participatory initiatives previously carried out. 
However, the change of government might have opened a new and 
unexpected window of opportunity for the associations. In the months 
following the TM, several neighbourhood movements, whose leaders are 
traditionally left voters, started meeting regularly and elaborated a series of 
proposals, which they submitted to the centre-right coalition once the latter 
was in office. The new government, which has never been in power before, 
has an interest in opening up to civil society to widen its support base and to 
compensate for its lack of administrative experience. In fact the assessore for 
Citizen Participation is actively supporting a new civic network, Casa del 
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Cittadino (Citizen’s House) created by the neighbourhood movements with 
municipal funds but open to all local associations and citizens to discuss 
public policies. Seventy associations and civic lists spontaneously organized 
into a constituent assembly that produced a series of proposals to amend the 
existing Regulations on Citizen Participation of the town’s statute. These 
were partly revised and finally approved by the local council, which added 
however several constraints. Participatory arenas can now be opened on the 
initiative of the administration or of citizens, although they will only have a 
consultative role and important limitations in terms of time (the 
participatory process needs to be completed within 90 days) and structure. 
The administration, however, has committed itself not to take any final 
decisions on issues under discussion by citizens, to consider citizen proposals 
and, if they are not accepted, to justify clearly why.   
The project that we put forward [...] is the creation of this meeting place to 
bring together all the neighbourhood movements and citizen associations, the 
wider community, a sort of citizen council, but with a clear structure and rules, 
not just a random thing, as happened before. And the last, and most important, 
request we put forward is to amend the statute. All our efforts will be 
meaningful if we can change the regulations. [PR26 - Leader of neighbourhood 
association] 
 
Although these associations could hardly claim to be representative, 
their leadership has enabled a new channel between citizens and institutions 
through opening up a participatory space where citizens and associations can 
bring issues to the attention of the city and the political elites. They have 
created an association of associations, PratoPartecipa, with its own website 
and Facebook page, and they organise regular meetings to discuss issues and 
elaborate policy proposals. These will automatically be debated by the 
council. PratoPartecipa’s latest proposal, which has been welcomed by the 
current mayor, entails the establishment of a new figure, the Civic Observer 
(Osservatore civico) and its institutionalisation under the corpus of norms 
that regulate the USP. The function of civic observers will be to “regularly 
monitor the implementation of the USP, to propose and evaluate projects 
and to know in advance the administration’s choices and intentions with 
regard to town planning” (Il Tirreno 22-01-12). The Local newspaper Il 
Tirreno has also launched a fortnightly column to facilitate communication 
between citizens and local politicians, called “You’ve got mail, assessore” (C’è 
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posta per l’assessore). The mayor, through this new column, has already 
stated his support for the institutionalisation of the civic observers. “Of 
course I believe it is right that citizens actively participate and that they 
perform a control function on the implementation of the structural plan. I 
have already sent out instructions to study a formula to insert the figure of 
the civic observers in the statute of the plan” (Il Tirreno 22-01-12). A team of 
experts will elaborate the new norms which will then be discussed with the 
associations of PratoPartecipa. 
 
Conclusion 
The case of Prato is particularly interesting in many respects. The 
context appeared highly favourable to participatory and governance 
mechanisms such as the SP and the USP. There were important issues that 
needed urgent and effective political action. In Trento the need for an SP was 
not entirely understood by local stakeholders, since the city is not facing 
particularly urgent challenges and the provincial level, which did not fully 
endorse the process, is generally viewed as the main institutional interlocutor 
on development policies. By contrast Prato is confronting important 
economic and social crises and it needed to elaborate a new strategy to 
overcome the recession and re-invent its economic structure. The social 
conflicts spurred by growing immigration flows had to be finally addressed. 
The private and social actors were committed to finding solutions, in a 
context where tripartite negotiations (trade unions, trade associations, and 
local government) have successfully encouraged economic development 
during the past century.  
The mayor, an expert in planning with several years of experience at 
the regional level, initially acted as the committed sponsor of the process, 
assisted by the CEO of the new Local Development Department, also an 
expert in planning at the regional level. The social fabric, although it has been 
weakened by the crisis of the textile district and the restructuring of the old 
Communist Party which used to be the main channel of local participation 
through political circles and the so-called case del popolo, is still vibrant with 
several structured and citizen associations. Unlike the case of Trento, the 
Regional Government of Tuscany was highly supportive and offered a strong 
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normative framework and financial incentives to sustain the participatory 
processes, even awarding funds to finance the flagship project; but local 
politics resented regional interferences, particularly on the USP. 
However, many factors intervened to hinder the impact of this season 
of participatory plans, which overall lacked a vital ingredient: a leadership 
able to communicate identity incentives and encourage the formation of a 
collective actor, in a context of distrust and pre-existing conflicts between 
part of civil society and local institutions, and feuds within the ruling party. 
Gritty political conflicts weakened SP and were the main cause of the first 
ever defeat of the Left in local elections. As the mayor was isolated within his 
own majority, which felt he had been “imposed” upon the city by the regional 
government, he often shied away from taking strong stances. Complaints 
grew about dispersing resources on something like the SP which, like in all 
other cases, was generally perceived to be unsubstantial by political parties 
and the media. Thus, the mayor withdrew financial support. It was only 
because of the commitment of the CEO of the Local Development service and 
the think tank IRIS that the process went ahead.  
The collective actor never emerged, the participatory process was 
perceived as non-inclusive and unsubstantial as a decision-making arena, 
and it soon lost legitimacy. Finally implementation of the flagship project, 
which had been endorsed by Region, was jeopardised by the change of 
government. Had a solid collective actor been developed around this project 
and the vision of the city’s development it interpreted, the opposition would 
have find it difficult not to endorse the project. On the contrary, there was an 
important failure of the leadership in fostering and communicating a vision. 
The council for the most part never shared or understood SP and 
perceived it as a wish list with limited impact on administrative life. If some 
level of scepticism was justified, since in the end the process produced few 
tangible results (but perhaps it was partly a case of self-fulfilling prophecy), 
generally councillors displayed limited awareness about the potentials of SP. 
The lack of political and administrative competence is certainly a hinder 
when it comes to complex governance and long-term planning.  
Thus, a fractured political structure translated into the isolation of the 
mayor, who struggled to communicate identity incentives to the local 
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community and was not able to continue to support the process in the face of 
political obstructionism even from within his own party. As political 
leadership faded away, this signalled to stakeholders that the process would 
turn into a formality, reinforcing the most sceptical views of the media and 
the local council. Internal political divisions and conflicts between the 
recently divided Local Development Department and Town Planning Office, 
each referring to a different political faction, contributed to hampering 
collaboration and synergy within public services.  
One of the most remarkable aspects of this experience was the 
spontaneous bottom-up networking of social stakeholders, which developed 
during the meetings and outside of the institutional framework. As some 
environmental and farmers associations had a common objective in 
protecting green land on the outskirts of the city and enhancing sustainable 
farming, they formed a forum to elaborate policy proposals and later 
registered as an association of associations to facilitate interfacing with state 
institutions.  
Both Trento and Prato’s administrations showed limited enthusiasm 
for citizen participation, mainly because they did not need to build legitimacy 
with the city at large: in Trento everything works, in Prato the Left had been 
in power for over 60 years and was confident it would never lose an election 
in this communist stronghold. In Trento, smaller organisations were 
sidelined by stronger and highly structured interests, while the process 
eventually fell under the full control of an efficient local authority, which 
turned it into a governmental tool. In Prato, there was widespread distrust 
and irritation towards local institutions, following several failed attempts at 
governance processes and consecutive equally unresponsive administrations. 
The leadership was perceived by local stakeholders as incapable of 
addressing the conflicts with the growing immigrant community and the 
crisis of the district, which seemed irreversible. These dynamics spurred a 
bottom-up (re)action, which gained the limelight during the elaboration of 
the USP. As the new mayor was not able to manage the escalating situation 
and open a dialogue with local neighbourhood organisations, the whole 
process was perceived by associations as non-inclusive and inevitably 
exacerbated conflicts.  
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Single-issue neighbourhood associations have been mushrooming 
everywhere in Italy in the past 10 to 15 years. They generally organise against 
local urban projects, but dismissing these associations as a “Not-in-my-
backyard” phenomenon would be to underestimate the growing distance 
between citizens and politics, to which the neighbourhood associations are a 
physiological reaction. In theory, the new participatory governance should 
help to bridge such distance. The example of Prato is emblematic of people’s 
interest in participating, but the rhetoric and sanitised formality of top-down 
efforts alienated local associations, which perceived these mechanisms as 
tokenistic exercises. Whether these arrangements were intentionally 
tokenistic or not is beyond the point. The distrust on the part of the 
associations might have been justified by previous “top-down” participatory 
mechanisms whose outcomes were bypassed by the administration and 
which were unable to deliver the demonstration effect (Fung and Wright 
2003), creating further disaffection. The fact that the participatory process 
linked to the USP was opened roughly one year from the end of mayor 
Romagnoli’s first term reinforced the conviction within the community that 
this was just an attempt to increase political support.  
The experts that coordinated the participatory events were from 
Florence and not entirely aware of some of the conflictive dynamics in town, 
hence they were unable to manage them. By this point, the administration 
was torn apart by internal divisions and the mayor struggled to communicate 
in an effective manner with the local community. By the end of the process 
(and with new elections looming), the mayor ceased all dialogue with the 
associations. By that point it was already widely known that the governing 
party would not support its incumbent mayor at the forthcoming elections; 
this further diminished the legitimacy of the process in the eyes of the 
associations. After the elections, as the city was still bamboozled by the 
surprise of having the first ever centre-right administration after 63 years of 
left-wing governments (which no one, not even the centre-right parties, 
expected) the associations joined forces and were proactive in organising a 
bottom-up participatory process, as they took advantage of the window of 
opportunity represented by the change of government.  
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The recurrent question was whether these associations were at all 
representative of the wider population. They clearly are not, but by opening 
up a new deliberative space for all citizens and associations, whether 
structured or not, and by including several professionals, architects and 
engineers, they can provide local politics (which often lacks technical 
competence) and public services with alternative resources and valid know-
how. Politicians still seem to understand participatory arenas as consultative 
at best, but a public debate involving citizens and experts from civil society in 
an open and transparent fashion, sustained by the media attention that the 
new projects of La Casa del Cittadino and PratoPartecipa are enjoying, 
could foster both greater citizen empowerment and more accountable and 
efficient local government.  
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Chapter 5 
 
 Lecce: “Un Ponte Verso Lo Sviluppo  
Economico-Sociale-Culturale”120 
 
 
In Lecce the Strategic Planning (SP) process was launched in 2005, as 
the Region decided to use SP as an instrument to invest EU structural funds. 
Lecce, with a population of 100,000, represents the main cultural and 
administrative centre of the Salento area, in the ordinary-status region of 
Puglia and, like most of the Italian South, it has long suffered from poor 
economic growth and decreasing financial capacity. After a long season of 
governance arrangements, which started in early 1990s with territorial pacts, 
SP gained popularity as an instrument to help cities and their surroundings 
to encourage economic and social development. The evident contradiction in 
Puglia’s case emerges from the fact that, while SP is generally conceived as a 
voluntary instrument, here it was the regional government that strongly 
encouraged the creation of area-based agglomerations of municipalities, 
which would together elaborate an SP, making it a necessary requirement to 
access regional and European structural funds. This had pros and cons, 
inevitably affecting actors’ motivations to participate as well as the nature of 
the SP projects.  
Whereas the lack of coordination and clarity in the relationship with 
the regional level partly hindered results, surprisingly high levels of 
cooperation between the local and the provincial tiers, notwithstanding the 
different political colour, facilitated the elaboration of the plan through a 
fairly inclusive process. The interesting aspect of this case indeed lies in the 
emergence of a facilitative leadership through the coordinated work of the 
political sponsor, the mayor, and the administrative champion, the CEO of 
the SP office. Beyond effective results in terms of project implementation, 
which in this case strongly depended on regional transfers, the process, 
notwithstanding several shortcomings, fostered new cooperation between 
some associations and the local administration. Thus SP has, directly and 
indirectly, opened new channels between civil society and institutions 
through a series of redevelopment and cultural projects based on 
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participatory methods, some of which were included in the final plan. Like in 
Trento, and contrary to Prato, leadership was strong and based on well 
coordinated work between politics, represented by the mayor, and the 
bureaucracy. Here the political leadership had an interest in building greater 
support with the city at large, as the mayor aimed at emancipating himself 
from the previous and very charismatic mayor, who was at the time still part 
of the giunta but often contesting its work. The mayor thus needed to create 
a collective actor to increase his personal consent. In this he was aided by the 
CEO of the SP office, an expert in governance eager to raise his professional 
profile, and by the provincial government, which chose a collaborative stance 
rather than a conflicting one. Influence over the process was equally 
distributed among all the stakeholders, including trade and third sector 
associations and the Province, whose representatives chaired several working 
groups. This enhanced cooperation and augmented the collective sense of 
ownership of the process. 
 Findings presented here are based on relevant documents, newspaper 
articles and 45 semi-structured interviews with institutional, private, and 
social actors involved in the SP process.121 The first section describes the local 
socio-economic structure and political system, while the subsequent section 
offers an overview of governance experiences at the local and regional level, 
to help contextualise the emergence of SP and its impact. Finally, the last 
section focuses on SP, the process and its outcomes to date.  
 
The Socio-Economic Context  
Lecce’s economic structure is characterised by the presence of nuclei 
of artisanal tradition and industrial production operating since the inter-war 
period. In the 1980s lower production costs attracted foreign and northern 
firms looking to sub-contract work to local entrepreneurs, who began to 
launch new activities, mainly based on traditional manufactures, such as 
clothes, shoes, leather goods, and furniture (Piattoni 2004). During the 
second half of the decade the international situation changed. Industrial 
activity had created new wealth among the local population and made the 
local labour less willing to work for lower wages, while competition from 
developing countries became tougher (ibid.). There were attempts to create 
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consortia, a route that had successfully been implemented in the North, but 
which required mutual trust and cooperation. Lecce’s local authorities 
instead chose to support individual entrepreneurs. They gave the latter 
“permits to build their factories outside infrastructured industrial areas, 
failing to enforce national contractual agreements and indeed helping them 
to break the nascent local trade unions.” (ibid.: 328). Today the few 
remaining companies successfully export in Italy and Europe, but “they 
achieved their hegemony at the expense of the diffused know-how which is at 
the basis of the success of this type of industrialisation” (ibid.: 328).122  
Over the past 20 years, the gap in terms of human capital and research 
between most of the Italian South and all other European regions, including 
the least developed, has deepened (Svimez 2008; Svimez 2011)123. 
Insufficient investment in research and development has a detrimental effect 
on Mezzogiorno’s economy, as well the unsolved issue of salary differentials 
between northern and southern regions, which continue to cripple growth in 
the South (De Rubertis 2010). However, Puglia has recently been investing in 
innovation and new technologies, and Lecce is now becoming the capital of 
nanotechnology, with the inauguration of a specialised site a few years ago 
(L’Espresso 3-4-2007).124 Interestingly, as the recession is determining a 
steep decrease in the number of entrepreneurs in the North of the country,125 
there has been a boom of new enterprises in the South, with 31 percent of all 
new businesses being created here (Linkiesta 16 August 2012). The lack of 
labour demand is incentivising young people to create their own jobs. In 
Puglia, a new regional scheme called Bollenti Spiriti (Passionate Spirit) funds 
new projects by young Pugliesi. Good ideas receive funds for €10,000/ 
20,000 and Puglia now generates the highest number of business spinoffs in 
Italy.126 
In the past European programme period 2000-6,127 structural funds 
helped enhance significantly the city’s architectural heritage and Lecce has 
rebranded itself as a tourist destination. Although the past programme 
period has produced significant outputs, there was a persistent 
implementation deficit in the South, due to the lack of human resources, 
adequate co-financing, weak project design and poor inter-institutional 
coordination (Svimez 2011). This meant that simpler and smaller projects, 
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with a weaker long-term impact, were privileged. However, among southern 
Operational Programmes, Puglia’s showed the best investment capacity, with 
payments of 111.2 percent of the total contributions for the 2000-2006 
programme period (ibid.).  
The emphasis on the discourse of participation and partnerships, 
which over the past 15 years has informed several new participatory 
initiatives at the regional and local levels, has been embraced by the regional 
government, which chose to invest funds for the programme period 2007-13 
through SP. The rationale, according to official documents, was to increase 
local responsibility on investing funds and implementing projects, as well as 
reinforcing the local social capital, through enhanced networking between 
institutional, private and social sectors.  
Puglia’s social fabric is generally fragmented, characterised by 
clientelistic relations. Low levels of trust are reflected in relatively high 
perception of increasing criminality, despite the fact that the rate of violent 
crimes has been decreasing.128  Several voluntary and cultural associations 
tend to be self-referential with limited propensity towards cooperation. An 
interviewee (LE15) described this as a “nil-nil” logic, whereby if one cannot 
achieve something it is preferable to him/ her that no one else does.  
It is true that there is a lot of associationism here, but this is a consequence of 
the fact that everyone wants to have their own piece of the cake, since they’re 
incapable of cooperating. Because 50 associations could just mean that they 
cannot cooperate. [...] In a territory like ours these dynamics are destructive. 
And this [the SP] for us was an attempt to overcome this logic and foster an idea 
of common good beyond each person’s own turf.  [...] In a parochial context like 
this one, if one tries to do something, they’re always boycotted, so everyone 
learns that it’s easier to mind their own business, if you don’t want to be ruined. 
[LE15 - Local Association] 
 
However, in the past few years, encouraged by new institutional openings, 
particularly at the regional and the provincial level, new initiatives have 
spurred in Lecce, whereby associations spontaneously cooperate to organise 
participatory urban laboratories and workshops, cultural events, and even 
debates using deliberative methodologies, such OST129 (Il Quotidiano 25-04 
2008; 3-06-2008). 
Puglia’s political culture has been described by Piattoni (2004: 321) as 
based on “ineffective clientelism,” whereby patrons are weak and divided and 
have limited bargaining power vis-à-vis the centre to attract resources or vis-
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à-vis the periphery “to enforce any given distribution.” During the First 
Republic, the Christian Democrats (DC) were the dominant party in the 
region, with a strategic programme based on pushing for the industrialisation 
of the South. Puglia’s leading political figure, Aldo Moro, was behind this 
programme. After his assassination in 1978 Puglia’s political landscape 
appeared extremely fragmented, determining the loosening of channels 
between the centre and the periphery. There followed fluid policy-making 
based on shifting coalitions of interests, with no stable leadership. Innovative 
policies interwove with clientelistic practices, often hindered by the inertia of 
the public administration (ibid.; also see Chubb 1982).  
The reforms of the 1990s shifted the focus from the parties to the 
candidates’ personal resources and charisma. The vicissitudes of Lecce’s DC 
began to be determined by a new actor in Salento’s politics, Raffaele Fitto, 
who, in the 1990 regional elections, had won a seat becoming the youngest 
regional councillor in Italy at the age of 21.130 He founded a new centre-right 
formation, the CDL (Christian Democrats for Freedom), and in 2000 he was 
elected regional President with the centre-right coalition. Fitto’s influence 
was crucial in reversing the results of the 1995 municipal elections in Lecce, 
when the centre-left candidate, Salvemini, was elected mayor.131 In 1998 his 
support thus helped the centre-right coalition to win the elections, with 
Adriana Poli Bortone as the mayoral candidate of the post-fascist party AN 
(Alleanza Nazionale/ National Alliance). Poli Bortone won a second term in 
2003 and in 2007 the same coalition won a third term with Perrone (deputy 
mayor in the previous administration) as mayor. He won a second term in 
May 2012. While the power dynamics have changed at the regional level, with 
the centre-left in power and a far-left President, Nichi Vendola, Fitto’s 
influence has remained strong in Lecce.132  
The centre-right vicissitudes at the national level and the divisions 
within Berlusconi’s party (with part of the former AN leaving the majority) 
also had an impact on Lecce’s local government. The deconstruction and 
restructuring process of Italian political parties, which still experience great 
difficulties in finding a stable bipolar system (Minaldi and Riolo 2005), 
translated into divisions within Lecce’s centre-right majority, which had 
seemed very strong and compact under the previous mayor Poli Bortone (Il 
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Quotidiano and La Gazzetta del Mezzogiorno May-October 2010). The degree 
of charisma and strength of a mayor, who concentrates on himself several 
powers, clearly plays a pivotal role in guaranteeing a cohesive majority in the 
council. In Lecce, personal as well as political conflicts (mostly concerning 
projects carried out by the previous administration which left the municipal 
coffers in deficit to the tune of €10 millions) poisoned the relationship 
between the former and very charismatic mayor Poli Bortone – who in the 
Perrone administration was initially acting as deputy mayor - and the new 
mayor. These conflicts translated into a difficult situation, whereby part of 
the majority sided with Poli Bortone and no longer supported the mayor and 
his cabinet, and yet refused to move to the opposition benches.  
Here as in the rest of Italy, the new political class displays very weak 
ties with political parties, which struggle to interpret society and channel 
citizen participation, and politics tends to revolve around big personalities. 
The difficulty of the Left, for instance, is that globalisation caught it unprepared. 
The capacity of Lecce’s PD (Democratic Party) to channel participation is 
scarce, nothing. But it’s also hard because today there is this parcelling out of 
society. I used to be the provincial secretary of the PDS (Democratic Party of 
Left) when Occhetto [secretary of the Italian Communist Party in the late 
1980s] put an end to the old PCI. But it was a different, more compact society. I 
used to go to the FIAT factories, I knew the workers’ shifts, because they were 
all members of the party. When you went out they would recognise you. We 
were their party. […] Today the situation is much more magmatic. [...] In the 
old world people’s profession defined them, it was a clear expression of society. 
Today, the worker no longer recognises me as his/ her party. The middle class, 
the professionals, might still have some distrust towards the old communists. 
So we risk being neither fish nor fowl. [LE 29 – Councillor, opposition] 
 
Several interviewees (i.e. LE2, LE9, LE16, LE29, LE36, LE39, LE42) 
complained about the lack of political and administrative competence within 
the council. Although political parties still exert influence, this is often 
limited to the selection of candidates and, proportionally to the mayor’s 
personal political capital, to cabinet formation.  
The councillors have some room of manoeuvre if they want to, but few, no one 
really, know the instruments at their disposal. [...] Party schools no longer exist. 
When councillors are elected they think they have been struck by a beam of 
divine light and then they do not even bother reading the regulation book, the 
statute. They know nothing. When there is a council meeting they do not even 
know how to move and they are often crashed [by the cabinet]. [LE42 - 
President of the Council] 
 
As examined in Chapter 2, what has effectively become a presidential 
system at the local level is missing a strong framework of checks and 
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balances, as councillors lack the capacity to exert control functions over the 
executive. Lecce might now be facing bankruptcy, with a €10 millions deficit 
inherited by the previous administration. The previous mayor governed with 
scarce opposition, as she enjoyed strong electoral support.133 European 
structural funds were instrumental to carry out several infrastructural 
projects to regenerate the city centre, which increased the mayor’s visibility. 
There were few controversial projects, such as the trolley bus line, whose 
usage in a city like Lecce is questionable and which, according to interviewees 
(LE13, LE42, LE45), was just a way of intercepting European funds that 
would have otherwise been diverted elsewhere. The trolley bus, whose overall 
cost amounts to €23 millions, still does not function, 1500 days after it was 
built, with a considerable waste of public resources (Il Paese Nuovo 4-07-
2011). The City Halls’ bond debts crisis is also proving a challenge for the 
commune’s finances, and a leasing for buildings in Via Brenta turned out to 
be a fraud at the expense of the commune, which still owes large sums to the 
company involved (Corriere del Mezzogiorno, 03-09-2011; La Repubblica 
03-09-2011) 
Poli Bortone [former mayor] did a lot but she created a massive deficit. I was 
part of that administration, as her assessore for Finances and I produced a lot 
of money through addressing tax evasion. This money, as fast as I spread poison 
to make it, she spent it. This is clearly how you create support and gain 
visibility, because a mayor that rebuilds a city is clearly loved by citizens. Paolo 
[Perrone, the new mayor and former assessore for Public Works] found himself 
in a situation where three or four ill-omened decisions - the bonds and Via 
Brenta - brought the commune on the verge of bankruptcy. And it is clearly 
politically difficult to antagonise a previous mayor that was so loved, although 
today many are questioning some of her decisions. [LE42 - President of the 
Council] 
 
In June 2011, Lecce’s mayor had to respond of the budget deficit 
before the Regional Court of Auditors and presented his plan on how to 
restore the budget to balance, through cutting expenses and addressing tax 
evasion, while “cleaning up” bad debts (Online National Press Agency 
http://www.dasud.com/regioni/puglia/notizie-dalla-puglia/4605/la-corte-
dei-conti-promuove-l%E2%80%99operazione-risanamento-del-comune-di-
lecce.html.) His plan was accepted by the Court. 
Thus, in this case, although the SP was incentivised from the regional 
tier, the local leadership had a strong interest in promoting and supporting 
an inclusive process, as the formation of a collective actor around a new 
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vision of development represented an opportunity to increase the new 
mayor’s visibility and legitimacy within a conflictual political context and vis-
à-vis the former mayor, whose charisma continued to cast a shadow over the 
current administration. 
 
A New Approach to Local Governance 
In the past decade, Puglia’s local development strategy has been 
increasingly based on negotiated planning, with several area-based projects 
for local development characterised by an approach which combines private 
and public resources and integrates social and economic policies. Several 
territorial pacts and territorial integrated projects (PIT)134 have been 
activated in the region since the 1990s, and, albeit not always effective in 
terms of outcomes, they have proved important in promoting cooperative 
behaviours among different local actors and in defining a consensual 
development strategy (Santandrea 1997; Santandrea and Giorgio 2004). 
These governance mechanisms, by including all interested actors, have been 
able to open new deliberative arenas (Bobbio 2002), yet successful 
experiences seem to be often based on the consensus built around a strong 
and informed political leadership (Tedesco 2005). In Puglia, as elsewhere, 
the main problem with territorial pacts and other governance mechanisms is 
the risk of fragmentation of actions because of lack of coordination between 
local governance projects and relevant regional programmes (Santandrea 
1997).  
Since 2005 the left-wing regional government has put great emphasis 
on concepts of participation and has established a new Department for Active 
Citizenship to elaborate collective strategies on how to invest EU funds. A few 
thematic internet forums were set up (Bobbio 2007); the website includes 
different thematic areas and for each area there is a forum where citizens can 
discuss policy issues or send their suggestions by email.135 Despite the 
innovation and the potential of the idea, the website has so far failed to 
attract “average” citizens and most contributions are from experts (ibid.; see 
also http://pugliattiva.regione.puglia.it; Gangemi and Gelli 2006).  
Lecce launched its own participatory programme back in 2001, in 
response to regional directives on planning and development under Measure 
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5.1 of the regional Operational Programme for EU structural funds (see 
www.comune.lecce.it).136 The main objective was the creation of partnerships 
between social and institutional actors, through three phases: diffusing 
information about the new strategy through representatives of the public and 
private sector; distributing short questionnaires to collect ideas and 
proposals from the general public; and organising a series of meetings with 
coordinated groups of representatives of the public and the private sector. A 
final Protocol of Agreement (Protocollo d’Intesa) was signed by 43 
associations, including religious associations, the local University, and nearly 
all the private and public organisations that operate locally. This initiative, 
which was a first attempt at an urban SP, aimed at implementing an 
integrated system of development based on networks among all the 
organisations involved. 
 In 2004 the first area-based Piano di Zona,137 involving the city of 
Lecce and neighbouring municipalities, was launched to reorganise and 
develop social policies, through a participatory process open to relevant 
association representatives, as well institutions and trade unions. A few 
rounds of meetings were organised between November 2004 and June 2005, 
followed by the activation of working groups for each thematic area to decide 
on priorities and elaborate proposals (www.comune.lecce.it).  
Lecce is the only city in Puglia to have received funding for two 
neighbourhood contracts (contratti di quartiere), during the Poli Bortone’s 
administration. These are participatory projects of urban and social 
regeneration of degraded neighbourhoods, which lack services and suffer 
from weak social cohesion. They were first launched under Law 662/96, 
which set aside funds to invest in these types of projects. Following the 
experience of the neighbourhood contracts, in 2005 a new programme for 
the regeneration of peripheries (PIRP), also based on a participatory 
approach, was designed on the initiative of the regional government. Lecce 
immediately applied the new law to the regeneration of the neighbourhood of 
Via Leuca, which was approved with cabinet act 470/ 17-07-06.  
Thus, the SP process developed within a context of great institutional 
enthusiasm for new governance mechanisms and partnership-based 
development policies. On the one hand the decade-long season of territorial 
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pacts and other arrangements based on partnerships certainly helped to 
build up important technical experience to capitalise upon. On the other 
hand previous arrangements, as they often delivered disappointing results, 
constituted a liability and stakeholders inevitably showed some scepticism. 
Nevertheless, some dynamic associations (LE15, LE38) were able to use the 
new legislation to open new channels with the administration and carry out 
innovative participatory experiences.  
Under regional law 21/2008, a group of local young architects expert 
in participatory urban planning (LUA – Open Urban Laboratory), a cultural 
association, Manifatture Knos, and Lecce’s local government made a bid for 
funds for a regeneration project in via Leuca, which, as examined below, is 
also linked to the flagship project of the SP. As these associations had a 
history of collaboration with smaller municipalities around Lecce, they 
showed a high degree of awareness of institutional dynamics and 
participatory processes. 
We responded to a call for bids of the regional Ministry of Culture for €5/ 
10,000. We had a project of participatory democracy called “Knos [Manifatture 
Knos – cultural association] listens” [...] But LUA always told us that it makes 
no sense to arrange participatory events without the backing of the local 
administration and its involvement as a partner, since it’s the only way to 
ensure that participatory decisions are implemented. If several citizens 
participate and then nothing happens it’s worse than having no events at all. So 
we approached the City Hall and they suggested we worked in Via Leuca [since 
there were already funds for projects in that neighbourhood, under the PIRP 
legislation]. [LE15 - Cultural Association] 
 
Several other local associations also participated and a series of outreaching 
events were organised to collect ideas and involve local residents in the 
elaboration of projects (LeccePrima.it 29-07-2011).138  
[...] Every association had different ideas on how to involve people. Some 
visited private residencies to measure energy waste; others organised theatrical 
performances involving school children. In the end we produced a document 
with all the ideas that emerged from this outreaching exercise. [LE15 - Cultural 
association] 
 
Some institutional actors complained about the fragmentation of all 
these initiatives. 
The PIRPs, for instance, do not take account of a wider understanding of 
planning that encapsulates the whole city. [...] If you only involve the 
community through the PIRPs the impact is going to be limited. [...] Before 
implementing very local projects, one should ensure they are well integrated 
within a wider urban plan. [...] If we keep moving in small pieces and through 
small projects, we end up worsening the overall urban logic of the city and 
making it uglier. [LE39 - Councillor, independent] 
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Had it been understood as a process rather than a mere list of projects, the 
SP could have represented the necessary framework to ensure the coherence 
of several smaller governance initiatives; but, as examined below, the 
excessive politicisation of the decision-making body (control room) meant 
that a collective and coherent vision was finally sacrificed for sub-optimal 
solutions that ensured greater consensus. 
 
The Strategic Plan: Coordinating Action 
Lecce adopted SP in 2005, during the Poli Bortone’s administration, 
when the current mayor was deputy mayor and assessore for Public Works; 
however the bulk of the process developed during the first years of the 
Perrone administration. The regional government financed 10 area-based 
strategic plans covering the whole regional territory (BURP 07-04-2005).139 
The Region published its guidelines two years after launching the process, in 
2007, creating much confusion among local authorities; the guidelines 
defined a highly centralised process (Pasqui 2010).  
In Lecce the rationale was to elaborate a development model coherent 
with other plans and projects, also at other institutional levels, around three 
main themes: tourism, the environment, and culture. 16 protocols of 
agreement were signed by the local administration with several private and 
social actors, such as trade associations and unions, the Chamber of 
Commerce, the University of Salento, and several research institutes. 
Suggestions from the community were collected through the so-called “box of 
ideas”, scattered around schools and public squares, where citizens could 
post their visions for the city’s future. Working groups involving institutional, 
social and private stakeholders were formed around 11 thematic areas140 to 
elaborate proposals and projects, following the presentation of a SWOT 
analysis. The thematic areas were identified based on the preliminary 
documents but also the measures of the Operational Programme for EU 
structural funds, thus bending the SP to European requirements. 
A “Strategic Planning Office” was set up for the technical management 
of the process, the coordination of the participatory mechanism and the 
supervision of the elaboration of the plan (Document Strategic Planning 
Lecce)141. The “inter-institutional assembly” grouped the political 
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representatives of the 31 municipalities involved in the plan and was 
expected to formulate clear political and strategic guidelines during the 
planning phase. A decision-making body, the so-called Cabina di Regia 
(control room), assembling the mayor of Lecce, the provincial president, the 
presidents of the two unions of smaller municipalities and the mayors of five 
other communes, overviewed the process and guaranteed final decision-
making. Another assembly comprised of all the social and private 
stakeholders. 
Prior to the SP, a mapping exercise was carried out to identify local 
actors and their degree of influence and representativeness, based on 
AccountAbility 1000 (AA 1000). This is a tool developed by ISEA (Institute of 
Social and Ethical Accountability) which aims at ensuring the credibility and 
authoritativeness of the social mapping through using shared international 
standards.142 A Task Force was created to identify local priorities with 
regards to the chosen thematic areas. Each thematic area was studied in 
depth by specific working groups (involving local actors based on voluntary 
adherence), through research and analysis and through identifying relevant 
and feasible proposals. The whole task force was coordinated by the CEO of 
the SP office, who indicated deadlines, procedures and objectives. Each 
group had to nominate a representative who, with the help of the SP Office, 
would define the methodologies and tools that would facilitate the debate. 
The SP office also appointed a facilitator to work with the group 
representatives and manage the micro-process; the facilitator was also in 
charge of drawing up a final report on the entire process. The choice of 
having representatives of different associations and institutions (i.e. trade 
unions, trade associations, public service CEOs, and provincial government 
officers) as chairs of different working groups ensured a highly inclusive 
process and greater interdependence of stakeholders. 
According to official documents (Document Strategic Planning Lecce) 
the governance model was inspired by the European Commission’s White 
Paper (2001) which encourages institutional openness and wide and diffused 
participation. The rationale was to support local administrations in 
facilitating interactions between institutions and other stakeholders and in 
guaranteeing the effectiveness of subsidiarity and the coherence with other 
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planning instruments at the regional, national, and European level. The 
process employed participatory tools to facilitate the meetings, and in 
particular the European Awareness Scenario Workshop (EASW). This is a 
methodology introduced by the European Commission DG Enterprise, in 
order to promote participatory democracy in local government through 
workshops, with the aim to identify and plan solutions to existing problems 
regarding the environment, urban planning and/ or regeneration and 
sustainable development. The participatory philosophy underpinning the 
plan, as emphasised in the official documents, was inspired by the 
transparency principles promoted by European guidelines, such as the 
European Green Book on transparency, the Plan D for Democracy, and the 
White Paper on European communication policy. Publicity and information 
on the process were ensured through a Communication Plan that referred to 
Regional guidelines 1828/2006, to guarantee transparency regarding final 
funding of the selected projects and continuous information on the process.  
We paid much attention to things such as the logo, a coherent image, continuity 
in the message and the posters. [LE1 - SP Office, officer] 
 
It took a long gestation period between the initial research work, where the 
local university performed an important role which helped produce the 
preliminary documentation and the mapping of local stakeholders (as well as 
the social network analysis which identified power centres within the local 
community), and the elaboration of the projects by the working groups. The 
control room of the mayors finally selected 500 projects – an excessive 
number perhaps, as examined below - and the final plan was voted by the 
council in October 2008. 
 
The Participatory Process:  
Promises And Disappointments 
There was an impressive effort on the part of the SP office to ensure an 
inclusive process, which reflected the high technical expertise in participatory 
planning and governance mechanisms of the SP office’s CEO. In this case, as 
in Trento and in Prato, the meetings were open to the public, but a thorough 
preliminary analysis of the social context allowed the organisers to select an 
ample number of stakeholders representing all interests, who were directly 
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invited to take part in the working groups. There was careful preparation of 
the agenda of the meetings, while the presence of local government officers 
that acted as facilitators guaranteed space for all participants. The choice to 
involve representatives of different interests in coordinating and chairing the 
working groups served to guarantee greater cooperation and 
interdependence. Thus, for instance, the working group on local development 
was chaired by the president of the trade association; the working group on 
welfare by the CEO of the Social Policies department; and the working 
groups on town planning and the environment by a provincial-level CEO.  
The involvement of the provincial level and the coordination between 
the two tiers, notwithstanding the different political colour of the two 
administrations at the time, represents one of the most positive aspects of 
Lecce’s case, as it ensured good coordination throughout the process. The 
fact that regional and European funds were at stake clearly represented an 
incentive to participate and guaranteed interdependence of stakeholders, 
since it was clear that the SP had the potential of becoming a substantive 
decision-making arena. However, financial incentives twisted the very nature 
of SP, since the elaboration of a vision of development was not a priority per 
se, but a means to capture available funds.  
There was perhaps excessive faith in the capacity of methodologies to 
guarantee by themselves a true horizontal debate, but some less structured 
participants failed to understand the rationale of the initiative and what was 
expected from them (LE3, LE6, LE12, LE31, LE34). Thus, their contribution 
was undermined. Furthermore, here as in Trento and Prato, participatory 
mechanisms proved difficult to sustain after the initial planning phase. 
Initially I was very enthusiastic about being involved in the project, but I later 
lost all enthusiasm. We put in a lot of work, but they [the City Council] stopped 
giving us information on the projects. [...] At the beginning we were a bit 
confused. We did not fully understand what we had been invited to. We were 
told that local authorities wanted to submit some projects to the regional 
government. But there was never a preliminary meeting for all the stakeholders 
to explain what the process was about, that our proposal would be one of many 
and that later a cabina di regia would select some proposals. [LE31 - 
Researcher] 
 
The selection of the final projects out of the working groups’ proposals 
pertained to the control room. While a body that guaranteed final decision-
making was necessary, the control room being very political (and politicised), 
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it was often excessively responsive to mayors’ pressures; and political 
compromise partly jeopardised the strategic approach, as attested to by the 
high number of projects included in the final plan. Interviewees (LE1, LE2, 
LE22, LE24, LE43) believed that the inability to focus on a few strategic lines 
was a fundamental weakness of Lecce’s SP. The plan was perceived by many 
as an unrealistic shopping list that sacrificed strategy for compromise among 
the institutional actors represented in the control room.  
The outcome was the creation of omnivorous plans, where the centrality of the 
vision was dispersed in thousands of trickles. […] All in all the 10 SPs of Puglia 
list projects for €22 billions, and this is a contradiction for an SP. […] €22 
billions worth of programmes and projects that on average would cost about 
€150 thousands each and that have very little value added. Some are near 
ridiculous: cultural events costing one €4000 and the other one €10,000. 
[LE43 - Regional Evaluation Task Force, Officer] 
 
The staff of the SP office justified their choice of listing several, even small, 
projects, but this would seem to conflict with the understanding of SP as 
elaborating few strategic ideas that can drive economic and social 
development in the long term, rather than producing a list of projects that 
could become redundant or irrelevant within a few years. 
We wanted to collect the desires of the community and we did not want to 
exclude the project of a partner that plans to have, one day, a park for dogs, for 
instance. That might not be our priority now, but, within a hierarchy, we have 
also inserted that project and others that might not receive regional funding 
now, but for which we could find funds later through others channels. So, we 
didn’t make this list with the idea that 500 projects worth over €2 billions 
would be financed immediately. [LE1 - SP Office, officer] 
 
There were no formal regulations of co-decision with partnerships and this 
engendered fragmentation of projects and a re-awakening of mayors’ 
anxieties to bring home something tangible, which resulted in a strong 
hierarchy of projects, based more on the municipality’s influence rather than 
on quality and strategic impact. 
Notwithstanding the important funds available here, the response of 
the media was similar to that of Trento and Prato. Local newspapers did not 
show much support for the process, claiming to interpret the scarce interest 
on the part of the general public. Most articles in the local newspapers were 
informed by the City Hall’s press office, which by contrast was very active, 
and were generally notifications of the events taking place, with few articles 
that offered an analysis of the process and what it entailed. 
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I think this is because this idea of area-based development, which has its logic, 
ends up overlapping [in people’s imagination] with other initiatives that clearly 
did not stand out for strategic vision, so to speak. These are clearly operations 
that do not generate great interest. And so inevitably there was little attention 
from the media. Perhaps the implementation phase will see greater attention 
from the media and more satisfaction of the general public. [...] I think the plan 
was not understood. The strategic vision was a bit vague and there was little 
communication capacity beyond institutional milieus. This has weakened the 
elaboration phase. [LE45 – Journalist for local newspaper] 
 
Thus, even where, as in Lecce, there was strong commitment to an 
inclusive and participatory process, as attested to by the fast paced, multi-
faceted communication campaign of the SP office, the SP did not seem able 
to attract public interest. The language might still be too technical and, 
beyond the results promised by the most innovative participatory 
methodologies, local administrations are still too inexperienced to be aware 
of, and bridge the gap between, professionals and ordinary citizens (or 
perhaps unwilling to invest too much in these exercises). This inevitably 
inhibits participation on the part of certain actors. Sometimes even 
professionals, who were familiar with the language if not with the political 
dynamics (LE31, LE34), did not feel they had enough leverage on the process 
vis-à-vis other, savvier actors, who were more used to interfacing with 
institutions. Nevertheless, as examined above, some proactive associations 
such as Manifatture Knos and LUA were able to capitalise effectively on the 
new openings. 
Like in the previous two cases, as the elaboration phase came to an 
end, coordination and communication mechanisms weakened and 
stakeholders were no longer informed about further progress. While local 
government waited for regional funds, the whole process stalled for several 
months.  
Frankly initially the participatory process was intense when general objectives 
had to be identified, through the usual forms of forums, OST, EASW, but there 
was no co-decision process throughout each phase. Once that first planning 
phase was completed, the social and private partners were forgotten. And it 
became an institutional and political problem. [LE43 - Regional Evaluation 
Task Force, Officer] 
 
In Lecce there was a political interest in, and the administrative 
capacity for, an inclusive process to foster a collective actor, but the excessive 
politicisation of the control room, and the exclusion of other stakeholders 
after the planning phase, jeopardised the strategic vision. Without a genuine 
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collective actor, the need for selectivity clashed against inclusivity, as the 
initial rationale of few core strategies was sacrificed for several sub-optimal 
project ideas that kept all the mayors happy. 
 
The Outcomes: A Plan Of Compromise 
The flagship project of the plan was an infrastructural measure, as in 
Trento and Prato. It concerned the redevelopment of the quarries of Marco 
Vito, envisaging the creation of a grandiose park, and was signed by the well-
known Portuguese architect Alvaro Siza. This project had long been in the 
pipeline and, as in the previous two case studies, the SP offered the 
opportunity to “popularise” it and communicate it to the city, hence the 
emphasis on starchitects who can capture people’s imagination.143  
According to official documents, in Lecce 59 percent of the projects 
included in the final plan are entirely new projects, which emerged from the 
working groups, and 22 percent are pre-existing. Some interviewees, 
however, (LE3, LE31) argued that projects were not necessarily debated 
within the working groups, rather individual stakeholders would just propose 
their own project, which would then be selected if in line with the 
overarching strategies. The control room and the stakeholders that signed 
protocols of agreements with the institutions selected the strategic themes 
through the Evaluation of Social Sharing (Valutazione di Condivisione 
Sociale). Such themes correspond to the thematic areas of the working 
groups. The final priorities identified mainly concerned infrastructural 
projects and interventions to enhance energy saving activities, as well as 
several projects to promote local research and development, and tourism. 
The main challenge in this case was to bend the strategic lines of the plan so 
that they fitted the dimensions and measures of the structural funds, which 
clearly constrained the overall vision. The CEO of the SP office reiterated 
how, beyond weak coordination with the regional tier, the very institutional 
framework of the SP in Puglia, as it was a compulsory regional programme to 
access funds, generated an ambiguous set of incentives contrary to the nature 
of SP. 
 
The other side of the coin is that this initial consensus over the projects, this 
sharing and being together and so on – or the fundamental principles of 
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bottom-up planning... This initial consensus, which we [as the SP office] built 
through intense daily work including on Saturday and Sunday, was driven, and 
this is a weakness of the whole experience, by the prospects of regional funds. 
So this often implied that instead of focussing on the qualitative and 
quantitative impact of a project… The projects did not always integrate within a 
certain development scenario, because this scenario kept changing. The Region 
changed the guidelines, they changed the procedures, even the Operational 
Programme changed. On the one side local creativity was very helpful, but the 
expectation of receiving funds was disappointed. [LE2 - SP Office CEO] 
 
Since there were delays in disbursing the funds of the new programme 
period that would finance the SPs and as the first two years of the EFRD 
(European Fund of Regional Development) were already available (€340 
millions), the regional government decided to start funding few strategic 
projects (the so-called progetti stralcio) provided they were ready for 
implementation (Cabinet act N. 2685 28/12/2009). Whereas Lecce’s area-
based plan was among the few that were submitted to the regional 
government according to the agreed time schedule, several other areas had 
not completed their planning phase, five years from the launch of SP. The 
rationale behind the decision to disburse a first lump of money was to give a 
tangible signal to the community in order to guarantee at least some short-
term outcomes. Nevertheless, this strategy was perceived by local mayors 
(LE44) as a political exercise, since there was now an attempt to redistribute 
the available funds among all the local authorities, irrespective of whether 
they had completed their plan or not and of the quality of the projects. The 
regional assessore justified his choice, since the risk was to increase the gap 
between economically stronger areas, like Lecce, and weaker ones.144  
We could have given the funds to the cities that had completed the plans on 
time according to the first guidelines, but we would have exacerbated the gap 
between areas. The two clusters of municipalities that were fastest were also the 
strongest economically – Lecce and Bari. So we would have strengthened the 
strongest and weakened the weakest. [LE25 - Regional assessore for Finances] 
 
However, contradictions between the first set of guidelines and the latest 
progetti stralcio generated much confusion and resentment among local 
authorities. The mayors of Lecce and Bari clearly resented this lack of clarity 
and they perceived this new strategy of money allocation as a political U-turn 
from the initial guidelines. 
 
They forced us to reason and reflect on ourselves and then they said, no we’ll 
decide. And they mortified us. [...] They were in a hurry to spend this EU 
money, and that’s why they insisted on the fact that the projects had to be ready 
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for implemention. They went back to the same degenerate logic of the previous 
programme period – so give us something ready, small and ugly, rather than 
beautiful, difficult and strategic projects. [LE44 - Mayor] 
 
There were a few conditions. To access the new funds projects had to 
be strategic and involve several municipalities.145 These should be large 
structural projects with an overall cost of at least €5 millions, which fostered 
coordination of networks to produce collectively generated strategies. They 
had to enjoy the approval of both public and private stakeholders and be 
clearly linked to the overall vision of the plan. Inevitably the whole process 
became very political. In Lecce, the project selection process turned into yet 
another exercise in compromise to please all the mayors. In the end several, 
sometimes small projects were submitted. 
After our regional meeting to present the new funds, the mayors went back 
home and started beating the living daylights out of each other to get a bit of 
these funds. The quality of the projects was not that great either. A third of the 
projects could not be funded with EFRD money. They wanted the sewers, but 
the EFDR does not fund them. […] Or they wanted to pave a square, but you 
can’t do that with the EFDR. [...] Another series of projects had very long 
completion times or were not feasible. So our regional officers had to contact 
municipalities and help them identify other projects. [LE25 - Regional 
assessore for Finances] 
 
Local administrations made a good case for the argument against the 
requirement of submitting projects ready for implementation, which 
conflicted with the idea and the nature of SP. If the rationale behind SP is to 
elaborate strategic projects collectively - and some municipalities were still 
defining their SP, while no feasibility studies had been conducted yet – the 
condition that only finalised projects could be submitted often forced local 
government to search beyond their SP portfolio of projects and present long-
standing project ideas.  
I believe that the problems arise basically from the first guidelines […] for area-
based strategic planning. One thing above all – SP is not naturally conducive to 
a planning dimension where the rationale is accessing public funds. This 
approach has partly distorted the process itself and frankly I think that the EU 
structural funds do not bend well to the logic of integration of projects, because 
of their separation into axes and measures. [LE43 - Regional Evaluation Task 
Force, Officer] 
 
Although, according to independent experts [LE24], Lecce’s plan 
stood out for consistency between the vision and the projects elaborated, in 
the end the effort to please too many (institutional) actors with the progetti 
stralcio was clear. The lack of coordination capacity (and perhaps political 
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commitment) on the part of the regional tier and the immaturity of local 
administrations in terms of planning capacity severely weakened the plan.  
In Lecce the elaboration phase worked very well, both the way working groups 
were formed and the way they functioned, and at least some of the choices that 
emerged from these groups were actually the result of group discussion and 
deliberation. [...] The main criticisms regard two aspects. First, the Region no 
longer believes in this process. [...] We don’t know what resources are actually 
available to finance it – it seems there was an afterthought. Second, the 
institution of the cabina di regia as a representation of only institutional actors 
affected the final decision-making process, and projects were often chosen not 
for their quality, but to please everyone. [LE10 - Province CEO] 
 
The nature of the control room was also problematic, as it only included 
political actors, but no representatives of private and social stakeholders. 
This inevitably exposed the SP to excessive political pressure.146 Thus, the 
lack of clarity from the regional level and political ambitions within the 
control room dispersed the potential built by an inclusive and thoroughly 
organised process.  
Perhaps the SP was too ambitious a project. During the season of the PIT147, the 
regional government chose the thematic areas and local action was limited to 
identifying projects within already defined measures and for a fixed amount of 
money depending on the project. For the SP local authorities enjoyed greater 
autonomy, without knowing how much money they would receive, because we’ll 
decide that ex-post, based on the results of the SP. Perhaps we were too 
ambitious given the average cultural level of local authorities, but also of the 
regional level. The Region showed really poor coordination capacity. [LE24 - 
Regional Evaluation Task Force, Independent Expert] 
 
 
Facilitative Leadership 
The efforts of the SP office148 ensured good levels of coordination 
throughout the process, and the collaboration between the office CEO and 
the mayor guaranteed consistency in the relationship with the stakeholders 
and the other local authorities involved. The mayor had an interest in 
encouraging an inclusive process to increase his legitimacy with the city at 
large, private interests and civic associations (vis-à-vis the popular former 
mayor with whom there were deep conflicts). By the same token, the CEO 
was passionate about fostering working practices based on governance, 
around which he had built his whole career. The SP also gave greater 
visibility to his expertise and he certainly hoped to raise his own professional 
profile within public services.  
Institutional learning within the SP office was significant, although it 
was perceived to be a foreign body by the rest of the public services and the 
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impact in terms of inter-sectoral cooperation was disappointing. 
Nevertheless the office, which since the end of the elaboration phase of the 
SP has been downsized, continues to promote governance programmes and 
still plays a pivotal role in identifying EU calls for bids and funding 
opportunities at the regional and national levels, thus enhancing the local 
government’s capacity to extract external resources (Le Galès 2002). By the 
same token, it continues to drive the innovation process of the local public 
services. 
As an office we went through a very significant experience, both in terms of 
inter-institutional cooperation and our work with associations, but also in terms 
of the degree of coordination within the office, the relationship with other local 
administrations. And we created a series of projects that I believe are very 
interesting, since they have fostered a significant level of creativity. [LE2 - SP 
Office CEO] 
 
The highly positive aspect about Lecce’s case was the emergence of a 
facilitative leadership, whereby leaders work with others to achieve results 
(Svara 2008).149 In this case the SP office worked closely with the mayor and 
the provincial level, which played an important role in coordinating and 
managing political pressures. The provincial tier, which had traditionally 
been in charge of development strategies, initially resented the regional 
government’s decision to devolve planning functions to local authorities. 
Nevertheless, a conscious decision was made to be actively involved in the 
process led by Lecce’s City Council, and the Province, despite being of a 
different political colour, gave an important contribution to the plan, through 
public service managers and political representatives who were actively 
involved in coordinating the working groups and who participated in the 
inter-institutional assembly. 
Over the past few years, the provincial level tried to reaffirm its role as 
coordinator of this type of governance and planning. The Region made a 
different choice and instituted this system of area-based planning, although I 
gather there has been an afterthought regarding these funds. In the end we 
participated and we tried to be generous and within Lecce’s plan we contributed 
actively. I coordinated two working groups and a colleague of mine chaired a 
third one, hence three out of 11 groups. Not only did we offer our human 
resources but also projects and know-how that we had developed over the years. 
[LE10 - Province CEO] 
 
This coordination between Lecce’s local government and the Province gave 
greater legitimacy to the process in the eyes of local stakeholders and it also 
helped to manage (to a point) the political ambitions of the other 30 mayors 
involved in the area-based plan, who were inevitably under pressure to bring 
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home tangible results - and funds. The change of provincial government in 
2009 weakened coordination, although the new administration has the same 
political colour as Lecce’s centre-right administration, and notwithstanding 
the commitment of the new provincial president to the SP plan. Once again, 
continuity at all levels is paramount yet very difficult to secure.  
Here as in the previous two cases, political parties and local 
councillors showed limited awareness of the process and did not participate.  
[Political awareness even within the cabinet] was unclear. Some were aware, 
like myself, since I am the political point of reference of the whole process. It 
was mainly the public administration that followed everything, the SP office and 
those CEOs that coordinated working groups. The rest had very little 
involvement. [LE 44 - Mayor] 
 
SP was perceived to be a “pie in the sky” and as something too removed from 
ordinary administration to be of political interest. 
But it [the SP] is clearly a very political act! These things though have little 
political returns for politicians. And here there is a political class that thinks this 
is just a fairy tale. They all have their very specific issues to be preoccupied with, 
very specific reference groups. This is how they build political stock. You 
represent certain interests and defend only those. Most councillors know very 
well their constituency and which small projects they need to put forward in 
order to maintain support. [LE24 - Regional Evaluation Task Force, 
Independent Expert] 
 
 
As the focus of the community is quickly shifting away, there is a 
general sense of disaffection among the stakeholders who were actively 
involved in the elaboration process, who have not informed about 
developments. The successful elaboration process failed the test of 
implementation, unable to guarantee continuity of the coordination 
mechanisms once the plan was finalised. As funds were delayed and there 
was much administrative and political confusion, the SP office was not sure 
how (and what) to communicate with stakeholders, and the process became 
an affair of experts and mayors. These developments have engendered much 
disappointment among those who had enthusiastically championed the 
process. 
 
For me this experience won’t go anywhere. It will be like water dispersing in the 
ground. It’s pessimistic but it’s what I think. Unless a visible politician decides 
to endorse SP, even just in rhetoric... In that case perhaps things will start 
moving again. [LE24 - Regional Evaluation Task Force, Independent Expert] 
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In Lecce, however, the mayor has recently managed to secure new 
national and regional funding for the implementation of the SP’s flagship 
project: the redevelopment of Marco Vito’s quarries (resolution Cipe n.62 03-
08-2011). Since he has recently been re-elected for a second term and the SP 
office is still managed by the same CEO, who has been the true champion of 
the process throughout, there is hope that the plan will come back on the 
local political agenda. 
 
Conclusion 
Lecce’s SP is one of “lights and shadows”. The SP office acted as an 
effective champion of the process, which was legitimised and strengthened by 
the sponsorship of the mayor. The good coordination between the political 
and the administrative level and the expertise of the SP office (which has 
diligently learnt the EU lesson on governance) guaranteed consistent 
organisation and a fairly inclusive process. New channels between local 
government institutions and some local associations were opened and 
existing institutional relationships with some structured stakeholders were 
strengthened, as the latter were directly involved in the organisation and 
facilitation of several working groups. This helped to increase the mayor’s 
legitimacy vis-à-vis the former mayor, Poli Bortone, with whom there were 
growing political conflicts. Her administration had started the SP process, 
when the current mayor Perrone was assessore for Public Works. As Perrone 
tried to emancipate himself politically from her cumbersome presence, the 
SP also represented a way of augmenting support for himself among private 
and social actors. There were surprisingly high levels of coordination 
between the local government and the provincial level, notwithstanding 
different political colours, and greater cooperation between public services at 
both levels was fostered through the active collaboration between Lecce’s SP 
office and some provincial CEOs.  
Two aspects weakened the plan, partly jeopardising outcomes. The 
first aspect concerns the regional initiative of offering financial incentives 
and linking the SP to the European programme period. The regional 
government, by frequently changing guidelines and mechanisms for fund 
disbursement, created much confusion among local authorities, which, on 
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their part, lacked planning capacity and experience. Chapter 7 will examine 
in greater detail the pros and cons of offering financial incentives to start a 
process that should be a voluntary choice of local administrations, as it 
requires high levels of commitment and awareness. By the same token, one 
wanders whether local stakeholders would have participated so actively, had 
they not seen the clear prospect of accessing public funds. In other cities, 
where the process was voluntary, stronger and more structured actors did 
not participate as intensely. In Lecce, with the exception of political parties 
and councillors, most stakeholders perceived SP as the main decision-making 
space to capture public funds. This initially encouraged and sustained high 
levels of participation and guaranteed some degree of interdependence.  
The second aspect concerns the highly politicised nature of the control 
room, which had the final word on project selection. Since the most 
important body in the architecture of Lecce’s SP only included mayors and 
other institutional actors, while excluding private and social stakeholders, 
final decisions became a political affair, often sacrificing strategy for political 
compromise. As decision-making eventually appeared confined to the 
political level and as the prospect of prompt funds was disappointed, there 
was a growing feeling of disaffection among private and social stakeholders. 
Furthermore, the SP office, once the elaboration phase was concluded and its 
human resources downsized, struggled to sustain communication and 
coordination mechanisms with the same intensity, with the risk of dispersing 
the social capital that was built during the process. The mayor, who has 
recently been re-elected for a second term in May 2012, is now putting the SP 
back on the political agenda, through the financing of the flagship project, 
with the intention to enhance and re-invigorate the legitimation of his new 
administration, following the deep conflicts that weakened his majority 
during his first term.  
Thus, Lecce’s case offers a more mixed picture. Here, like in Trento, 
the local leadership was strong, but had an interest in being more inclusive. 
Local associations, unlike in Prato, were collaborative and some small 
organisations were able to capitalise on the SP to open stable channels with 
local institutions, which have only recently started to be more open to civil 
society. However, excessive politicisation of the control room (from which 
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private and social stakeholders were excluded) jeopardised the formation of 
that collective actor that an inclusive participatory process had begun to 
foster. Without a genuine collective actor, the tension between selectivity and 
inclusivity resolved in favour of the latter and political compromise, as 
hundreds of little-strategic projects were included in the final plan to please 
the political ambitions of 31 mayors. Weak coordination with the regional 
level, from which project funding depended, contributed to that 
implementation gap from which all these plans, albeit to different degrees, 
suffered. 
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Chapter 6 
 
 “Sassari bella, buona e forte” 150 
 
 
Sassari’s Strategic Planning (SP) process started in September 2006, 
under a new centre-left administration. Sassari, which numbers about 
120,000 inhabitants, is the second city in size and importance of the island of 
Sardinia, a special status Region since 1948. It was one of the first cities in 
the Region to launch a participatory process of this kind, responding to 
regional financial incentives.  
Overall the notion of governance, encouraged by EU programmes, is 
gaining momentum within Sardinian local government, whose public 
administration’s working culture has slowly started to change over the past 
decade. Conversely, political elites still struggle to fully understand and 
embrace the new governance instruments. As examined in the previous 
cases, the commitment and coordinated work of the political and 
administrative leadership is paramount to guarantee positive outcomes. A 
leadership that is strong and inclusive can facilitate an open and meaningful 
process. Here, although there was initial political will to sponsor the SP, 
limited political awareness meant the process soon became an administrative 
affair, championed by the department of Local Development and its CEO. In 
this case the mayor, a doctor that actively worked in the voluntary sector, 
already represented a break from previous political cycles and he already 
enjoyed greater legitimacy among civil society. As a mayor he opened several 
new channels between local institutions and associations. However, as a 
relatively inexperienced politician he did not want to be perceived as lacking 
control and was careful not to upset influential political interests within his 
own party. Weak political endorsement affected the legitimacy of SP, while 
the lack of coordination between local government and the provincial and the 
regional levels translated into the familiar implementation gap. Coordination 
between tiers is clearly a necessary condition to guarantee tangible outcomes, 
particularly where, like in Sassari and Lecce, the process fully relied on 
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regional funds, with all the pros and cons that this entails and which will be 
discussed in greater detail in the final chapter. 
Findings presented here are based on relevant documents and 47 
semi-structured interviews with actors involved in the SP process.151 The first 
section describes the local socio-economic structure and political system, 
while the subsequent section offers an overview of governance experiments 
at the regional level, to help contextualise the emergence of SP and its impact 
on Sassari’s polity, which will be examined in the rest of the chapter. 
 
The Socio-Economic Context  
Sassari and its territory have been suffering from a prolonged period 
of economic stagnation and a progressive weakening of the social fabric, but 
the city remains economically one of strongest areas in Sardinia (Svimez 
2011). Among the factors underpinning the decline is high unemployment. 
Sassari’s economic activity rate is above the overall average in Sardinia, with 
62 percent, compared to the regional average of 59.3 percent. According to 
the Svimez report (2008) on Mezzogiorno’s economy covering the 2001-
2007 period, Sardinia fared better than most other Southern regions, with a 
GNP growth of 1.5 percent per year, although all Southern regions have a 
very low per capita GDP if compared with Northern regions. However, the 
recent economic downturn has marked the decline of Sardinian industries, 
with several factories closing down and unemployment on the increase. In 
2011 the economy was stagnant with 0 percent growth (Svimez 2011). 
Sassari’s production structures are scarcely diversified and hampered by a 
technological lag, since even within relatively mature sectors, such as tourism 
and the food industry, the productive chain still presents several incomplete 
links.152 
Albeit sharing problems such as a weak economy and poor 
infrastructure with the rest of Mezzogiorno, Sardinia is very different from 
other southern regions in terms of social capacity. A survey from ISTAT 
(March 2010) finds that Sardinia displays higher than average levels of 
participation in demonstrations and election rallies, second only to the 
autonomous province of Bolzano, in Trentino-Alto Adige. Sardinian men 
rank first in Italy for time spent volunteering for political parties (3.7 
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percent) and Sardinian women are only second to women from Emilia. The 
study also finds that 63 percent of Sardinia men and 56 percent of Sardinian 
women regularly read newspapers. Sassari displays an important presence of 
cultural and volunteer associations and, having built the first university in 
Sardinia, founded in 1671, still represents one of the main cultural centres of 
the island.  
You can’t imagine how many organised groups there are. A lot. Political groups, 
voluntary groups. Groups that organise to exchange books... [...] We count 17 
internal groups [to our association] that deal with the most diverse things, 
whether music, cinema, child activities. Then there are youth groups, old people 
groups that organise card games tournaments etc. [...] I think the associational 
fabric is quite rich and well organised. [SS19 - Cultural Association] 
 
The social context, notwithstanding the cultural decline, is dynamic, 
but, as was the case in Lecce, it is also fragmented as associations are often 
self-referential and struggle to co-operate. Timid attempts at creating 
umbrella associations, such as the Voluntary Council, gathering together 
several voluntary associations in order to increase their capacity and 
bargaining power vis-à-vis institutions, have failed to work because of 
particularistic interests, search for visibility and competition for funds on the 
part of often very small organisations. What is difficult is to foster networks 
of associations. 
Associations don’t network and this is a weakness. [...] Everyone just minds 
their own business and this is the limit of associationism. [...] I think there is 
not yet awareness of what associationism should mean. [SS39 - Sport 
Association] 
 
Civil society was long excluded from local governance and even trade 
and employers associations often lamented they had limited involvement in 
policy-making. The centre-left administration, which first took power in 
2005 and was re-elected in May 2010, has opened to civil society, both 
through structured participatory mechanisms, such as SP, and more informal 
channels. Some voluntary and non-profit organisations have started to work 
regularly with the local government, and in particular with the department of 
Social Policies and the department of Youth Policies and Education.  
The previous administration didn’t even talk to us. Not only did they not consult 
us, they did not even talk to us, which is different. They never agreed to see us, 
they never even looked at us. This administration is another world, we’re in 
heaven. You have to consider that the mayor used to be president of this 
association. He knows us, he knows what we do and how we’re organised. [SS19 
- Cultural Association] 
 
175 
 
Often such channels build upon a personal relationship, for instance between 
a particular administrator and the president of an association. These 
informal links are generally highly effective, although more institutionalised 
mechanisms could help prevent the lack of continuity often experienced 
when there is a change of giunta, or even of just one assessore.  
The assessore [social policies] is very sensitive to our issues – she listens to us. 
But it’s episodic, it’s not a structured process, it depends on individual good 
will, mine or the assessore’s. By chance, I also happen to have a good personal 
relationship with this assessore. [...] But this cannot be the criterion. It’s not 
politically acceptable. [SS19 - Cultural Association] 
 
The fact that the current mayor is a doctor and very active within the 
voluntary sector has certainly increased the bargaining power and the role of 
some associations. 
The mayor comes from [our association], he used to be our regional 
administrator. We organise sport activities for vulnerable people and the mayor, 
who is a doctor, was among the professionals helping out. [...] There is also a 
personal connection. [...] Administrators that come from the associational 
world are better, perhaps because they have a more open mentality than those 
that grew up within political parties. [SS39 - Sport Association] 
 
As examined in earlier chapters, the mayoral reforms have certainly 
changed local politics by opening greater space for candidates outside party 
circles and by reinforcing the direct relationship between the mayor and the 
local community. During the First Republic, Sardinian politics was 
dominated by the DC (Christian Democrats), although some of the secular 
parties (Socialists, Sardinian Autonomists, Liberals and Republicans) also 
had a large support base. Between the 1970s and the early 1980s the 
Communist party (PCI) was led at the national level by the Sassarese Enrico 
Berlinguer, and it represented the main opposition party. As part of a 
coalition with the Socialists and the autonomist party, the PCI governed the 
city between 1975 and 1980 and again between 1990 and 1994. In 1995, after 
five tormented years during which about four different executives and three 
mayors took power, with several councillors changing sides and altering the 
balance of power between the majority and the opposition, the first direct 
mayoral elections represented a major turning point and a chance to finally 
ensure some political stability.  
The centre-left coalition won and a woman (an innovative factor in 
itself), Anna Sanna, a primary school teacher with previous political 
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experience as an MP for the Communist Party, was elected mayor. Divisions 
within the coalition meant that Anna Sanna ran for a second term in 2000 as 
an independent. As the Left split, the centre-right coalition won the elections 
and the candidate of National Alliance (AN), Gian Vittorio Campus, a plastic 
surgeon, was elected mayor. The new administration was also characterised 
by deep divisions and, as political parties continued to shape and reshape 
themselves and they repositioned themselves in the political spectrum at the 
local, regional, and national level, councillors shifted from side to side, even 
threatening the dissolution of the council. The transition from the First to the 
Second Republic was still in progress in Sassari, and the divide between 
administration and citizens was still profound. The main accusations that 
civil society raised against the centre-right mayor and his executive were 
excessive authoritarianism and refusal of any dialogue with local 
associations. At the following elections, in 2005, the centre-left coalition was 
back in power.153  
The current mayor Gianfranco Ganau, also a doctor, seems to have 
learnt that the decisional illusion (Trigilia 2005) characterising the previous 
two administrations was not a winning strategy and he is far more inclined 
towards mediation with all sides. However, few interviewees perceived him 
as fully autonomous and recognised he was sometimes too responsive to the 
influence of specific political tendencies within the party that supported his 
candidature. 
This mayor, unlike the previous two, is quite nice, personality wise. The two 
previous mayors, outside formal council meetings, never met anyone, not even 
people from their own coalition. Not only does this mayor regularly meet with 
his majority but he also helps the opposition. [...] Clearly as a mayor is also 
subject to... and we clearly saw what pressures from those political tendencies 
he had to respond to. [...] He was forced to replace assessori that he would have 
never changed, only because of threats from these currents, which would say, 
“Either you do it or I won’t support you”. [...] And these pressures always 
respond to personal rather than collective needs. [SS13 – Councillor, 
opposition]  
 
Nevertheless, the mayor’s mediation skills and greater openness to the 
local civil society contributed to his growing popularity and his re-election in 
May 2010 with over 65 percent of the votes, something unprecedented in 
Sassari’s politics. The strong support he enjoys also led a few smaller centre-
right civic lists, within a highly fragmented party structure, to align 
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themselves with the government coalition, in view of forthcoming 
elections.154 
Now, the last mayor’s report received 30 votes – our majority is 24. [...] This is 
symptomatic that some people are getting ready for the forthcoming elections 
[in May 2010] [...] They understand that our mayor worked well and he’s likely 
to be the winning candidate at the next elections. Thus, part of the opposition 
starts to gravitate around the mayor also by supporting his programmatic 
agenda. [SS7 - Councillor, majority] 
 
Although Sassari’s mayor has shown some degree of enthusiasm 
towards participatory mechanisms, political awareness of such instruments 
is still low and often clashes against the need for political visibility and quick 
results. The understanding of local democracy is changing towards a more 
direct relationship between political leadership and citizens, whereby 
political parties are unable to act as mediators, while large associations often 
suffer from a representativeness deficit. The most clamorous victims of these 
changes, as examined in Chapter 2, appear to be elective assemblies, reduced 
to ratifying executive decisions and unable to feel comfortable in the new role 
of steering and scrutiny. 
 
From Government to Governance 
Sardinia has acted as a pilot for several planning and development 
experiments, whereby high expectations have been duly mortified by poor 
results (Toscano 1982; Marongiu 1991; Zurru 2005). Over the past fifty years 
this island, which displays important cultural and geo-physical 
characteristics that set it apart from the mainland, experienced three main 
planning phases: a first phase of industrial conversion that marked the 
entrance, albeit marginal, of Sardinia within the spheres of modernization; a 
second phase of cultural production and emphasis on tourism and beach 
resorts that was perceived to be full modernity and that in a way 
acknowledged the failure of the local industry. Finally a third phase was 
characterized by hyper modernism and hyper tourism, based around a 
consumption economy (Mazzette and Tidore 2008).155  
Within the last fifteen years, as a consequence of the end of traditional 
extraordinary intervention in Mezzogiorno and as an effect of the EU 
cohesion policy, new resources have been invested in planning and 
development projects, particularly in the South of Italy. A range of new 
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instruments came about, from Territorial Pacts to LEADER Programmes and 
Area Contracts.156 Sardinia elaborated its own governance mechanisms, such 
as territorial integrated projects (PIT - Progetti Integrati Territoriali,) and 
integrated area plans (PIA - Piani Integrati d’Area),157 thus launching a new 
planning season characterized by partnerships with private and social 
stakeholders and an integrated approach (Bottazzi 2005).  
Sardinia, perhaps because of previous experience with planning 
instruments, is among the first regions in Italy to have embraced the new 
governance approach. Because of its special status and its greater autonomy, 
planning, as an effort to accelerate economic and social development, has 
always enjoyed great support (ibid.). More recently 80 percent of Sardinian 
local authorities were involved in programmes such as LEADER (I, II and 
Plus), Urban, Agenda 21, INTERREG, which place great emphasis on local 
involvement and partnerships. The so-called GAL (Groups of Local Action) 
helped to ensure high levels of participation and to augment local authorities’ 
awareness of their new responsibilities. In 2005 Sardinia passed a regional 
law on integrated social policies to implement the novelties introduced by the 
328/2000 Act (Piano di Zona).158 The new Local Plan of Sardinian Social 
Services (Piano Locale Unitario dei Servizi, PLUS) aims at promoting 
integrated and inter-municipal planning and a culture of participation and 
subsidiarity, through continuous dialogue among institutions, the third 
sector and beneficiaries (Salis et al 2006).  
The regional government maintains an ambiguous attitude towards 
bottom-up policy-making. On the one hand it has responded, at least 
formally, to central and EU pressures for greater decentralisation and local 
participation, also through encouraging participatory mechanisms at the 
local level, such as SP. On the other hand it has continued to centralise 
decision-making in the operational phase. In 2004 the new centre-left 
regional administration launched a process of integrated planning for local 
development (Pianificazione integrata), to invest new EU funds (Bobbio 
2007). Different bodies – a regional group in charge of coordination, local 
planning workshops and technical regional groups - overviewed the process, 
which covered several sectors: industry, agriculture, rural development, 
tourism, environment, and social inclusion. The local planning workshops 
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represented the most innovative part of the process: these were technical 
units with a stable presence in each of the eight provinces to facilitate inter-
institutional cooperation among local stakeholders (ibid.).  
Initially institutions were highly represented, while private citizens 
and businesses’ attendance was scarce.159 The Regional Government then 
launched an outreach process (animazione territoriale), by using the local 
workshops. Eight new local forums were organised and new methodologies 
used to facilitate participation. Working groups were formed (each including 
30/ 40 participants) and each one had to identify four strategic thematic 
areas, with the facilitators’ help. About 1600 people took part in the new 
forums, with high attendance of individual citizens (from 100 at the 
beginning of the process to 500) (ibid.). The money initially allocated to this 
process was doubled (to €700 million), by adding new regional and national 
funds; the Regional Planning Centre received 14,000 applications for 
partnerships, attesting to the success of the process. Once the partnerships 
were formed the Region decided that methodologies such as Project Cycle 
Management (PCM)160 and GOPP (Goal Oriented Project Planning)161 should 
be employed to facilitate participatory planning. By January 2007, 200 
integrated projects that had been put forward were under examination; the 
first 59 have been approved and concern the productive chain in agriculture 
and rural development.  
The process proved successful and in 2007 it received an award from 
the central government’s department for Development and Local Economy 
(ibid.).162 However, the lack of political awareness and continuity meant that 
even the approved projects have not yet been implemented. The assessore for 
Regional Development left because of divergent views with the President and 
once again the whole process stalled when it reached the operational phase.  
The problem was too little commitment, and of this I’m sure. Limited 
commitment. I only need to bring you one example. When we had a call for bids 
for CIVIS [a EU programme], it clearly said that local authorities would have to 
prove to be part of existing partnerships with other stakeholders. But there were 
very few partnerships in place. I and other local government officers met with 
all local authorities to explain that partnerships would represent the main 
selection criteria. In the end this element was not considered, because the 
regional government published the rankings before we even completed our 
evaluation work on CIVIS, which was patently ignored. Here we really lacked 
political commitment to the process. If you start the process, you don’t then go 
and make face to face deals with provincial presidents, if you had first launched 
a process that entailed an integrated approach. The risk is the same with SP, the 
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lack of commitment, but not necessarily on the part of mayors, rather on the 
part of ‘mamma’ Region, which then says, “Whatever, one of many processes...” 
[SS24 –Regional Officer, Regional Evaluation Centre]  
 
These failings at the regional level clearly affected participation levels in 
Sassari’s own participatory mechanisms, particularly on the part of local 
businesses.  
 
The SP: Between Innovation and Inexperience 
Collective Action And Democratic Process 
As examined in the previous section, Sassari’s new participatory 
approach to planning was not born in isolation, instead it built upon several 
governance experiences within the last decade, at the local and regional 
levels. The city is involved in several Programme Agreements and Area 
Contracts for local development, including several PIT and PIA. Particularly 
within certain departments, such as Social Policies and Youth and Education 
Policies, several regional and national instruments and laws have contributed 
to building awareness of governance mechanisms and to promoting a culture 
of greater openness towards the involvement of stakeholders and service 
users. Sassari’s SP process had already been agreed by the centre-right 
administration (2000-5), since regional and European structural funds were 
available to finance these new mechanisms. The centre-left administration 
elected in 2005 strongly sponsored the process and in 2006 launched its SP, 
as the deadline to claim funding approached.163  
An ad hoc administrative office, consisting of City Council employees 
and a few scholarship holders, offered technical support and oversaw 
coordination mechanisms and relations with external stakeholders. Here as 
in the other cases, the champion of the process came from within public 
services, the CEO of the Local Development Department. She was assisted by 
a few experts from the local University and by a provincial government 
agency for local planning and sustainable development, DEMOS. The latter 
has an autonomous administrative structure and its main function is to offer 
technical support for socio-economic and territorial planning.164 As many 
lamented (i.e. SS4; SS6; SS40; SS45) the University was not as involved in 
the process as the administration would have expected. With the exception of 
few academics that chaired some working groups, the University limited 
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itself to producing diagnostic documents, while it took no active part in the 
planning phase. 
Let’s say that there [in the SP process] the big institutions were the weak link. 
They had no ideas to bring to the table and did not fully believe in strategic 
action as an instrument. Because it is well known that within the University 
there is little governance and, I can add, little familiarity with democracy. So it 
is difficult for them to embrace this way of doing things. [SS45 – Academic 
Expert] 
 
The first phase of SP, based on listening to, and collecting ideas from, 
citizens through postcards distributed in the most degraded areas and in 
local schools, was concluded with a week of collective meetings (settimana 
strategica), in September 2006. Each of five working days was dedicated to 
the discussion of a particular aspect of local development and social policies, 
whereby citizens could interact with experts and local administrators.165 In 
the morning experts from the local University and various political and civil 
society figures would give lectures to discuss the diagnostic documents. In 
the afternoon experts from Demos and from a local agency offering 
professional consultancies on deliberative instruments for policy-making, 
Policy, coordinated the working groups, using methodologies such as the 
European Awareness Scenario Workshop (EASW). People were divided in 
several groups, according to whether they participated as administrators, 
citizens, experts, and private sector representatives, to envisage the future of 
the city in terms of best and worst case scenarios. Later, groups mixed 
according to interest and expertise, so as to ensure interactions among all 
categories; each group focused on a particular theme, whether the 
environment, social policies or local development.  
To see people participating in the focus groups was something really new. 
Because I was used to meetings between local government officers and 
politicians, between the giunta and public service CEOs and it was always the 
same chessboard. To see this chessboard widened with all the pieces mixed... 
The chancellor with the student to plan the future of the University… Different 
interests interacted and were not in opposition as we would have expected, 
but worked together to produce ideas that would improve this town. I think 
this was a very important result. [SS9 - Assessore for Local Development] 
 
These events were open to everyone; however, as one of the local agencies 
involved (SS6) pointed out “simple citizens were not truly involved, also 
because there was no real interest in involving them.” Some associations 
chose not to participate, as they felt they did not have the right instruments 
or space to have an incisive input. 
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In theory, [the SP] was open to everyone, but it was only a formal opening, all 
openings can be useful, better than nothing... But if you try to discuss about 
something you don’t know, you won’t have much to say... I mean that I think 
there was no full awareness of what they [the organisers] were doing, what the 
SP was about and what kind of contribution we could have offered. […] Perhaps 
it was also my fault, but I feel no one really understood what to do. [SS19 - 
Cultural Association] 
 
Limited awareness was an issue within the local cabinet, as generally the 
political motivation for supporting SP was to access regional funds. 
There was no much awareness; we did not know exactly what we were doing. 
We knew that this plan was important because we didn’t want to miss the 
chance of accessing funds rather than because we felt we needed to have a 
strategic plan... Anyway, the plan was produced in the end, but the rationale 
behind it was not to lose these funds. [SS47 - Former assessore for the 
Environment] 
 
Following the strategic week, the debate on each issue was taken 
forward through thematic roundtables that met regularly over a few months, 
chaired by experts and coordinated by facilitators from Demos and Policy. 
Although these meeting were open to all those that took part in the strategic 
week, some stakeholders were directly invited and there was a natural 
selection as the more technical nature of the debate assumed higher levels of 
competence. However, working groups on “hot” topics such as the 
environment (SS46) and the urban redevelopment of the town centre (SS45) 
attracted much attention from ordinary citizens. Participation was high 
particularly on the part of small shopkeepers and homeowners, but also 
associations of disabled people interested in voicing their ideas on 
architectural barriers (SS45). Their proposals were hardly acknowledged by 
politics, which after the planning phase was unable to capitalise on the new 
social capital and involve these new stakeholders in the process through 
stable channels.166  
Smaller stakeholders initially participated with enthusiasm but they were not 
really listened to. [...] This administration was able to manage the hot phase, 
encouraging citizens to participate – and this is not an easy city to involve – but 
then they [the administrators] were not able to manage the following stage, the 
cold phase. [...] They didn’t really care, if I can be honest about it. They 
understood the utility of this instrument and took from it what was useful to 
them, but did not understand that they had to ensure continuity of the process 
[SS45 – Academic Expert]. 
 
Generally there was a very high response from local stakeholders - also 
because the incentive of regional funds appealed to some trade and industry 
associations (SS45) -  but involving actors such as private companies, banks, 
or the Chamber of Commerce proved particularly difficult.  
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The president of the Chamber of Commerce, for instance, was always invited 
but he never participated. Also with the Bank of Sardinia (Banco di Sardegna) 
there was very little interaction. Banks generally, although they were all invited, 
did not participate much. [SS42 - Office of the General Director, officer] 
 
Some assessori (SS9) also argued that the banks, which could have been 
interested in co-financing some development projects, proved difficult to 
engage. They were invited to take part in the process, but they did not appear 
to see any value in it and showed low levels of trust in the administrators. 
I tell you, I don’t trust politicians. [...] This was the usual set-up to sell some 
thin air. So much that the SP started at the local level, then out of jealousy and 
personal ambition, Giudici [the provincial president] also wanted her own SP. It 
was clear that it was all just for political visibility. [SS36 - Banco di Sardegna] 
 
The administration made a special effort to engage the most deprived 
neighbourhoods, in Sassari’s periphery, S. Maria di Pisa. During a one day 
workshop, which took place locally in December 2006, residents and 
administrators worked together on concrete strategies to reduce the socio-
economic gap between the area and the rest of the city. Simple citizens and 
associations actively engaged with the administrators, while the Church and 
the local schools in particular emerged as two important local players in the 
regeneration process. 
 
In this case citizens and association representatives were very much involved 
and important problems concerning that neighbourhood emerged [during the 
forums]. We used EASW, because there were too many people to have just focus 
groups. EASW was better than other methodologies, also because we were 
discussing specific issues, about the neighbourhood and its development. [SS6 
– Local Agency] 
 
Important issues emerged during these neighbourhood meetings, such as the 
need to transfer the SERT (the centre for drug addiction treatment), which, 
at the heart of an already problematic area, such is S. Maria di Pisa, 
heightened the residents’ perception of poor security. The daily difficulties 
and disservices experienced by the local population encouraged high 
participation in the forums. In fact the new participatory arena was initially 
perceived to be a place to complain about poor services, refuse collection, or a 
pavement to be repaired. Eventually the facilitators and the methodologies 
they employed proved useful in fostering a fruitful dialogue and encouraging 
the elaboration of innovative ideas and solutions. Projects in this case were 
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much more concrete and easier to implement, which can help explain the 
more positive attitude on the part of participants. 
We had a high response for the working groups where we debated... At my table 
there were citizens that asked me questions and discussed issues that we are 
now trying to address. And everything started with those forums. [...] The SERT 
has been transferred. The local administration will soon fund a project whereby 
the whole local square will be rebuilt and within 15 days we’re going to have a 
special meeting with the executive which will be open to all citizens. And this 
new opened approach was encouraged by that initiative [the SP]. [SS20 – Ward 
President] 
 
Overall the attempt at building a collective actor clashed against 
several obstacles, specifically the lack of trust of many stakeholders who grew 
disaffected with participatory experiences, following failure at the regional 
level, and limited conviction on the part of the political leadership, which 
only endorsed SP half-heartedly. These factors partly de-legitimised the 
process, which was left in the hands of the Local Development CEO and a few 
academic experts, and affected the inclusivity of the process, as the mayor 
preferred different, less horizontal, channels to communicate with civil 
society. 
 
The Plan 
The results of the strategic week and the subsequent focus groups and 
meetings were elaborated by Demos in a final document. The emphasis is on 
Sassari’s will to reinforce its role as the main administrative and cultural 
centre of the area, “through the creation of an integrated urban system based 
on networks of complementarities and synergy with other cities in the North-
West of the island.” (Document of Sassari’s Strategic Plan: 57).167 According 
to the final document, Sassari perceives itself at the “heart” of the North-
West’s economic and cultural system. The city wants to look outside, to the 
market, and reinforce its internal and external accessibility, in order to access 
international scientific, touristic and cultural networks, also through urban 
regeneration and through offering new services (ibid.). The main macro-
objectives show the omnivorous nature of a plan that, like the previous ones, 
expects to cover all policy areas: welfare, the environment, culture, 
education, governance, new technologies and communication, mobility and 
urban regeneration. Each project is briefly described and synergies with 
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other projects are identified; an appendix provides more in depth description 
of all projects.168  
Whereas the final plan broadly reflected the issues and the ideas that 
emerged during the process, several project ideas were long-standing 
proposals pre-dating the SP, or there was in any case a strong commitment 
on the part of the administration to finance such projects.169 Here as in the 
previous three cases, SP became a useful mechanism to “popularise” certain 
projects, which were already on the political agenda. The inability to select 
few strategic objectives is apparent, in spite of the stated goal of the process 
to identify the territory’s competitive advantage. This was perhaps inevitable 
given the pressure of having to match the plan with the dimensions and the 
requirements of structural funds, as well as having to please numerous 
stakeholders in order to guarantee high levels of consensus. 
You need to identify something that you’re the only one to offer, to create your 
competitiveness. Thus, if Cagliari is the capital and has got the regional opera 
organisation; if Nuoro has got the ethnographic institute and is investing in 
local culture and traditions, Sassari has the University, it can count on an 
important associational fabric – there are several cultural and voluntary 
organisations. It has got the commuters that can represent a resource. [...] If 
Sassari wants to rebrand itself as a tourist city, it has to make a choice and make 
it clear in its SP that its vision is that of a tourist city […]. Choosing a strategy 
does not mean that you stop dealing with waste recycling or improving your 
welfare system, or abandon the protection of the environment. But by choosing 
a strategy you’re giving the city an identity that will always be its own. [SS22 – 
Local Development Officer] 
 
The final document recommends the need to set up a control room 
(cabina di regia) that will coordinate and monitor the implementation of the 
plan, a permanent structure consisting of institutional and private 
representatives. The importance of a control room was also reaffirmed by the 
mayor in his presentation of the plan to the council. This control room was 
conceived to be an agile and highly representative structure that would meet 
perhaps twice a year to monitor implementation and identify financial 
opportunities. The Local Development office would have offered technical 
support. However, the control room was never established and the main 
coordinator of the process – the CEO of the Local Development office – left 
for another position within the local health trust; the implementation phase 
stalled and the plan quickly disappeared from the political spotlight.  
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At the same time, other plans were being elaborated, at different tiers 
of government. In 2007 the area-based SP at inter-municipal level (Piano 
strategico d’area vasta) was launched and it involved 6 municipalities. The 
process was also coordinated by Demos and by a committee of academic 
experts, who employed the same methodologies that were used for the urban 
SP to facilitate the focus groups. The main thematic areas were the 
environment, mobility, productive chains, training and culture, welfare, 
governance and transports, somehow overlapping the urban SP.170 Although 
all meetings were open to the public, this process mostly involved 
administrators and a few private stakeholders, perhaps because identity 
incentives at a higher administrative level are more difficult to communicate 
to, and be understood by, the wider community, or because this plan 
appeared to simply overlap the urban SP.  
The elaboration of the new Town Plan, 20 years after the last one, 
proceeded simultaneously. Being a much stronger and well known 
government tool, it inevitably catalysed the attention of the community. 
Experts and environmental associations (SS4, SS45, SS46) that took part in 
the SP complained about poor synergy between the SP and the Town Plan, 
since it was clear that the latter, where stronger and more conflicting 
interests were at stake requiring several compromises, followed its own path. 
The executive also acknowledged the greater importance of the Town Plan 
vis-à-vis the SP. 
The Town Plan was generally perceived to be more important than the SP. The 
SP does not interfere with citizens’ life in the short term, while the Town Plan 
has immediate repercussions as well as medium-to long-term effects. Citizens 
are more familiar with the Town Plan, they understand what it entails. [SS47 – 
Former assessore Environment] 
 
Here as in Trento and Prato, the most symbolic project of the SP, its 
flagship project, was also part of the new Town Plan, creating at least one 
clear link between the two plans. This was a redevelopment project of the 
area of Eba Giara and S.Donato, to create an urban park, with a cycle lane, 
pedestrian areas and served by public transports. In his 2007 programmatic 
document,171 the mayor emphasised the link between the Town Plan and the 
SP by describing this very project: “It’s no accident that this project is among 
the priorities of the urban SP, showing that this objective reflects people’s 
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expectations.” The intention was to further legitimise the Town Plan by 
highlighting the collective endorsement of the project through the SP. Overall 
as the elaboration of the Town Plan developed, SP soon disappeared from the 
political agenda, while deep conflicts between property developers, 
politicians and environmental associations were unleashed.172 
These things [strong interests, property developers and speculators] have won 
with this Town Plan. [They didn’t feel the need to participate in the SP] because 
they work at other levels. […] There was a councillor who said, “I won’t vote for 
the [Town] Plan unless I’m allowed planning permission to build 64 villas”. 
[SS46 – Environmental Association] 
 
Town planning was a more political and technical affair and did not undergo 
a formal participatory process, although there was a consultative process and 
by law residents can submit amendments to the final plan. 
 
The Implementation Gap 
An office within the Local Development office – which at the time of 
the SP was part of the Department for Culture and Tourism – has inherited 
the functions of the ad hoc SP office. It has developed an internal database 
and an information system that serve to monitor SP and help every 
department to work towards the implementation of the plan through 
available financial opportunities. “We always have the SP document under 
our eyes”, said a local government officer from that department (SS22). 
Nevertheless, the plan has not been entirely incorporated by the public 
administration and local government officers often struggle to understand 
that their work should be an integral part of a strategy; they cannot 
necessarily perceive the direct link between projects that should be part of an 
integrated action. The fact that no evaluation system was in place represents 
an important weakness which further hampered the operational phase, since 
there was no mechanism that would help to regularly monitor the process 
through ex-ante, mid-term and ex-post evaluations. A local government 
officer (SS22) suggested that cyclical evaluations, perhaps every year, could 
have helped to have a clearer picture of the process, but such a system, only 
vaguely considered and never planned in detail, never materialised. The 
Local Development Department has elaborated a database that includes all 
SP projects that have been implemented, but this is not enough to give a 
188 
 
consistent and exhaustive picture, also due to the lack of collaboration from 
other departments. Furthermore, evaluations should ideally be carried out by 
an independent body, perhaps the control room that was never established. 
A few minor and scarcely strategic projects were completed at the time 
of fieldwork, mainly involving the Youth and Education Policies department, 
where a very committed assessore, who also had a delegation for Citizen 
Participation, encouraged a strong participatory and integrated approach 
within her department, assisted by a supportive CEO. These were small 
projects that would have most likely been implemented even without the SP. 
However, the participatory forums served to reinforce the assessore’s 
intention to pursue certain projects, since similar issues were in fact raised 
within the deliberative arenas, thus giving greater legitimacy to her own 
programme.  
In terms of youth policies, the public-private partnership for nurseries went 
ahead, but it would have happened anyway. It was one of the objectives of the 
SP, but there was no need of an SP to do this. The project Central Peripheries [a 
series of participatory initiatives targeting poor children in the most degraded 
areas and involving teachers, pupils, and their parents] went ahead. We also 
had a youth forum which involved students and young people in planning youth 
activities, but it was a disaster. [...] There was participation, but participatory 
planning needs concrete and quick results. They [the young people involved] 
produced a nice project for a youth centre and we also had the funds [€1 
million]. We’ve been waiting two years now and we still don’t know if we can go 
ahead. Because building regulations in Italy... We’re not in China. [...] So 
naturally young people lose enthusiasm and they stop participating. [...] We 
also implemented Ludobus173 which engages kids in open air activities... But 
these were small things... [SS14 – Assessore for Youth and Education Policies] 
 
After the elaboration phase political commitment started to fade away. 
Since the very beginning the process had been for the most part an 
administrative affair, with only a few political figures – the mayor and a few 
assessori who were directly involved – fully endorsing it, while the rest of the 
executive and the council kept at the margins. Councillors from both sides 
stated that, although they were invited to participate in the meetings and 
roundtables, there was no formal involvement of the council; it was up to 
each councillor whether to participate or not. They felt the process reinforced 
the position of the mayor to the detriment of the council, while their initial 
scepticism was vindicated by the slow progress of the implementation phase. 
Generally, the importance of a participatory approach to planning was not 
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fully understood by councillors, and SP was perceived, at best, as a tool to 
access regional funds. 
  
The council voted on the final plan, because those documents represent guiding 
acts that are the responsibility of the council, but the elaboration of these 
documents took place elsewhere within the working groups. [...] I thought it was 
a good experience, albeit limited, [...] exactly because in the end, politically, it’s 
all managed by the mayor and there are precise mechanisms that bypass the 
council a bit. [...] Overall the council perceived it as something of little 
importance; they didn’t feel as they owned it. […] Let’s say that beyond the 
usual political dynamics the council didn’t understand the concrete usefulness 
of the process, because it does not appear to affect every day life. It was 
perceived to be the book of “What I will do in the future, but who knows when”. 
[SS12 – President of the Local Council] 
 
 
The mayor (SS41) stressed how perhaps the greatest limit of SP in 
Sassari was the limited political awareness with regard to these instruments, 
particularly within the council, which tended to have a dismissive attitude. 
Councillors interviewed pointed out that, as “the true representatives” of the 
people, they were still the best interpreters of citizens’ will, since 
participatory mechanisms, no matter how open, can never be representative. 
“My choices are the citizens’ choices” (SS7). This attitude can help explain 
why, with few exceptions (SS12), they tended to focus on the limits of 
informal participatory mechanisms, which they believed demand 
institutionalised mechanisms allowing for a more defining role for the 
council.  
The mayor, although he supported the process, had to be regularly 
prompted by local government officers or by a particularly zealous assessore 
and be reminded about what they were doing and why they were doing it, as 
politicians tend to focus on more urgent issues, on how politically marketable 
their actions are. Politicians’ lack of familiarity with, and diffidence towards, 
these instruments also affect the political will to embrace and support 
collaborative arrangements. Participatory mechanisms can easily turn into 
political boomerangs and politicians can feel threatened by the challenge of 
sharing their decision-making power. 
I’m not saying that the mayor didn’t believe in it. He did believe in the process, 
at least partly. He’s very interested in these novelties, although he might not 
understand these instruments entirely. But he was intrigued, I think. […] But 
then there are many different pressures from different sides… And who is in 
power is often afraid of these processes, they fear these things might get out of 
hand and thus they seem dangerous. He [the mayor] feels he cannot decide 
enough, that it seems that he’s not the one who takes decisions, but someone 
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else does. And this inhibits the will to fully embrace these things. [SS14 - 
Assessore for Youth and Education Policies] 
 
Thus, limited political awareness of participatory instruments and 
some scepticism on the part of administrators also help to explain the lack of 
political commitment, which inevitably affected the legitimacy of the process. 
The mayor already enjoyed high levels of support and legitimacy among the 
local civil society, following a centre-right leadership that had refused 
dialogue. He opened other, vertical channels with several local associations; 
these were easier to control politically than open participatory mechanisms 
and reduced the political pressure for a strong endorsement of the SP. 
Politicians struggle to focus on long term projects, as they need quick results 
and visibility in order to build political stock. 
At the political level, there is great focus on ordinary activities, on individual 
programmes. Often politicians lack a unitary vision. [...] One should also 
consider that every assessore has her own programme, the programme agreed 
with the rest of the giunta and the mayor. She has her own objectives and wants 
to give her own mark, her own style to her department. The assessori can’t be 
mere executors of the SP and they often don’t remember, it’s not always on their 
mind. [SS22– Local Development Officer] 
 
It should be emphasised that SP in Sassari as in Lecce was not an entirely 
voluntary process, since the regional government promoted these 
instruments which became a means to access regional and European funds. 
In Sassari, this affected the degree of awareness and commitment on the part 
of political elites, as they did not have to invest local financial resources to 
run the process.  
The fact that the SP was bound to deadlines imposed by the Region 
meant that the whole process had to be “compressed” within a few months, 
leaving limited time for communication and awareness building. However, 
tight deadlines also encouraged a more innovative approach. 
[The tight deadlines] paradoxically gave us – well, we chose to do that – the 
most innovative element of Sassari’s SP, this strategic week. We had these time 
constraints, particularly for the collective process of elaboration of ideas – since 
all the desk analysis and diagnostic documents had already been produced. [...] 
But the most original part was this horizontal debate employing all these 
different methodologies to foster... [these new ideas]. And the fact that we had 
to squeeze everything within this week, which we called strategic, actually 
worked out, because in a context where people are not used to [this sort of 
involvement] something like that is more effective, it’s like when you launch a 
big festival... So there was a very high response. [SS4 – Academic Expert] 
 
A very efficient mayor’s press office, a dedicated website and the opening of a 
forum that would encourage and sustain the debate after the strategic week 
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were all effective tools that tried to offset the negative impact of tight 
deadlines. However, the local media soon lost interest, after the first 
enthusiasms fuelled by the impressive work of the mayor’s press office, which 
networked closely with the main newspaper and TV stations. The analyses of 
La Nuova Sardegna (the most widely read newspaper in Sassari) became 
increasingly sceptical, particularly when reporting on the area-based plan, 
which, as argued by a journalist (SS37), was far removed from the local 
community. 
They talk of bottom-up planning and involving stakeholders, but I think the 
level is too high. These [themes] are hard to understand. This is the feeling. I 
tried to explain what was going on in the simplest words, also because if one 
reads the documentation produced by Demos... It’s thin air. If you give that 
stuff to the average reader, he looks at you... This is a dream book! [...] The title 
[of one of the articles on the area-based SP] was “Technical rehearsals of an 
improbable future”. [...] I have to try to put myself in the reader’s shoes. I 
imagine aunt Peppina reading my article on the area-based SP – the name itself 
is puzzling, frankly. In the end she says, “But if there’s no money, what are these 
people thinking of doing exactly?” [SS37 – Journalist for local newspaper] 
 
With regard to private actors, their focus was rather on individual 
projects and measures and the SP was perceived to be an arena to push 
through projects already in the pipeline and that could be financed through 
regional funds, rather than a space of public deliberation and elaboration of 
new, collective projects. Among stakeholders, particularly trade and industry 
associations, there was undoubtedly some scepticism due to previous 
participatory mechanisms at regional level that failed to produce tangible 
results. 
The problem is that this new [participatory] drive was already hampered from 
the start, because of previous experiences, and in particular the Region’s 
integrated planning, which progressively lost momentum. If you put people 
together around a table - especially here in Sardinia where it’s always a struggle 
to involve people - once you have involved them and these people work together 
and eventually even feel motivated, in the end if they don’t see any results 
people won’t get together again to discuss the same issues. There was a learning 
process and the networking was important, because people get to know each 
other and they exchanged ideas, opinions, contacts – and later it will be easier 
to talk to them. But clearly, if you don’t see results, next time politicians talk 
about bottom-up planning, we might keep going [because we are 
institutionalised associations and it’s part of our job], but most people will have 
stopped believing in it. [SS5 – Industry Association] 
 
The third sector and cultural associations, which naturally have fewer 
direct channels with the administration, tried to capitalise on the process and 
participated actively, albeit with some exceptions, as we saw above (SS19). 
Some associations complained about limited access to the required 
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information, which they believed hampered their clout on the process. The 
innovative methodologies employed were generally very successful in 
facilitating a horizontal dialogue among very different actors and the 
strategic week was an event for the community. Pretty soon the general 
perception was that the plan had just been a way to access funds and that 
there was not enough political awareness or commitment to implement it.174 
Participation appeared to be more effective where it had a more restricted 
scope, at the neighbourhood level, in S. Maria di Pisa. 
After the approval of the urban SP by the council, the director of the 
Local Development Department, who had been the committed champion of 
the whole process, moved to another position within the national health 
trust. The new director, albeit an expert in planning, had a very different 
approach and there was a lesser effort in sustaining coordination 
mechanisms among all the actors. Continuity, once again, is thus crucial for 
success, but really difficult to secure. The absence of a permanent dedicated 
SP office and a control room, which could have facilitate the formation of a 
collective actor, undermined the operational phase. The then CEO of the 
Local Development Department recently returned to the City Council as CEO 
for Social Policies, and she is determined to use the SP as a framework for 
ordinary administration within her department.  
My reasoning, now that I’m back is that those ideas, those projects [from the 
SP], where are they? What are we going to do? [...] I’ve only been back a few 
months and, perhaps because they [local government officers from the Social 
Policies Department] know how important [the SP] was for me, people here at 
the Social Policies department, although this department did not participate 
that actively in the SP process… They are already asking me whether we will go 
back to working on those projects now. [SS40 – Former Local Development 
CEO] 
 
Since the SP process was initially encouraged through regional and 
European funds, the administration was reliant on the regional government 
to implement projects and, unlike other Sardinian cities, Sassari did not 
perceive its SP as something that could be integral to ordinary administration 
and financed also through local resources. 
 
For instance, Oristano [another Sardinian city] had the clever idea to say, “No, 
wait a minute, this SP is not just for the PISU [regional funds for urban 
development]. I can actually use the PEG [local resources] from each 
department that can be relevant to the SP.” Today Oristano can say that its SP 
has produced investments for €100 millions. [SS24 – Officer, Regional 
Evaluation Centre] 
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As the calls for bids for the EU programme period are being published, 
some bigger and more strategic projects, requiring partnerships and greater 
inter-institutional cooperation, might now come back on the political agenda 
(SS10, SS11). At this point, however, it is yet unclear if and how the 
stakeholders initially involved in the elaboration of these projects will 
participate in the implementation phase, since no coordination mechanisms 
were kept in place (SS11, SS22). The new centre-right administration’s 
regional development plan does contemplate new funds to finance collective 
and integrated projects elaborated through SP and to enhance the planning 
efforts carried out so far.175 The PISU (Integrated Plans for Urban 
Development) are the new mechanism to fund SP projects under the regional 
Operational Programme for Objective 2 structural funds. Sassari’s flagship 
project (the redevelopment of Eba Giara and S. Donato – see the previous 
section) was awarded €25 millions by the regional government, and Sassari 
recently became a member of the national coordination committee of 
strategic cities (La Nuova Sardegna 19 February 2011).  
 
Before writing our regional development plan we organised a series of meetings 
in all provinces. We have examined all plans already elaborated, including the 
various Strategic Plans. [...] There has been a great planning effort during the 
past programme period, from the PIT to the new generation of integrated 
planning and area contracts, and SP should represent the framework of all the 
previous efforts. The idea is now to stop planning and instead enhance what we 
already have. [...] The stakeholders’ involvement in monitoring and 
contributing to the implementation of these plans is one of the requirements 
that underline the rationale behind the regional development programme. [...] 
We have already opened a blog and we’re planning to start an online forum. 
[SS25 – Regional Planning Centre CEO] 
 
Some worry (SS9, SS14) that, by financing individual projects, the regional 
government might compromise the overall strategic idea of the SP and thus 
hamper the integrated approach. To date, most of the projects that Sassari 
has submitted for funding under the PISU are small projects of the Youth and 
Education department, with limited strategic impact (SS14). 
 
Too Many Plans Too Little Coordination 
The input from other institutional levels was fairly limited if not of 
outright ostracism. There were severe clashes with the Provincial government 
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– although a centre-left coalition was in power at both levels. The Province, 
in order to reaffirm its planning functions, decided to launch its own SP, Il 
Patto per il Nord Ovest (The Pact for the North-West) when Sassari had 
already started its area-based plan (which already covers most of the 
province). The two plans were somehow in conflict, also due to a very 
different understanding of SP as a planning and participatory instrument, 
and the Province was scarcely involved in Sassari’s plan, though it could and 
should have played an important steering role. An inflation of plans at 
different institutional levels inevitably caused the familiar planning fatigue 
among stakeholders, who lamented that having to attend dozens of meetings 
for different plans that lacked synergy proved time-consuming and 
unconstructive. The rich season of governance processes that started in the 
early 2000s was perceived by stakeholders as lacking overall strategy and 
coordination, while taking part in meetings entails a big investment in terms 
of human resources, which some actors cannot afford, especially in the face 
of few tangible results.   
In the end all these SPs, PIT and GAL, without a real direction... One can’t even 
target one’s resources, focus... We tried to follow some of them, the urban SP 
and the area-based one. [...] However, these processes mean meetings, whole 
mornings, whole days, and in the end you can’t get the overall idea. So, this 
phase of governance is very welcome, but if everything happens at the same 
time and is badly organised, in the end one ends up running from place to place 
for nothing. [SS5 – Industry Association] 
 
The city generally failed to understand the rationale behind the 
provincial SP, the Pact for the North-West, as this was perceived by many 
(SS3, SS4, SS5, SS9, SS11, SS12, SS22, SS24, SS35, SS36, SS40, SS41, SS43) 
as a vehicle for the provincial president’s visibility needs vis-à-vis Sassari, 
which besides being the provincial capital is also much bigger as a local 
authority (about 1000 employees vis-à-vis 300 in the provincial 
administration). The director of the provincial Local Development 
Department explained how the Pact was conceived as an instrument that 
would coordinate the various governance processes in the province. It aimed 
at offering a framework to help integrate all other plans and EU programmes.  
[This process] was also self-financed through our own budget and still it has 
suffered from this pseudo-competition with Sassari’s area-based plan. No one 
understood that the provincial SP aimed to represent a strong link for the inner 
towns, since the 7 cities which took part in the area-based plan were all coastal 
cities. [SS33 – Provincial Local Development Department CEO] 
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There were some important failings in terms of communication on the part of 
the Province, if not only Sassari’s local administration but also most private 
and social stakeholders were not aware of how the Pact related to the area-
based SP. Perhaps the new responsibilities devolved to provinces and local 
authorities over territorial planning have not been fully understood by either 
tier of government.176 
There was need for visibility [at both levels]. [...] If the President of the Province 
has just included this great idea of SP, of a Pact for the North-West, in her 
programme and at the same time all the major cities in the Province get 
together and choose Sassari as their main coordinator for this idea of 
metropolitan city... Well, in theory this is not in conflict with the Province’s 
idea. But you try and make politicians understand this. The idea of “us together” 
clashes with the political assertion of the ego. [SS23 – Director of Local 
Development Agency] 
 
The Sardinian regional government did not offer either guidelines or 
support, weakening the level of integration among the plans produced by 
cities within the same territory and increasing the risk of fragmentation. 
At the beginning the idea was to give complete freedom over this instrument 
that, also at the national level, was new. And more important it was introduced 
in Sardinia at a point in time where the EU guidelines for the new programme 
period were not in place. This generated a few weaknesses, since what 
happened was that each local authority planned in isolation, as if it were a 
universe in itself, not linked to the rest of the world, based on a self-centred idea 
of development. [SS25 – Regional Planning Centre CEO] 
 
On the one hand the Region disbursed funds to promote SP and, at least 
initially, invested in integrated planning at the regional level. On the other 
hand, the centralising vocation of the Region, both at the political and 
administrative levels, meant that, once the SPs had already been elaborated – 
with limited guidance from the regional level – there was no attempt to 
incorporate local SPs into regional planning. Instead communication 
between local and regional government proceeded through more 
“traditional” political channels, through bargaining between the President of 
the Region and individual mayors.  
After that [the conclusion of the SP process] neither the European Community 
nor the Region kept their promises. From neither side you had something like: 
“OK, only those who carried out a good SP process will have access to funds”. 
There has been no attempt to incorporate projects [from local SPs] within the 
regional development programmes... Even in terms of timetable they [the two 
levels] were completely disconnected and only by chance certain ideas were 
synergic. [...] You would have expected that the Region’s president would come 
and say: “OK, if there are projects that were elaborated collectively or through 
the SP they should have priority.” No, it wasn’t like that, there was one man in 
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power who would bargain directly with each mayor. This was another reason for 
frustration for those who took part in the SP process. [SS4 – Academic Expert] 
 
Other interviewees also emphasised the responsibilities of the regional level 
which would send mixed signals, by initially encouraging participation but 
later reinforcing centralisation and a vertical decision-making process. 
Soru [former governor of Sardinia – centre-left administration] made some big 
mistakes in this respect. He came here with our SP and he expected to decide 
over what was good or bad in it. That’s the negation of the idea of SP. And it’s a 
signal. Because if you do it and you’re at the top, then why shouldn’t a mayor act 
the same way, and if the mayor does that and everyone wants to decide on their 
own small things, then the SP ends in tatters, obviously. [SS14 – Assessore for 
Youth and Education Policies] 
 
Conclusion 
For Sassari the SP represented a consciousness raising process as the 
city finally confronted a 20 years long crisis. The local context, not used to 
participation or to being involved in policy-making, responded with mild 
enthusiasm, following the disappointing results of a regional initiative of 
participatory planning. Although the city enjoyed the buzz surrounding those 
months of frenetic planning, most participants were structured stakeholders 
rather than small businesses and simple citizens. Furthermore, not all trade 
and industry associations actively took part, overwhelmed by a planning 
fatigue, since too many participatory mechanisms started simultaneously and 
at different levels of government. There was never a clear political intention 
or awareness to create a collective actor around a clear vision of the city, but 
the SP was rather interpreted as the newly elected mayor’s programmatic 
document. 
Tight deadlines imposed from above to access funds meant the plan 
had to be prepared and approved within less than one year. This had some 
unexpected positive effects, since it forced the administrators to organise 
very innovative events within a short period of time. The settimana 
strategica facilitated the awareness-raising process in a context not used to 
this type of participation. In general, voluntary and civic associations were 
eager to capitalise on these arenas and on a more open approach on the part 
of the new centre-left administration, whereas more institutionalised bodies 
such as the Chamber of Commerce did not feel the need to participate 
actively. In this respect limited interdependence of actors clearly hampered 
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the leverage and the impact of the process. Contrary to what happened in 
Lecce, where the availability of regional funds created strong expectations 
and encouraged active participation of structured actors, in Sassari low levels 
of trust in the regional government and the absence of clear regional 
guidelines determined more sceptical attitudes. By the same token, limited 
political commitment to the process also signalled to stakeholders that 
substantive decision-making was happening in other venues, for instance 
where the Town Plan was being discussed. The mayor, who came from the 
voluntary sector, already enjoyed high levels of legitimacy among civil society 
and opened new direct channels with several associations, which were easier 
to control politically than an open participatory process. 
If here, as in the other cases, political parties and councillors did not 
understand the process and remained at the margins, local government 
officers, notwithstanding some initial resistance, are slowly absorbing this 
new working culture, particularly within the departments that were directly 
involved in the SP process, Local Development and Youth and Education 
Policies, which could count on the commitment of their respective CEOs and 
the political sponsorship of the two assessori.177 
We now have a well defined SP and we are now at the beginning of the 
implementation phase, except for two or three small projects that we managed 
to implement. For everything else we are expecting calls for bids. [The SP] is 
still an instrument that we are using, since every time we prepare a little project 
or initiative we verify whether it’s linked to the priorities identified by the 
citizens through the SP – it’s like the ultimate test. The civil service now uses a 
monitoring document (MOF) which, for every call for bids, for every new 
financial opportunity that comes up, tells us, the politicians, that that particular 
call for bids fits a particular strategic direction within the SP. But also for the 
smallest things, the ordinary administration, I personally tend to verify whether 
it corresponds to the SP. Of course we need to understand that this is not a 
closed document but that it has to adapt to changes in the context. [SS9 – 
Assessore for Local Development] 
 
The presence of internal leaders committed to the process, such as the 
Local Development CEO, was pivotal to ensure coordination and motivate 
staff. At every level, successful participatory initiatives or implementation of 
collectively elaborated projects often depend on the coordinated initiative of 
an innovative public service CEO and a political sponsor. This is why 
ensuring continuity at both political and administrative levels is crucial for 
sustaining coordination mechanisms and securing success, and yet difficult 
to guarantee.  
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Thus, the lack of political awareness and genuine interest in the 
process, the choice of the mayor to open vertical channels with local 
associations (which had long been excluded from local policy), thus reducing 
civil society’s pressure for participation, and scepticism on the part of more 
structured actors jeopardised the attempt at building a collective actor and 
diminished the legitimacy of the participatory process. 
The implementation phase also suffered from lack of inter-level 
coordination. These processes require a framework of multilevel governance 
that can ensure consistency at all administrative levels. One of the main 
constraints, here as in Trento and Lecce, was certainly the different modus 
operandi between tiers of government, which can cause fragmentation of 
local initiatives and hinder the credibility of a local authority vis-à-vis its 
community. As Sardinia’s regional administration changed, safeguarding the 
SP process has proved increasingly difficult. Although the emphasis is now 
on the new PISU as the mechanism through which to implement SP projects, 
the risk is that every new administration will continue to have its own new 
acronyms, engendering confusion and exacerbating policy fragmentation. 
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PART THREE:  
COMPARING AND EXPLAINING 
RESULTS 
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CHAPTER 7 
The Politics of Strategic Planning  
The Case For Renewing Local Democracy 
 
SP has been promoted by practitioners and policy makers across 
Europe as a new mode of planning that would encourage a strategic approach 
to local development and offer new tools to foster partnerships, with the 
underlying assumption that a city, a place, could and should become a 
collective actor to face the new local and global challenges. These four case 
studies represent a good test for the efficacy of SP, as they are diverse cases 
characterised by different socio-economic and political contexts and present 
different types of political leadership. Comparative analysis can thus provide 
answers to a set of questions: what is the impact of SP on the local polity? 
How, if at all, does it affect the decision-making process? Does it facilitate 
inter-sectoral cooperation, also across different tiers of government, and can 
it influence working practises? Does it encourage the involvement of new 
actors in local policy making? Does it foster new networking among 
associations or help to open new channels between less structured actors and 
local institutions? Inevitably, expectations were so high that they were bound 
to be partly disappointed, while the faith placed on the new deliberative 
methodologies often clashed with political dynamics, inexperience, and weak 
local planning and administrative capacity. Political interests can hinder or 
facilitate outcomes, as the latter are often explained by forms and resources 
of leadership. 
Evaluating the degree of success or failure of an SP is certainly 
challenging since it can have a multi-faceted impact on local politics and the 
local polity. The observations collected through the comparative case-study 
allow for some reflections on the value-added of these plans. 
Notwithstanding strong differences in terms of the socio-economic context 
and social fabric, in all cases similar dynamics developed. While the process 
represented an important collective reflection on the state of the local 
economy and society, limited political awareness and long-term 
commitment, poor coordination between tiers of government, and the 
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inheritance of traditional administrative and political practices that do not 
encourage flexibility hindered the outcomes. Nevertheless, SP was still able, 
at least in patches, to open new channels between different local actors and 
between associations and the administration. In all cases it represented a 
learning process for those involved, despite the understandable 
disappointment with the outcomes (or lack thereof).  
Trento is a rich city where the public sector represents the dominant 
actor; it is characterised by highly efficient public services and a strong 
political majority, with the centre-left in power at both the local and 
provincial levels. The economy is based on strong cooperatives and the rich 
social fabric counts numerous associations. Here SP served to renew the 
vision of local development, which has been excessively reliant on the public 
sector, in view of diminishing central transfers. Trento appeared to have the 
most conducive context to successful SP and, indeed, several measures were 
implemented within the first few years from the approval of the final plan. 
However, the plan became a governmental tool, in line with more traditional 
planning, with scarce involvement of the other stakeholders, while a 
committed political leadership assisted by technical experts maintained a 
strong, though exclusive grip on the process. The SP was unable to facilitate 
cooperation between the local authority and the autonomous Province, which 
undermined the plan by boycotting the flagship project, hence jeopardising 
the plan’s overall vision.  
In Prato, on the contrary, SP was a collective reflection to look for 
solutions to urgent economic and social challenges, as the textile district is 
undergoing its deepest crisis yet. The growing immigrant community 
meanwhile struggles to integrate but is building a successful economy, 
though outside the legal framework. The Left wing coalition, in power for 63 
years, was unable to resolve internal feuds and was increasingly distant from 
the local community, convinced that they would never lose in what had 
traditionally been considered a stronghold of the Communist Party. A weak 
political leadership struggled to communicate effectively with the local 
community, compromising the legitimacy of the process. Although the SP 
disappeared from the political limelight, here it facilitated networking 
between environmental and agriculture associations that created a new 
202 
 
association of associations with the aim of protecting and redeveloping the 
Parco Agricolo. The failure of little-inclusive participatory mechanisms 
spurred bottom-up initiatives, as well organised neighbourhood associations 
questioned top-down participatory venues and invented their own space for 
policy-making.  
In Lecce SP was not a voluntary process, like in the previous two 
cases; here there were regional funds available for its financing and the 
rationale was to use this instrument to invest EU structural funds. Lecce was 
selected as a representative case of the southern context, which, following 
Putnam’s thesis (1993), suffers from a weak associational fabric and 
opportunistic behaviours that hinder local institutions. However, the 
fieldwork unveiled several dynamic associations which took advantage of the 
new institutional openings and actively participated in the SP. Here, with all 
the limits of Puglia’s proceduralisation of SP, the political leadership teamed 
up with the expert leadership of the SP office’s CEO to facilitate the inclusion 
of other actors, such as the centre-left-ruled Province, which played an 
important role in the process, notwithstanding the different political colour. 
Finally in Sassari, although there were regional incentives, SP still 
involved some degree of local initiative. Like in Trento, a new mayor here 
wanted to emphasise that his mandate represented a break with the past and 
he opened up to the local civil society. Sardinia’s associational dynamics 
differ from the rest of the South, with high levels of volunteering, although 
associations are often small and self-referential. The political structure is far 
more fragmented than in Lecce or Trento, although the current mayor has 
displayed important mediation skills. However, the process developed into a 
technocratic affair, coordinated by the CEO of the Local Development 
Department, who, assisted by academic experts and local development 
agencies, was the sole committed champion. When she left her job and as 
regional funds were delayed, the political and administrative focus shifted 
elsewhere, towards the Town Plan, which attracted stronger interests.  
All the plans, albeit to different degrees, stumbled over the operational 
phase. The pathological implementation gap was often the result of 
insufficient political awareness of these processes and weak coordination 
among tiers of government. Short-term political interests inevitably won over 
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long-term strategies. Local leadership was unable to sustain the momentum 
of the SP and its commitment inevitably faded away, signalling to private and 
social stakeholders that decision-making would happen in other venues. 
Weak coordination across tiers, particularly in the two Southern cases where 
the process relied almost entirely on regional transfers, condemned these 
experiments to fragmented initiatives, as the new role of the (medium-sized) 
city is still dependent upon, and often constrained by, higher tiers, since 
increased responsibilities were not matched by sufficient financial authority 
or local political entrepreneurial capacity. 
Table 7.1 summarises and scores outcomes in each case.  
 
TABLE 7.1  IMPACT OF SP 
Scores range from 0 to 1  
 
A lack of strategies that identify and enhance the city’s competitive 
advantage dented the effectiveness of all plans. Scores on institutional 
learning were determined by whether the administration has established a 
permanent SP office, as in the case of Trento and Lecce, or a dedicated sector, 
as in Sassari, to monitor the implementation of SP and to facilitate 
cooperation among all departments. Inter-sectoral cooperation was 
evaluated in terms of greater integration between sectors.178 Scores on inter-
level cooperation were based on the degree of cooperation across 
government tiers during the planning phase and the extent of collaborative 
involvement of the provincial and regional levels in the process. Increased 
associational networking was measured by considering whether, and to 
what degree, associations that participated in the plan later collaborated 
  
EFFECTIVE-
NESS OF 
STRATEGIES 
 
PROJECT 
IMPLEMENT-
ATION 
 
INSTITUTIONAL 
LEARNING 
 
INTER-
SECTORAL 
COOPERATION 
 
INTER-
LEVEL 
COOPERA-
TION 
 
INCREASED 
ASSOCIATIO-
NAL 
NETWORKING  
 
INFLUENCE 
ON 
WORKING 
PRACTICES 
TRENTO 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 
PRATO 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
LECCE 0 0.5 1 0 1 0.5 0.5 
SASSARI 0 0.5 1 0 0 0 0.5 
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more intensely with other stakeholders and/or the administration. Finally 
the influence on working practices is strictly linked to institutional learning 
and inter-sectoral cooperation and was measured in terms of awareness of 
the SP within public services and whether the plan has completely been 
abandoned or has incentivised and strengthened the commitment to 
governance.179 The comparative approach also unveiled the effects of the 
proceduralisation of SP in the two southern cities, as it altered the voluntary 
nature of the process that characterised the other two cases. 
This chapter will assess the impact of SP, its direct and unintended 
effects, by focusing on the three dimensions of the dependent variable: the 
formation of the collective actor, the democratic process, and the operational 
phase. The hypothesis set out in Chapter 2 was that different forms and 
resources of local leadership (independent variable) will affect SP outcomes, 
but such an impact can be constrained or enhanced by two intervening 
variables: the local culture (pre-existing associational dynamics) and the 
institutional and political constraints and opportunities that come from other 
tiers of government (multilevel governance). The case of Trento shows how 
highly structured associations can in fact exclude weaker or non-organised 
interests. Furthermore, local associations can be more or less collaborative 
(the cases of Lecce and Prato are quite indicative in this respect), though this 
will often depend on how facilitative and inclusive the leadership is perceived 
to be. The leadership’s commitment will send an unequivocal signal that the 
process is a substantive decision-making arena, and this can foster greater 
participation.  
Institutional constraints and the dynamics of multilevel governance 
strongly affect outcomes, at times beyond the control of the local leadership. 
On the one hand, the regional level tends to encourage the new governance 
arrangements. On the other hand, competition for political visibility between 
regional, provincial, and local government affects coherence in terms of 
planning strategies across levels, while a lack of administrative coordination 
and a different modus operandi can determine fragmentation of local 
initiatives. The section on Explaining Results will discuss the empirical 
effects of variables in order to identify typologies.  
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The four main dimensions of Le Galès’ definition of modes of 
governance have guided the analysis of each case study which, in order to 
contextualise the emergence and development of SP, focused on the structure 
of local society and political institutions (i.e. the degree of the strength of the 
local government and its links to other levels of government, the economic 
situation and the influence of the associative sector); the institutionalisation 
of collective action (the SP and other governance mechanisms that were 
implemented at the same time, which stakeholders were invited etc.); the 
political orientation of the local government; and finally the outcomes (the 
capacity to extract resources from the EU, the state, the region, the market; 
the type of policies carried out – or not – and their coherence). The emphasis 
has been on the role of local leadership that can facilitate or hinder two main 
aspects of urban governance: internal integration and external integration 
(Le Galès 2002). The first aspect refers to the leadership’s ability to integrate 
different interests, while the second aspect entails the political capacity to 
situate the local community within the larger context of inter-institutional 
interaction, in order to present collective local strategies to the outside world 
and extract resources from higher tiers of government and the private sector. 
Although the new mayors enjoy more channels, beyond the traditional 
political party routes, in these four cases they still seem to fall short of the 
required entrepreneurial skills and often lack the political ability to manage 
complex local dynamics.  
 
Assessing the Impact 
The Formation Of The Collective Actor:  
Institutional Learning And civic Networking 
In the current shaky political and economic climate, coming to terms 
with a plan that attempts to address uncertainties and identifies a clear focus 
or vision of the future (see Mintzberg’s category of thinking about the 
future)180 is undoubtedly challenging (Donolo 2003). SP becomes a “self 
conscious collective effort to re-imagine a city, an urban region or wider 
territory and to translate the result into priorities for area investment, 
conservation measures, strategic infrastructure investments and principles of 
land use regulation” (Healey 2004: 46). Chapter 1 examines the emergence of 
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and the rationale behind the city as a collective actor. When Pichierri (1997) 
indentified the five elements that characterise the city as a collective actor 
(collective decision-making; a strong local identity; integration mechanisms; 
internal and external representation; a capacity for innovation), he does not 
assume the city should be viewed as a priori collective actor. In fact, 
integration of interests becomes a response to new challenges and the 
collective reflection and ensuing strategies might well serve to legitimise a 
certain political order and certain interests, while others might be excluded 
(Le Galès 2002; Pinson 2005). In all four cities there was a more or less 
convincing effort to create a local identity and the collective reflection on the 
state of the local society and economy fostered new awareness, but also 
reinforced in all cases pre-existing ideas of the city and its future 
development. This might be caused by the fact the weaker interests 
(immigrants, the poor, neighbourhood associations) were not invited or 
excluded themselves from a process that they perceived as lacking legitimacy. 
Within politically charged environments like in Prato, conflicts were further 
exacerbated; these processes, as often highlighted by the literature, can turn 
into deadly political boomerangs.  
The space offered to new actors was often very limited and collective 
decision-making was mostly forgone come the implementation phase, but a 
new form of dialogue was nevertheless opened that should not be taken for 
granted (Mintzberg’s inclusivity and integrating decision-making). Some 
new stakeholders, cultural and social actors, were involved (particularly in 
Lecce), they brought with them new ideas, but also an all new set of 
expectations, and fostered new awareness. As these expectations were often 
disappointed, unintended dynamics were set in motion, often as a reaction to 
the constraints of the new invited spaces (Cornwall 2002). Social capital was, 
à la Coleman (1988), linked to, and fostered by, action, as the SP - together 
with other governance mechanisms - acted as a new window of opportunities, 
which contributed to creating the space where to “invent” participatory 
alternatives, often from the bottom up. As actors met at the SP meetings they 
sometimes began to network and this led to collaboration and/or the creation 
of new associations, thus new social capital.  
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In Prato, although the SP was eventually put aside, citizen associations 
met and organised around common objectives such as the Parco Agricolo. 
Later, during the USP process, as an effective “institutional” leadership was 
missing, the critical action of neighbourhood associations gave way to an 
alternative participatory platform in opposition to top-down initiatives. In 
Lecce, local associations such a LUA and Manifatture Knos were able to 
capitalise on the new openings of the SP to strengthen communication 
channels with local institutions, and later they started their own highly 
inclusive participatory workshops of urban planning for the redevelopment 
of via Leuca with the support of the local administration. Here, invited and 
invented spaces mutually reinforced each other. In Trento, on the contrary, a 
structured and collaborative civil society, which although rich and variegate 
never felt the need to be critical and is sometimes too comfortably close to 
institutions, partly marginalised weaker and less structured stakeholders. In 
Sassari, where civil society is less organised than in Trento or Prato and 
where some smaller stakeholders, such as cultural and environmental 
associations, were sceptical about the opportunities offered by SP, things are 
nevertheless changing as a more open administration has renewed the 
institutional dialogue with citizens.  
The attempt at creating a strong local identity, however, failed to 
convince trade associations and private actors. They initially responded to 
the call of local administrators, but in most cases they were soon 
disappointed by lack of leadership’s clarity and coherence. In Trento, as 
examined later, the local administration was not able to involve the Province 
in the process. The Province is perceived by private stakeholders as their 
main institutional interlocutor; thus they felt it would not be cost-effective to 
invest human and financial resources in a process in which the most 
important institutional actor in local development was not actively taking 
part. In Prato it became soon apparent that the mayor was politically isolated 
and for that, as well as because of previous disappointing governance 
initiatives, SP soon lost legitimacy. In Sassari private stakeholders 
approached SP with a sceptical attitude, disaffected after participatory 
planning at the regional level, which had involved hundreds of people, had 
not produce the expected outputs; lack of coordination between the local and 
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the provincial level exacerbated distrust as too many, non-synergic plans, 
were launched, causing planning fatigue. Lecce was most successful in 
involving private stakeholders, who were offered an active role in 
coordinating working groups, while the process acquired greater legitimacy 
through the involvement of the provincial level, which worked in a 
coordinated manner with the local administration. The rationale behind this 
type of “open” and facilitative leadership will be examined in the section on 
leadership. 
Administrations, perhaps naively, failed to recognise the presence of 
different and very conflictual interests. These do not necessarily manifest 
themselves during the elaboration phase, when stakeholders carry out the 
SWOT analysis and debate on alternative visions, but they emerge strongly at 
the time when choices must be made and resources have to be distributed 
(i.e. Lecce’s highly politicised control room/ cabina di regia). The capacity to 
aggregate different interests crucially depends on the availability of resources 
and feasible projects around which to organise networks of actors. In this 
respect all these processes showed weak coherence between visions and the 
actual projects. The endless list of projects became a hinder on cooperation 
dynamics. 
The strive to create a collective actor also concerned the public 
administration, where internal leaders were often able to communicate new 
values with direct and indirect effects in terms of institutional learning 
(Selznick 1957).181 Several new methodologies of governance, management 
and evaluation of public policies were introduced, sometimes for the first 
time. While they might not have changed working practices for good, they 
have come to be part of the professional background of local administrators 
and have certainly contributed to skill development. Staff that were directly 
involved in SP (including public employees on temporary contracts and 
young researchers and scholarship holders – i.e. TR11, SS1, SS42) were later 
hired in various departments and, as their commitment to the process 
remains strong, they have formed a community of practice to encourage and 
diffuse innovative modes of governance and are likely to drive some degree of 
organisational learning.  
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Although in all cases the champions of the process came from within 
the public administration, these internal leaders were often isolated and 
unable to overcome strong resistance from within other sectors. 
Nevertheless, Trento and Lecce set up a permanent SP office or Ufficio di 
Piano (although in Lecce the office was downsized soon after the planning 
phase),182 and Sassari established a coordination team within the Local 
Development Department to increase cross-sectoral collaboration in view of 
calls for bids at the regional, national, and European levels. In these new 
offices most employees actively took part in SP and are now committed to a 
collaborative approach (TR2, TR4, TR11, LE1, LE2, LE5, SS22, SS42). 
However, the SP offices and their successors are still perceived to be separate 
bodies within public services, and the SP, like the several innovative 
programmes of local integrated planning of the past 15 to 20 years, is viewed 
as “exceptional”, hence incapable of deeply influencing ordinary 
administration (Palermo 2001). 
We have not reached that routine incorporation of the SP, it has not been 
absorbed. There is a lot to do, but I think it mostly concerns the culture of 
people, because not everyone has the immediate perception that what they’re 
doing is part of a strategy, there is not a direct link. It happened that some 
sectors presented projects to the giunta without even thinking that our 
department was working on similar things, which were included in the SP, and 
that we had carried out specific work on that same issue. [...] One has to 
remember that there is much ordinary administration work which distracts 
people. They just execute things, so from their point of view this is not their 
problem – perhaps rightly so. [SS23 – Local Development Office] 
 
Ordinary administrative models can hardly be permeated by the radical 
change of working practices and roles experimented with during the SP 
process. Particularly in Sassari and Lecce, where the SP was fed by external 
financial incentives, there was the perception within public services that it 
would only continue as long as the “extraordinary” funds were available 
(LE4, SS23).  
However, local administrations are increasingly versed at intercepting 
funding opportunities from higher tiers of government, and in this respect 
governance mechanisms such as SP, which encourage large structural 
planning in a multilevel governance perspective, represent invaluable 
experience to build new skills upon (TR2, LE2, PR34, SS22, SS42). Where 
the provincial level was fully involved in, and committed to, the process, as in 
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the case of Lecce, greater cooperation between services across tiers 
developed, as public service officials met their counterparts at other levels; 
greater collaboration has continued also after the planning phase (LE2; 
LE10). Of course, whether these results are enough to justify the large public 
resources invested in these processes should be a matter of debate; however, 
since these plans have already been elaborated recognising the positive 
spillovers can be a fruitful exercise.  
With regard to Le Galès’ dimension of external integration, all four 
cities struggled to defend and present their strategies to the outside world. 
Although there has been important institutional and political learning in this 
respect, all cases displayed limited capacity to extract resources from higher 
tiers and the private sector in order to implement their strategies. Trento, as 
it tried to integrate the SP into its ordinary administration and partly 
involved the private sector in financing the redevelopment of the ex-Michelin 
area, was perhaps the most effective in this respect. However, failing to 
involve the Province cost the local administration its most important project, 
Busquet’s redevelopment of the train station and the surrounding area.  
Prato, through capitalising on the experience and the networks of the 
mayor and the Local Development CEO (they both had prior careers in 
regional planning) was able to intercept European funds to fund the SP 
process and to involve some private actors in backing the redevelopment of 
the Ex-Banci area, which was also endorsed by the region. However, as 
examined above and in Chapter 4, a weak leadership with poor 
communication skills, internal conflicts, and the change of government 
jeopardised the initiative. Sassari and Lecce, as already discussed, suffered 
the limits of forcing the SP process into the strict regulations of the EU 
structural funds. As local government and local stakeholders relied on these 
funds to implement the SP, there was limited incentive for them to identify 
other financial sources.  
However, in all cases, SP opened new space for dialogue with nearby 
cities to rethink local development in a metropolitan scale: the North-
Sardinia project with Sassari at its centre; the Prato-Florence-Pistoia axis of 
manufacturing vocation; the integrated metropolitan system including 
Trento, Verona, Mantua, Brescia, and Vicenza, to invest in logistics and 
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economic development, but also culture and research; and Lecce’s area-based 
plan and the increasingly popular idea of the Salento Region, with the Lecce-
Brindisi axis. It is difficult to foresee how such projects will develop and 
whether this grand vision will clash against traditional Italian parochialism 
(campanilismo). It should be noted that, in the early 2000s, as the discourse 
on metropolitan areas was starting to gain greater attention, new and smaller 
provinces were being created. However, there is certainly growing awareness 
of the need to team up to overcome the current crisis and optimise financial 
and human resources. 
Finally, the last element of Pichierri’s collective actor, the capacity for 
innovation, still struggled to come through and SP showed limited impact on 
influencing processes and producing innovative strategies, as examined later. 
Apart from the novelty of involving new actors and broadening the type of 
participants in the discourse on local development, SP tends to follow the 
path of traditional planning; thus the emphasis is still on producing piles of 
often redundant and wordy documents. This lack of methodological courage 
has partly constrained the potential of the process.  
 
The Process: The Democratic Dimension 
The activation of structured forms of interaction and participation is a 
quintessential dimension of SP, and what distinguishes it from more 
traditional planning. In this respect SP is often a means of reinforcing 
networking and governance dynamics, and the content of the plan can 
represent an opportunity to build greater cooperation and social capital 
(Pasqui et al 2010). Following Fung and Wright’s Empowered Deliberative 
Democracy Model (EDD) (2001), which was discussed in Chapter 1, a 
participatory mechanism should ensure practical orientation, bottom-up 
participation and deliberative solution generation in order to guarantee three 
objectives: effectiveness, equity, and sustained participation. Effectiveness 
will be a key to advancing public ends through effective problem solving and 
successful implementation, since if the performance falls short of 
expectations and forgo the demonstration effect, the participatory project 
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will lose legitimacy and jeopardise the credibility of future participatory 
mechanisms. 
Notwithstanding the efforts placed on organising the forums and 
workshops and coordinating stakeholders in the elaboration phase, the 
implementation gap clearly hindered the overall impact, since democratic 
legitimacy cannot simply be about procedures but also demands some 
substantive elements (Estlund 1997). In all cases, there were important flaws 
in the organisation of these processes that fell short of the normative 
standards conceptualised by deliberative democrats and were, for the most 
part intentionally, scarcely inclusive. It should be emphasised that in all cases 
the local media, which could have played an important role in guarantying 
publicity and pressing for accountability of the process, after an initial but 
short-lived enthusiasm, remained at the margins between scepticism and 
outright ostracism. Communication was left entirely to the administration’s 
press office. Journalists complained that the documents were “unreadable” 
(PR11; LE46; SS38) and that the lack of conceptual clarity made it difficult 
for them to convey the rationale of the process to their readership. 
Generally, traditional stakeholders were invited as well as some new 
social actors; however, (and particularly in Trento and Prato) the process did 
not reach out to the wider community. Citizens had greater space within 
other initiatives, such as the Social Plan in Trento and Prato’s USP and Town 
Meeting, notwithstanding, particularly in the case of Prato, the severe 
limitations in terms of the inclusivity and efficacy of these processes. Sassari 
and Lecce initially made a greater communication effort, through very active 
press offices, and attempted to reach non-organised citizens by hosting 
events such as “the box of ideas.” Postcards were distributed in schools and 
to passers-by in public places to encourage residents to write down ideas and 
visions of the city’s future. These were then collected by local government 
officers and later fed into the discussion on the plan during participatory 
meetings and forums. It was a non-rigorous attempt at including in the 
process the wider public, who was unlikely to participate directly.  
In Lecce, the working groups involved several new actors, although 
they were not all fully aware of what the process entailed or equipped to 
participate in equal terms with stronger and more structured stakeholders 
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(LE12, LE31, L34). In Sassari, the strategic week was devised as a series of 
public events to raise awareness among the population. Here some 
associations (SS19) chose not to participate as they felt that the process was 
not truly inclusive since, whether deliberately or unintentionally, no previous 
information was given to smaller associations. As they did not know what to 
expect, they felt they could not give any substantial input and did not want to 
legitimise the process by taking part. 
Overall, the innovation of the deliberative forums and workshops, 
albeit with many shortcomings in terms of the effectiveness of the horizontal 
debate, was perhaps more incisive in the two southern cases, which employed 
novel methodologies to facilitate dialogue. Unlike Trento and Prato, which 
often relied on traditional assemblies (albeit facilitated by experts), Lecce and 
Sassari, having launched their process a few years later, could capitalise on 
the rich experience accumulated by other cities and, assisted by local 
professionals, employed more innovative, although perhaps formulaic, 
methods such as the EASW and the OST. Both cities carried out a detailed 
mapping of all local associations, and the press office’s institutional 
communication was thorough and very effective. Albeit with all the limits 
examined, the process represented, initially at least, an event within the local 
community.183 However in all cases, the focus was less on imagining a new 
vision collectively and rather on ensuring the “popularisation” of pre-existing 
planning ideas.184  
In Sassari, after the strategic week, as stakeholders organised in 
working groups to elaborate the plan, there was a natural selection, and non-
organised citizens felt somewhat unwelcome. 
I don’t know to what degree these meetings were a real space of debate. I didn’t 
perceive them as a place of horizontal discussion. There was a schedule of 
people that had to speak. But it wasn’t a moment where people would say, “we 
have this project…” and where sitting next to the assessore and the 
businessman there was a resident of Santa Maria di Pisa [Sassari’s very poor 
periphery] who could reply, “well, I think so and so.” It was not like that and 
perhaps it was not meant to be. Perhaps it was already a higher level with 
experts, from academia or the private sector, to decide how feasible the project 
was, which resources to invest. [...] So I think that they expected the strategic 
week to be the participatory moment where there was the bulk of ideas. [SS2 - 
Student] 
 
Working groups focusing on “hot” topics such as urban regeneration were 
nevertheless highly attended by less structured actors, such as homeowners 
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and disabled people’s associations with high stakes in the debate (Fung and 
Wright’s practical orientation). They tried to capitalise on the new openings 
and organised to put forward feasible proposals. The administration, 
however, as examined later, was not able to (or interested in) enhance this 
new social capital.  
Generally, there was some naivety in placing excessive faith on 
deliberative methodologies, sometimes following participatory manuals to 
the letter. They did help to facilitate dialogue, but on their own they fell short 
of ensuring a truly horizontal decisional environment. They were often 
formalised and only partly responded to the demands and the cooperation 
capacity of different contexts, as not enough thought was given to their 
objectives and repercussions. Furthermore, participatory mechanisms only 
characterised the elaboration phase, but in all cases the administration did 
not build upon these early efforts and much of the social capital created 
through the process was dispersed. Coordination mechanisms stopped in all 
four cities after the conclusion of the planning phase, as the SP offices were 
downsized (Lecce) or dismantled (Sassari and Prato). This inevitably dented 
the legitimacy of the SP as stakeholders, particularly those who had invested 
considerable amounts of human resources, were often unaware of any 
progress and felt excluded. If the operational phase in Sassari and Lecce 
slowed down while local government waited for regional funds to be 
disbursed, even in Trento, where the plan was integrated into ordinary 
administration and implementation proceeded rapidly, stakeholders were 
oblivious to such developments. Since the flagship project of the train station 
redevelopment was never implemented, stakeholders assumed that the 
process had stalled (TR7, TR15, TR16, TR17, TR18, TR19, TR26, TR33, 
TR34).  
Trento and Prato invested in an Urban Centre, but were not able (or 
willing) to develop it into an effective structure that could channel 
participation on important planning issues. As both cities were undergoing 
the redefinition of their Town Plan, the Urban Centre could have represented 
a useful instrument to involve the community in the process. Instead, it came 
to be perceived by politicians as something to be tamed and was emptied of 
much of its potential (see Chapter 3). 
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Overall, there is still limited political awareness and widespread 
distrust of these instruments that can turn into political boomerangs, as in 
the case of Prato, and clash against politicians’ need for quick returns to build 
political stock. This often means that a participatory process is 
enthusiastically opened to increase the initiator’s visibility but without an 
adequate understanding of how it will be managed. As the process develops 
(sometimes too slowly by politicians’ standards, sometimes delivering 
unpalatable results) political attention shifts elsewhere, generating 
discontent and disaffection among participants. As in the case of 
participatory budget in one of Trento’s wards, politicians’ impatience with 
procedural lengthiness and initial low levels of participation meant the 
process was not repeated. However, as explained by the ward president (see 
Chapter 3), these processes need time to prove their effectiveness; as results 
are delivered and there is a demonstration effect, more people will 
participate. 
Trento’s choice of institutionalising SP, amending its statute to 
guarantee constitutionally that planning is strategic and participatory, is 
significant and yet one might doubt its substantiveness, in light of the 
comments of the author of the Trento’s plan (TR2), who recognised the 
difficulty of controlling participation and opted for a less participatory 
approach in view of the city’s second plan. As noted by an officer working for 
the regional government of Sardinia: 
The problem is that this process can be easily bureaucratised. What I mean is 
that it becomes a process that has to be done, but no one really believes in it. 
And this is the risk for all processes, especially at the regional level. Because at 
this level there is always greater intolerance towards dialogue and this generates 
bureaucratisation. Then partnerships can be perceived as something that has to 
be done, but with no expectations. This is why it is important to give these 
processes some structure, otherwise […] governance turns into a ritual. [SS24 - 
Regional Evaluation Centre] 
 
Undoubtedly, in all four cases the biggest obstacle to the participatory 
dimension of SP came from local councils and political parties, where the 
new governance mechanisms were perceived to bypass traditional 
representative channels. In fact councillors were scarcely involved in the SP 
process, whether out of scepticism or scarce awareness, thus missing an 
opportunity to reinforce their role, which admittedly was curtailed by the 
mayoral reform. Against such political scepticism a new phase of political 
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turmoil has galvanised Italian social movements, and a new wave of civic lists 
and grassroots parties, which overcome the left-right dichotomy, is emerging 
to contest elections against mainstream political parties. They interpret a 
renewed demand for greater citizen involvement to ensure transparency and 
accountability, but also to tap into the resources that civil society can offer to 
a political and administrative system in the doldrums. The risk, as always in 
Italy, is that of populism or a just as dangerous post-ideological apolitical 
drift which exhausts itself into the inevitable limits of a technocratic 
government. This period of uncertainty however offers much more space for 
innovative solutions and to open new windows of opportunities, as analysed 
in the section on associational dynamics.  
 
Understanding (Non) Implementation 
The implementation gap that affected all the plans to a different 
degree can be ascribed to several factors.185 Certainly the political aspect 
played a decisive role since short-term political interests and a lack of 
continuity in terms of political approach and policy decisions compromised 
results. As the literature often finds (see Chapter 2), politicians’ short 
attention span and the gap between their political interests and collective 
goods (or between electoral politics and substantive politics – Le Galès 1998) 
often explains the failure to translate the ambitions of the initial phase into 
tangible results in the operational phase. Even in the case of forward-looking 
administrators the short-term political interest is always privileged to 
augment political stock.  
There was also some degree of naivety among political elites and 
stakeholders in thinking that planning would naturally happen, as the 
elaboration phase was completed. However, planning, as examined in 
Chapter 1, succeeds or fails at the point of implementation, and 
implementation is a moment of decision-making in itself, which also involves 
several political and administrative levels. In this respect, Trento’s second 
SP, Agenda 2020, represents an interesting attempt at reflecting on the 
meaning of planning and controlling its dynamics by understanding all the 
clashes, uncertainties, and irrationalities of a decision-making process. SP 
should have been understood as an ongoing process, whereby the focus was 
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on reinforcing governance structures to foster a collective actor around an 
overall vision of the city’s development. Instead SP became the actual plan, a 
long list of projects eventually put aside, thus creating false expectations 
among stakeholders. Although this wishlist can continue to represent a point 
of reference for future administrations (TR2, LE2, SS22), this approach has 
constrained the potential of the process, engendering disaffection among 
stakeholders and perhaps even inhibiting further cooperation. A more open 
document capable of problematising the process and the vision a bit further 
would have perhaps required greater inclusiveness, but the participation 
dimension, as examined above, had many shortcomings. In this respect 
politics could mediate between two dimensions - wishlists on the one hand 
and opportunistic behaviour on the other - by containing both flights of fancy 
that cannot be translated into concrete projects and the risk of limited room 
of manoeuvre, as the process is hijacked by opportunistic interests or relies 
excessively on procedural and technical considerations (Pinson 2005). 
 In the absence of a genuine collective actor with long-term 
commitment, selectivity and inclusivity will inevitably become mutually 
exclusive: inclusivity will sacrifice selectivity, as stakeholders opt for sub-
optimal solutions that enjoy greater consensus; or selectivity will sacrifice 
inclusivity as the participatory space is reduced. Whereas in Trento the local 
leadership chose to constrain participation even further for the second SP, to 
ensure an effective role of the administration as the strongest actor that could 
guarantee selectivity and prompt decision-making, in Lecce the emphasis 
was on an inclusive process (also to augment the mayor’s legitimacy), which 
eventually sacrificed selectivity. 
Given the differences in terms of local contexts, the four plans and the 
official documents display surprising uniformity. There might thus be an 
imitation factor characterising all these processes. The models are often 
Barcelona’s plan, the progenitor of the new wave of SPs, and Turin’s plan, 
which was the very first Italian SP in 1998. Therefore, different contexts, 
different rationales, and yet very similar formats of the SP documents. The 
orthodox approach of these plans and their formulaic language reveal a deep 
standardisation process (also see Pasqui et al 2010), whereby the plan 
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becomes the crystallisation of the elaboration phase within a very rigid 
framework.  
Sometimes such similarities are explained by the fact that the same 
development agencies, such as Formez, offer consultancies to local 
government. However, in these four cases the organisation of the process was 
for the most part an internal affair, and an SP office was set up to support the 
administration. Development agencies had a marginal role in Sassari (but 
Demos is owned by the local and provincial governments) and in Lecce, 
which briefly relied on an agency from Milan, Lattanzio, to support the SP 
office on procedural aspects (LE1, LE2). All four cities could count on 
internal expertise in planning and governance, but, as expected, they referred 
to previous plans, sometimes using them as blueprints. A public official in 
Sassari (SS22) confirmed that initially “the whole office was busy 
downloading the plans of other cities”. This would appear as rational 
behaviour on the part of local administrations. “Organisations tend to model 
themselves after similar organisations in their field that they perceive to be 
more legitimate or successful” (Di Maggio and Powell 1983: 152). The 
popularity of certain reforms and arrangements can often be ascribed to such 
mimetic processes rather than to concrete evidence of their greater efficiency 
(ibid.). The risk is the transfer of general strategies which could apply to any 
context but are truly strategic for none.186  
All plans include a presentation of preliminary documentation and the 
SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats) analysis; the 
definition of a medium-to long-term vision of the territory’s development; 
and a list of strategies and projects for each policy area. The binomial theme 
of tourism/environment and culture is present in all plans, even in the case 
of localities that do not have a tradition in that respect, like Sassari or Prato. 
Themes of governance, with a focus on strategies to reinforce inter-
institutional and cross-sectoral cooperation and to encourage administrative 
decentralisation, are also recurrent. On the contrary, there is less emphasis 
on other thornier and more complex themes, such as poverty or social 
segregation of weaker sectors of the population (immigrants, the new poor). 
In Prato’s plan, for instance, the presence of a growing Chinese community 
has generated political and social fractures; the issue is analysed in the 
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preliminary documents, yet there are no projects that attempt to foster 
greater integration, neither were immigrant communities involved in the 
elaboration process.  
There were inconsistencies between detailed SWOT analyses, which 
demonstrate great awareness of the local socio-cultural and economic 
challenges, and very ambitious visions that were inevitably perceived to be 
unrealistic by the community. These plans were somehow imprisoned in a 
seemingly irreconcilable split between a visionary elaboration phase 
contemplating grandiose projects, often entrusted to starchitects such a 
Renzo Piano and Joan Busquets in Trento or Alvaro Siza in Lecce, and an 
implementation phase which entailed a reality check and was often reduced 
to putting forward smaller projects of limited innovation and impact, 
disengaged from the high level of the overall framework (Pasqui et al 2010). 
Healey (2004) reaches similar conclusions in her essay on SP where she 
highlights the difficulties encountered when translating innovative visions 
into the reality of legal, regulatory and planning norms, and the constraints 
of a traditional planning culture. 
The weakness of these plans also lies in an overestimation of local 
authorities’ competencies and administrative capacity, as grandiose projects 
were presented as flagship projects but could not be implemented without 
the full endorsement of higher tiers of government. The case of Trento, with 
its project to move the train station underground, is particularly telling in 
this respect. As the competency pertained to other levels and the provincial 
government was more oriented towards a high speed rail, the project was 
never implemented. The two southern plans paid the price of having to rely 
on regional regulations, which lacked consistency and generated much 
confusion. Conversely, one of the reasons behind the success of Trento’s 
Social Plan was precisely that the decision-making authority on social 
policies had been fully devolved to the local level.  
In all cases, the flagship projects were infrastructural and represented 
the only link between the SP and the Town Plan (or the Urban Structural 
Plan in Prato), as in an attempt to legitimise two planning approaches that 
were otherwise scarcely synergic. Whereas Trento and Prato had to abandon 
their flagship project (because of obstructionism from higher tiers in the case 
220 
 
of Trento, and a change of government in the case of Prato), hence 
compromising the entire vision of the plan, Sassari and Lecce, a few years on, 
might have succeeded in securing funding to implement their most 
important project. Whether this good result ensues from effective leadership 
or newfound multilevel coordination would be perhaps an optimistic 
conclusion. Rather these projects were long-standing ideas and the SP might 
have been in this case successful in putting them back on the political 
agenda.  
Often, the bureaucratic machine is held responsible for 
implementation failure, because of low levels of specialisation and 
administrative capacity, but in all four cases the main obstacles were political 
in nature. Where there was political support and the local government 
enjoyed full authority over a specific policy, measures (albeit often small) 
were implemented (see the case of Sassari’s Youth and Education 
Department or Trento’s Social Plan). Although inevitably there was some 
degree of resistance from within public services, innovative proposals often 
emerged from the bureaucracy. If, as observed by Dente (1990), lack of 
capacity within the public administration explains the reliance of Italian local 
(and central) government on external academic experts, in all these cases the 
experts that drove the process were public service CEOs (albeit aided by 
academics). This can perhaps be interpreted as a positive sign of growing 
competence and confidence of local public services, following the Bassinini 
reforms which have facilitated the entry of experts in local administrations; 
by the same token, several years of European programmes have certainly 
encouraged the adoption of new methodologies and working practices based 
on governance. 
 
Explaining Results 
Leadership Resources And SP Outcomes 
The SP cycle in Italy has developed during a phase of acute political 
and administrative crisis in local regulations. The reforms deeply affected 
local democracy, by altering the relations of power between the council and 
the giunta, and by changing the relationship between a highly visible mayor 
and the local community. Mayors are now the heads of the local community, 
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and greater visibility and powers can help them to partly free their 
administrations from excessive interference from party politics (although 
weak and discredited parties contribute to this effect). Local government has 
been devolved greater decision-making authority and some tax raising 
powers; however, it still depends on central and regional transfers and this 
inevitably weakens local autonomy and problemitises the notion of local 
accountability. New mayors experience the dilemma of having to respond to 
several new responsibilities and being directly accountable, in a context of 
decreasing transfers from the centre, while local government tends to be 
most penalised by the stability pact enforced in Brussels and by the new cuts. 
The issue of decreasing financial capacity has been a dramatic one for 
medium-sized cities faced with the challenge of reinventing a development 
path in a post-Fordist scenario, like Prato, and in contexts of deep economic 
crises, like Sassari and Lecce. Local businesses here hardly have the human 
and financial resources to invest in projects and act as active participants 
within a governance model. Political parties, after seemingly re-emerging 
from the scandals of Tangentopoli and briefly recovering some strength and 
influence, have now plunged back into a corruption and competence crisis 
that has irrevocably dented their credibility and capacity of 
representativeness, amid growing support for populist and ‘apolitical’ 
formations and civic lists.  
In an uncertain political context, local elected leaders are forced to 
seek continuous legitimation of policy decisions, which might seem perhaps 
counter-intuitive in the case of directly-elected mayors. Since political parties 
are unable to mediate the relationship between voters and elected politicians, 
the values and the political culture of the elected individual will strongly 
influence the relationship with the electorate.187 The entrepreneurial mayors 
and their executive find themselves in a double role of administrators and 
gatekeepers, whereby involving the bureaucracy and civil society becomes 
pivotal in order to guarantee a responsive and legitimate leadership (Galanti 
2011).188  Governance and participatory arrangements, such as SP, can 
therefore appear as a convenient channel to renew leaders’ public 
legitimation.  
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The SP process became strictly linked to the resilience of the political 
leadership, but political visibility was given priority over the formation of a 
collective actor around strategic actions and this approach jeopardised long-
term results. When the leadership changed, even where there was political 
continuity as in Trento,189 the SP stalled or was rejected altogether, as in the 
case of Prato. The political focus had already shifted away from the SP during 
the second term of Sassari’s and Trento’s mayors, as the giunta changed and 
the CEOs who had acted as champions of the process moved to a different 
role. Had SP been understood as a process rather than a list of projects, this 
might have facilitated its endorsement beyond political divides. Instead the 
SP often came to coincide with the mayor’s political manifesto, which made it 
difficult for the opposition to endorse it.  
All four mayors, apart from Lecce’s,190 launched SP at the very start of 
their mandate to mark a break from previous administrations in terms of 
method. This was particularly true in Sassari, where the previous two mayors 
suffered from Trigilia’s decisional illusion and vehemently excluded any 
input from civil society and even trade associations, alienating much support. 
Conversely, the new mayor, a doctor, came from the voluntary sector and was 
already well known within cultural and voluntary circles. This undoubtedly 
served to build support from civil society, and once he was in office several of 
local associations found a new direct channel with the administration.  
In Prato, on the contrary, the new mayor struggled to distance himself 
from the previous and much contested administration and was unable to 
resolve or even manage pre-existing conflicts with some sections of civil 
society, which were in fact exacerbated. Here infighting within the ruling and 
historically dominant centre-left party inhibited the emergence of an 
innovative leadership that could have driven change and attempts at building 
a collective actor were delegitimated a priori. By the same token, the ruling 
party was convinced that it could count on historical loyalty from the 
electorate and did not feel the need to invest resources in building new 
legitimacy. 
  In Trento and Lecce, where leadership developed within relatively 
cohesive local political structures, the formation of the local collective actor 
had very different outcomes for very political reasons. In all cases there were 
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strong political incentives to launch the process, as SP represented primarily 
a way of rescaling (political and financial) power to the local level vis-à-vis 
higher tiers. This explains the trial of force between the local and the 
provincial level over development policy. Trento’s process clashed against the 
dominant role of the Province and its governor who understood the local 
administration’s initiative as an attempt to challenge the balance of power 
between the two levels. Without the endorsement of the provincial level, it 
was always going to be difficult to create a collective actor, as most structured 
stakeholders see the Province as their main institutional interlocutor – it 
holds the financial resources and the political power. Interdependence of 
stakeholders within collaborative arrangements is pivotal to produce 
meaningful cooperation, but it is hard to engender, as more powerful actors 
can either control the process or have the option of more effective and non 
collaborative channels (Ansell and Gash, 2007; Innes and Booher 2003). 
Lecce’s political leadership had the most to gain from building an 
inclusive process, which would also strategically involve the Province, as it 
needed to renew its own legitimacy more than the other cases. The current 
mayor succeeded a charismatic predecessor, who continued to overshadow 
his mandate, often taking a conflictual stance. By contrast in Trento an 
efficient local administration did not need to strengthen its legitimacy among 
citizens and was more interested in involving stronger interests that might 
have helped to increase its leverage vis-à-vis the Province. This however 
penalised smaller interests that thought they could capitalise on what they 
initially perceived as a new opening, but were instead sidelined. In Sassari 
the process was initially quite inclusive, as a new “civic” mayor wanted to 
mark a radical break with his predecessors. However, inexperience, fear of 
losing control over a process there was little familiarity with, as well as the 
fact that several other channels were being opened with the local civil society, 
deflated the enthusiasm about SP.  
A second dimension of the leadership variable is represented by a 
technical expert - the public service CEO. In each city the CEO of the SP 
office or the Local Development Department, assisted by some local 
government officers, experts from academia and/or local think tanks, 
became the “champion” of the participatory process on the strength of the 
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backing (at least initially) of the political “sponsor” (Bryson 2004; Hendriks 
and Tops, 2005). These CEOs played a challenging and decisive role in 
coordinating the process, often in solitude, as political legitimation faded 
away, and against the scepticism and reluctance of the bureaucratic machine 
to accept new working practices (PR34, SS40). They tried to convey new 
values in the bureaucracy’s working practices, based on participatory 
governance (Selznick 1957). All these figures built their own professional 
career around themes of governance, through consultancies, publications, 
collaborations with the local university and other tiers of government. 
Therefore they also had an interest in furthering their career by enhancing 
their expertise in governance within the public services.  
These chief executives were often supported by a committed staff of 
young employees, some of whom started their work experience within public 
services when the SP was launched and who have embraced the new working 
practices. The limit of the public service leadership, as well as the political 
one, lies in the difficulty to guarantee continuity. Although CEOs’ 
commitment is less influenced by short-term interests, they often move to 
different departments or jobs, and the cases examined show how newcomers, 
who have not “lived” the process since its inception, tend to be less 
supportive of it, even when they share the underlying rationale and core 
principles (SS11). 
The most difficult aspect for these figures is to act as a bridge between 
public services, politics and the stakeholders involved. In all cases, at least 
initially, it was these CEOs who appeared to contribute the most to the 
emergence of facilitative leadership. As examined in Chapter 2, in a local 
context that is increasingly fragmented, the type of leadership now required 
to create identity incentives within the new multilevel governance system 
could be defined as facilitative leadership. The case studies demonstrated 
how facilitative leadership can emerge from the coordinated work of a 
political sponsor of the process and a champion from public services and/or 
civil society. Thus, this type of leadership is about supporting and 
coordinating stakeholders’ action, rather than simply being in charge and 
controlling the process (Denhardt and Denhardt 2003; Svara 2008).191 A 
facilitative leadership will be pluralist, so that different people or 
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organisations can lead different phases of the process. The more inclusive 
and heterogeneous the leadership is - opening up to all sectors of society and 
spanning across public services, politicians, the private sector, and civil 
society - the more effective it will be in building wider support around a 
certain project or vision.  
As explained above, political leadership might have more or fewer 
(personal) incentives to open an inclusive process, but all four case studies 
show how politics and the bureaucracy have to work closely together to 
facilitate this type of collective planning. Some public service CEOs and 
officers provided politicians with innovative policy tools and ideas, even 
helping to put on the agenda solutions initially not considered by the local 
executive.  
What one [public service officer] should always do is to remind politicians about 
why we are doing this, in a way showing them a clear goal. They are forced to 
focus on concrete issues, on conflictual problems, on how politically useful any 
action turns out to be. They need to be supported on these innovative actions. 
So, this support of the politician is also part of our responsibilities as the 
technical side of administration [...] Otherwise they [the politicians] tend to 
move towards ordinary administration, towards daily business. [SS40 – Former 
Local Development CEO] 
 
Although collaboration between politicians and bureaucrats is developing 
and goes beyond decision-making, with the mayor or an assessore often 
closely following policy implementation (Regonini 1993), we are still far from 
overlapping of administrative and political responsibilities, or Aberbach, 
Putnam and Rockman’s “pure hybrid” (1981). Notwithstanding the 
increasing presence of bureaucrat innovators that support the mayor or an 
assessore, from interviews with public service officials a widespread 
scepticism emerged towards politics and its dynamics (PR14), while 
politicians can at times feel frustrated with what they perceive as 
bureaucratic obstructionism (PR35). 
There is a line beyond which politicians cannot go and the CEOs feel they have 
to stonewall, otherwise there would a commingling and this is not always 
understood. From the Town Planning Office the hostility was towards the 
mayor himself, because they felt the mayor wanted to interfere... [PR35 – 
Mayor] 
 
Thus, in all cases innovative bureaucrats with previous experience in 
governance, and an interest in enhancing new working practices within 
public services, championed a process sponsored by the mayors and, in 
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Trento, Prato and Sassari, one or two assessori. In most cases, the 
“designated” facilitative leadership struggled to emerge, often paying the 
price of local conflicts, politicians’ short attention span and interests, and the 
difficulty in ensuring continuity (but also the naivety of academic experts and 
consultants living in a “universe of one” - see Wagenaar 2001 - and “showing 
excessive faith in the formal aspects of their participatory methods” but 
“unable to recognise and resolve unexpected conflicts” - see Bussu and 
Bartels 2013).192 Table 7.2 defines typologies of leadership, in terms of 
strength (also determined by the degree of cohesiveness of the local political 
structure) and inclusiveness. Different forms of leadership determined 
variations in outcomes with regard to the formation of the collective actor, 
the democratic process, and implementation. 
 
Table 7.2 LEADERSHIP TYPOLOGIES 
 Inclusive Exclusive 
Strong Facilitative 
(Lecce) 
 
Governmental 
(Trento) 
 
Weak Dispersed 
(Sassari) 
Ineffective 
(Prato) 
 
In Trento, a strong and fairly cohesive majority with a very popular 
mayor and very efficient public services – which at the time of the first SP 
were already undergoing a deep restructuring process through the Social 
Plan – maintained a strong grip on the process that intentionally restricted 
the platform of stakeholders involved, as explained above. The process thus 
combined strong leadership but an exclusive approach that transformed the 
SP into a governmental tool, effective in implementing (smaller) measures 
but unable to produce a shared vision of the city and form a collective actor. 
The second SP focuses on few strategic lines and gives even less emphasis to 
the participatory dimension, reinforcing the choice of a governmental 
approach. This, as mentioned above, might be explained with the fact that 
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the local leadership did not need to increase its legitimacy with the city at 
large.  
The case of Prato proved the most complex; here there was a strong 
incentive for both the local leadership and private and social stakeholders to 
form a collective actor in order to face the deepest crisis of the industrial 
district to date. Because of disagreements within his own party over the 
benefits of SP, the mayor felt pressured to withdraw his support, financially if 
not in rhetoric. Notwithstanding the work of the dedicated CEO and the local 
think tank IRIS, without any genuine political endorsement (and the 
required resources) the stakeholders could hardly commit to a process that 
was increasingly perceived to be redundant and ineffective. Pre-existing 
conflicts and disillusionment with previous governance efforts whose 
outcomes were disregarded by local elites also contributed to the general 
scepticism. The local leadership failed to foster and communicate a shared 
vision of the city, as conflicts with civil society became more intense. When 
the new centre-right administration gained power in 2009 the SP and its 
flagship project were put aside, even if this meant losing the regional funds. 
This happened without flinching from the community and the stakeholders 
that were involved in the SP, which is another testament to the failure of the 
leadership to create identity incentives. A coordinated and inclusive 
leadership struggled to emerge also because of the arrogance of political 
elites that failed to use this opportunity to renew their legitimacy, as they 
believed they would never lose an electoral contest in this stronghold of the 
Left. We could define this typology, weak and exclusive, as ineffective 
leadership. 
Overall, leadership in the two southern cases proved more inclusive, 
for the reasons highlighted above. In Sassari, the mayor displayed important 
mediation skills within a fragmented party structure. He was thus open to 
dialogue with the opposition in the council and engaged with civil society, 
which had long been excluded from local policy-making. By the same token, a 
very committed public service chief executive closely followed the SP process, 
assisted by local experts, and was extremely effective at involving and 
coordinating stakeholders. Here there seemed to be the prerequisites for a 
facilitative leadership to emerge. However, the commitment of the mayor 
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and the political focus quickly shifted to the Town Plan, where stronger 
interests and more immediate outcomes were at stake. In this case, the SP 
was not an entirely voluntary choice of the mayor/entrepreneur; it soon 
became clear that regional funds would be delayed and that the new regional 
centre-right administration had a different approach to participatory 
planning, which contributed to the fading emphasis on the process. The 
antagonistic attitude of the provincial government that started its own SP 
and the launch of the area-based plan almost simultaneously also created the 
perception of an inflation of plans, putting excessive pressure on 
stakeholders and exacerbating confusion. Without a control room able to 
coordinate what had initially tried to be an inclusive process, leadership was 
dispersed. 
Finally, in Lecce, the centre-right administration vaunted a strong 
majority, serving its third term, with the new mayor Perrone elected in 2007 
after being deputy mayor in the previous administration. Conflicts developed 
between Perrone and the faction gravitating around the previous mayor and 
this incentivised the mayor to renew his legitimacy through an inclusive SP 
which opened up to several new stakeholders.193 Here, with all the limits of 
the local public services, a very experienced chief executive - an expert in 
planning who also collaborates with the regional centre-left coalition on 
governance programmes - was able to coordinate the process effectively, as 
he enjoyed the mayor’s support. The leadership of the process was thus 
strong and inclusive, as it devolved the coordination of some working groups 
to external figures from trade associations and other tiers of government, 
specifically the Province. In this case, notwithstanding the different political 
colour of the provincial administration, there was full collaboration, which 
helped to strengthen the legitimacy of the process. In the end, weak 
coordination with the regional level, the political limits of a process involving 
several municipalities (in Lecce SP was area-based), and an excessively 
politicised control room (the decision-making body) partly jeopardised the 
implementation phase. Nevertheless SP facilitated the opening of new 
channels between the administration and cultural and civic associations, 
while cooperation with provincial offices was also strengthened. The 
leadership that emerged was thus facilitative.  
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To summarise, different forms of leadership (the independent 
variable) influence the outcomes of SP in terms of formation of the collective 
actor, democratic process, and implementation (the three dimensions of the 
dependent variable). In the two southern cases the leadership needed to 
reinforce its legitimacy with the city at large, hence the incentive to create 
broader constituencies of stakeholders and to open a more inclusive 
participatory process (particularly in Lecce), at least initially. For instance, in 
Lecce a stronger and coordinated leadership was more successful at the 
formation of a collective actor, which ensued from a facilitative approach. It 
was less successful at implementation mainly because of weak coordination 
mechanisms with the regional level (the multilevel governance intervening 
variable examined below) and a lack of local resources. By contrast, Trento 
needed to gain legitimacy vis-à-vis the Province. Here, a strong leadership 
and efficient public services were able to guarantee effective implementation 
of smaller measures (which were mostly already in the pipeline and were 
easily integrated into ordinary administration), but they failed to create that 
collective actor that could have backed a wider vision of development and 
helped to represent it externally to higher levels of government. The lack of 
communication capacity on the part of political elites and the fact that local 
stakeholders did not seem to understand fully the rationale of the process 
and the need for a different institutional interlocutor, other than the 
Province, jeopardised results. 
  
Re-Inventing The Political Space  
Although the participatory process had several shortcomings, as 
analysed above, it had important spillovers, which often depended on how 
associations interacted with the local leadership and the new participatory 
space, whether they perceived them to be inclusive or not, and whether they 
were willing or able to capitalise on the new openings. In the debate of 
leadership vs. pre-existing associational dynamics, these cases demonstrate 
that leadership, when facilitative, and governance mechanisms representing 
institutional openings can stimulate new social capital around specific 
actions. Empirical findings show how levels of participation in the process 
were determined more by the perceived inclusiveness of the leadership and 
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the deliberative arenas than by historical associational dynamics.  Table 7.3 
identifies some typologies. 
 
Table 7.3 ASSOCIATIONAL CONTEXT TYPOLOGIES 
 Cooperative Conflictual 
Strong Exclusive (of less 
structured interests) 
(Trento 
Critical 
(Prato) 
 
Weak Collaborative (with state 
institutions) 
(Lecce) 
Disorganised 
(Sassari) 
 
In Lecce, for instance, the cultural association Manifatture Knos and a group 
of young architects called LUA were able to open important collaborations 
with the local and provincial administration, through the SP and other 
mechanisms of urban governance, such the PIRP (see Chapter 5). Assisted by 
public services and funded by the local and regional government, these 
associations organised a series of participatory events for the redevelopment 
of a neighbourhood, which have so far proved inclusive and effective. 
However, as associations increasingly interact with government and they 
conform to and internalise rules, becoming more professionalised, their 
legitimacy and representation capacity might be weakened (Nicholls 2006). 
 In Prato, a disappointing SP process represented nevertheless an 
important arena where civic and environmental associations with similar 
goals could meet, work together, and increase bargaining power vis-à-vis 
institutions. Whether these initiatives would have developed without the SP 
it is difficult to establish, but opening up a collective process and encouraging 
a reflection on the territory might have triggered new awareness and 
curiosity among smaller associations or, at least, it might have inspired 
renewed enthusiasm to put forward certain ideas that were in the 
backburner. In Trento, the poli sociali (see Chapter 3) have become pivotal in 
involving (and controlling?) the rich social fabric of the city. In those wards 
characterised by deeper social conflicts and where associations struggle to 
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come forward, social and youth workers are helping to create meeting points 
and bring residents together through opening new spaces and encouraging 
bottom-up initiative. In the past few years, many cities like Sassari and Lecce, 
which had seen their cultural capital eroded, have witnessed the 
mushrooming of new cultural associations, despite and perhaps in reaction 
to the crisis, and whose main characteristic is eclecticism. More open 
administrations have facilitated this process, and a new wave of associations, 
albeit outside the logic of the market, seems to indicate the overcoming of the 
distinction between culture and counter-culture.194  
However, the conflict between invited and invented spaces (Cornwall 
2002) is still far from being redundant, particularly in a context where 
politics and its formal institutions are perceived to be lacking legitimacy. In 
Prato, the antithesis between critical and incumbent democracy (Blaug 2002) 
became very real through the struggle of neighbourhood associations against 
the USP top-down participatory process. These groups of residents felt the 
process was neither inclusive nor effective, and their opposition triggered a 
series of unexpected bottom-up initiatives, finally giving way to a new 
participatory forum organised by the associations themselves. They 
questioned the top-down setting of the rules and the agenda, and that 
“democratic engineering” that Habermas (1987) calls “colonisation”, or 
cooptation of the participants. The leader of these associations gradually 
developed into a facilitative leader, who, through his own network of 
contacts and through capitalising on his legitimacy within the community (he 
is the local GP) and interpersonal skills, was able to develop an alternative 
participatory project. During the interview, he explained how the 
associations’ practices developed from adversarial critical campaigning to 
pro-active institutional networking (Bussu and Bartels 2013): 
The idea of the project we are now elaborating with the support of this new 
administration was actually born during the Town Meeting. There [after 
months of adversarial politics and boycotting of participatory meetings] we 
started talking about the structural plan [USP] as citizens, putting forward our 
vision of what the city should look like... When we started putting forward our 
considerations [to the left-wing administration] we only got one answer, “No.” 
They would tell us, “You do your own participatory process then...” The new 
assessore [member of the centre-right executive] for Participation, when I 
proposed our projects to him, said, “I don’t know much about this, but if you 
help me understand, I’ll be happy to look into this.” And I thought this was a 
very good beginning. So we kept putting forward new projects and requests, 
such as a venue where to organise our meetings, which would become the 
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Citizen’s House, and which should have specific features so as to act as an 
interface between the city and the administration. [PR26] 
 
When the new centre-right administration was elected, a political 
opportunity structure (POS) (Tarrow 1994) materialised. Tarrow defines the 
POS as “consistent – but not necessarily formal or permanent – dimensions 
of the political environment that provide incentives for people to undertake 
collective action by affecting their expectations of success or failure.” He 
identifies “the opening up of access to power, shifting alignments, the 
availability of influential allies, and cleavages within and among elites” as the 
main salient changes in the POS (Tarrow 1994:85-6).195 Changes in the POS 
might then affect the capacity of associations to mobilise social capital.196  
Most members of Prato’s neighbourhood associations had strong 
ideological positions and were initially very suspicious of a right-wing 
administration. The leader (PR26) is also a left-wing voter but eventually, 
and through his intermediation with the new government, the project took 
off. The new administration, which had never been in power before, had an 
interest in opening up to civil society to widen its support base and 
compensate for its lack of administrative experience. Thus the 
neighbourhood associations were able to open the Citizen House (La Casa 
del Cittadino) and they collectively elaborated a series of proposals to amend 
the local statute regulating citizen participation. In this case facilitative 
leadership  
emerged out of the neighbourhood associations’ practices of (1) critical 
campaigning to find the space to organise pre-existing social pressure and 
antagonism against the old administration and top down participation that they 
perceived to be non inclusive; (2) taking advantage of the new window of 
opportunity opened by the change of government through institutional 
networking; and (3) structuring themselves into an umbrella association to 
interface with local institutions while formalising citizen participation by 
successfully pressing for changes to the local statute (Bussu and Bartels 2013). 
 
In Trento, as in Prato, neighbourhood movements were able to quickly 
organise and effectively use the local media, attracting greater public 
attention than top-down participatory processes were ever able to do. These 
associations created their own space to exercise their voice, what Fraser 
terms “subaltern counterpublics” (1992), which, as highlighted by 
Mansbridge (2000), become “laboratories of self-interest” that can enable 
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excluded groups to build a politics of engagement and voice their demands. It 
is interesting how Prato’s counterpublics are now engaging with institutions. 
Whether the tension between formalism and procedures and the need for 
substantive outcomes is resolved will depend on whether and how this 
grassroots facilitative leadership continues to develop, but nevertheless the 
case of Prato is telling of the limits of sanitised participation, with rules and 
goals set from above, vis-à-vis the dynamism of bottom-up experiences, 
where mobilisation is around clear and urgent issues. 
 
The Elusive Multilevel Governance 
Multilevel governance, an integral part of the discourse on local 
development (see Chapter 1) continues to represent a major challenge. This 
intervening variable does significantly affect the role of local leadership in 
determining outcomes, as was particularly evident in the two southern cases 
and in Trento. Institutional constraints and weak multilevel governance will 
inevitably compromise integrated strategies and determine the 
fragmentation of local initiatives and projects. Although legislation in the 
past ten years has finally spelt out the division of administrative and 
legislative responsibilities between regional and local levels, regional 
government has often failed to resist the temptation to centralise resources 
and powers. In this respect, the dispute between local and regional tiers has 
not been fully resolved (Segatori 2003).197  
Through the SP process local authorities recognise the need to 
confront the challenges identified at a scale bigger than just municipal level, 
requiring inter-municipal cooperation. SP, through agreements and specific 
protocols, forces local government to overcome a reductive interpretation of 
its role and its autonomy, as in isolation or in conflict vis-à-vis other local 
authorities and higher tiers, or private and social stakeholders. However, 
beyond good intentions, in most cases SP rather than facilitate dialogue 
exacerbated antagonism, fuelling competition over political visibility, 
particularly between local government and the provincial level, with the only 
exception of Lecce. Provincial administrations felt threatened in their 
precarious role as agenda setters in local development. For years the debate 
on the role of the provincial level has animated the discourse on Italian local 
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government and there have been several, mostly demagogic proposals to 
abolish provinces, which generally had to be withdrawn in the face of local 
politicians’ furore.198 Many interests are at stake and discussing the need for 
a provincial level is beyond the scope of this study. In these four cases, 
however, the SP process highlighted overlapping and conflict between 
municipal and provincial administrations. In Trento, Sassari and Prato, the 
provincial level chose to launch its own governance mechanisms, sometimes, 
as in Sassari, in competition with the city’s plan. As the approach and 
methods were different but the scope very similar, this inflation of plans 
created confusion among stakeholders, who struggled to invest human 
resources to take part in all the events and resented the lack of coherence 
between the plans.  
A clear connection between regional/provincial policies and local SPs 
is paramount, and regional-level institutions could have their ideal 
interlocutors in existing local partnerships and networks (Gangemi and Gelli 
2006). Instead Trento’s provincial government, which did not feel the need 
to participate in the elaboration of the SP, had the political and financial 
authority to undermine it. In order to guarantee implementation and 
safeguard the credibility of the local administration, the latter should enjoy 
full administrative competency, decision-making and financial authority over 
the decisions at stake - as in the case of Trento’s successful Social Plan - or be 
able to ensure the involvement of higher tiers in the process to ensure some 
degree of coordination, as happened in Lecce with regard to the provincial 
level. 
Puglia and Sardinia’s regional governments showed an inconsistent 
attitude, on the one hand encouraging strategic and bottom-up planning 
through financial incentives, on the other hand hindering it through a 
centralising approach, as governance aspirations conflicted with 
governmental practices and political interests. Here the naivety of the 
regional administrations, which initially, and perhaps ambitiously, intended 
to assign greater responsibilities to local government, clashed against its own 
lack of coordination capacity and local government’s limited planning 
experience. When the regional administration realised that it was not able to 
coordinate the process in a coherent way through a governance approach, it 
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withdrew into more traditional government practices and the logic of 
political bargaining.  
As examined above, there is an intrinsic conflict in governance 
mechanisms between selectivity and inclusivity, whereby the latter better 
responds to the demand for political consensus, while the former might 
imply a too high political risk. This was particularly evident in Lecce: at the 
local level the control room became a bargaining game between the mayors 
of the area-based plan; at the regional level the progetti stralcio politicised 
the whole process reverting precisely into what, it was claimed, the 
administration wanted to avoid, or the distribution of resources irrespective 
of the quality of projects (finanziamenti a pioggia). 
Tuscany is again a different case; here local government treasures its 
own autonomy. Unlike Sardinia and Trentino, special status Regions that 
enjoy greater powers vis-à-vis central state but also over their local 
authorities, in Tuscany local government is politically very strong and the 
Region has scarce influence over it. This, however, without the required 
policy coordination, can contribute to furthering the fragmentation of local 
SP processes and can jeopardise overall coherence. Prato’s local government 
strongly resented regional interference in its USP and, within an already 
conflictual context, the Region, through the regional Authority 
(Ombudsman), was unable to act as a super partes referee, between the 
associations on war footing and the leadership torn apart by internal 
conflicts.  
 
The Pros And Cons Of Proceduralisation 
One main subdivision within the four cases concerns the aspect of 
incentives, which clearly affect multilevel governance relationships, and in 
particular between the local and the regional level, at times severely denting 
the clout of local leadership. As outlined in Chapter 1 and 2, SP is generally a 
voluntary process initiated by local government; since 2005 it has undergone 
“proceduralisation” and cities in the South of Italy were encouraged to link 
SP to the new EU programme period of structural funds. Whereas in Trento 
and Prato SP was an entirely voluntary experience, on the initiative of a new 
mayor interested in emphasising a shift from his predecessors’ approach, in 
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Sassari and in Lecce SP was also a response to regional calls to invest EU 
funds through participatory planning; thus, there was an external 
solicitation. In Sardinia the SP process was not compulsory and Sassari was 
one of the first cities to accept the challenge of launching this new 
governance mechanism, implying some degree of voluntary initiative. By 
contrast, in Puglia the regional government demanded that local authorities 
organised themselves into agglomerations of municipalities for area-based 
planning (area vasta). It should be emphasised, however, that Lecce 
voluntarily launched its own municipal SP, which was incorporated into the 
area-based plan, and embraced several other governance mechanisms. 
One of the problems that arise from linking the SP to structural funds 
is the pressure to meet EU deadlines. On the one hand, deadlines might be 
useful to focus the discussion and constrain what could turn into a rhetorical 
drift with no substantive conclusion; on the other hand imposing peremptory 
deadlines from above and bending the whole planning process to this effect 
betrays the rationale of the SP, which needs time to reach its maturity and 
build consensus over priorities and a large-scale vision. By enacting strict 
deadlines the risk is to force the process into a different level of planning of 
smaller impact, which can hardly have medium-to long-term effects. 
However, there might be some unexpected spillovers. In Sassari, for instance, 
tight deadlines forced the administrators to organise very innovative events 
within a short period of time to attract public and media attention - the so-
called strategic week. This facilitated the awareness-raising process in a 
context not used to this type of participatory mechanisms and was perhaps 
the most successful aspect of Sassari’s SP. 
Camagni (2010) calls southern SPs “artificial” plans and highlights 
how they are often characterised by a leadership deficit deriving from limited 
awareness, on the part of political elites and other stakeholders, of the need 
for a plan, which becomes just another way of accessing funds. The plan, he 
argues, is no longer a means to respond to certain challenges but an aim in 
itself. The fact that local government in Sassari and Lecce did not need to 
invest its own resources in the elaboration process and that the 
implementation of SP was linked to EU funds might have in fact determined 
both positive and negative consequences. On the one hand, since the 
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resources to elaborate the plan could be easily accessed, administrations had 
nothing to lose in trying, with the risk of lower political awareness. On the 
other hand, the very presence of resources facilitated the opening of the 
process and increased participants’ commitment, enhancing consensus-
building over specific priorities. The existence of available resources can, in 
theory, increase implementation capacity and foster a virtuous process. 
However, in the case of Lecce and Sassari the strategic aspect was often 
penalised by the very nature of the European structural funds, which do not 
lend themselves easily to an integrated approach to planning.  
An SP must be a voluntary process, which identifies opportunities around 
precise choices [or strategic lines], not the opposite, where if there is a call for 
bid then I will invent a project specifically for that. That’s a very old way of 
planning. And if you consider that structural funds have very rigid regulations 
which do not bend to the process of integrated planning it is difficult to think 
that the two mechanisms can combine easily. The Region on the contrary had 
thought about the opposite mechanism, not a plan but rather a programme of 
projects. And this represented a fundamental step backward, where there was 
the expectation that you make the SP to have funds and not that you will 
eventually access funds to sustain the SP. So this was the distortion of the very 
idea of SP. [LE43 - Regional Evaluation Task Force, Officer] 
 
In the end, it will prove difficult to fit this great planning effort within EU 
programming, not only because of insufficient investment in high quality 
integrated projects, but mostly because guaranteeing coherence between the 
SP and the EU programmes could be beyond the administrative capacity of 
Italian local government (Deidda 2010). 
Furthermore, while participation in Lecce, for instance, was easier to 
sustain also because participants felt they could get a slice of the pie, this also 
fostered opportunistic behaviours as stakeholders were interested more in 
accessing funds for their own projects than in a collective vision of 
development. This can generate a coherence deficit (Camagni 2010), with 
plans characterised by high numbers of often self-referential projects that are 
not always integrated into a strategic vision.199  
These are omnivorous plans that lose sight of strategy to emphasise 
instead a sectoral approach. In this respect, regional decisions have 
exacerbated these failings: the Sardinian regional government chose to 
finance individual projects through the PISU200 and the Region of Puglia 
disbursed preliminary funding for projects ready for implementation, the so-
called progetti stralcio.201 This approach further dented attempts to pursue 
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integrated planning. In Lecce, as only few projects could be submitted for the 
first batch of funds, the cabina di regia’s (control room) selection was an 
exercise in compromise to please all the mayors of the area-based plan, once 
again sacrificing strategy. In Sassari, the first few projects submitted for 
funding under the PISU were small social policies projects, some of them 
already implemented or close to full implementation. 
Sassari and Lecce’s mayors denounced that regional decisions might 
have been partly dictated by the old logic of redistribution to accommodate 
all municipalities, particularly those of the same political colour, irrespective 
of whether they had completed their SP and of the overall quality of their 
plan. On the one hand, it is understandable that regional ministers were 
reluctant to distribute available resources only among the municipalities that 
had completed the SP, since these tended to be economically and socially 
stronger areas, whereas weaker territories would have been further 
penalised. On the other hand, changing guidelines and mixed signals from 
the regional tier generated confusion and resentment on the part of local 
government.  
 
Conclusion 
The Quality of Local Democracy 
The literature on the local level (Bagnasco 1999; Magnaghi 2000) 
often looks at local society as the space most conducive to empowering 
citizens, by building planning capacity and local knowledge. The local level, 
as argued by both the literatures on urban governance and deliberative 
democracy, is believed to be the scale at which society can produce a virtuous 
relationship between the sense of “belonging to a territory and responsibility 
for and knowledge of local problems and issues of citizenship and 
participation” (Fedeli 2011:78). However, this virtuous cycle cannot be taken 
for granted. In Massey’s words (1994:6), “the persistent identification of 
place with community” is a misidentification, since communities increasingly 
exist without being in the same place and one place can house many 
communities. Instead places should be understood as “points of intersection” 
or “moments in networks of social relations and understandings” so as to 
have “an extroverted sense of a place” (ibid.:7-8). In fact, as pointed out by 
Crosta (2003), belonging to a territory can no longer be taken for granted as 
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imposed upon the actor, as necessarily linked to his/her usage of it. On the 
contrary, belonging becomes a political choice linked to action. The 
mobilisation of actors inevitably depends on variable factors that can hardly 
be generalised. Czarniawska (2004) suggests referring to “action’s networks” 
rather than actors’ networks, since the actors ensue from the action, as 
evident in the case of Prato’s neighbourhood associations. The SP could have 
represented that “action” around which to build a collective actor but in these 
four cases it fell short of it.  
The quality of Italian local democracy and of its representative venues 
has been put to test by several political and socio-economic dynamics. The 
crisis of legitimacy for political parties means that these no longer act as 
vehicles of political participation and are unable to represent magmatic 
societies, whereby individuals have several different affiliations. Amid 
increasing dissatisfaction with traditional institutions, neighbourhood 
associations continue to mushroom fuelling antagonistic and conflictual 
politics. The latest crisis of national party politics is opening the way to 
several civic lists, which lack fully democratic internal organisation. Local 
societies then have anticipated the challenges that national democracies are 
now facing: the fragmentation of interests and its repercussions on 
democratic institutions. 
The 1990s local reforms have strengthened the local executive and the 
role of mayors, who are now the heads of the local communities, with which 
they enjoy a privileged relationship. Conversely, councillors have been 
divested of much of their previous authority and weakened by recruitment 
practices which, combined with the evanescence of political parties as a space 
of political debate and training, affect their level of administrative 
competence and political awareness.202 On the one hand, recent reforms have 
emphasised the “presidential” role of the mayor, who has acquired 
substantive powers and can now appoint assessori and public services CEOs. 
On the other hand, the practice of governance requires that decision and 
policy-making become a shared process involving all stakeholders and at 
different levels. This dual tendency within local politics, at least in the short 
term, will necessarily undermine the role of the councillors depleting it of 
substantial functions (Segatori 2003). The empirical research has confirmed 
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a destructuring process in terms of the organisational capacity of political 
parties at the local level and their weak leverage on local government through 
the council.203 The latter appears unable to perform its functions of steering 
and scrutiny, the opposition is relegated to a toothless role, and local 
democracy has been deprived of political mechanisms of checks and 
balances;204 one consequence is the worrying budget deficit that several 
cities, like Lecce, are now confronting. The political discourse on local 
government in Italy has long emphasised the importance of strengthening 
decision-making, which has also informed the mayoral reform, in a context 
that had been characterised by unstable governing coalitions and a weak 
decisional capacity. From this political context arises the need for renewed 
and continuous legitimation, beyond the electoral vote, of the mayor’s 
mandate, as citizens demand greater transparency and accountability. 
However, governance mechanisms can represent at best a partial solution, at 
worse a further complication. Representative institutions are failing to 
guarantee local democracy, which cannot solely rely on the mayor and his 
good intentions to guarantee accountability and good governance; thus, it 
might now be time to shift the emphasis to the quality of local democracy. 
These four case studies do not allow, in their complexities, for easy 
generalisations, and the findings cannot simply be applied to different types 
of localities (i.e. larger or metropolitan cities), but they do offer a valid 
example of the shortcomings and potential of SP in very different contexts. 
The governance processes investigated display some common traits which 
can facilitate a comparative understanding of these four stories: the size of 
the cities and the nature of the mechanisms implemented, also in relation 
with more general processes of change in terms of political reforms and 
administrative reorganisation. The comparative analysis has unveiled how 
different forms and resources of leadership explain varying results, as 
outcomes are influenced on three levels: the formation of a collective actor, 
the democratic process (and consequently how the local context responds to 
the new openings), and the implementation phase. The degree to which local 
leadership needed to reinforce its legitimacy explained variance in terms of 
the inclusivity of the process and the incentive for the formation of the 
collective actor. The SP was an ambitious attempt at reconciling fragmented 
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interests and creating a collective actor in order to infuse some legitimacy 
into the representative system, but it was also a means for mayors to 
capitalise on their newfound visibility and to strengthen their own 
programmatic document. The rationale was to create collective incentives 
and constituencies, to legitimise the local leadership and to redefine the scale 
of development.  
There is still a deep chasm between the ideal of collective decision-
making through deliberation and what political elites understand as 
participation. There is still much inexperience and unawareness among the 
local political class on how to manage participatory spaces and how to 
reconcile the latter with traditional mechanisms of representation. In a 
context where the directly-elected mayor can augment his/her visibility 
through these new instruments, which can reinforce his/her legitimacy, their 
political appeal is strong, but often there is poor understanding of how these 
spaces will develop and what impact they will have on the local polity. 
Politicians are now waking up to the realisation that participation is certainly 
not just a tool for consensus building and that it can in fact exacerbate 
conflicts, if it is not perceived to be inclusive enough. In fact, these new 
venues can even augment the distance between the community and the 
administration, if collective decisions are not followed through, as often 
happens, delegitimising the participatory exercise and its initiators.  
By combining different paradigms - the literature on deliberative 
democracy, the literature on urban governance and the literature on planning 
- to carry out the analysis of the empirical phenomenon, this study has 
evidenced the expectations and the results, disclosing direct and indirect 
outcomes of the SP in each case and highlighting the positive effects of 
facilitative leadership. The literature on urban governance has helped to 
understand the dynamics that led to the emergence of SP and the effort to 
build a collective actor, as yet another planning instrument promised to help 
cities to face economic and political challenges, following several and not 
always fortunate experiments with integrated planning. Scholars of 
deliberative democracy offered a valid framework to analyse the process, 
based on criteria such as the effectiveness of communication and publicity, 
the degree of inclusivity, the role of methodologies, and the interdependence 
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of stakeholders. Finally the literature on planning helped to unveil the 
intrinsic contradictions of SP, which struggles to move beyond, and might 
even be less effective than, traditional planning.  Governance arrangements 
continue to clash against short-term political interests, central and local 
limits, a lack of local resources, as well as working practices and 
communication methods still much imbued with a traditional and 
governmental approach.  
Overall, these cases would seem to question theories that overplay the 
role of associational dynamics. This study would seem to disprove Bryson’s 
argument (2004) that SP is particularly necessary where it is unlikely to 
work, since it requires a rich social fabric that the process will further 
enhance (see Chapter 1). Leadership can more convincingly explain the 
success and inclusiveness of the participatory process, which can open new 
channels between associations and the local institutions, as in Lecce. 
Leadership, however, can no longer be solely identified with political 
institutions, as the new governance mechanisms require it to be facilitative. 
Facilitative leadership can emerge from the coordinated work of a political 
sponsor and a public service CEO or a civil society expert that act as the 
champions of the governance process and guarantee its inclusiveness and 
legitimacy; but then it needs to open to other key stakeholders - private, 
social and institutional. If an inclusive process is pivotal to ensure far-
reaching strategies, local efforts, even when concerted and fairly effective, 
can be undermined by weak inter-level coordination, which is a powerful 
intervening variable. As new social and economic challenges are increasingly 
on a metropolitan scale, there is growing awareness of the need to create 
networks across cities and institutional tiers, but multilevel governance 
continues to clash against the centralising tendencies of the regional level, 
particularistic interests, political visibility, and a parochial approach to local 
government.  
 
What future for Strategic Planning? 
After a decade of SP, some questions need to be addressed: is this 
mode of planning useful, or has its time already passed? Theory and 
empirical data indicate that an effective plan would have to combine an open 
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and experimental planning style with some degree of institutionalisation and 
formalisation to safeguard the process against the political cycle and secure 
some continuity. However, are Italian local planning capacity and multilevel 
governance too weak to be able to implement such sophisticated 
mechanisms? SP certainly strengthened administrators’ commitment to 
certain projects and helped them to intercept and systematise long-standing 
project ideas. In cities like Trento, Sassari and Lecce internal offices continue 
to work on augmenting inter-sectoral cooperation and to monitor calls for 
bids and regional and European funds that could help to finance the 
implemention of the plan. Thus, SP, although now distant from the political 
limelight, is still present on some local government officers’ desks. This does 
not translate into the success of the process, whose shortcomings have been 
clearly highlighted, but it should be acknowledged that all these governance 
programmes also serve to build important institutional learning.  
In the cases examined SP was, unavoidably perhaps, deeply tied to, 
and dependent upon, mayors and their political cycle, which inevitably 
weakened its impact, since it is more difficult for the opposition to endorse 
the plan and for the process to continue to enjoy support through changes of 
government. By the same token, political sponsorship of the process is 
initially pivotal, and as responsibilities are dispersed the mayor remains the 
only bridge between traditional institutions and new participatory arenas, 
while guaranteeing that informal decisions can later translate into tangible 
outcomes. The solution to this dilemma might be an inclusive control room, 
not just of political representatives as in Lecce, but gathering representatives 
of private and social interests, of political institutions – including members 
of opposition parties - and public services, at different government levels, so 
as to create a genuine collective actor behind strategic actions. This structure 
should still be agile enough so as to guarantee final decision-making. So 
envisaged, the control room could represent an institutionalisation of 
facilitative leadership and would monitor the implementation of the SP, 
guaranteeing its inclusiveness also during the operational phase. This would 
solve the problem of excessive politicisation of the process and its 
identification with the mayor’s mandate. Greater attention to facilitative 
leadership and to the conditions that can foster it is required in both research 
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and practice, as a process that can promote dialogue and collaboration on 
local affordances and constraints (Bussu and Bartels, forthcoming).  
The novelty of the SP and the absence of adequate institutionalisation 
that could secure continuity clearly affected its incisiveness. Out of the four 
cases, only Trento effectively institutionalised SP, by amending the local 
statute so that planning now has to be strategic and participatory by law.205 
However, proceduralisation also poses some dilemmas, as on the one hand it 
could be excessively rigid and constrain the experimental nature of SP; on the 
other hand, it might not be enough to safeguard the process against the 
erratic developments of political cycles, as institutionalisation runs the risk of 
transforming governance processes into yet another layer of bureaucracy.  
As invited spaces tend to set the agenda and the rules from above, the 
democratic intent of these participatory exercises is diminished and 
mobilisation will be harder to sustain. Opening up a more substantive 
dialogue with invented spaces could be more fruitful. Further research is 
therefore needed on how to capitalise on new bottom-up initiatives and open 
channels between them and local institutions.  
Overall SP has not moved beyond traditional planning. In these four 
cases the few projects implemented were long-standing project ideas and 
would have most likely happened without the SP. Compared to traditional 
planning, SP would appear to be weaker in producing exhaustive and highly 
technical analyses. SP might actually prove to be an oxymoron; planning 
inherently tends to preserve categories rather than rearranging them and for 
this it works best when broad strategies already exist, rather than when 
strategic change is required (Mintzberg 1994).  Change that is planned 
formally is hardly creative but rather incremental, generic, and oriented to 
the short term (ibid.). Furthermore the conflict intrinsic to SP between 
centralised synthesis and decentralised initiative risks turning participation 
into a mere gathering of inputs, discouraging stakeholders’ commitment. 
Perhaps if the rationale is the formation of a collective actor and fostering 
commitment is crucial, planning should be put aside, while coalition building 
around either concrete actions or, more ambitiously, new values might be 
more beneficial.  
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The face of local democracy has greatly changed over the past few 
decades. The challenge raised by governance and the practice of deliberative 
democracy is certainly triggering a wider reflexion on the way we understand 
local government and on the role of traditional political institutions. New 
interactive policymaking (Hajer 2003) plays and will continue to play an 
ever important role in the network society, not merely to prevent conflict and 
build consensus but to renew and redefine democracy, by enhancing the 
capacity of actors to communicate and interact in an effective manner. 
However, the cases presented here are yet another testament to the fact that 
governance mechanisms are not inherently good or bad and their impact on 
the local polity cannot be taken for granted. They should be seen as 
structures generating a context of opportunities and constraints, where 
facilitative leadership will be instrumental in fostering dialogue and 
sustaining the community’s focus on the collaborative process. 
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NOTES 
                                                 
1 The acronym SP will refer both to Strategic Planning (as a process) and the Strategic Plan; 
in case of the latter the article will be used (i.e. the SP). 
2 The need for more integrated understanding of local development, based on vertical and 
horizontal multilevel governance, is also reflected in the choice of many municipalities to 
link their Strategic Plan to an area-based plan that covers the entire metropolitan area.  
3 Trento is an autonomous Province; Sardinia is a special status Region; Tuscany and Puglia 
are both ordinary status Regions, but in Tuscany local government has always enjoyed 
greater autonomy and bargaining power vis-à-vis the regional tier. 
4 The evidence on the effects of decentralisation, in terms of citizen satisfaction, democratic 
accountability or service delivery efficiency, remains highly contested (Devas and Delay 
2006), yet most scholars and policy-makers agree that local policies and services that 
directly affect people’s lives should be delivered at the lowest jurisdictional level, following 
the principle of subsidiarity. Conventionally scholars distinguish between deconcentration, 
or the administrative decentralisation of services to local authorities, and devolution, or 
political decentralisation to locally elected bodies with some degree of financial autonomy, 
through own revenue sources, and decision-making power on certain policies (Devas and 
Delay 2006). However decentralisation is hardly that clear-cut and often deconcentration 
and devolution processes coexist within the same country (i.e. the UK), sometimes leading to 
tensions between the two (ibid.). 
5 Some scholars understand Western European decentralisation reforms as a response to 
local demands for greater democratic control and autonomy and a recognition on the part of 
the central state of regional aspirations, such as in Belgium, Scotland, Spain and Italy (Devas 
and Delay 2006). However, Hooghe and Marks (2001) argue that at least part of the 
rationale behind decentralisation is central government’s interest in diffusing 
responsibilities on particularly unpopular or difficult policies, such as the management of 
schools or the healthcare system. As power over several policy areas is diffused upward to 
supranational decision-making bodies, such as the EU, downward, through a 
decentralisation process, and outward to the private market and the third sector (Leonardi 
and Nanetti 2007), the need for new forms of governance represents a reaction to the 
challenge of an overall redefinition of the state and its functions. 
6 The “new regionalism” (Keating 1998), however, should not be understood as a 
homogenous phenomenon, since “[t]he effects of economic change are powerfully mediated 
by culture, by institutions, and by politics.” (Keating 2001:375). 
7 URBAN aims at revitalising socially and economically depressed areas and at renewing 
decision-making processes by promoting the involvement of local communities; like other 
EU programmes, URBAN is fostering a network of cities through the dissemination of rules 
and norms to access funds, in a classic case of hybridisation of different urban policy 
traditions (Le Galès 2002; Atkinson 2001). 
8 On cross-national learning and institutional reform, specifically in relation to 
telecommunications, Thatcher (2004:774) argues that, “the analysis of internationalization 
should include not only economic globalization but also overseas reforms and supranational 
regulation. Not only can these different forms of internationalization influence domestic 
politics, but they may combine to produce powerful pressures for institutional reform.” 
9 Under the principle of subsidiarity legislation and implementation of national and global 
policies should be devolved, wherever possible, to the local level (Scholte 2005). Article 5 of 
TEC refers to the exercise of shared competencies, whereby the European level will exert 
certain political and administrative functions only when they cannot be achieved by member 
states individually and when an action by the EU can guarantee greater efficiency (see 
D’Agnolo 1998). 
10 Already in the mid-1980s the Council of Europe had institutionalised local autonomy 
through the “European Charter on Local Autonomy”, following which local autonomy has 
become a shared value among European states. 
11 Even a highly centralised state like the UK, having granted devolution to regions which 
traditionally displayed aspirations to autonomy, such as Scotland and Wales, has introduced 
regional ministers allegedly “to provide a clear sense of strategic direction for the nine 
English regions and to help strengthen their links with central government” (http://www.go-
se.gov.uk/ournetwork/675481/), although their role has been questioned by many observers. 
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12 The stated objectives of the EU cohesion policy are: to reduce the gap between poor and 
rich regions; to enhance employment and social inclusion, by reducing social inequalities. 
However, the broader goal might be to move towards higher forms of integration. 
13 When studying network governance in European networks of regulatory agencies, Cohen 
and Thatcher (2008:67) find that the impact on decision-making is much less incisive than 
expected, as these networks “do not bind together sectoral actors from private and public 
sectors: although ERNs are required to consult private actors, those actors are not full 
members. […]There is little sign of a major shift in the allocation of formal powers in 
regulation.” 
14 The EU has produced several papers that contribute to the debate on multilevel 
governance. Already by the late 1990s, a few papers, such as Towards an urban agenda in 
the European Union (EC 1997) and Sustainable urban development in the European Union: 
a framework for action (EC 1998), mentioned vertical integration of governmental actions 
and partnerships, and stated the need to encourage citizen participation. In 2001, the white 
paper on European Governance describes the levels of responsibilities and competences that 
will engender successful European governance, and it reiterates the need to make the 
European governance system more citizen-oriented. 
15 Hooghe and Marks (2003:241) identify two types (I and II) of governance: Type I “bundles 
competencies in jurisdictions at a limited number of territorial levels, […] which are 
mutually exclusive at each territorial level, and the units at each level are perfectly nested 
within those at the next higher level”. Type I thus reflects a simple design principle on which 
federalism is based. Type II splices “public good provision into a large number of 
functionally discrete jurisdictions […] which are task-driven. Hence the same individual may 
be part of several overlapping and intersecting jurisdictions” (ibid.). 
16 As multilevel governance entails the participation of institutions at different jurisdictional 
levels and partners from civil society as equals, the literature asks whether the dispersion of 
power challenges the Westphalian state. While some scholars understand multilevel 
governance as an alternative to hierarchical government, others believe that policy networks 
are contained within governmental institutions (Peters and Pierre 2000; Rhodes 2000). 
17 The definition of “familistic regime” derives from the fact that in Southern European cities 
the lack of welfare arrangements, in a context of high unemployment, places considerable 
pressure on families, which act as safety nets (Morlicchio 2005). Within the familistic 
regime, weaker state initiatives and the legacy of clientelism, in a context of reduced 
transfers from the centre, give rise to a very fragmented landscape in terms of urban modes 
of governance, ranging from particularistic and clientelistic partnerships to highly 
empowering participatory experiments (Kazepov 2005).  
18 However, this literature often underplays “the importance of externally imposed structures 
that predispose local actors to particular forms of behaviour” and the influence of 
government and external investors (Harding 1997:294). Peterson (1981) argued that policy 
makers pursue their policy objectives and urban development top-down. His argument is an 
extension of public choice theory, whereby economic strength becomes the most important 
goal. As individuals are self-interested, they seek the best tax-to-service ratio and can move 
to more competitive cities/ regions that meet their preferences. Cities will thus discourage 
population mobility by strengthening the local economy. Peterson’s analysis has been 
questioned by many scholars, since economic self-interest cannot explain urban politics by 
itself, as the latter is influenced by interest groups, regime structures and intergovernmental 
policies (Clark and Ferguson 1983; Stone 1989; Waste 1989; Wong 1990). Furthermore, as 
analysed in this chapter, devolution and globalization have opened economic development to 
include a wide variety of public, private, and third sector stakeholders (Basolo and Huang 
2001). 
19 Europe is characterised by a dense network of medium-sized cities, which developed 
during the Middle Ages around a central place that still gathers the political and citizenry 
symbols (Bagnasco and Le Galès 2000), whereas US cities have a grid structure that 
develops around business districts, with a tendency towards suburbanisation (Kazepov 
2005). 
20 This neo-localism is defined by Bagnasco and Trigilia (1993:95) as “a particular division of 
labour between the market, the social structures and, increasingly, the political structures, a 
division which allows a high degree of flexibility in the economy and rapid adjustment to 
market variations, but also a redistribution of social costs and real benefits from 
development within the local society”. 
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21 “Key elements are […] the scope and organisation of actors involved in the making of a 
mode of governance; the degree of institutionalisation of collective action and conflict-
resolution mechanism; the combination of political, social, and market forms of regulation; 
the strength and the stability of mechanisms to aggregate and represent interests” (Le Galès 
2002:270). The degree of fragmentation or integration of groups is not stable and remains 
subject to issues of competition, control, power relations, conflict, and leadership (ibid.). 
22 This framework will guide the analysis of each case study. 
23 The role of experts is still important, but rather than pre-empting citizen input, they act as 
facilitators during popular deliberative decision-making and they bridge the gap between 
professional and citizen insights. 
24 Tarrow’s (1994) Political Opportunity Structure (POS) can offer a useful framework of 
analysis to explain different levels of associationism and social capacity, in a new-
institutionalist perspective that takes account of political and institutional factors for the 
formation of social capital, rather than relying on a culturalist, path-dependent explanatory 
framework (see Putnam 1993). For Putnam volunteer associations appear to be the main 
locus of social capital, while the role of employment, family or education, let alone 
institutional design and political agency, is entirely neglected (for a critical analysis of 
Putnam’s work, see Pasquino 1994; Levi 1996; Tarrow 1996). 
25 Ostrom (1990) argued against conventional solutions that typically involve either 
centralised governmental regulation or privatization of resources. By contrast she found that 
resource users are best placed to manage their public goods. She suggests the design of 
durable cooperative institutions organized and governed by the resource users themselves. 
26 These function as spaces of regroupment or withdrawal, but also as training spaces to 
build political awareness and scale up the agitation to wider groups.  
27 The categories of invited and invented spaces will be helpful in analysing the case studies 
of this work, particularly Prato’s participatory process. 
28 Crosta (2006) proposes the image of the everyday maker, or the citizens that take part in 
the policy process as it offers them the opportunity to put forward their own daily actions, 
whereby daily life can be treated as policies. 
29 The willingness to introduce market innovations in the public sector, following the 
neoliberal doctrine, has been perceived by many observers as the rationale underpinning the 
argument for a more opened policy-making process. However arguments against the 
neoliberal rolling back of the state and certain partnerships (generally where private 
interests are the dominant actors) do not preclude support for participatory democracy, 
when the latter is understood in terms of empowerment of stakeholders and marginalised 
sectors of society, rather than just as an instrument to augment administrative efficiency.  
30 According to Lipset (1984) a democratic electoral regime is legitimate when a large 
proportion of the population vote, thus as voting turnout and engagement in political parties 
continue to decline, liberal democracy also faces important legitimacy issues. 
31 Arnstein’s (1969) ladder of citizen participation identifies three main tiers of 
participation: nonparticipation includes processes that are deemed as informative, but give 
citizens no say over policies and are just a way for officials to advertise their policy decisions; 
tokenism refers to processes where participants have a voice, but decision-making is 
retained by the governing authority; finally citizen participation describes processes where 
citizens become partners in policy-making and have semi or fully delegated decision-making 
authority. 
32 The translation is mine. 
33 Formez PA (Public Administration) is a centre offering training, consultancies, and 
services to promote innovation within public services. It works on a national level and is part 
of the Department of Public Function of the President of the Council of Ministers 
(Dipartimento della Funzione Pubblica della Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri). See 
http://www.formez.it/chi_siamo.html 
34 The Contrat de Ville, similar to the Italian negotiated planning, is an instrument that uses 
contracts to speed up and coordinate transfers from several different ministries towards a 
particular urban area, in order to elaborate an agreed strategy of development with local 
authorities and based on local projects (Perulli 2010). 
35 Friedmann noted “The conventional concept of planning is so deeply linked to the 
Euclidean mode that it is tempting to argue that if the traditional model has to go, then the 
very idea of planning must be abandoned. The only way around this dilemma – either Euclid 
or nothing – would be to define planning independently and distinct from the engineering 
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sciences, which were its original inspiration. Such a definition involves the linking of 
knowledge to action: planning is that professional practice that specifically seeks to connect 
forms of knowledge with form of action in the public domain. Although fairly abstract, this 
definition... allows us to think of a non-Euclidean model of planning.” (Friedmann 1993). 
36 In January 1990 central government (Andreotti VII) proposed a motion of confidence to 
ensure that electoral rules were not included in the bill (Di Virgilio 2005). 
37 Since 1999 mayors can run for a third consecutive term, if one of the preceding two terms 
lasts less than two and a half years, for reasons other than voluntary resignation. Initially the 
law prescribed a term to be four years long, but in 2000 terms were extended to five years. 
Some scholars and practitioners argue that term limits should abolished, in order to 
guarantee greater continuity and accountability (see Agosta 1999; Bianco 2003; Caciagli 
2005; Newell 2007). 
38 In municipalities with over 5000 people, the mayor is elected through runoff voting: if no 
candidate wins 50 percent of the votes in the first round, all but the two most voted 
candidates are eliminated and a runoff voting occurs, two weeks later. Every mayoral 
candidate is linked to one or more lists of council candidates. 60 percent of seats are linked 
to the winning mayor (unless a different list has won 50 percent of the votes, in which case 
there is no majority premium the mayor’s lists). Citizens can express one preference for a 
council candidate. Since 2013 national elections for the first time voters in municipalities 
over 5000 people can express two preferences, provided the second preference is for a 
council candidate of different gender from the first preference. 
39 When a councillor is appointed assessore, she/he has to resign her/his council seat. 
40 In December 2005, central government (Berlusconi II) passed a highly controversial 
electoral law for national elections, which re-introduced a proportional system, but with a 
majority premium and closed party lists. 
41 The reforms interpret the 1990s renewed enthusiasm in institutions and the belief that 
they can shape political preferences, engendering interdependence between relatively 
autonomous social and political institutions (March and Olsen 1984).  
42 Notable examples of professional politicians who were capable of rebranding themselves 
as innovative mayors are Antonio Bassolino in Naples, Leoluca Orlando in Palermo or 
Francesco Rutelli in Rome. However, political newcomers such as Massimo Cacciari in 
Venice also enjoyed durable success. 
43 In his work on the relationship between central and local government, Tarrow (1977) 
compared the cases of Italy and France. In France, central transfers were allocated according 
to bureaucratic criteria, hence a communist mayor would received her share of subsidies 
from a conservative national administration, just through filling out the forms correctly. 
Conversely, prior to the reforms, Italian local government would only access central 
government funding through political influence. 
44 Several mayors, especially in the South, were actually nostalgic for direct transfers from 
the centre or against privatisation of utilities – since connected administrative appointments 
constituted political weapons and resources – while others, particularly in the North, showed 
a clear inclination towards federalism and fiscal autonomy (Pasotti 2007). 
45 Already law 59/1997 had designed the devolutionary process, by planning devolution of 
new functions and responsibilities to Regions and local authorities. It also aimed to reform 
public services. This was a legge delega, or delegated legislation, whereby the power to 
legislate on a particular matter is delegated by Parliament to the Executive. 
46 This process is proving fairly slow. The autonomous province of Trentino’s electoral law 
for the provincial council was passed in 2003, whereby both the council and the President 
are directly elected with a proportional system and a premium for the winning coalition. 
Puglia finally approved its regional electoral law in 2005. The regional council of Sardinia 
approved a new statutory law in March 2007 and a confirmative referendum was held in 
October 2007.  
47 Special statute regions are expected to adjust their statute to the new constitutional 
reforms, but this process is proving painfully slow. However, in the meantime, there exists a 
clause of “greater favour” (maggior favore), under art 10, which preserves special statute 
regions’ specificities and ensures they are automatically recognised the same level of 
autonomy now granted to ordinary regions, where this is greater than what provided for by 
their special statute. Furthermore, in view of federalist plans, many argue that special statute 
regions might become redundant, as attested to by a recent dispute between the autonomous 
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province of Trento and the regional government of Sardinia and central government 
regarding financial transfers currently on hold (Tessari 2009). 
48 However, to date only Lombardy and Veneto have discussed a bill and no law has been 
promulgated. 
49 This is a legge delega on fiscal federalism, which will enact art.119 of the Constitution. The 
main element of the new bill is the levelling of local taxes and transfers to regions based on 
standard costs of services (the most virtuous regions will be used as a frame of reference), 
rather than historical levels of regional expenditure, which would tend to foster waste and 
corruption. However implementation presents several difficulties, as the Senate of the 
Regions has not been established yet. Furthermore, as noted by the Court of Auditors (Corte 
dei Conti) the financial situation of local authorities and their effective requirements are yet 
to be examined; there is the issue of central government interference on several key 
elements, such as the nature of services and the definition of new taxes, which conflicts with 
Title V. The implementation of leggi delega is generally long and confused. Most 
problematic is the issue of public debt, which has grown steadily to finance local authorities; 
as resources are devolved to local authorities the burden of the debt is off-loaded on regional 
government (Uckmar 2009).  
50 ICI (property tax) used to represent the main income for many Italian municipalities; in 
April 2008 the newly elected right-wing government (Berlusconi III) cancelled ICI on first 
properties. This severely penalised local authorities, as the promised central funds to offset 
the steep reduction in local resources following the new bill were not disbursed. Moreover, 
substituting a tax with central transfers clearly contradicts the devolutionary aims of 
previous reforms. The Monti government recently introduced a new tax, called IMU 
(Imposta Municipale Unica – One Municipal Tax), which replaces both the tax on land for 
the second home and the old ICI. Each local authority can apply its own IMU’s tax rate, by 
increasing or lowering the standard rate. 
51 The intervention by the central government on fiscal issues undermines local autonomy. 
The reduction of the tax on labour, for instance, has affected IRAP, the regional business tax 
(Bordignon and Turati 2008). The 2007 Internal Stability Pact and Health Pact often simply 
off-loads the burden of financial adjustment on local authorities, resulting in an increase in 
local taxes rather than a reduction of expenditures (ibid.). However, there are signs of 
progress, as virtuous local government can now use surplus to finance investment, 
introducing greater dynamism in local revenue regimes. 
52 In the first round of local elections following the reform, political parties represented only 
2/5 of all the lists (Di Virgilio 2005). 
53 The biggest challenge to mayors will mostly come from their own majority, as the reform 
ensures the predominance of the giunta over the council. 
54 On how parties operate at one or more sub-national levels, see Hopkin (2008) and Hopkin 
and Pieter van Houten (2009). 
55 The councillors’ loose relationship with their party could reinforce their responsiveness to 
their constituency, what Newton (1976) defined as the parochial councillor, whose main 
concerns are the problems of his/her ward level electorate; or what Copus (2004) terms the 
councillor’s ‘pastoral role’. (Newton (1976) identifies four other types of councillors: the 
people’s agent, who perceives herself as a representative of the whole council area, as well as 
her ward; the policy advocate; the policy broker, who sees herself as an arbitrator of policy 
matters; and the policy spokesman, who keeps a broader perspective in her relationship with 
her constituents.) Since day-to-day administration now rests with managers and the cabinet, 
whereas the reforms push the council towards a role of “scrutiniser” (Berg and Rao 2005), it 
might be difficult for councillors to cultivate a direct relationship with their ward, beyond 
personal favours. 
56 It should be emphasised that Italian local political elites, even in the previous system, 
never showed good planning capacity. However, councillors interviewed generally felt that 
previous political elites had access to some degree of training through party schools, while 
the multiple preference system would foster more selective candidate lists. Interviewees 
often stressed that the absence of structured political parties and the type of political 
recruitment encouraged by the single preference are at the origin of what many perceive as a 
deterioration of local political elites. 
57 PR stands for Prato, TR for Trento, SS for Sassari, and LE for Lecce. 
58 As examined in Chapter 7, empirical findings demonstrate the fallacy of the separation 
between politics and the bureaucracy, as coordinated work between political leaders and 
251 
 
                                                                                                                                          
public service CEOs is pivotal to ensure inclusive and effective governance mechanisms. 
59 In several cities, particularly in the South of the country,  the real estate and the building 
sector, the so-called blocco edilizio, colluded with local political actors and exerted great 
influence, also because they were the only actors capable of addressing the problem of lack of 
housing and infrastructure , albeit operating outside the legal framework (Pinson 2007) 
60 These governance policies have been encouraged by the EU through the 2000-2006 
structural funds, with programmes such as Interreg and URBAN I and II, and they represent 
an integral part of the guidelines for the 2007-2013 structural funds. 
61 Clearly many factors contributed to the rise of successful industrial districts, such as local 
political subcultures and local actors (Burroni 2005; Trigilia 1989).  
62 Although contemplated by the 1948 Constitution ordinary statute regions were only 
introduced during the early 1070s. The five special statute regions had already been 
established in 1948.  
63 Area contracts have the objective to create local development and employment through 
implementing innovative business strategies, in a context of greater flexibility, through 
favourable credit terms (Salis et al 2006). 
64 In 1990, a law (142/1990) was passed which established programme agreements (accordi 
di programma); although it only contemplated a role for public administrations, and not for 
all stakeholders, it acknowledged the need for inter-institutional integration (Bobbio 2004). 
Since then things have evolved rapidly with new bills on local development (i.e. territorial 
pacts), urban policies (i.e. neighbourhood contracts, law 662/1996 and 21/2001) and the 
environment. Law 22/1997 on waste management, for instance, is based on seven types of 
“programme agreements”. Interestingly, the most important inclusive process for 
environmental policies, Agenda 21, is based on European and international laws, but is not 
reinforced by national laws.  
65 The translation is mine. This Act is linked to the 1997 Budget law, n. 663, of 23rd 
December 1996.  
66 Putnam fails to explain why civic cooperation appears to be strongest in the Po Valley 
region, where mass parties, Socialist and Catholic, rooted themselves during the late 
nineteenth century. This was a deliberate strategy on the part of Socialist and Catholic 
parties and helped to create “just the kind of secondary associations that make up Putnam’s 
measures of civic capacity” (Tarrow 1996:394). The difference in performance between 
North and South seem to depend on political rather than cultural or associational 
explanations (see Pasquino 1994). 
67 Real estate interests are notoriously strong in Italy, often linked to local elites through 
clientelistic channels (see Chubb 1982). Political leaders may also build clientelistic ties with 
citizen associations and social movements, although alliances based on clientelism are 
unlikely to produce empowerment.  
68 Selznick introduces a distinction between organization and institution. Institutions are 
presented as the evolution of organizations, as the latter become less instrumental and more 
infused with values. 
69 “The collusive lie in all of this is the pretense that the normative pattern is the reality, and 
the pragmatic departures are temporary deviations” (Bayley 2001). 
70 In public administration and public management, facilitative leadership is a common 
variable in models that aim at explaining collaborative behaviour within public 
organisations, cross-sector partnerships, and network governance (Luke 1998; Linden 2010; 
Sullivan and Skelcher 2002; McGuire 2006; Ansell and Gash 2007). 
71 “Empirical research has identified several best practices by which facilitative leadership 
can engage people in constructive participatory processes (see Crosby and Bryson, 2005; 
Linden, 2010; and Williams, 2002 in table 1). By profiling successful facilitative leaders, a 
close connection has been established between their practices and personalities (see Morse, 
2010 in table 1). Particular attention has also been given to the micro-politics and 
communicative acts through which planners, mediators, and facilitators resolve policy 
disputes (Susskind, 1999; Susskind and Crushank, 2006; Forester, 1999, 2009; Escobar, 
2012)” (Bussu and Bartels 2013). 
72 “In this respect, facilitative leadership is closely linked to the interdependence of 
stakeholders (Ansell and Gash, 2007). Participants who have strong stakes in the issue at 
hand and perceive the participatory venue to be a substantive decision-making arena (or do 
not have access to alternative and more effective channels) will be more willing to commit to 
the process and take a lead. In turn, facilitative leadership will further strengthen 
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participants’ commitment and (awareness of their) interdependence by sustaining an 
inclusive political space and fostering common objectives” (Bussu and Bartels 2013). 
73 In all cases new offices (the SP office or its successor) were established to foster greater 
cross-sector cooperation and coordinate applications to calls for bids at the regional, 
national and EU levels. 
74 As the number of interdependencies among different levels of government is growing, this 
second dimension becomes all the more important (Le Galès 2002). 
75 Associations are often used to engaging with institutions through pressure actions for 
short-term gains (Grindle 2007). 
76 This method has not received much attention, but it represents a mixture of the most 
similar and most different analysis, or J.S Mills’s joint method of agreement and difference 
(Seawright and Gerring 2008). 
77 This is an indicator of leadership strength vis-à-vis the party structure. 
78 Pragmatic and logistical issues also affected case selection (see Gerring 2007). 
79 Putnam’s study was based on indicators such as low voting turnouts, participation in 
referenda, circulation of newspapers and number of sport and cultural associations; Cartocci 
used circulation of newspapers, electoral participation, blood donation rate, membership in 
sport associations. Sabatini prefers the indicators employed by ISTAT surveys (data collected 
between 1998 and 2002), based on five main dimensions: family bonds (bonding networks), 
informal relationships (friends and acquaintances) and volunteer organisations (bridging 
networks), active political participation and civic conscience. 
80 Trento, after adopting its first SP in 2000, has already launched its second one; Prato 
introduced SP in 2004, Lecce in 2005, and Sassari in 2006. 
81 A regional department on citizen participation has also been established. 
82 Although cases were selected so as to test specific theoretical hypotheses, other factors will 
appear that might show significant influence; thus new hypotheses might be generated 
(Gerring 2007; Seawright and Gerring 2008). 
83 A list of all participants in the SP process has been issued by each local administration and 
published on the dedicated website. 
84 Trento: city of opportunities. This title encapsulates the vision of Trento’s SP which is 
interpreted by former mayor Pacher’s words in December 2000, when the protocols of 
agreements had just been signed: “The city of Trento intends to look at its future with a 
strong anticipatory capacity […], first and foremost with regard to the awareness that a 
development cycle based on a strong welfare model and public investment is coming to an 
end. But also with regard to the understanding that the capacity to develop strictly depends 
on [the capacity of] a city and a territory to generate value” (cited in Detassis and Penasa 
2005:26; the translation is mine). 
85 In fact, under the terms of its special status, Trentino-Alto Adige enjoys a positive balance 
of transfers, as it receives from central state 1.719 euro per person more than what it pays in 
taxes (http://www.cgiamestre.com/). 
86 Fieldwork in Trento was carried out between January and February 2010. 
87 Trentino-Alto Adige’s special status had been promulgated in 1948, following the 1946 
agreement between Prime Minister Alcide De Gasperi, originally from Trento, and the 
Austrian Home Secretary, Gruber. 
88 The 1992 Act 266 prevents national laws from having direct effect in the Region, allowing 
the two Provinces the time to enact them. 
89 It should be pointed out that the phenomenon of voluntary associationism has been 
subject to a deep transformation, from several social networks of catholic and secular 
associations to smaller groups where specific cultural identities and interest representation 
are prevalent (see also Losito 1997). 
90 Available at http://www.laboratoriourbano.tn.it/pianostrategico/  
91 A new plan on mobility and one on tourism policies were recently approved by council. 
92 See Trento’s Strategic Plan, available at  
http://www.laboratoriourbano.tn.it/pianostrategico/ 
93 One ad hoc role as Head of Strategic Planning was created to ensure coordination of the 
whole process; this figure was supported by the director of the Local Development 
Department, which had already promoted the 1999 forum. 
94 Three scholarships were awarded by the City Council to postgraduate students from the 
local University to support the organisation of the SP and to carry out research and analysis 
of the outcomes. 
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95 The Council of Trent (Latin: Concilium Tridentinum) was the 16th-century Ecumenical 
Council of the Roman Catholic Church. It is considered to be one of the Church's most 
important councils. 
96 2/3 of the 73 measures listed in the final plan were implemented within a few years since 
ratification by the council.  
97 The old website TrentoFutura has recently been removed while the rich documentation on 
the SP published online can now be accessed through the dedicated website of the local 
urban centre CasaCittà http://www.laboratoriourbano.tn.it/pianostrategico/. This would 
seem to indicate less emphasis on the SP process, as the few channels that had been put in 
place to foster participation and communication with the community at large have now been 
closed. 
98 In 1998 the city council had approved the adoption of the change to the Town Plan (122/31 
July 1998) and the redevelopment of the area. During those years the PRUSST (Programmes 
of Urban Regeneration and Sustainable Development) was also adopted and represented an 
important instrument to reflect on urban transformations. The PRUSST programme was 
introduced by ministerial decree in 1998. These are programmes of urban regeneration and 
sustainable development promoted by the Ministry of Public Works. These programmes are 
intended to fund infrastructural projects for the regeneration of the economic, productive 
and employment system of a locality, also through environmental redevelopment projects 
and the regeneration of the local social fabric. 
99 The ex-Michelin area is being transformed into a residential area with a series of cultural 
and touristic structures. 
100 Abstention under the council statute equates to voting against. 
101 The Province has however devolved several competencies to 16 new districts (the 
Comunità di Valle) instituted with the provincial bill of 16 June 2006 (n.3). The new 
competencies concern: Primary Education; Social Services; Public Housing; Urban Planning 
(except for planning at the provincial level and all national, regional and provincial 
competencies); Economic planning (http://www.comunitavalle.provincia.tn.it/normativa/). 
102 The leader of the association and her husband run their own studio of architecture. 
103 Key individuals only become “champions” of a participatory project if they have a 
“sponsor” who gives political backing to their often unconventional practices (Hendriks and 
Tops, 2005). How to obtain and keep such a sponsor is a matter of context-specific activities. 
104 See Chapter 1 for a discussion on critical and incumbent democracy. 
105 Fieldwork in Prato was carried out between May and June 2010. 
106 Available at www.pratoagenda.it. 
107 Prato still produces 27 percent of all Italian textiles. However, according to Unioncamere 
(the Italian union of all chambers of commerce), in 2001 Prato was 16th in Italy in terms of 
per capita GDP, but in 2010 it was 44th, losing 28 positions within 9 years; by far the worst 
performance in the country (Trento is 12th; Sassari 76th, and Lecce 94th). 
(http://www.go.camcom.gov.it/allegati/pdf/statistica/valore-aggiunto.pdf). 
108 Out of 7000 enterprises, half are owned by Chinese. The rate of registration turnover at 
the Chamber of Commerce is 60 percent. This means that every year six out of ten 
businesses close and six new are opened, always the same ones but with a different name 
(Corriere della Sera 06-11-2010). This also explains the discovery that a money transfer 
company in via Pistoiese in 18 months transferred to China about €550 million through 
60,000 operations of under €12, 500 (Pieraccini 2010). 
109 At the end of his mayoral term Romagnoli went back to his post at the regional 
government. 
110 It should be noted that the antagonism between Florence and Prato dates back several 
centuries, as the latter has long been trying to emancipate itself from the perception of being 
just a suburb of the former. Prato was in fact bought by Florence from Naples’ Angioini six 
centuries ago, for 17,000 florins and long treated as a colony to exploit. 
111 Data from Prato’s Chamber of Commerce confirm that the output of textile industry fell by 
5.2 percent in 2009, whereas the clothing industry grew by +10.6 percent in the same year. 
112 Such ambitions, albeit laudable, are perhaps naive, since Prato would be competing with 
one of the world capitals of art, Florence, only a few kilometres away. In this respect the 
vision of the plan shows some weaknesses in framing the competitive advantage of the 
territory. 
113 The SP process’ overall cost was €1m and 200,000 (La Nazione 4-11-2005). 
114 This was a project financed by the EU and involving Tuscany and three other European 
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regions, West Midlands, Vastra Gotaland, and Saxony. The project aimed at equipping 
traditional industrial districts with the technology and know-how to face de-industrialisation 
processes, investing in logistics and services to enterprises (www.intoscana.it; Il Tirreno 05-
11-2005). 
115 The project's specific objectives are: 
• to identify, share and exploit the partners' T&A knowledge-base of productive know-
how and creative heritage as a driver for innovation and inspiration source for the 
production of new high added-value and environmental friendly T&A products; 
• to create a transnational cluster combining the partners economic, technological, 
and creative resources in order to integrate R&D, fashion and design know-how in 
the productive chain, to support the interaction between emerging designers, textile 
museums, training and research centres and T&A SMEs, and to facilitate the 
creation of new enterprises in the T&A sector.” (http://www.texmedin.eu/)  
116 The first agreement protocol was signed in 2005  
(http://www.regione.toscana.it/regione/multimedia/RT/documents/2011/02/24/212eac6f4
24c10493ae148a87c710085_docprogterrparco21febbraio2011carteqcbassarisoluzione.pdf). 
The rationale of the project is to develop a series of policies to enhance the cultural identity 
of the territory, protect the environment, and encourage its economic potential in a 
sustainable way (i.e. local small-scale farming and tourism)  
(http://www.parcodellapiana.it/live/index.php?a=open&ids=4992b3f2e30cf&id=49a3bcbe
396cf&l=it). 
117
 SP was linked to the Local Development Department and the USP to the Town Planning 
Office. 
118 This figure was instituted with the law on participation 69/2007. 
119 That same evening, the associations organised the screening of the film “Hands over the 
city” (Le Mani sulla città), a famous Italian film on the interests and collusions behind 
planning decisions, followed by a public debate (La Nazione 26-03-2009). 
120 “A bridge towards economic, social and cultural development.” This is the title of Lecce’s 
SP, which encapsulates the vision of Lecce as driving the development of the area and 
bridging between the diverse 31 municipalities involved in the area-based plan. 
121 Fieldwork in Lecce was carried out between September and October 2010. At the time of 
fieldwork the councillors and assessori interviewed were still in office, but since May 2012 a 
new administration, headed however by the incumbent mayor, is in government. 
122 In the whole Mezzogiorno, small individual firms are prevalent compared to other 
arrangements, such as cooperatives or bigger enterprises: 55.7 percent of all registered 
enterprises, 62.6 percent of newly registered enterprises, and 71.7 percent of failed ones 
(Svimez 2011). 
123 In 2011 Puglia registered a + 0.3 percent growth (Svimez 2011). 
124 The agreement between the public and private sectors foresees the creation of three sites 
overall; the other two sites will be based in Bari and Foggia. 
125 In 2011 there were 25,000 fewer entrepreneurs than in 2010 (Ilvo Diamanti, cited in 
Linkiesta, 16 August 2012).  
126 6 percent of all spinoffs in Italy, whereby Puglia is only second to Friuli, in the North-
East. 
127 Puglia still benefits from convergence policies as an Objective 1 Region. 
128 Among Southern regions, Puglia is second for perceived risk of crime, with 34 percent, 
following Campania (54 percent) (Svimez 2008). The local mafia, Sacra Corona Unita, found 
its specificity in its connections with Eastern Europe’s criminality. As it never had the same 
perverse ties with local institutions as those established by other mafias in Campania, Sicily 
or Calabria, it has always been a marginal phenomenon in Puglia. However, in Lecce a few 
assessori were charged with aiding and abetting local mafia organisations, within a criminal 
investigation on the last Poli Bortone’s administration, which also involved the mayor and 
the deputy mayor at the time (current mayor Perrone), who were charged with abuse of 
authority (La Rebubblica 23-10-2003). 
129 OST (Open Space Technology) is used for citizen assemblies involving high numbers of 
people. Participants freely decide what to focus the debate on, within the thematic areas 
agreed; the assembly, coordinated by a facilitator, defines concrete actions. This 
methodology facilitates spontaneous collection of ideas and suggestions that would 
otherwise struggle to emerge (Bobbio 2007). 
130 His father, who had been the regional president, tragically died in a car crash in 1988. 
255 
 
                                                                                                                                          
This event contributed to increasing Raffaele’s popularity and brought him to political 
limelight. 
131 This administration was not able to complete a full legislature and the council was 
dissolved in 1997. 
132 Fitto, former minister of Regional Affairs and Local Authorities in the last Berlusconi’s 
Government (Berlusconi III), was indicted by Bari’s Office of the Prosecutor for corruption 
and illicit party funding. This was a case of rigged calls for tender, as he contracted out the 
management of 11 hospitals to the entrepreneur Angelucci, whose Group donated €500,000 
to Fitto’s party list during the electoral campaign for the 2005 regional elections. On 12 
February 2013 Fitto was sentenced in first instance to four years in prison and five years 
disqualification from public office. The Italian criminal justice system is articulated in three 
levels: Primo Grado (court of first instance), Secondo Grado or Appello (court of second 
instance or Appeal), and Cassazione (Court of Cassation). The first two judgements are 
independent from one another. The Cassazione is a judgment on the regularity of the first 
two judgements. 
133 Italian local government can borrow independently (art. 202 D.Lgs. 267/2000); local 
mechanisms of checks and balances are thus all the more important. Recently UK-based 
investment banks have been accused of mis-selling financial products to Italian cities and 
regions (swaps and derivatives) in deals worth €35bn, causing a debt crisis in several 
communes. “Although these Swap deals appeared to offer attractive interest rates, in reality 
the regions had unwittingly placed their own taxpayers on the hook for complex derivative 
bets which would end up costing them far more than expected.” 
(http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-19545849). 
134 A PIT (Pianificazione Intergrata Territoriale - Integrated Territorial Planning) 
constitutes of several highly cohesive cross-sector initiatives involving several public and 
private actors to pursue local development. The activation of a PIT follows a long 
preliminary phase whereby the Regional Planning Centre involves the Provinces in an 
outreach action to define the themes of the projects. 
135 The thematic areas are: agriculture and rural development, environment and energy, 
sustainable urban development, social inclusion and wellbeing, infrastructure and 
transports, innovations and enterprises, legality and security, tourism, and information/ 
media. 
136 Measure 5.1 includes several government initiatives for urban regeneration and 
redevelopment: it promotes projects that improve the quality of life of provincial capital 
cities and the competitiveness of regional urban systems within a regional strategy aiming at 
coordinating and organising urban and metropolitan functions.  
137 Social Policies plan, see Chapter 2. 
138 According to interviewees (LE2, LE15, LE38) Via Leuca is a particularly interesting 
neighbourhood from a sociological perspective, since it is traditionally poor and over the 
years has attracted several immigrant communities and students. It is close to the town 
centre, but it did not benefit from the regeneration projects financed through the previous 
EU programme period. The process started in autumn 2008. The first phase consisted of 
theatrical performances and outreach activities taking place in the high street to capture the 
residents’ attention. A week of workshops and events followed (11/17-10-2009): a cycling 
event was organised to explore the neighbourhood with the residents and collect initial 
reflections. A mobile information point was set up and it became an operative office to 
register for activities. An old bus was also used to move around the area reaching out to local 
residents directly. The groups and associations carried out several studies and surveys and 
all documents are displayed in the library of the local school. The second phase of the 
Laboratory started in March 2010, whereby, based on information and impressions collected 
in the autumn, associations and the citizens who took part in the process elaborated a few 
regeneration projects, which became part of Lecce’s Strategic Plan and will be implemented 
involving local professionals and citizens. After a period of silence, in July 2011 an 
agreement was signed between the administration and the 13 associations involved to finally 
start the implementation phase. LUA and Manifatture Knos also applied for a new regional 
call to finance regeneration projects. The projects submitted are a prosecution of what 
already started in Via Leuca, including the conversion of an old manor house into a guest 
house, a site where to carry out several workshops and an audiovisual library where to store 
all the material and documentation produced. 
139 Overall the whole SP process for all the area-based plans of the Region cost €11.5 million, 
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also including extra funds to Lecce and Bari under Measure 5.1. 
140 These are: welfare, management and usage of cultural heritage, cultural events, strategic 
planning and urban development, public works, environment, urban mobility and 
transports, local development and internationalisation, rural development, local governance, 
knowledge society (società della conoscenza). 
141 Available at http://www.areavastalecce.it/on-multi/Home.html 
142 This tool includes a section dedicated to the selection of, and interaction with, 
stakeholders called “Stakeholder Engagement Standard”, which considers general criteria to 
identify stakeholders, based on 6 main points: responsibility, influence, proximity, 
dependence (on the local authority for resources), representativeness and strategic and 
political influence (i.e. those stakeholders, such as the local university, which can provide 
information concerning specific problems and have the resources to address them). 
143 The project, however, had a troubled course and was marred by alleged irregularities in 
the bid, to the point that a few officials were sued (Il Quotidiano 11-05/ 09-06-2010). 
144 According to the last Svimez report (2011), Lecce is one the few consolidated strong areas 
in the region. 
145 Only two or three projects per area could be submitted. 
146 In fact individual mayors’ need for visibility unleashed predictable dynamics. Even with 
much compromise to keep everyone happy, a municipality sued the city of Lecce before the 
Regional Administrative Court because its own projects were not submitted for the first 
batch of funds (the progetti stralcio). This further contributed to slowing down the process 
(LE44). 
147 Progetti Integrati Territoriali (Territorial Integrated Projects), a type of social pact. 
148 Lecce’s SP office collected a few prizes for its work. The initial dossier of preliminary 
documents for the SP “A bridge towards socio-economic and cultural development” received 
a national acknowledgement by winning the Quality award within the programme Sfide 
2007 (Challenges 2007) (http://www.re-set.it/sfide2007/cdrom/home/home.html) 
promoted by the Department of Development of Territorial Economies (DiSET), section 
“Good Ideas”. Later Lecce’s Area-Based SP received another prize at Sfide 2008 
(http://expo.forumpa.it/page/37384/sfide-2008-scelte-strategiche-per-la-governance-
territoriale-dall-idea-alla-realizzazione) in the category “From idea to practice”. Lecce was 
awarded these prizes because it showed that it could pursue a governance strategy capable of 
coordinating a plurality of actors and high-level professionals for an integrated action of 
growth and development (www.areavastalecce.it) 
149 See Chapter 2 and Chapter 7. 
150 This is the title of Sassari’s Strategic Plan: Sassari beautiful, good and strong. The vision 
of the plan envisaged a city characterised by a coherent and harmonious development; a 
welcoming city that cares about all its citizens’ needs, especially the weakest sectors of the 
population; and finally a city that can develop a strong and sustainable economy. 
151 Interviews were conducted in Sassari between November and December 2009. At the time 
of fieldwork the councillors and assessori interviewed were still in office, but since May 2010 
a new administration is in government, headed by the incumbent mayor that was re-elected 
with 65 percent of votes. 
152 Like the rest of Sardinia, the city suffers from a vertiginous decline in population growth. 
Within less than four decades, Sardinia went from having one of the highest birth rates in 
Italy to the lowest. Low levels of immigration mean that Sassari, unlike other cities, 
especially in the North of Italy, cannot count on immigrants to reverse the trend towards 
rapid population aging. A recent study by the Department of Economics of the University of 
Sassari calculated that within the next 50 years Sassari’s population size will decrease by 
50,000, while the number of both immigrants and emigrants will grow (see 
http://www.istat.it/it/sardegna). 
153 At the regional level, the centre-left was in power between 2004 and 2009, with Tiscali 
tycoon Renato Soru as president. In 2009 the centre-right coalition won the regional 
elections, and Ugo Cappellacci is the new president. Voting turnouts continued to decline, 
with only 67.58 percent of voters against 71.2 percent at previous regional elections in 2004. 
154 Mayor Ganau’s popularity also drove the re-election of the more controversial centre-left 
incumbent at the provincial level, Alessandra Giudici, who received most votes in the city of 
Sassari. 
155 These three phases correspond to three different approaches to planning and 
development. Between 1962 and 1974 with law 588/ 1962 and a new Extraordinary Plan of 
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Regeneration (Piano di Rinascita) central government aimed at financing Sardinia’s economic 
and social rebirth by encouraging industrial development. A second plan in 1975 (law 268) 
amended the previous bill and encouraged an agrarian reform. Finally in 1991, the regional 
statute was amended and article 13 launched the so-called Third Plan of Regeneration 
(Mazzette 1991:133). This third phase (1990-2009) is characterized by greater 
decentralization and, at least in rhetoric, a more incisive bottom-up approach. 
156 See chapter 2 for a description of all these instruments. 
157 For a definition of PIT, see Chapter 5. A PIA (Area-based Integrated Plan) involves a 
series of strategic projects on policy areas such as productivity, infrastructure, environment 
and services. The regional government, together with the provincial governments, issues 
directives on how to organise a PIA, including the objectives, the methods and the priorities 
that should be considered when elaborating and implementing the projects. It also indicates 
funds and financial resources, as well as the total amount to be spent (Salis et al 2006). In 
Sardinia the PIT and the PIA, as they entailed a phase of top-down planning, responded to 
the Region’s aspirations to regain that decision-making power which had been questioned 
during the 1990s.  
158 See Chapter 2 for a description of this bill. 
159 This was because of disillusionment and general lack of trust after a previous cycle of 
integrated planning launched back in 2001, when the regional administration had not been 
able to finance the participatory projects. 
160 The project cycle normally consists of five main stages: identification, preparation, 
appraisal and agreement by the supporting agency and Government, implementation, and 
monitoring and evaluation. For participatory projects this cycle should be conceived as a 
flexible and fluid process, whereby one or more phases could be merged or even suppressed. 
161 This method was devised in the 1960s and was initially employed by USAID and some UN 
agencies. The German development agency GTZ has developed it into a more organic form 
and introduced the figure of the moderator, who helps the stakeholders to identify proposals. 
This method is now part of several EU programmes and tied to some funds, such as Europe 
Aid. It is structured in two phases: analysis and scoping. 
162 The award Sfide. Scelte Strategiche di sviluppo (Challenges. Strategic Developmental 
Choices) for the section Buone Idee (Good Ideas). 
163 Like in other Objective 1 Italian cities, Sassari’s SP was financed through European and 
regional funds under Measure 5.1 for urban policies. 
164 In 2006 Sassari’s local authority became a shareholder of DEMOS. The agency has been 
going through financial difficulties in the past few years and all the 9 employees were 
recently made redundant (La Nuova Sardegna 01-08-2012). 
165 Each day entailed lectures and forums on a particular aspect of Sassari, its cultural life, 
development potential, the local University, services, and quality of life; and each day had a 
different and symbolic title: A competitive Sassari, A caring Sassari, A sustainable Sassari, 
Sassari as a University city, A liveable Sassari. 
166 About a month after the end of the strategic week in October 2006 the “Forum of 
cultures” took place where all cultural associations operating in the area were invited to 
debate about how to enhance and promote cultural activities in Sassari. At the same time 
another forum, on Youth, coordinated by the Department for Youth and Education and the 
agency Policy, was launched. OST (Open Space Technology) and focus groups were among 
the methodologies employed to facilitate the debate (www.comune.sassari.it). 
167 Available at  
http://www.comune.sassari.it/sito_piano_strategico/piano_strategico_28_giugno.htm. 
168 Most projects concern environmental issues – and in fact the focus groups on the 
environment were highly attended – from waste recycling to investments on renewables and 
a more sustainable management of the water cycle. (In terms of energy Mezzogiorno 
produces more than it consumes, and regions such as Puglia and Sardinia are at the 
forefront on renewables. For solar energy production, Puglia is first among southern regions, 
with 28 percent and Sardinia second with 22 percent. Puglia is also the strongest producer of 
wind energy (26 percent), 98 percent of which is produced in the South of Italy. (Svimez 
2011)) A series of projects aimed to increase accessibility and mobility, whereas others 
concern the redevelopment of the town centre, being also linked to a previous PIT and to the 
new Town Plan. Most welfare projects targeted children and old people; only one project 
aimed at helping disabled people to lead more independent lives through new services. 
However, there were no projects to foster greater integration with new immigrant 
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communities. Projects for local development were generally oriented towards new 
technologies, such as a Wi-Fi network to cover the whole metropolitan area and the creation 
of an e-government model, as well as a new centre of engineering and ICT research. Finally a 
few projects intended to enhance the cultural offer, for instance through fostering a network 
of local museums and a creativity district to sustain and encourage local cinema, fashion and 
music. 
169 For instance, the Start-Cup to coordinate and encourage greater interaction and facilitate 
technological transfer between academic research, local businesses, and industries (SS1); 
projects regarding the urban regeneration of the town centre; projects for the redevelopment 
of the town centre, already contained in the Town Plan; the Local Produce Fair to increase 
competitiveness of local producers, to shorten the agricultural and food chain of production, 
and to promote local produce in international markets. 
170 The final plan of the urban SP was ratified by the council in June 2007 with 20 votes in 
favour, out of 28 councillors present. Eight councillors abstained. The area-based plan was 
approved in September 2008, with 18 votes in favour and 11 abstainers. 
171Available at  
http://www.comune.sassari.it/comune/sindaco/sindaco_relazione_annuale_07.pdf) 
172 There were several controversies regarding the final Town Plan, which was initially 
rejected by the regional government for inconsistencies with the overall regional regulations, 
and later questioned by environmental associations and citizens for irregularities, which 
determined the indictment of the giunta and all the councillors that voted to approve the 
plan (i.e. the whole majority). The trial is ongoing. 
173 Ludobus consists of a van containing various entertainment tools and interactive games, 
driven by youth workers through deprived areas to engage local children. 
174 In this respect there were also timetable issues since the SP process was launched at the 
end of the past EU programme period (2000-6), while calls for bids for the new programme 
period (2007-13) had just been published (SS43). 
175 34 Sardinian administrations now have an SP. 
176 Until the past administration the Province did not have an actual role in planning and 
local authorities only had a nominal local development office. Within the past 15 years, the 
idea of planning and the discourse on governance have enjoyed increasing popularity and 
there has been great emphasis, at least in rhetoric, on decentralising planning from regional 
to local offices. During the past administration, since the EU requires integrated planning 
and partnerships as a precondition to access funds, both the local and the provincial 
government started to invest in human resources to reinforce their planning capacity. 
Several experts were brought into the public administration both at the local and provincial 
level. 
177 After the 2010 election the giunta has changed, and the assessori who were directly 
involved in the SP process are no longer in the cabinet. 
178 Results are mainly based on accounts of CEOs and public officials interviewed. 
179 Since the other complementary plans were also considered, Trento scored highest in 
influence on working practices because the Social Plan radically changed the organisation of 
the Social Policies department, as discussed in Chapter 3. Trento is also the only city to have 
institutionalised SP, by amending the local statute, and it has launched its second SP. 
180 Chapter 1 outlines the three rationales underlying SP, according to Mintzberg (1994): 
thinking about the future of the city, or the construction of a vision; integrating decision-
making, by creating a coalition of actors as governance tool; and improving coordination 
mechanisms, as a government instrument to increase inter-sectoral coordination. 
181
 Dente (2007) also finds that these plans tend to deliver intangible rather than concrete 
results. 
182 This is because regional funds covered the costs of the new SP office only during the 
elaboration phase. 
183 However, it should be emphasised that here as elsewhere not all the stakeholders invited 
felt at ease within the workshops and less structured actors struggled to have their voice 
heard. 
184 To different degrees this is true of all four cases. 
185 As observed in Chapter 3, the fact that Trento implemented 2/3 of its SP projects within 
two or three years raises doubts about their strategic impact or whether they would have 
happened even without the SP, which might have simply served to systematise them. 
186 However, sometimes organisational modelling can trigger innovation, as imperfect 
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attempts to imitate unwittingly engender unique features (Alchian 1950). The idea of the 
strategic week in Sassari was a creative response to strict deadlines imposed from above. 
187 Weber (1949) first identified the pre-modern character of local power, as this is strongly 
influenced by physical proximity and personal relationships between administrators and 
citizens. 
188 Today scholars tend to believe that the innovative stance interpreted by the first directly-
elected mayors has run out of steam, and there is now growing demand for forms of 
institutionalisation and consolidation of the innovations of the early to mid 2000s (Pasqui et 
al 2010). 
189 In Trento, the new mayor Andreatta had been assessore and deputy mayor under the 
previous administration. However, political continuity on its own was not enough to ensure a 
continuous emphasis on SP, which had already diminished during the second term of mayor 
Pacher, who launched the plan. 
190 As examined in Chapter 5, Lecce’s mayor, Perrone, had already been part of the previous 
administration and was perceived as the heir apparent of the previous mayor, whose 
charisma and popularity helped to further Perrone’s own political career. 
191 Conversely weak leadership is more vulnerable to party pressures and/or ties with strong 
interests (as happened in Prato). 
192 The case of Prato in this respect is particularly interesting, since here facilitative 
leadership did emerge, but from within neighbourhood associations, “as key individuals 
effectively became facilitative leaders without having deliberately planned to be” (Bussu and 
Bartels forthcoming). 
193 The executive maintained a strong grip on local power and Perrone was recently re-
elected for a second term. 
194 This is the phenomenon that Rodwin (1981) defined as neo-bohème, a cultural context 
where artistic expressions can no longer be interpreted as in opposition to mainstream 
culture and resistance against hegemonic culture, rather as market niches. 
195 Electoral instability or conflicts within the government structure may induce political 
elites to compete for support from associations (Tarrow 1994). 
196 Intuitively one might assume that inclusion and integration on the part of the institutions 
will generate potential for social capital, but Tarrow (1996) warns that fuller access to 
decision-making might discourage collective action or create closer ties among political elites 
and community leaders. This might inhibit or even prevent participation and inclusion of the 
wider community. 
197 An analogous problem concerns the local-central government relationship, whereby 
disputes often re-emerge when Central State takes it upon itself to intervene on 
infrastructure, social or economic policies that should be the responsibility of local and 
regional government following amendments to the Constitution (see for instance the repeal 
of the property tax, which represented the main income for local government during the last 
Berlusconi administration, or the controversy over the “Piano casa” on planning 
permission). 
198 In May 2012 Sardinian people chose to abolish all provinces in a referendum. In the 
meantime the Monti administration had initially proposed the abolition of all provincial 
councils as of the next round of local elections. However, more recently this proposal was 
also withdrawn and provincial councils will continue to exist, but only mayors and local 
councillors already elected at the local level within that same province can be elected to 
provincial councils. They will thus hold a dual mandate. The latest government budget (July 
2012) halves the number of provinces by the end of 2012. Provinces will need to meet three 
requirements: 350,000 inhabitants, 50 municipalities, and 3000 square kilometres. This 
means that the number of provinces will be cut from 109 to 54. (La Repubblica 04-07-2012). 
199 It should be emphasised that, whether voluntary or not, all four plans failed to identify 
clear strategic lines and instead produced trickles of often small projects, in an attempt to 
cover all policy areas. 
200 The integrated plans for urban development - the new mechanism to fund SP projects 
under the regional Operational Programme for Objective 2 structural funds 
201 Regional government was under pressure to invest the first batch of European funds. 
202 Today the main function of political parties is to select candidates, not by following 
organisational rules or defined criteria, but simply based on who can bring more votes. 
203 However, when big interests are at stake, as during the elaboration of the Town Plan, 
local party secretariats’ influence is more strongly felt. 
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204 Insofar the only mechanism of checks and balances is represented by the justice system, 
through the Court of Auditors and the regional administrative court of law, which can only 
intervene ex-post. This weakness inherent to the local political system could open the way to 
the predominance of the judicial power, which could translate into a power conflict between 
politics and the judicial, and which could transform the latter into an influential political 
actor and offer opportunities for judicial lawmaking (Shapiro 1981:145). 
205 It should be emphasised that Trento was also the only city to implement a post-evaluation 
of the process, as an exercise conducive to the elaboration of its second plan. 
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APPENDIX 1 
 
Semi-structured interview 
 
Private interests/ associations/ citizens 
 
1) How did you hear about the SP?  
 Degree of information/ publicity on the SP 
2) Why did you choose to participate? 
 Consensus building on the process 
3) What did you expect? 
4) How were/ are you involved in the SP?  
 Input on policy-making (Inclusiveness of the deliberative 
process/ Role of the facilitators/ methodologies to facilitate the 
debate) 
 Concrete responsibilities to ensure/ monitor implementation 
(subscription of the final document/ what input after the 
workshops?) 
5) What mechanisms were employed to coordinate different actors and 
their interactions? 
 Creation of new partnerships following the workshops? How 
were they sustained?  
 Did any particular actors play a greater role in coordinating 
interactions? 
 What was the role of the local administration in coordinating 
the process? 
 How many/ which actors are still working on the project? 
6) To what extent do you think the local system is naturally inclined 
towards cooperative and inclusive forms of governance (presence of 
associations/ cooperatives/ districts)?  
 What level of interest on the part of the population? 
7) Do you think previous governance experiences (PIT, territorial pacts) 
helped to organize and conduct the SP process? 
 Building upon existing partnerships 
8) What impact do you feel SP had on the type of policies produced? (and 
you/ your organization in particular?) 
 Do you think certain projects (those in which you were 
involved) would have been produced anyway? 
 Degree of innovation?  
 Input of new actors that were not previously involved 
 Impact of methodologies employed to facilitate the debate and 
the emergence of innovative ideas 
9) What impact do you think SP had on the actors involved? 
 Cognitive effects 
 Governance networks 
 Relationship between the administration and civil society 
10) How was consensus on the final document formalised? Were there any 
defections/ explicit criticism/ significant absences? 
11) What visions do you feel were produced (weak, inertial, strong, 
inclusive)? 
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12) Limits of SP 
 Lack of financial resources? 
 Lack of cooperation between actors? 
 Lack of political will/ institutional capacity? 
 Lack of coordination with other jurisdictional tiers? 
13) Potential of SP 
 Do you think that xxx will produce another plan? Why? 
 What input can civil society participation have in local 
governance? When? How?  
 
Executive (assessori/mayor) 
1) How would you describe the SP process in xxx? 
 Consensus building 
 Methodologies employed to facilitate the deliberative process 
 Actors involved/ how were they involved?/Why? 
2) What was/ is the degree of support/ interest among the assessori? 
3) Do you feel there was/ is support from the Council/ political parties? 
 Does the SP have a political colour? 
 Was the council involved? How? 
4) What did you expect from SP? 
5) What do you think SP has achieved? 
 Expected and unexpected results (competitiveness vs. social 
cohesion) 
 Impact on policies (Do you think certain projects would have 
been produced anyway? Degree of innovation? Input of new 
actors that were not previously involved in policy-making) 
 Impact on governance networks 
 Impact on the PA (public administration)/ Coordination 
between departments 
 Coordination between jurisdictional levels 
 Relationship between administration and citizens 
6) What mechanisms were employed to coordinate different actors and 
their interactions? 
 Creation of new partnerships? How they were sustained?  
 Did any particular actors play a greater role in coordinating 
interactions? 
 How many/ which actors are still working on the project? 
7) Do you think previous governance experiences (PIT, territorial pact) 
helped to organize and conduct the SP process? 
 Building upon existing partnerships 
8) What do you think was the level of synergy between SP measures and 
other programmes/ projects/ policies (i.e. urban plan (PUC)/ social 
policies (PLUS)/ area-based SP/ provincial SP)? 
 Strategic plan as a “container” of integrated measures or as a 
plethora of fragmented projects? 
 Level of coordination with other policies/ projects at other 
jurisdictional level 
9) What was the role of the local administration in coordinating the 
process? 
 How much autonomy? 
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 What level of influence from other tiers? 
 What level of influence from political parties? 
 What level of influence from strong local interests (which ones?) 
10) What was the role of the region/ province in the process? 
 Support vs. ostracism  
 Coordination of strategic measures? 
 How much autonomy for local administrations vs other tiers  
11) Based on individual measures/ projects, what is the degree of 
implementation of the plan to date?  
12) Did objectives/ priorities change during the process? Why?  
13) What communication/ publicity strategies, if any, were adopted to 
communicate implementation or progress on implementation of 
projects?  
14) Limits of SP 
 Lack of financial resources? 
 Lack of cooperation between actors? 
 Lack of political will/ institutional capacity? 
 Lack of coordination among jurisdictional tiers 
15) Potential of SP 
 Do you think that xxx will produce another plan? Why? 
 What input can civil society participation have in local 
governance? When? How?  
 
Council 
1) How would you describe the SP process in xxx? 
2) How was the council involved? And you in particular? 
3) Do you feel there was support for this participatory initiative among 
councillors? 
 Conflicts between councillors/ parties and the executive? 
 Councillors felt bypassed? 
4) What degree of awareness/ interests? 
 Expectations  
5) Do you think previous governance experiences (PIT, territorial pacts) 
helped to organize and conduct the SP process? 
 Building upon existing partnerships 
6) What do you think was the level of synergy between SP measures and 
other programmes/ projects/ policies (i.e. urban plan (PUC)/ social 
policies (PLUS)/ area-based/ provincial SP)? 
 Strategic plan as a “container” of integrated measures or as a 
plethora of fragmented projects? 
 Level of coordination with other policies/ projects at other 
jurisdictional level 
7) What do you feel was the role of the mayor/ executive (any particular 
assessore?) in coordinating the process? 
 Mayor’s ownership of the process?  
 SP with/without political colour? 
 Autonomy of the mayor? 
 Role of/ interest from political parties 
8) Any cognitive effects for the Council? 
9) Limits of SP 
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 Lack of financial resources? 
 Lack of cooperation between actors? 
 Lack of political will/ institutional capacity? 
 Lack of coordination among jurisdictional tiers 
10) Potential of SP 
 Do you think that xxx will produce another plan? Why? 
 What input can civil society participation have in local 
governance? When? How?  
 
 
Public Administration 
1) How was your department involved in SP (and you in particular)? 
 Role of CEOs in the SP process vis-à-vis politicians (particularly 
active actors among PA that coordinated the technical aspect of 
the plan?) 
 Degree of awareness 
 Level of interests/ support from PA 
2) What do you feel was the degree of awareness and support on the part 
of political elites (executive and council)? 
3) Did you refer to other cities’s SP in order to organize the process? 
4) What did you expect from SP? 
5) What were the effects of SP on public administration? 
 Policy innovation vs. process institutionalization 
 Level coordination among different departments? With other 
actors (private, social)? 
 Level of coordination among different policies (i.e. strategic 
plan and urban plan/ strategic plan and social policies under 
PLUS/ urban SP and area-based SP). 
6) Do you think SP has encouraged greater coordination with other tiers 
of government (regional/ provincial departments)? How? 
 Coordination between SP and regional/ provincial strategic 
actions/ planning 
7) What type of evaluation (ex-ante/ ex-post) has been carried out? If 
not, why? If yes, was it effective?  
 Diagnostic documents: how useful?  
 Do you think the final measures were coherent with the issues 
identified by the diagnostic documents? 
 Main evaluation mistakes 
8) Based on individual measures/ projects, what is the degree of 
implementation of the plan to date?  
9) Did objectives/ priorities change during the process? Why? What 
actors were involved?   
10) Limits of SP 
 Lack of financial resources? 
 Lack of cooperation between actors? 
 Lack of political will/ institutional capacity? 
 Lack of coordination among jurisdictional tiers 
11) Potential of SP 
 Do you think that xxx will produce another plan? Why? 
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 What input can civil society participation have in local 
governance? When? How?  
 
Development Agencies/ experts/ academics 
1) How would you describe the SP process in xxx? 
2) Did you refer to other cities’s SP in order to organize the process? 
3) How did you advertise the process and inform the population? 
4) What actors were involved? How? 
5) To what extent do you think the local system is naturally inclined 
towards cooperative and inclusive forms of governance (presence of 
associations/ cooperatives/ districts)? 
6) How helpful do you feel the methodologies employed were in 
encouraging an inclusive debate? How do you feel the deliberative 
forums/ workshops worked/ did not work? 
7) How was consensus on the final document formalised? Were there any 
defections/ explicit criticism/ significant absences?    
8) What visions were produced (weak, inertial, strong, inclusive)? 
9) How were political elites involved? 
10) Based on individual measures/ projects, what is the degree of 
implementation of the plan to date? (Only for development agencies.) 
11) Did objectives/ priorities change during the process? Why? What 
actors were involved?  
12) Did you carry out an evaluation of the process? (Only for development 
agencies.) 
13) What do you think has really worked/ not worked? 
14) Limits of SP 
 Lack of financial resources? 
 Lack of cooperation between actors? 
 Lack of political will/ institutional capacity? 
 Lack of coordination among jurisdictional tiers 
15) Potential of SP 
 Do you think that xxx will produce another plan? Why? 
 What input can civil society participation have in local 
governance? When? How?  
 
Regional and provincial actors 
1) What is the state of SP in the region/ province? 
2) How did you evaluate xxxx’s SP? (Only for regional evaluation task 
forces) 
3) What were the main limits and potential? 
4) Was there a particularly successful SP in the region/ province? 
 Why do you think it was more successful than xxx’s? 
5) What was the role of the region/ province in the process? 
 Support vs. ostracism  
 Coordination of strategic measures? 
 How much autonomy for local administrations? 
6) What do you think is the future of SP in this region? 
7) What input can civil society participation have in local governance? 
When? How?  
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APPENDIX 2 
 
List of Interviewees 
Sassari 
1. Coordinator Industrial Liaison Office (SP project), 24-09-09 
2. Student (participant in the SP workshops), 30-09-09 
3. President of Farmers’ Association, 09-11-09 
4. Economist, University of Sassari, coordinator of the SP, 10-11-09 
5. Director of Industry Association (Confindustria), 11-11-09 
6. Director of local development agency (expert in deliberative policies), 12-
11-09 
7. Councillor, Democratic Party, 13-11-09 
8. Regional President of ANCI (Communes’ Association), 13-11-09 
9. Assessore for Local Development, 16-11-09 
10. Director of Local Development Agency, 16-11-09 
11. CEO Local Development Department, 17-11-09 
12. President of the Council, 17-11-09 
13. Councillor, Partito della Libertà, 17-11-09 
14. Assessore for Education Policies (also in charge of citizen participation), 
17-11-09 
15. Councillor, centre-right civic list (also local government officer), 18-11-09 
16. President of trade association (Confcommercio), 18-11-09 
17. Councillor, party for Sardinia’s independence (majority), 18-11-09 
18. Councillor, Democratic Party, 19-11-09 
19. President of cultural association (Arci), 19-11-09 
20. Ward president (circoscrizione 2), 19-11-2009 
21. President of voluntary organisation (Auser), 20-11-09 
22. Local government officer (Local Development), 20-11-09 
23. President of local development agency, 20-11-2009 
24. Regional government officer, Regional Evaluation Centre, (Cagliari) 23-
11-09 
25. CEO of Regional Planning Centre, (Cagliari) 23-11-09 
26. Provincial president of sport association (UISP), 24-11-09 
27. Local government officer, Social Policies, 24-11-09 
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28. Director of education policies, Local Prison (San Sebastiano), 24-11-09 
29. War president (circoscrizione 3), 24-11-09 
30. Local government officer, Social Policies, 24-11-09 
31. Employee, local development agencies (facilitator in deliberative forums), 
24-11-09 
32. President of association of voluntary associations (consulta del 
volontariato), 25-11-09 
33. Provincial CEO, Provincial Development Office (in charge of provincial 
SP, Il Patto per il Nord Ovest), 25-11-09 
34. Local government officer, Education policies, 25-11-09 
35. Mayoral office: Mayor’s spokeswoman and press agent (group interview 
with 2 people), 25-09-11  
36. Senior Banker (Banco di Sardegna), 26-11-09 
37. Journalist (La Nuova Sardegna), 26-11-09 
38. Councillor Democratic Party (Margherita), 27-11-09 
39. Former president of sport association (UISP), 27-11-09 
40. Former CEO of Local Development Department (champion of the SP 
process), now CEO of Social Policies, 28-11-09 
41. Mayor, 28-11-09 
42. Local government officer, office of the general director 
43. General director, 30-11-09 
44. President of the Province, 30-11-09 
45. Sociologist, University of Sassari, coordinator of SP, 30-11-09 
46. President of environmental association (Legambiente), 05-11-09 
47. Former assessore for Environmental Policies, 07-12-09 
 
Trento 
1. Consultant for the re-organisation of the Social Policies Department, 18-
01-10 
2. CEO Strategic Planning Office, 19-01-10 
3.  Former assessore for Local Development, now president of the Artisans’ 
Association (CNA), 19-01-10 
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4. Former CEO of the Local Development Department, now CEO of Tourism 
and Culture, 20-01-10 
5. General Director of the City Hall, 20-01-10 
6. Economis, University of Trento, coordinator (coordinatore scientifico) of 
the SP process, 21-01-10 
7. Director of the Science Museum, 21-01-10 
8. Director of the Urban Centre, architect, University of Trento, 22-01-10 
9. President of the council, 25-01-10 
10. Former CEO of the Town Planning Office, now CEO of the Mobility 
Sector, 25-01-10 
11. Local government officer, office of the General Director, 25-01-10 
12. War president ( circoscrizione 12), 26-01-10 
13. Former mayor, now provincial vice-president, 26-01-10 
14. Head of neighbourhood movement, 27-01-10 
15. President of the Architects’ association, 27-01-10 
16. President of trade association (Confesercenti), 28-01-10 
17. Member of Farmers’ Association (CIA), 28-01-10, 28-01-10 
18. President of Disabled People’s Association, 28-01-10 
19. President of trade association (Confcommercio), 28-01-10 
20. Local government officer (Social Services), 29-01-10 
21. Sociologist, University of Trento, coordinator of the Social Plan, 29-01-10 
22. President of environmental association (Legambiente), 29-01-10 
23. Architect, University of Trento, coordinator of the Strategic Plan and 
several other participatory processes, 01-02-10 
24. Councillor, Democratic Party, 01-02-10 
25. Councillor, Forza Italia (now Popolo della Libertà), 01-02-10 
26. Former president of the Architects’ Association, 02-02-10 
27. Local government officers (group interview with 2 people), decentralised 
social policies office, 02-02-10 
28. Mayor, 02-02-10 
29. Assessore for Tourism and Culture, former majority councillor (at the 
time when the SP process was launched), 02-02-10 
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30. Ward president (circoscrizione 11) and educator working for 
decentralised social policies office in that ward (group interview with 2 
people), 03-02-10 
31. Sport association president and member (UISP - group interview with 2 
people), 03-02-10 
32. Councillor, right wing civic list, 03-02-10 
33. President of the Hotelkeepers’ Association, 04-02-10 
34. President of the Industry Association (Confindustria), 04-02-10 
35. Assessore for Social Policies, former majority councillor (at the time 
when the SP process was launched), 04-02-10 
36. Hotelkeeper, 04-02-10 
37. President of Cooperatives’ Association (Consolida), 04-02-10 
 
Prato 
1. Architect, University of Forence, coordinator of SP and head of the 
association of associations Parco Agricolo, (Firenze) 10-05-10 
2. Regional officer, Planning, (Firenze) 10-05-10 
3. Local Development Agencies (Regional level), experts of deliberative 
practices (groups interview with 2 people), (Firenze) 11-05-10 
4. Director of local development think tank and coordinator of SP, 12-05-10 
5. Director of local development think tank, 12-05-10 
6. Former assessore for Local Development (when SP was launched), 12-05-
10 
7. President of the Artisans’ Association (CNA), 13-05-10 
8. Director of local research institute (specialising on textiles), 13-05-10 
9. Architect, director of Urban the agency in charge of the ex-Banci 
redevelopment, 14-05-10 
10. Editor of local newspaper, Il Tirreno, 15-05-10 
11. Journalist, Il Tirreno, 15-05-10 
12. President of Farmers’ Association (CIA), 17-05-10 
13. President of environmental association (SlowFood), 17-05-10 
14. CEO of Planning Office, 18-05-10 
15. Secretary of local trade unions (CGIL), 18-05-10 
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16. President of the Council, 18-05-10 
17. Former assessore  for Town Planning, 19-05-10 
18. Director of textiles museum (Museo dei Tessuti), 19-05-10 
19. Director of industry association (Confindustria), 19-05-10 
20. President of Farmers’ Association (Coldiretti), 19-05-10 
21. Member of environmental association (Legambiente) and architect, 19-
05-10 
22. President of the Chamber of Commerce, 20-05-10 
23. Coordinator of the Urban Structural Plan (USP) and architect, University 
of Florence, (Firenze) 20-05-10 
24. Provincial assessore for Culture and Tourism, 21-05-10 
25. Councillor, Popolo della Libertà, 21-05-10 
26. President of neighbourhood association Piazza Mercatale, 22-05-10 
27. Former regional assessore for Local Development (he wrote the bill on 
citizen participation 69/2007), (Pistoia) 24-05-10 
28. Coordinator of fair trade consumer group (Gruppo di Acquisto 
Sostenibile – GAS), 24-05-10 
29. Former president of the Province, 24-05-10 
30. President of trade association (Confcommercio), 25-05-10 
31. Assessore for Town Planning, 25-05-10 
32. Assessore for Immigration and Participation, 25-05-10 
33. Mayor, 25-05-10 
34. Former CEO of the Local Development Department (in charge at the time 
of SP), (Firenze) 26-05-10 
35. Former mayor, (Firenze) 26-05-10 
36. Councillor, Democratic Party, 26-05-10 
37. President of cultural association (Arci), 27-05-10 
38. Councillor, Democratic Party, 27-05-10 
39. Ward President (circoscrizione centro), 27-05-10 
40. Journalist of local newspaper La Nazione, 27-05-10 
41. President of the Province, 27-05-10 
42. Councillor, Popolo della Libertà, 27-05-10 
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43. Regional president of the Communes’ Association (Anci), (Firenze) 28-
05-10 
44. Ward President (circoscrizione Sud), 28-05-10 
45. President of voluntary association, 28-05-10 
46. Former president of the council (at the time of the SP), 28-05-10 
 
Lecce 
1 Local government officer, SP office, 08-09-2010 
2. CEO of the SP office, 08-09-10 
3. President of Governmental Agency for Environmental Research (ARPA – 
Regional Agency for Prevention and Protection of the Environment), 09-09-
10 
4. Former CEO of the Social Policies Department, now head of the cabinet, 
09-09-10 
5. Local government officer, SP office, 09-09-10 
6. President and former president of environmental association (Cicloamici), 
09-09-10 
7. Director of voluntary association (Aurora), 10-09-10 
8. Ward president (circoscrizione 2), 13-09-10 
9. Councillor, Democratic Party, 13-09-10 
10. Provincial CEO of the Local Development Deapartment, 13-09-10 
11. President of Voluntary Association (Cittadinanza Attiva), 13-09-10 
12. President of cooperative of artists (Artemisia), 14-09-10 
13. Former general director, 14-09-10 
14. President of Artisans’ Association (CNA), 14-09-10 
15. President of cultural association (Manifatture Knos), 15-09-10 
16. President of CUIS (Consorzio Universitario Interprovinciale, Salentino), 
former councillor, Io Sud (centre-right party headed by senator and former 
mayor Poli-Bortone), 15-09-10 
17. Councillor, Popolo della Libertà, 16-09-10 
18. Councillor, Io Sud, 16-09-10 
19. City Hall’s press agent, 16-09-10 
20. President of local trade unions (CISL), 17-09-10 
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21. President of Voluntary cooperative (Immanuel), 17-09-10 
22. Former provincial assessore for Local Development, 18-09-10 
23. Councillor, Democratic Party, 18-09-10 
24. Expert, Regional Evaluation Centre (professor at the University of Bari), 
(Bari) 20-09-10 
25. Regional assessore for Finances (Bari) 20-09-10 
26. Former regional assessore for Local Development (Bari) 20-09-10 
27. Former secretary of provincial trade unions (CGIL), 20-09-10 
28. President of Industry Association (Confindustria), 21-09-10 
29. Councillor, Democratic Party, 21-09-10 
30. Regional level consultant on planning, architect, 21-09-10 
31. Researcher CNR (Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche), 22-09-10 
32. Professor of Political Geography, University of Salento and expert of SP, 
22-09-10 
33. Former president of the Architects’ Association, 22-09-10 
34. President of environmental association (KRONS), 22-09-10 
35. Provincial head of cabinet, 23-09-10 
36. Councillor, La Puglia Prima di Tutto (centre-right party), 23-09-10 
37. President of voluntary association dedicated to immigrants (INTEGRA), 
23-09-10 
38. Independent association of architects expert of deliberative and 
participatory planning (LUA), 23-09-10 
39. Councillor, independent, 24-09-10 
40. President of trade association (Confesercenti), 27-09-10 
41. President of the Province, 27-09-10 
42. President of the council, 27-09-10 
43. Regional officer, Task Force for the area-based plan (Bari) 29-09-10 
44. Mayor, 29-09-10 
45. Journalist for local newspaper Il Quotidiano, 30-09-10 
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APPENDIX 3 
 
List of Main Stakeholders  
(according to SP documents in each city) 
 
Trento 
Accademia di Commercio e Turismo  
ACI - Automobile Club Trento  
ACLI del Trentino  
ADOC  
Agenzia delle Entrate - Trento  
Agenzia del Lavoro - Trento  
ALFID - Trento  
APPA - Agenzia provinciale per la protezione dell'ambiente  
APT di Trento  
APT del Trentino  
ASIS Trento  
Associazione Albergatori della provincia di Trento  
Associazione Artigiani e delle piccole imprese del Trentino  
Associazione "Bilanci di giustizia"  
Associazione "De Gasperi"  
Associazione Ecomuseo Argentario  
Associazione Industriali della provincia di Trento  
Associazione titolari di farmacie  
ATAS - Trento  
Azienda forestale Trento - Sopramonte  
Azienda provinciale per i servizi sanitari  
Banca commerciale italiana  
Banca di Roma - filiale di Trento  
Banca di Trento e Bolzano  
Camera di Comm. Industria Artigianato e Agricoltura di Trento  
Casa della Giovane  
Cassa centrale delle Casse rurali  
Cassa rurale di Sopramonte  
Cassa rurale di Trento  
Centro di ecologia alpina  
Centro servizi culturali S. Chiara  
CESCOT  
CFP "Canossa"  
CFP Universita popolare trentina  
Club Armoni  
CNR - Consiglio Nazionale Ricerche  
Codacons Trentino - Alto Adige  
Collegio Arcivescovile - Trento  
Collegio dei geometri della provincia di Trento  
Collegio guide alpine - Trento  
Collegio notarile - Trento  
Collegio provinciale dei periti industriali  
Comando militare regionale  
Comitato interprofessionale degli Ordini e dei Collegi  
Comune di Aldeno  
Comune di Bolzano  
Comune di Borgo Valsugana  
Comune di Trento  
Comune di Verona  
Comunità di lavoro "Citta delle Alpi"  
Comunità solidale  
Confederazione italiana agricoltori  
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Confesercenti del Trentino procedure per la certificazione della qualità dell'ambiente e dei 
servizi turistici  
CONI - Comitato provinciale di Trento  
Consorzio Trento Iniziative  
Consorzio vini del Trentino  
Consulta comunale per il verde  
Cooperativa ALPI  
Cooperativa posatori e selciatori  
Cooperativa Samuele  
Cooperativa taxi Trento  
Diocesi tridentina  
Direzione didattica Trento 2  
Direzione didattica Trento 6  
ENAIP - Trento  
ENEL produzione  
FAI - Fondo per l'Ambiente Italiano, sezione provinciale  
FAITA - Trentino  
Farmacie comunali  
Federazione provinciale delle scuole materne  
Federazione trentina delle cooperative  
Ferrovie dello Stato  
FIAVET - Trentino  
Associazione culturale "Festival Internazionale Film della Montagna e dell'Esplorazione 
Città di Trento"  
Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio di Trento e Rovereto  
Fondazione trentina per il volontariato sociale  
FORMAT - Formazione Assindustria Trento  
GAD sperimentale "Città di Trento"  
Galleria civica d'arte contemporanea  
INAIL - Direzione regionale  
IN/Arch - Istituto nazionale di architettura, Trentino  
INPDAP  
INPS Trento  
Iniziative Urbane  
Interbrennero  
IPRASE  
ISA - Istituto atesino per lo sviluppo  
Istituto agrario di S. Michele all'Adige  
Istituto comprensivo Aldeno - Mattarello  
Istituto comprensivo Trento 1  
Istituto comprensivo Trento 2  
Istituto comprensivo Trento 3  
Istituto comprensivo Trento 4  
Istituto comprensivo Trento 5  
Istituto comprensivo Trento 6  
Istituto comprensivo Trento 7  
Istituto Euram  
Istituto magistrale "Rosmini"  
IPC "L. Battisti"  
Istituto Regionale di Studi e Ricerca Sociale  
Istituto "S. Cuore" - Trento  
Istituto salesiano - Trento  
Istituto sperimentale per l'assestamento forestale  
Istituto statale d'arte "A. Vittoria"  
Istituto tecnico commerciale "Tambosi"  
Istituto tecnico per geometri "A. Pozzo"  
Istituto tecnico industriale "Buonarroti"  
Istituto Trentino di Cultura  
Italia Nostra - sezione provinciale  
ITEA - Istituto trentino per l'edilizia abitativa  
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Liceo ginnasio "G. Prati"  
Liceo scientifico "Galilei"  
Liceo scientifico "L. da Vinci"  
MART - Museo d'arte moderna e contemporanea di Trento e Rovereto  
Mediocredito Trentino - Alto Adige  
Monte dei Paschi di Siena - Trento  
Movimento azzurro  
Museo Castello del Buonconsiglio  
Museo storico in Trento  
Museo tridentino di scienze naturali  
Museo degli usi e costumi della gente trentina - S. Michele a.A.  
Opera universitaria - Trento  
Ordine degli architetti della provincia di Trento  
Ordine degli assistenti sociali della provincia di Trento  
Ordine dei dottori agronomi e forestali della provincia di Trento  
Ordine dei dottori commercialisti della provincia di Trento  
Ordine dei geologi della provincia di Trento  
Ordine degli ingegneri della provincia di Trento  
Ordine dei medici della provincia di Trento  
Ordine degli psicologi della provincia di Trento  
PAN - EPAA  
Patto territoriale del Monte Bondone  
Poste Italiane  
Progetto Velaverde  
Provincia Autonoma di Trento  
Rete Ferroviaria Italiana - Direzione compartimentale  
SAT - Societa alpinisti tridentini  
SATEF - Trento  
Scuola media "Pedrolli" - Gardolo  
Associazione Servizi organizzativi ed immagine "Città di Trento"  
Sindacato CGIL del Trentino  
Sindacato CISL del Trentino  
Sindacato UIL del Trentino  
Societa Filarmonica - Trento  
SODALIA  
SOSAT  
S & P - Sistema & Progetto  
TM Hotels  
Trentino Parcheggi  
Trentino Servizi  
Trentino Trasporti  
Trento Expo  
Trento Fiere  
Trento School of Management  
UNAT - Trentino  
Unicredit - Caritro  
Unione agricoltori del Trentino  
Unione contadini della provincia di Trento  
Universita degli Studi di Trento  
Unione commercio turismo e attivita di servizio  
Villa S. Ignazio  
Whirlpool  
WWF del Trentino  
 
Prato 
(the SP document did not include a complete list of participants) 
ARCI  
ASM Spa 
Associazione Il Panda  
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Biblioteca comunale "A .Lazzerini" 
Camera di Commercio  
CCIAA 
CESVOT – Centro Servizi Volontariato Toscana  
CGIL – CISL – UIL (Sindacati) 
CIA (Confederazione Italiana Agricoltura) 
CNA (Confederazione Nazionale Artigiani) 
Coldiretti 
Collegio dei Geometri 
Confartigianato 
Confcooperative  
Confesercenti 
CONSIAG 
Consorzio ASTIR 
GIDA Spa 
HERA 
IRIS Think Tank 
Laboratorio Spazi e Tempi 
LegaCoop 
Legambiente 
Museo dei Tessuti 
Museo Pecci 
Ordine degli Architetti  
Ordine degli Ingegneri 
PIN – Polo Universitario di Prato 
Polizia Municipale 
Pratofutura Fabia 
Slow Food  
Società partecipate dal Comune 
Technology Tecnotessile 
Unione Agricoltori Pratesi 
Unione Commercianti  
Unione Industriale Pratese 
 
 
Lecce 
Accademia Kronos Onlus 
Aeroporti 
Alba Service Provincia di Lecce 
Agenda 21 
Agenzia dei Beni Culturali 
ANAS (Azienda Nazionale Autonoma delle Strade) 
ANCI (Associazione Nazionale Comuni Italiani) 
Antheus SRL 
API (Associazione piccole medie industrie della Provincia di Lecce)  
APT (Azienda di Promozione Turistica) 
AQP (Acquedotto Pugliese) 
ARPA (Agenzia Regionale per la Protezione Ambientale) 
Area Marina Protetta Porto Cesareo 
ASL (Azienda Sanitaria Locale) 
Associazione Aforisma 
Associazione Cicloamici 
Associazione Città Fertile 
Associazione Comunità Emmanuel 
Associazione Cuochi Salentini 
Associazione Disteba 
Associazione Donne Insieme 
Associazione Fluxus Open 
Associazione Ionico Salentina Amici Ferrovie AISAF Onlus 
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Associazione Italiana Contro Epilessia 
Accademia Kronos 
Associazione LUA 
Associazione Piccole Industrie 
Associazione RES – Programmi di residenza 
Associazione Sud Est 
ATO (Ambiti territoriali ottimali) 
Azienda Speciale per i servizi reali alle imprese S.r.l. 
Camera di Commercio Industria Artigianato e Agricoltura di Lecce  
Cantieri teatrali Koreja 
Certiquality  
CF&M Consulting 
CIA (Confederazione Italiana Agricoltura) 
CGIL-CISL-UIL- UGL (Sindacati) 
CNA (Confederazione Nazionale dell'Artigianato) 
CNR (Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche) 
CNR IMM (Istituto per la Microelettronica e Microsistemi) 
Co.I.S.S. Consorzio Imprese Sociali Salento 
Coldiretti 
Commedia SRL 
Compagnia delle Opere Lecce 
31 Comuni Area Vasta 
Comunità Diotima 
Comunità Speranza Ass Carcerario Onlus 
Confagricoltura 
Confartigianato di Lecce  
Confcooperative Lecce 
Confcommercio 
Confesercenti  
Confindustria Lecce  
Consorzio Azi Terra D’Arneo 
Consorzio CRISA 
Consorzio Nazionale Artigianato e Piccola e Media Impresa  
Consorzio Negro Amaro 
Consorzio Produttori Vini 
Consorzio Valle della Cupa 
Cooperativa Artemisia 
CRSA Basile Caramia 
CUIS (Consorzio Universitario Interprovinciale Salentino) 
Curia Arcivescovile 
Diocesi 
EDITA 
Elios Tours 
ESAS - ONLUS Consultorio "La Famiglia" 
Ergho 
Evolvit SRL 
Federazione Autotrasportatori Italiana Lecce 
Federcommercio 
Ferrovie 
Fitrading/ Associazione Istruttori Sportivi Salento 
Focus Management 
Fondazione Rico Semeraro 
GAL (Gruppo di Azione Locale) dei Messapi 
GAL Terra d’Arneo 
GAL Terre del Primitivo 
Gruppo di lavoro interstituzionale 
IACP Lecce 
IntegraOnlus 
IPAB 
ISBEM S.C.p.a. (Istituto Scientifico Biomedico Euromediterraneo) 
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Istituzioni socio-sanitarie 
Knowledge Management Agency Casarano 
Laboratorio di architettura del paesaggio 
Lavoro & Sport Soc. Coop. Sociale 
Manifatture Knos 
Ordine degli Avvocati 
Ordine degli Architetti, paesaggisti e pianificatori 
Ordine dei Farmacisti 
Ordine degli Ingegneri 
Ordine dei Geologi 
Ordine dei Geometri 
Ordine Psicologi Puglia 
Osservatorio permanente urbanistico 
Osservatorio Torre di Belloluogo 
Plan.Tour. (Planning Tourism)/ Federalberghi 
Piano Sociale di Zona 
PIS 
PIT 
Polaris Consulting 
Politecnico di Milano 
Polo Tecnologico (KMAC) 
Punto a Sud-Est 
Proget SRL 
Provincia Lecce 
Qualitek Lecce 
Ref. Servizi Informativi    
Referenti Istituzionali di area vasta e Segretari Comunali 
Regione 
Ricrearci 
Sansò SGM spa 
Società Land Planning SRL 
Solidarietà Salento soc. coop onlus 
Soprintendenze 
Top Consulting 
Unione Agricoltori Lecce 
Unione dei Comuni del Nord Salento 
Università del Salento 
Urban Centre 
WWF 
 
Sassari 
Abbanoa 
Accademia delle Belle arti 
ACLI 
ADECCO 
AFARP 
ANMIC 
Antenna 1 
Apisarda 
ARCI 
Arcidiocesi - Caritas 
Area Marina Protetta Capo Caccia 
ASI - Sassari 
Ass. Assonhor 
Ass. Blue note orchestra 
Ass. Centro Storico 
Ass. Città di Ar 
Ass. Contro la droga 
Ass. CTS 
Ass. Culturale "Piccino Picciò" 
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Ass. Danza Estemporada 
Ass. Dissimili -Lisena 
Ass. Forum Bambini e Ad. 
Ass. Il ramo d'oro 
Ass. Italiana Esposti all'Amianto 
Ass. La sorgente-LISM 
Ass. Le ragazze terribili 
Ass. Marco Magnani 
Ass. Mondo X 
Ass. Ogros 
Ass. Sarda Paraplegici 
Ass. S. Dessy 
Ass. Taribari 
Ass. Tiro con l'arco 
Associati archivio storico 
Athena 
Azienda Agricola Arghittu 
Azienda Fratelli Rossi 
Azienda Trasporti Pubblici 
Azienda USL 1 Sassari 
Banca del Tempo 
Banca Popolare Etica 
Banca di Sassaro 
Banco di Sardegna 
Bencasì 
Bioarchitettura Sardegna 
Carcere Sassari 
CEEA Baratz 
Centro Amico 
Centro nascita serena - librati dal nido - NPL - Nati per leggere 
CGIL credito 
CIA - Sassari 
Cineclub Sassari 
Circoli didattici 
Circolo artistico 
CISL Sassari 
CNR - Ibimet 
Comitato Provinciale Anziani 
Compagnia Teatro Sassari 
Confagricoltura 
Confartigianato 
Confcommercio 
Confesercenti 
Confidi Commercio 
Confindustria 
CONI – Sassari 
Conservatorio Stat. di musica 
Consorzio di bonifica della Nurra 
Consorzio TIR.SO 
Consulta Vol. Sassari 
Coop. A. S. 
Coop. Il Libro 
Coop. Soc. "Il Sogno" 
Coop. Teatro e musica 
Corpo Forestale 
CPD Sassari 
CPO Com. Sassari 
Croce Rossa 
Diocesi di Sassari/Ist. Sup. di Scienze relig. 
Dissimili - Lisena 
280 
 
                                                                                                                                          
Ditta Container - Ass. Menestrello - Manifesto sassarese 
ENDAS 
Ente Concerti "De Carolis" 
ERSU 
Ferrovie della Sardegna 
FILCEM CGIL 
FISM - CIF 
Fondazione Banco di Sardegna 
Forum Bambini e Ad. 
Forum Terzo settore/consorzio SIS 
GRECAM Sassari 
Guardia di Finanza 
HC Tangrom 
I.A.C.P Sassari 
II VV CRI 
Il Sardegna 
Il Sassarese 
INBAR Sassari 
Iniziative culturali 
INPS 
Istituto d'arte 
Italia Nostra 
Krenesiel 
La Nuova Sardegna 
Laborintus 
Legambiente Sardegna 
Libero professionista 
Libertas  
Liceo ginnasio statale “Azuni” 
Love Afflema associazioni nigeriana 
MAB Ass.Teatro 
Magnum Edizioni 
Manifesto Sassarese 
Mediterranea SRL 
Museo della scienza e della tecnica - Università di Sassari 
Mutuo Soccorso 
Ordine Architetti 
Ospedale 
Parco dell'Asinara 
Parco Regionale Porto Conte 
Polindustria 
Privati cittadini 
Promocamera 
Provincia di Sassari 
Punto Energia Provincia di Sassari 
Regione Autonoma della Sardegna 
Rete delle Associazioni disabili 
Sardaleasing 
Sceno.sist 
Servizio Agrometereologico Regionale 
Soccorso Sardo 
SOMEAANS 
Soprintendenza Archeologica 
Soprintendenza B. A. P. P. S. A. E 
Soroptimist 
Studio Daphne 
Studio Giaccardi associati 
Studio Sis 
SUNIA 
Sviluppo Italia 
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Teatro e/o Musica 
Teatro S'Arza 
Teatro Stabile di Sardegna 
Theatre en vol 
U. F. Ha. 
Ufficio Scolastico Provinciale - Sassari 
UISP 
UNICEF 
Università degli Studi di Sassari 
Videolina 
Volontariato Vincenziano 
WWF 
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